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International cooperation is an inherently complex concept. It can be analyzed from a 
legal, political, historical or socio-economic perspective. Each viewpoint would provide a reader 
with a different angle of analysis and probably stress the relative importance of one factor over 
the others differently. International cooperation in outer space has also been heavily influenced 
by the historical background to its development, the evolving political climate and the paths of 
development of science, technology, and the world economy. This book will focus on the legal 
analysis of international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space, but because of the 
underlying complexity of the issues, historical, with political and socio-economic considerations, 
will also become a part of the present work. 
The United States in 2012 proposed that the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee takes stock 
of the international mechanisms for cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.1 The work 
plan titled “Review of the International Mechanisms of Cooperation in the Peaceful Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space” adopted as a five-year agenda item for the years 2013-2017, attempts to 
find effective mechanisms of international space cooperation, focusing “not only on the legal 
aspects of those mechanisms but also on practical issues, such as the reasons behind the 
development of such mechanisms and the benefits for States that acceded to them.”2 While the 
goals of this book and of the study undertaken by the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee are 
analogous, they are not identical. 
The main goal of this book may be formulated as follows: to suggest the most appropriate 
and efficient forms of international cooperation available for addressing the respective specific 
sets of current and future categories of outer space activities. Continuing intensification of space 
activities would inevitably contribute to a greater scope and level of international cooperation. 
Advancements in space science and technology would prompt design of novel space projects that 
would necessitate the development of appropriate legal cooperative structures. Therefore, it is 
important to suggest forms of cooperation expected to be most successful in the achievement of 
                                                        
1 A/AC.105/C.2/2012/CRP.21/Rev.1  
2 Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its fifty-fourth session, held in Vienna from 8 to 19 April 2013, 
A/AC.105/1045, para. 168. 
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various cooperative goals, whether a future project envisions participation of a small group of 
States or the invitation of multiple actors. 
In the achievement of this goal, methods and mechanisms of cooperation used in modern 
international space cooperative endeavors will be analyzed. In the course of the present book, 
twelve mechanisms of international cooperation in outer space will be reviewed, whereas the 
analysis of each mechanism will focus on an institutional structure of cooperation and employed 
methods. Chapters two through five will address the universal mechanisms of cooperation, 
namely the Outer Space Treaty with three elaborating conventions, the United Nations 
Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the UNISPACE conferences. Review of these 
three mechanisms will provide the reader with an extensive overview of the legal basis for 
cooperation in outer space. The majority of States accept these mechanisms as the foundation of 
cooperative network in outer space, and therefore, their analysis will create a solid basis for the 
ensuing analysis. 
Next, two universal international organizations performing discreet functions in space 
activities will be reviewed. The International Telecommunication Union and the International 
Civil Aviation Organization do not specialize in outer space matters, but play an increasingly 
important role in the orderly regulation of outer space activities and therefore have to become a 
part of the analysis aiming to grasp the variety of approaches to cooperation in exploration and 
use of outer space.  
The mechanisms of cooperation uniting a limited number of States and fulfilling rather 
limited goals are also of interest for the present analysis. The dynamics of cooperation as 
exhibited in a smaller group differ from those observed in a mechanism uniting many States. For 
one, the level and depth of cooperation in a smaller group tends to increase compared to larger 
groups. Further, cooperation within a smaller group of States often has institutional features 
reflecting idiosyncrasies of the analyzed mechanism, particularly of its membership and 
proclaimed goals. Cooperation in the International Space Station project, the Committee on Earth 
Observation Satellites, the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme and the Code of Conduct for Outer 
Space Activities are all notable examples of international space cooperation uniting a limited 
number of States. These four mechanisms differ significantly in the goals pursued in 
cooperation, and therefore, are excellent subjects for the present analysis, which strives to collect 
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and thereupon analyze a representative number of modern approaches to international space 
cooperation. 
Regional cooperation is becoming increasingly important in most areas of international 
cooperation, and space cooperation is no exception. Although only a few regional space 
organizations have been created to date, the existing ones are worthy of in-depth analysis. Two 
organizations – the European Space Agency and the Commonwealth of Independent States – will 
be reviewed. They differ in many ways: in the history of their creation, in the composition, in the 
breadth of cooperation, in the depth of cooperation, and in many other respects. However, what 
unites them is the attempt to cooperate within a close-knit regional community to alleviate the 
technological and financial burden of outer space activities. The methods employed to achieve 
these goals will be at the center of the legal and institutional analysis of regional space 
cooperation. 
Finally, an overview of bilateral space cooperation concludes the analysis. Bilateral 
practice of the United States and Russia will be reviewed, paying attention to the most recent 
changes introduced into bilateral space treaties of both States.  
These mechanisms represent different levels and approaches to space cooperation: some 
are regional, others are multilateral, while others are perceived to be universal; the bilateral level 
of cooperation is also a part of the analysis. Acknowledging that some other, possibly interesting 
and influential mechanisms of cooperation are left out (such as on military cooperation, a subject 
matter of its own and hence presenting its own idiosyncrasies), it is nevertheless suggested that 
the list of mechanisms analyzed in the present book represents the general tendencies in 
international space cooperation in the second decade of the twenty-first century. 
Methodologically, the analysis is premised on several assumptions. This book is not 
about doctrinally correct but practically inapplicable and thus easily spurned theory akin to the 
philosophical doctrine of Immanuel Kant; it is an argument about framing and method, about an 
approach to analyzing and evaluating mechanisms of cooperation in outer space, created by real 
people and utilized in a real world, today. At the core of the argument is that any analysis, and 
thus any proposed methodology depends on many matters that cannot be predicted in advance or 
expected to remain constant.  
The first methodological assumption is that most mechanisms used in international 
cooperation may be designated to one of three categories: those of international organizations, 
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international treaties and international conferences respectively. Generally speaking, they run 
from the more institutionalized and more legally-binding to the less-institutionalized, less-legally 
binding and more political. Actually, moving even further to the political as opposed to 
institutional/legal side, a fourth separate category of cooperation – soft law – plays a major role 
in space law as well, and should also be taken into account in any comprehensive analysis of 
international cooperation in space. However, as will be explained in detail in the pertinent parts, 
this category, which embraces many informal and less formal mechanisms of cooperation, is too 
amorphous to be defined in conclusive terms. In the theory of international law, there is no 
consensus regarding the actual existence of such a category at all, less so regarding a universal 
definition of the category. In the absence of any precise, or close to precise, definition of the 
category, there consequently can be no set of criteria against which the respective mechanisms 
can be analyzed.  
It should be noted here, moreover, that cooperation can also be classified along different 
lines. Does it concern cooperation in the regulatory area? That is, whether the main aim of 
cooperation is to establish regulatory rules or even ‘soft law’ rules of the road to better guide 
participating States’ activities and provide for a measure of foreseeability. Or does it concern 
cooperation in certain projects or long-term programs? That is, whether the aim of cooperation 
requires a lot of specific contractual arrangements to make sure the project or program is not 
likely to give rise to insurmountable legal issues once under way. This dichotomy is 
perpendicular to the approach taken in this work, so it will not be used as a further distinguishing 
criterion at this stage, but at various places it will become clear that a cooperation category or 
mechanism operates in its peculiar way because of this dichotomy. 
Only a methodologically sound analysis can produce reliable results. In the absence of 
any generally accepted criteria, understandings and definitions regarding the concept of ‘soft 
law’, no such results can be attained. Not to ignore their importance, issues of soft law play a 
role across several of the categories and mechanisms which are discussed in this work, but as it is 
not the goal of the present work to resolve the ambiguities regarding ‘soft law’, they are better 
addressed in those particular situations than by suggesting they form a category of their own 
distinguishable from the three being distinguished and analyzed.  
The second methodological premise of the ensuing analysis is that fairly uniform 
definitions, or at least descriptions, of each of the three analyzed categories of cooperation have 
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been developed by the theory of international law. Based on this understanding, a set of criteria, 
which distinguish these three categories, will be used and adapted . These three categories are 
easily distinguishable using these criteria: membership/participation, secretariat, international 
legal personality, term of existence, binding force of documents produced, and existence of an 
opportunity to modify obligations.  
Application of these criteria to any particular mechanism of cooperation will allow 
furthering the analysis of such a mechanism as belonging to one of the categories of cooperation 
and, in particular, allow for qualitative evaluations of their feasibility, effectiveness and overall 
success. Thus, application of these criteria will highlight the features of the pertinent category 
and each mechanism of cooperation. The results of application of those criteria will allow us to 
assess and evaluate the willingness to cooperate, the intensity of cooperation achievable and 
hence the feasibility of particular mechanisms of cooperation in particular circumstances. These 
results are also pertinent to the conclusions about the results that can be effectively achieved 
using the respective mechanism and category. What has been achieved so far? What is possible 
to achieve, and what is required to make it possible? 
The main goal of the research, it should be recalled, is to propose the most appropriate 
forms of cooperation in the attainment of different goals in outer space activities. The term ‘form 
of cooperation’, therefore, should be distinguished from the terms ‘mechanism’ and ‘category’. 
A form of cooperation is understood as a general denomination for mechanisms of cooperation 
that pursue substantially similar cooperative goals and possess an inextricable institutional 
connection. As the definition suggests, it is a way to group mechanisms of cooperation not 
because they possess identical legal features, but based on the broader notions of pursued goals 
and the legal and institutional connection between the mechanisms designated to the same form 
of cooperation. 
The book is structured in fourteen chapters. The first chapter presents an overview of 
international cooperation of States in outer space. First, the legal basis for international 
cooperation is discussed, answering the general question of why States cooperate in their outer 
space activities. Analysis of both legally binding and non-binding documents, starting from the 
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space all the way through to the latest developments in space law, leads to the conclusion 
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that cooperation, though not mandatory in the exploration and use of outer space, is a desirable 
mode of behavior of States. 
The second part of the chapter provides a brief legal and historical overview of 
international cooperation in outer space. The evolution of space cooperation, which began as a 
two-State confrontation in the advancement of their military powers, all the way to private 
companies’ success in providing launching services for States commercially will be explored. 
The review of the changes that have taken place since the beginning of the space era, including 
the review of the evolution of the legal regime of international cooperation, of socio-economic 
and political factors leads to the conclusion that modern challenges in the exploration and use of 
outer space can be effectively addressed through international cooperation.  
The concluding part of Chapter 1 elaborates on the methodology of the ensuing analysis. 
The methodological approach is explained and substantiated in greater detail. The phenomena of 
an international organization, treaty and conference are discussed and generic definitions of the 
three categories are provided. Next, each of the six proposed criteria of analysis is defined and 
further elaborated, and their respective relevance for the analysis is addressed. Finally, broad 
conclusions on the purposes of mechanisms falling into different categories of cooperation are 
offered, conditional to their further refinement in these chapters. 
Chapters two through thirteen provide an extensive analysis of different mechanisms of 
international cooperation in outer space using the outlined methodology.  
The concluding chapter is aimed at, first, providing a comprehensive summary of the 
book’s findings, second, identifying forms of cooperation and elaborating their distinctive 
features, and, third, making proposals on the most effective forms of cooperation in the 
achievement of different cooperative goals.
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Chapter 1. Overview of International Cooperation of States in Outer Space 
 
International legal cooperation of States in outer space emerged almost immediately after 
the first space flight of Sputnik I on October 4, 1957. Unlike in many other areas, practical 
achievements in the exploration of outer space led to the creation of an international forum 
dealing exclusively with outer space related issues within a uniquely short period of time. On 
December 13, 1958 the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS) was established initially as an ad hoc committee of the United Nations General 
Assembly by way of the General Assembly Resolution 1348 (XIII) on the “Questions of the 
Peaceful Use of Outer Space”.1 Hence, within a little over a year following the first space launch 
the first international mechanism of cooperation was already in place.  
The interest in international legal cooperation in the area of outer space exploration and 
use might be explained in different ways. Only two States at that moment were technically 
capable of launching space objects, these two States were the main rivals in the Cold War, and 
there was the nature of outer space as an area above all States and presumably affecting all 
nations, though then accessible for only two. The factors probably combined to serve as an initial 
impetus toward the development of the mechanisms of cooperation. In ascertaining and 
describing patterns of international cooperation in outer space scholars look at the influence of 
science on international law development: “This new technology had inevitably led to changes in 
the law of international community, to the establishment of new international organizations and 
to the adaptation of existing organizations to treat the new issues.”2 
In the first part of this chapter the legal basis for cooperation will be explored. It has been 
suggested that international cooperation in exploration and use of outer space is still in its 
evolutionary process from policy to law, hence it is important to study legal issues pertaining to 
cooperation and acknowledge their importance for further development of international space 
law in general.3 Although in 1958 COPUOS was created almost in a legal vacuum, the 1963 
Declaration4 and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty5 established a firm legal foundation for the 
                                                        
1 Cf., Francis Lyall and Paul B. Larsen. Space law: A Treatise (2009), at 18. 
2 E.R.C. van Bogaert, Aspects of Space Law (1986), at 261. 
3 See, L. Minwen, “Evolution from Policy towards Law: International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space,” in Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 2013 (2014), at 622. 
4 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space 
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development of further cooperation. Non-specialized legal documents, including the United 
Nations Charter and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations6 
(1970 Declaration) will also be explored because of their enduring significance for the 
development of international law in general and international space law particularly. 
International legal cooperation in outer space as we know it today is based on the principles, 
maxims and goals established in the early days of outer space regulation. 
In the second part of the chapter development of the mechanisms of international 
cooperation of States in outer space and the role of cooperation in outer space exploration and 
use for the years to come will be analyzed. The earliest forms of cooperation will be explored 
along with the modern mechanisms, paying attention to technological advancements, political 
processes and economic changes that spurred these developments. Although many mechanisms 
of cooperation created in the 1960s and the 1970s are still successfully fulfilling their purposes, 
there have been substantial changes that altered in many ways the initially created institutions. 
With the emergence of new issues, including commercialization of outer space activities, space 
debris threats, outer space militarization concerns and others, finding effective means of 
cooperation has become more relevant than ever.  
In the concluding part of this chapter a basic set of criteria used to analyze every 
mechanism will be proposed. Unique challenges in legal regulation of exploration and use of 
outer space, particularly its intricate connection with the issues of national security and the 
extraordinary technical complexity of outer space activities, spurred creation of multiple 
mechanisms of cooperation, functioning on universal, regional and bilateral levels, dealing with 
broad and narrow areas of outer space exploitation, and focusing on legal regulation and 
technical coordination. In order to approach review and analysis of several currently existing 
mechanisms of cooperation, one needs a comprehensive and coherent methodology; the one used 
in this book is based on several criteria that can be used to distinguish between the three major 
categories of cooperation. The concluding part of the chapter will outline the methodology of the 
ensuing analysis and focus on identifying these criteria. Analysis of particular mechanisms in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(GAR 1962), GA Res. 1962 (XVIII) / UN GAOR, 18th Sess., 1280th Mtg. / UN Doc. A/RES/18/1962 (1963). 
5 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including 
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. 
6 G.A. res. 2625, Annex, 25 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), U.N. Doc. A/5217121 (1970), 121. 
 15 
following chapters will focus on fact-specific legal characteristics of the mechanism under 
consideration.  
 
1.1 Legal Basis for International Cooperation of States in Outer Space 
 
Here the international legal documents that established the general legal regime of outer 
space and thereby created and cemented the foundation for future development of outer space 
cooperation will be analyzed. Presently hundreds of international treaties have been concluded, 
dozens of international organizations have been created, and although all these mechanisms 
cumulatively create the legal basis for international cooperation of States in outer space, this part 
will focus only on those documents that proved to be cornerstones of the international space law 
regime. The United Nations Charter7 and later the 1970 Declaration furnished a legal basis for 
cooperation in every area of international relations. Even in the absence of any specific 
provisions, the United Nations Charter is the starting point of any international legal analysis. 
Outer space is no exception.   
The Outer Space Treaty has become the main pillar of international space law. It has laid 
down foundations for three elaborating conventions, and most of its provisions have ultimately 
evolved into an international custom – to the extent relevant for the theme of international 
cooperation, this will be further discussed as appropriate.8 In the present part of the book the 
Outer Space Treaty and the three elaborating conventions will be analyzed in the light of their 
role in creation of a legal basis for cooperation.9 This part is closed by an extended conclusion 
regarding a currently imposed legal obligation to cooperate in the exploration and use of outer 
space. 
 
1.1.1 The Charter of the United Nations 
As in any other area of international law, the United Nations Charter, having established 
                                                        
7 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, September 9, 2014, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml. 
8 M.P. Scharf, Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change (2013), at 58. 
9 The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies will not be analyzed 
because it is not supported by spacefaring nations, and therefore presumably has little influence on development of 
cooperation mechanisms. 
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the general principles of international law, is the foundation of the outer space legal regime.10 
Although at the time when the Charter was drafted and adopted prospective exploration of outer 
space was not on the agenda, the overarching nature of the document made it relevant even for 
this – at the time of drafting – nonexistent area of international law. Jenks noted at that time a 
persistent widespread impression that little of the Charter could have any application to outer 
space activities due to its earthbound character. He, though, accurately explained that a mere 
reading of the Charter sufficed to demonstrate that it was not so.11 Sir Brownlie called attention 
to the danger of studying specialized areas of international law without regard to international 
law as a whole.12 
In line with these points of view, the analysis will begin with the United Nations Charter 
as the basis for modern international law. Subsequent space law development heavily relied on 
the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The unanimously adopted Resolution 1962 
“Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space” pronounced as one of the guiding principles that such activities should be carried 
on in accordance with international law including the United Nations Charter.13 The Outer Space 
Treaty in Article III similarly pronounces: “States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in 
the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in 
accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations.”14 
Articles 1, 2, 11, 13 and 56 of the United Nations Charter contain provisions regarding 
member States’ obligations pertaining to cooperation. On the one hand, the United Nations 
Charter firmly established that cooperation is one of the vital activities of States in their pursuit 
of peace and security and in development in social, economic and human rights areas. On the 
other, the document has to be read as a whole and with regard to its object and purpose.15 If so 
                                                        
10 Каменецкая Е.П. Космос и международные организации: международно-правовые проблемы [Outer Space 
and International Organizations: International Legal Problems]. М., 1980. С. 16.; L. Minwen, “Evolution from 
Policy towards Law: International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,” in Proceedings of the 
International Institute of Space Law 2013 (2014), at 623. 
11 See, C.W. Jenks, Space Law (1965), at 207-08. 
12 I. Brownlie, “Problems of Specialization,” in B. Cheng (ed.), International Law: Teaching and Practice (1982), at 
109-113. 
13 A/RES/1962(XVIII), A/PV.1280 13 Dec. 1963. 
14 Art. III of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done January 27, 1967, entered into force October 10, 1967. 610 
U.N.T.S. 205, T.I.A.S. 6347, 18 U.S.T. 2410. 
15 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, entered into force January 27, 
1980. 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679. 
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read, the Charter does not per se prescribe cooperation in any area other than in the maintenance 
of international peace and security, as will be shown below. 
Article 1 of the Charter enumerates four purposes of the organization, namely 
maintenance of international peace and security, development of friendly relations, achievement 
of international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or 
humanitarian character, and creation of a center for harmonizing the actions of nations. It is still 
a matter of controversy whether the purposes as set forth in Article 1 are legally binding, but 
their place in the Charter and the legislative history of Article 1 point in the direction of 
qualifying the purposes as such.16 
Only the first purpose does impose the obligation to cooperate, be it in form of action or 
inaction. It has been suggested that the first paragraph of Article 1 describes the essential 
‘Purpose’ of the Organization, whereas the following paragraphs set out means designed to 
achieve this ‘Purpose’, albeit they are also purposes in their own right. More specifically, three 
following purposes are there to indicate that peace is more than the absence of war.17 The 
General Assembly has frequently emphasized the close link between the strengthening of 
international peace and security on the one hand, and disarmament, decolonization and 
development on the other.18  
Further, the wording of the first paragraph of Article 1 indicates that three different 
functions of the United Nations organs may be distinguished as far as the maintenance of 
international peace and security is concerned, as they are specified in the operative part of the 
Charter: the General Assembly should insist upon and take measures so that States do not 
threaten or cause a breach of the peace; the Security Council is mandated to take effective 
collective measures if a State commits an act of aggression or another breach of peace or 
threatens to do so; and the General Assembly and the Security Council can proceed to find an 
adjustment or settlement of the dispute or situation.19 Overall, the United Nations has not only 
created organs, where sovereign States are required to work together toward maintenance of 
international peace and security, but has also put in place a structure of coordination between 
                                                        
16 See, R. Wolfrum, “Article 1,” in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Vol. I 
(2002), at 40. 
17 Id. at 40-41. 
18 See, e,g, UNGA Resolution on the Strengthening of International Security, Res. 2734 (XXV), December 16, 1970. 
19 See, R. Wolfrum, “Article 1,” in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Vol. I 
(2002), at 43. 
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such organs, underscoring the importance of effective international cooperation in attainment of 
this goal. 
The formulation of the second purpose was rather controversial and spurred extensive 
discussions.20 Summary of these negotiations showed the objective pursued by the drafters of the 
second paragraph of Article 1. It assured that no peoples can be denied the right to self-
determination on the basis of any alleged inferiority, and the reference to self-determination 
encompasses the principle of self-government, but does not justify the secession. “Finally, the 
principle of self-determination was formulated as a basis for friendly relations among nations. 
Thus, according to the drafters of the Charter, a hierarchy of principles existed in that the right of 
self-determination should be pursued so long as it does not disturb friendly relations among 
nations.”21 Based on this interpretation, while generally being in favor of international 
cooperation as one instrument to help achieve this purpose it is hard to see how this paragraph 
mandates cooperation of States; rather it summarizes the general principle pertaining to self-
determination and describes its application. 
The third purpose is also not a general obligation to cooperate because it aims at 
‘problems’ – that is unless there is a specific problem that requires actions on the side of a State, 
no obligation to cooperate exists.22 This text did not cause major controversies apart from 
drafting changes, but the proposal was made to draft a bill of rights of nations and individuals. 
“It was, however, decided, that such a task should be left to the Organization.”23 The provision, 
therefore, should be viewed as an important part in achieving the major ‘Purpose’ as described 
above, which is the maintenance of international peace and security, and also as stipulating that 
international cooperation is generally a part of orderly international relations, but no specific 
obligation can be found here. Operative provisions of the Charter to which Article 1(3) pertains 
are Chapters IX and X, which similarly have not firmly established an obligation to cooperate, as 
it will be shown below.  
                                                        
20 It reads: “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.” 
21 R. Wolfrum, “Article 1,” in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Vol. I (2002), at 
44. 
22 It reads: “To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, an in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”  
23 R. Wolfrum, “Article 1,” in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Vol. I (2002), at 
44. 
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The final goal enunciated in Article 1 is also aspirational, where the United Nations is 
envisioned as a general forum where States can discuss the most pressing issues and, more 
specifically, those pertaining to international peace and security. The fourth paragraph has a 
double meaning: “It refers, first, to the decision-making process in the United Nations organs and 
its underlying philosophy, while at the same time envisaging the transformation of the society of 
States into a community of States.”24 It has been widely accepted that “the UN is a place for 
negotiations, exchange of views, harmonization of views as to the maintenance of international 
peace and security for the purposes of international cooperation as provided in the UN 
Charter,”25 but not all authors agree that the organization has been successful in achieving this 
purpose.26  
Additionally, since only the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1 were given legal 
expression in Article 2, and not the general aim of cooperation, the imposition of the duty to 
cooperate should be viewed as declaring the need to cooperate on a broad scale in achievement 
of the major purpose of the United Nations, as it has been explained above, and also as declaring 
cooperation as a desirable way of inter-State behavior.27 In the same vein, a prominent scholar 
enumerated several general principles enunciated in the Charter that are directly applicable to 
outer space activities, including the principle that all members “shall settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means” and the principle that “all Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State.” The list apparently deliberately fails to include the principle of 
cooperation in the list of general principles of international law pertinent to outer space 
activities.28 
Article 11 gives the right to the General Assembly to consider the principle of 
cooperation, but usage of the verb ‘may’ reemphasizes the voluntary nature of such 
considerations. Although Article 13 uses stronger language and the verb ‘shall’, this obligation 
pertains solely to initiation of studies and making recommendations. Thereby, taken together 
                                                        
24 Id.  
25 Морозов Г.И. Международные организации: Некоторые вопросы теории [International Organizations: Some 
Theoretical Questions]. С. 31; Cf. K.A. Annan, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century 
(2000), at 5-7. 
26 See, T.R. Van Dervort, International Law and Organization (1998), at 504. 
27 See, R. Wolfrum, “International Cooperation,” in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 2 (1997), at 
1245. 
28 Cf., C.W. Jenks, Space Law (1965), at 208. 
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these articles empower the General Assembly “to initiate studies and make recommendations to 
promote international cooperation in the political arena.”29 The last two words are indicative of 
the scope of functions performed by the General Assembly in the area of promotion of 
international cooperation. Keeping in mind the legally non-binding nature of the General 
Assembly resolutions30 and the overall unspecified nature of the obligations imposed,31 these 
articles should also be excluded as candidates for establishing an obligation to cooperate.  
Article 56, finally, uses even more unspecific language, declaring that States “pledge” 
themselves to cooperate in achievement of goals set forth in Article 55. There is much 
uncertainty concerning the scope and meaning of Articles 55 and 56 as a matter of international 
law. Henkin analyzed these articles as applied to the matter of human rights as follows: 
That states "pledge themselves" may suggest some form of legal 
obligation; but there has been no agreement among governments, or indeed 
among commentators, on the exact import and content of that obligation. While 
some governments and commentators have considered it only a general 
requirement of cooperation that has no normative content, others have argued 
that important infringements of generally-agreed human rights are violations of 
Articles 55 and 56. Some have further suggested that while the undertakings in 
the UN Charter were inchoate and general, they were realized and particularized 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, so that all parties to the UN 
Charter are legally obligated to abide by the provisions in the Universal 
Declaration. Yet another view has it that the UN Charter, the Universal 
Declaration, the various international conventions, resolutions of UN organs and 
other multilateral bodies, and the practices of states have combined to create 
customary, or a blend of customary and conventional legal obligations binding 
upon all states to respect at least some human rights norms.32 
                                                        
29 K. Hailbronner with E. Klein, “Article 11,” in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 
Vol. I (2002), at 278. [emphasis added] 
30 See, A. Obed, Legal Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly, 3 Colum. J. Transat’l L. (1963-1964), at 210, 
214. (“One must distinguish between the binding nature and the legal effect of resolutions of the General Assembly. 
Resolutions may have a legal effect even though they are not considered by states to be binding on them. In other 
words, the scope of “legal effect” is wider than that of “legally binding.”). While agreeing with the argument that 
UNGA resolutions might have significant legal effect, especially on future development of international law, their 
legally non-binding nature remains undisputed, and in the present case “legal effect” cannot amount to creation of a 
legal obligation to cooperate.  
31 See, Wilcox and Marcy, Proposals for Changes in the United Nations (1955), at 348, cited in A. Obed, Legal 
Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly, 3 Colum. J. Transat’l L. (1963-1964), at 215 (“The General 
Assembly, of course, does not possess international legislative authority. It can study, it can debate, it can 
recommend, but it cannot legislate. In general, apart from the approval of the budget, it cannot make decisions that 
are binding on the members of the United Nations.”). 
32 L. Henkin, The Age of Rights (1990), at 55-56. 
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Although Article 55 enumerates a wide range of lofty and important goals, the wording 
of Article 56 does not allow identifying it as a proper legal basis for the general obligation to 
cooperate. The verb ‘pledge’ seems to have been chosen deliberately: since it has little or even 
no inherent legal value, it is almost never used in binding international agreements. BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY explains: “To 'pledge' something means to put that thing up as collateral, in 
return for a loan. The collateral must be returned once full repayment for the loan has been 
received.”33 The OXFORD DICTIONARY provides a non-legal definition: “Commit (a person or 
organization) by a solemn promise.”34 Thereby, the verb in a sense used in this article would 
seem to lack legal value. This leads to the conclusion that Article 56 would not oblige States to 
cooperate.  
Even if ‘pledge’ and ‘solemn promise’ could have amounted under circumstances to a 
strong sense of obligation even legally speaking (such as for example in the context of the 
League of Nations35), substantial changes have occurred since 1945,36 when cooperation and 
development were seen only as precursors to international peace and security and not as valuable 
concepts on their own, leading to reevaluation of cooperation and development’s importance for 
the humankind in general and for the United Nations’ work in particular. Even such views, 
however, substantially limit the scope of any relevant obligation: “The promotion of sustainable 
development as well as international development and environmental co-operation are now 
among the core objectives of the United Nations.”37 Hence, it is proposed that Articles 55 and 56 
be interpreted expansively, but only as applied to sustainable development and cooperation in 
protection of the environment, and not as establishing a general obligation to cooperate. 
The conclusion that the United Nations Charter does not obligate States to cooperate in 
any area except in the maintenance of international peace and security does not mean that the 
Charter is not a relevant source for establishment of the legal basis for international cooperation 
in outer space. To the contrary, international cooperation of States in outer space is generally 
based on the Charter’s provisions. Although such cooperation goes beyond explicit, mandatory 
rules for United Nations members, cooperation for the purposes of economic, social and 
                                                        
33 Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), available at Westlaw BLACKS. 
34 Pledge [Def. Verb 1]. In Oxford Dictionary Online, September 3, 2014, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/pledge. 
35 Seek confirmation of that! 
36 See, N.J. Schrijver, The Future of the Charter of the United Nations, 10 Max Plank Y.B. U.N. L. (2006), at 20. 
37 Id. 
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humanitarian development is a desirable way of conduct for every United Nations member. 
Thereby, all enumerated articles of the United Nations Charter communicate the principle of 
cooperation, but with an important limitation to its dimensions.  
It has been suggested that the principle of cooperation might entail either an ‘obligation 
of result’ or an ‘obligation of effort’, sometimes also dubbed ‘persuasive obligation’38. The 
former presupposes that a hypothetical duty to cooperate would only be complied with if a 
particular result is achieved – in this case, if actual cooperation is the result of a request to do so 
– and is usually provided for in legally binding documents. The latter, by contrast, means that a 
duty to cooperate merely requires States to be willing to consider cooperation in good faith when 
a request is made, therefore, without any specific obligation to enter into actual cooperation with 
the requesting State.39  
Against this background, the United Nations Charter laid down the principle of 
cooperation, but did not establish a general obligation to cooperate. But it did establish an 
‘obligation of effort’ by way of inclusion of cooperation as one of the Organization’s purposes 
(Article 1), by way of entitling the General Assembly to take relevant steps in promotion of 
cooperation (Articles 11, 13), and by way of creation of the Economic and Social Council 
charged with creation of conditions of stability and well-being, which are necessary for peaceful 
and friendly relations (Articles 55, 56, 61). While none of the relevant articles creates a clear-cut 
obligation to cooperate, or more specifically the ‘obligation of result’, they all signify the 
importance of cooperation in international relations and introduce the principle of cooperation 
‘obligation of effort’ as an indispensable part of the modern international legal order. The 
‘obligation of result’, therefore, is limited to States’ obligations to cooperate in the maintenance 
of international peace and security, whereas cooperation in all other areas, while being 
considered beneficial, is left to the discretion of States, subjecting them solely to the obligation 
to consider cooperative proposals in good faith. 
Eminent scholars arrived at a similar conclusion, though from a somewhat different 
perspective: “Though the Charter of the United Nations establishes a general purpose 
organization, with authority extending to all value processes – from those most directly affecting 
                                                        
38 Add footnote as appropriate to Lepard’s book on CIL! 
39 Cf., F.G. von der Dunk, “Contradictio in terminis or Realpolitik? A Qualified Plea for a Role of ‘Soft Law’ in the 
Context of Space Activities,” in I. Marboe (ed.), Soft Law in Outer Space: The Function of Non-Binding Norms in 
International Space Law (2012), at 51. 
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minimum order (“the maintenance of international peace and security”) to those more 
immediately concerned with optimum order (promotion of “international cooperation in the 
economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields”) – and purports to make some of the 
decisions of the organization binding even upon non-members, the kinds of decisions authorized 
to be taken are so limited, and the procedural difficulties imposed upon decision so great, that the 
actual effective authority of the organization is much diminished.”40 
Some authors believe that the Charter is the world constitution. While this concept is 
perceived in varying ways, from stating that the Charter is “the text of reference” when 
international law is analyzed,41 to a belief that “the Charter is the constitution of the international 
community … not to be compared by any other international agreement,”42 these approaches 
agree that the Charter is a treaty establishing the most comprehensive framework of cooperation 
in the history of international relations.43 Generally, the importance of the organization as a 
permanent forum for multilateral diplomacy, and “the moral as well as legal strength of the 
Charter as the only comprehensive covenant common to the universality of States, is 
undoubted.”44  
 
1.1.2 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations 
Provisions of the United Nations Charter pertaining to cooperation were further 
developed in the 1970 Declaration. The Declaration was adopted in the form of a United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution, thus it is not a legally binding document. However, not all United 
Nations General Assembly resolutions are the same: some carry more weight than others, though 
remaining non-binding instruments from a legal perspective. It has been noted that the 1970 
Declaration is an example of the United Nations General Assembly resolution that “contain[s] 
interesting and valuable statements, some of which purport to be statements of international 
law.”45 One aspect to consider in this regard is the voting procedure. It is often pointed out that 
                                                        
40 M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 106-07. 
41 See, P. Dupuy, The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter Revisited, 1 Max Plank Y.B. U.N.L. (1997), at 31, 
33. 
42 Q. He, “The Crucial Role of the United Nations in Maintaining International Peace and Security,” in C. 
Tomuschat (ed.), The United Nations at Age Fifty, A Legal Perspective (1995), at ix. 
43 See, R. Macdonald, Charter of the United Nations in Constitutional Perspective, 20 Aust. Year Book of Int’l Law, 
Vol. 20 (1999), at 230. 
44 Id.  
45 F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 44. 
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the voting record is a good indicator of the level of support: it reflects whether the resolution has 
universal support, or may be deemed a concession or a compromise.46  
The 1970 Declaration was adopted without voting by consensus. Some have opined that 
consensus per se does not mean anything, because States favor this method owing to the absence 
of necessity to take a strong position on a particular issue, and hence it relieves them from taking 
on any specific obligation.47 The better view is that the voting procedure itself does not alter the 
essence or the nature of the document in question. During negotiations documents are often 
watered down to purely inspirational provisions, and in this case the voting procedure would not 
change the nature and legal force of respective provisions. And with regard to United Nations 
General Assembly resolutions, which are a priori legally non-binding, the notion of ‘specific 
obligations’ in the strictly legal sense is not applicable. Nevertheless, it is widely supported that 
resolutions adopted without voting or by an overwhelming majority of States might be used to 
identify the emergence of a customary norm.48  
The second thing to note is the title of the document  – ‘declaration’. The form of a 
declaration is used when participating States wish to underline importance of a particular 
decision. More specifically, this form is sometimes deemed appropriate for codification of 
existing customary international law or general principles of law.49 The Memorandum of the 
United Nations Office of Legal Affairs on the Use of Terms “Declaration and Recommendation” 
states: “In the United Nations practice, a ‘declaration’ is a formal and solemn instrument, 
suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated, 
such as the Declaration on Human Rights. A recommendation is less formal. Apart from the 
distinction just indicated, there is probably no difference between a ‘recommendation’ or a 
‘declaration’ in the United Nations practice as far as strict legal principle is concerned.”50 In the 
end, “declarations do not constitute a separate legal category,”51 but they bear additional political 
                                                        
46 For example, the UNGA Resolution voting record is often considered in the identification of emergence of a 
customary international norm. See, R. Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs 
of the United Nations (1963),at 2; I. Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs: International Law at the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (1998), at 19-20. 
47 See, E. Suy, “The meaning of consensus in multilateral diplomacy,” in Declarations on Principles - A quest for 
universal peace (1977), at 260. 
48 See, e.g., B. Conforti, B. Labella, An Introduction to International Law (2012), at 35, 42-43. 
49 H.J. Hahn, “International Organizations, Resolutions,” in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 2 
(1997), at 1334. 
50 E/CN.4/L.610 (2.4.62), at 1-2. [emphasis added] 
51 B. Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (1997), at 133. 
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and moral value, elevating them in the hierarchy of legally non-binding United Nations General 
Assembly resolutions. 
Taking into consideration both the voting procedure – consensus – and the declaration 
form, the 1970 Declaration serves as an important source for understanding the scope of States’ 
obligations derived from the principle of cooperation. Although it is debatable that the 1970 
Declaration is a codification of international customary law strictu sensu, and consequently that 
its provisions are of a legally binding nature, this document should be considered at the very 
least a reliable source of the generally supported view on the obligations stemming from the 
principle of cooperation. In the absence of a generally supported consensus regarding the 
customary nature of the provisions of the Declaration, they should not be treated as such.52  
The Declaration does not define the term ‘cooperation’ but the analysis of the text allows 
identifying cooperation as a voluntary coordinated action of two or more States, which takes 
place under a legal regime and serves a specific objective.53  Paragraph 1 and subsections (a) and 
(b) enumerate obligations of States following from the principle of cooperation. In two instances 
the Declaration uses the verb ‘shall’, while in other paragraphs the verb ‘should’ is used. It is 
only logical that if a legally binding treaty uses the words ‘should’ or ‘may’ instead of ‘shall’, the 
result is still a legal obligation. And vice versa, usage of the stringent ‘shall’ in a legally non-
binding document still cannot alter the legal nature of the relevant provision: what it can do is to 
put an emphasis on these provisions, signify their importance for this document, for the adopted 
organ or even for the whole international community.  
The Declaration uses the verb ‘shall’ in reiterating the obligation to cooperate in the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and in the promotion of universal respect and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Leaving aside to a more appropriate time 
and place the discussion of whether the international obligation to cooperate in protection of 
human rights exists, the Declaration’s statement about the existing obligation to cooperate in the 
maintenance of international peace and security is simply repetitive of the relevant provision of 
the United Nations Charter. The Charter established a clear-cut ‘obligation of result’ in the realm 
of maintenance of international peace and security – after all, this is what the Organization is all 
                                                        
52 Refer in general terms to the discussion on specific parts of the Declaration as CIL, to 
heed Professor Lepard’s comment 17. 
53 See, R. Wolfrum, “International Cooperation,” in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 2 (1997), at 
1242. 
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about; and hence the Declaration, being a source of a generally supported view on the principle 
of cooperation, could not have deprived the relevant provision of a separate, exclusive treatment, 
in this case exemplified by the verb ‘shall’. At the same time, this obligation is not broad enough 
to constitute a general obligation to cooperate in other areas of international relations.  
In the following subparagraphs pertaining to cooperation in “economic, social and 
cultural fields as well as in the field of science and technology”54 the verb ‘should’ is used. The 
notion of economic, social and cultural cooperation easily fits within the scope of general 
cooperation since it covers everything and anything, especially in our globalized and 
interconnected world. But the Declaration, being a legally non-binding document, and 
additionally using the verb ‘should’, following the legally weak wording of the Charter 
provisions in this regard, leads to a conclusion that the ‘obligation of effort’ as established in the 
United Nations Charter is the only obligation pertaining to cooperation in areas other than in the 
maintenance of international peace and security that has gained broad support of States.  
Further, paragraph 2 of the 1970 Declaration states: “Nothing in this Declaration shall be 
construed as prejudicing in any manner the provisions of the Charter or the rights and duties of 
Member States under the Charter.” Since the conclusion has been drawn that the United Nations 
Charter imposes the ‘obligation of result’ only in the area of maintenance of international peace 
and security, the Declaration, being an authoritative but still legally non-binding document, 
cannot and must not provide for more extensive obligations of member States. In the same vein, 
that does not preclude the Declaration from expressing a wish for States to cooperate in a broader 
range of areas, to promote and increase cooperation in the areas important for sustainable 
development of humankind.  
The 1970 Declaration in paragraph 8 of the preamble mentions the principle of non-
appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies, thus specifically extending application of its 
provisions to outer space activities. It has been stated earlier that the form of ‘declaration’ signals 
that the document is supposed to codify generally accepted norms of international law, and even 
international custom, albeit not altering its ‘soft law’ nature.55 Since the Declaration was 
specifically made applicable to the area of outer space exploration and use by virtue of the cited 
provision, the question is whether it was able to codify as a generally accepted, or at least 
                                                        
54 Id., at 1245. 
55 See, R. Wolfrum, “International Cooperation,” in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 2 (1997), at 
1242. 
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emerging, customary norm the obligation to cooperate in exploration and use of outer space. 
More specifically, was the Declaration capable of codifying the principle of cooperation in outer 
space as imposing the ‘obligation of result’? In 1970 it was only 23 years since the first space 
launch. Therefore, the question is whether by 1970 there was sufficient State practice to justify 
identification of an obligation to cooperate in outer space. The traditional approach56 requires 
that practice – just one of the international custom elements – must be general and consistent.  
The International Court of Justice held in the North Sea Continental Shelf case that, “the 
passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a 
new rule of customary international law … [yet] an indispensable requirement would be that 
within the period in question, short though it might be, State practice, including that of States 
whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform … 
and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of 
law or legal obligation is involved.”57 While some rules may inevitably take longer to emerge,58 
provided that practice shows sufficient generality and consistency, no particular duration is 
required.59  
It should be emphasized that identification of a customary norm mandating cooperation 
in outer space requires analysis not of the individual, read national, activities in exploration and 
use of outer space, but of the cooperative endeavors of States showing that “a general recognition 
that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.”60 Moreover, unlike, for example the right of 
innocent passage,61 establishment of a customary norm mandating cooperation, especially in its 
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norm after the Sputnik I space flight by way of absence of protests against flying a spacecraft above States’ 
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‘obligation of result’ dimension, would require existence of an affirmative practice 
unequivocally showing recognition by States of an existing legal obligation, primarily by means 
of engaging in appropriate cooperative activities motivated by the existing legal obligation, and 
not the mere willingness to engage in cooperation. Even though a relatively short period of outer 
space exploration and use does not bar the emergence of a customary norm, it is hard to advocate 
that by 1970, with successful participation of only two States and quite limited cooperative 
activities, the practice of cooperation in outer space activities had become “extensive and 
virtually uniform” (unless one would make the argument that also non-spacefaring States should 
somehow cooperate with those States in the course of the latter’s space activities, such as by 
discussing the hosting of ground stations62). Therefore, the 1970 Declaration did not and could 
not establish a general obligation to cooperate, especially with respect to outer space activities. It 
reaffirmed the existing ‘obligation of result’ in cooperation in the maintenance of international 
peace and security and reaffirmed the ‘obligation of effort’ as established by the United Nations 
Charter in other areas, but hardly more.  
 
1.1.3 Outer Space Treaty and Three Elaborating Conventions 
Space law has had an astonishingly good start.63 The Outer Space Treaty, however, being 
the seminal international instrument for law of outer space, has not done much in establishing the 
legal basis for cooperation per se. The Outer Space Treaty is a treaty of principles,64 thus its 
provisions should be treated accordingly. Articles III, IX, X, and XI declare the need to 
cooperate, whether to maintain international peace and security (Article III), to have regard for 
corresponding interests of other parties (Article IX), to allow observation of space objects 
(Article X), or regarding dissemination of information about space activities (Article XI).  
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Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (1993), at 135; M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, 
Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 205 (“The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space was, therefore, fully justified in concluding that “during the Geophysical Years 1957-1958 and subsequently, 
countries throughout the world proceeded on the premise of permissibility of the launching and flight of the space 
vehicles which were launched, regardless of what territory they passed ‘over’ during the course of their flight 
through outer space.””). 
62 See further down, where in the context of the bileratal treaties’ discussion such treaties 
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63 V.V. Vereshchetin, “Space Law,” in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 4 (2000), at 556. 
64 Id. at 553.  
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The overarching provision for interpretation of these articles is Article I declaring outer 
space and celestial bodies a ‘province of all mankind’. The concept of the ‘province of all 
mankind’ is different from the ‘common heritage of mankind’ concept, where the latter is based 
on the presumption that space exploitation can take place only within the limits of specific 
international regime,65 while the former is focused on providing equal access to all States by 
promoting equal participation in its use and exploration unless specific obligations have been 
agreed upon.66  All other Outer Space Treaty provisions are inseparable from the concept of the 
‘province of all mankind’ and should be analyzed accordingly. 
If the main purpose of the Treaty is to prevent deprivation of any State of the opportunity 
to explore and use outer space for peaceful purposes, then provisions of Articles III, IX, X and 
XI all convey the same idea: due respect to the existing right to exploration and use of outer 
space of non-spacefaring nations by the States active in outer space activities. The purpose is to 
ensure global access to the resources of outer space, to save the opportunity for exploration even 
for those players who are not capable of reaching it physically yet, and to get spacefaring nations 
used to the fact that they are not the only ones willing to explore outer space, its resources and its 
secrets. Likewise, “the Outer Space Treaty provided for further limitations to any potential 
unfettered freedom to act in outer space in the context of its ‘global commons’ character by 
requiring all space activities to be conducted in accordance with general international law, by 
imposing certain limitations on military uses, by imposing certain coordination and consultation 
requirements in case of potentially harmful space activities, and by allowing access ‘to 
representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity’ to ‘[a]ll stations, 
installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies’.”67  
With this perspective, none of the cited articles of the Outer Space Treaty, strictly 
speaking, seems to create a legal basis for cooperation. None of the articles encourages 
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cooperation. Rather, cooperation is seen as a final point of the process, not as a modus vivendi 
that has to be achieved by way of existence of the Treaty as such.68 The references to 
international organizations carrying on activities in outer space in Articles VI and XIII do not 
operate as provisions setting forth a mechanism of cooperation. The literal reading of the 
provisions prompts the conclusion that existence and operation of such organizations is already 
presumed and that the role of the Treaty is to provide a legal standard for regulation of their 
pertinent activities. The third sentence of Article VI reads: “When activities are carried on in 
outer space by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall 
be borne by the international organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in 
such organization.” The operative word here is ‘when’: the Treaty does not require, or even 
recommend carrying on activities in a cooperative manner using a mechanism of international 
organization, but merely provides rules in case such cooperation might be taking place.  
Therefore, the Treaty has a limited effect on the understanding of the principle of 
cooperation in outer space activities. It acknowledges existence of certain cooperative 
mechanisms, provides appropriate legal regulation but refrains from advancing cooperation by 
way of establishing a new mechanism of cooperation, instead elaborating on the ways the 
principle of cooperation operates in outer space activities. Provisions enunciated in Articles III, 
IX, X and XI should be regarded as implications of the principle of cooperation, several of its 
practice-oriented incarnations as applied to outer space activities.69 Hence, the Treaty has 
confirmed the status of the principle of cooperation as one of the general principles, but not as a 
concrete unconditional legal obligation, whether it is understood as one of an effort or one of a 
result.70  
Three elaborating conventions: the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts and the 
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1969),71 the Convention on International Liability 
for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972),72 and the Convention on Registration of Objects 
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Launched into Outer Space (1975),73 do not specifically mention the issue of cooperation, except 
in their preambles. This is perfectly logical because these international treaties themselves are the 
results of intensive cooperation among interested States. These instruments provide for a detailed 
mechanism of coordination, claims settlement, exchange of information and collaborative 
actions. The three elaborating conventions are both the result of cooperation, and the basis for 
collaboration.74  
 
1.1.4 The Principle of Cooperation in Outer Space 
Having reviewed cooperation-related provisions of the United Nations Charter, the 1970 
Declaration, the Outer Space Treaty and three elaborating conventions, the conclusion is drawn 
that the obligation to cooperate is rather limited, while the message is very broad. This 
conclusion is true both generally in international law and in space law in particular.  
Kolosov famously stated: “Adherence to the principle of cooperation is one of the State’s 
obligations. Implementation of the principle of cooperation must comply with the provisions 
constituting its content. With regard to specific scope and terms of cooperation of particular 
States, (beyond the limits constituting specific elements of the principle) they must be a topic of 
corresponding agreements. No State is entitled to impose on the other State object and terms of 
cooperation in any area. There is no legal obligation in this regard provided by the international 
law.”75 In other words, Kolosov viewed the obligation to cooperate as being one of an ‘effort’, 
clearly rejecting the possibility of imposition of the ‘obligation of result’ in international legal 
cooperation. 
Along the same line, Lukashuk pointed out that the principle of cooperation was legally 
assailable, because it was as hard to legally oblige States to cooperate in specific matters, as it 
was hard to bind them with friendship.76 More radical views exist, including the one expressed 
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by the former member of the United Nations International Law Commission and judge of the 
International Court of Justice Fitzmaurice. He opined that it was hard to imagine that an idea of 
obligation to cooperate would develop into a general principle of international law.77 In the 
context of space activities Jenks opined to the point, albeit in a somewhat limited context, 
explaining that “the general obligation of States to be guided in their space activities by the 
principle of cooperation and mutual assistance does not involve a firm obligation of cooperation 
in any particular arrangements.”78 
Wolfrum suggested that acceptance of the principle that States were under a general 
obligation to cooperate with one another would result in a fundamental restructuring of 
international law in three ways. First, international law would be transformed from a set of rules 
preserving the present state of existing international relations into a regime oriented to fulfill a 
certain mission: promotion of international social justice. Second, it would substantially alter 
rights and duties of States, making the development and wellbeing of common international 
places a common interest for all States. Third, it would change the status of subjects of 
international law, increasing significance of international organizations vis-à-vis a single State, 
and introducing inequality in relationships between States.79 
The last view apparently treats the general obligation to cooperate as one of a result and 
is probably exaggerating the consequences of existence of such. First, States remain sovereign, 
and their choice, whether regarding cooperation or participation in an international organization 
or a treaty imposing an obligation to cooperate, remains free and legally unrestrained. It is indeed 
doubtful that the obligation to cooperate, especially in its ‘obligation of result’ dimension, would 
obtain a status of a ius cogens norm automatically binding every State notwithstanding its will, 
from which no derogation is ever permitted.80 Second, universal cooperation is not always 
practically possible and outer space is a good example.  
In a limited field, an obligation to cooperate does exist. It is undoubted that all members 
of the United Nations are under a legal obligation to cooperate in the maintenance of 
international peace and security as provided by Articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter, 
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whereas States obviously are under both obligations of effort and result. Cooperation in this area 
is a centerpiece, a cornerstone of the United Nations. Without this obligation neither legally 
binding decisions of the Security Council, nor peacekeeping operations would ever be possible.  
None of the specialized international treaties regulating outer space activities has 
developed a comprehensive legal regime of cooperation, instead referring to principles and 
norms of general international law and the United Nations Charter. In these circumstances, the 
Charter and the 1970 Declaration are the only relevant sources for identifying the scope of the 
principle of cooperation. Their analysis led to a conclusion that international cooperation of 
States is only mandatory in the maintenance of international peace and security. In all other areas 
States are merely required to promote cooperation in accordance with general principles of 
international law.81 This conclusion squares with the obligation of result-effort dichotomy: the 
‘obligation of result’ pertains solely to the maintenance of international peace and security, while 
cooperation in all other areas should be characterized as the ‘obligation of effort’. The status of 
the principle of cooperation as the general principle of international law is supported by the 
majority of authors, and has been reaffirmed multiple times in international documents of both 
legally binding and non-binding character. But, as it has been shown above, the ‘obligation of 
result’ side of the principle of cooperation is not viewed as an indispensable part of the principle, 
while the ‘obligation of effort’, or the requirement that States act in a cooperative manner in their 
relations, is an undisputed part of the principle of cooperation in international law. 
The Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space 
for the Benefit and in the Interest of all States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of 
Developing Countries adopted as United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/22 on 
December 13, 1996 is considered to be a “general framework for international cooperation.”82 
The Declaration pronounces: “States are free to determine all aspects of their participation in 
international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space on an equitable and mutually 
acceptable basis. Contractual terms in such cooperative ventures should be fair and 
reasonable.”83 It confirms that international cooperation should be in full compliance with 
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international law including the Charter of the United Nations and the Outer Space Treaty. It, 
however, by contrast to the first draft of the Declaration presented to the COPUOS Legal 
Subcommittee in 1991, abandoned the approach of forcing countries into cooperation. Scholars 
have argued that “the only constructive but simple reason [for that] should have been that 
international cooperation should not be forced upon countries, because without shared interests 
cooperation cannot be fruitful.”84 It has been further argued that “the most important political 
lesson might be that international cooperation neither can nor should be forced upon States.”85 
“International cooperation according to this Declaration is characterized by the free 
choice with respect to modes of cooperation and the renouncement of so-called “forced 
cooperation” as well as any forced transfer of technology.”86 Almost 40 years following the 
beginning of international space cooperation States adopted a legally non-binding, though widely 
supported document summarizing the principle of cooperation as applied in outer space 
exploration. The interpretation of the principle of cooperation suggested above is in full 
compliance with the one adopted in the Declaration. 
The International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities in paragraph 6.3 provides a 
good overview of the principle of cooperation supporting the proposed approach. It states:  
Subscribing States, particularly those with relevant space capabilities and 
with programmes for the exploration and use of outer space, should contribute to 
promoting and fostering international cooperation in outer space activities, giving 
particular attention to the benefit for and the interests of developing countries. 
Each Subscribing State is free to determine the nature of its participation in 
international space cooperation on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis 
with regard to the legitimate rights and interests of parties concerned, for 
example, appropriate technology safeguard arrangements, multilateral 
commitments and relevant standards and practices.87 
Thus, States in exploration and use of outer space must cooperate to maintain 
international peace and security, or alternatively are under the ‘obligation of result’, and should 
cooperate, whenever feasible, in the economic, social and cultural fields as well as in the field of 
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science and technology and for the promotion of international cultural and educational progress, 
or alternatively are under the ‘obligation of effort’. In the latter spheres the duty to consider 
cooperation in good faith transforms into the obligation to cooperate in practice only pursuant to 
relevant provisions of specific international agreements.88 
  
1.2 Role of Cooperation in Exploration and Use of Outer Space 
 
International cooperation of States in outer space had a fast start, gradually developed and 
went through dramatic transformation in the 1990s. In this part of the book it will be explored 
how international cooperation in outer space began, how it developed, where it is now and how 
the most recent trends in exploration and use of outer space have affected international 
cooperation. The transformation and evolution of the mechanisms of cooperation, and the 
alteration of the legal basis for cooperation will be analyzed against a historical, economic and 
technological background. Emerging trends and corresponding legal issues in exploration and 
use of outer space will be briefly covered.  
 
1.2.1 The First Mechanism of Cooperation – Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
The United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) was 
historically the first mechanism of international legal space cooperation. It had been initially 
established as an ad hoc Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in 1958, and was 
made permanent one year later by General Assembly Resolution 1472 (XIV) of December 12, 
1959. At that time the Committee had eighteen members, and as of 2016 it has eighty-three 
members, what makes it one of the larger United Nations committees.  
The General Assembly saw the issue of outer space exploration as one of the prominent 
challenges to the international legal regime that existed at that time. The fast pace in creation of 
the Committee, and the fact that the legal issues of outer space exploration and use prompted the 
United Nations General Assembly to establish a separate office instead of including a question in 
the General Assembly agenda, showed recognition of the peculiar problems involved. It also 
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demonstrated that there was a new area of activities lacking any kind of regulation, which both 
called for and provided an opportunity for a new thinking and new procedures.89  
Other authors explained that “it was perfectly normal that the General Assembly should 
take care of the new problems, but the materials were too specialized for a meeting which was 
intrinsically too political and too large for dealing with a new technology. Fortunately, the 
United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space or COPUOS was set up.”90 
Soviet international law theory explained the swift start and rapid development as something 
obvious and natural: “Major scientific developments have always created the necessity for 
regulating new relations. Law cannot and must not fall behind scientific and technical progress. 
Law must in a timely manner regulate those relations that had been established while using 
advancements of modern science, and exclude (limit) the damage that is caused by unreasoned 
(unfounded) experiments.”91  
COPUOS played a paramount role in the creation and development of international space 
law.92 Within the Committee five outer space treaties were negotiated and drafted, and four sets 
of guiding principles were developed. COPUOS still remains the principal international forum 
where all interested States are able to exchange information and discuss the most pressing issues. 
The Committee in its report to the United Nations General Assembly noted “the instrumental 
role it had played in constructing the legal regime governing outer space activity for peaceful 
purposes, which was an entirely new branch of international law, and in providing a unique 
platform at the global level for enhancing international cooperation for the benefit of all 
countries, in particular in the area of using space applications for sustainable development.”93  
Despite the initial remarkable success of the Committee’s work, currently more and more 
often proposals are voiced about reforming COPUOS. It is suggested that COPUOS has become 
hulking, over-bureaucratized, lacking political will to move on and consider the most pressing 
issues in a decisive way. As space law matures and as what is required tends more and more to 
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be private and domestic law solutions for particular problems, it may be that COPUOS will take 
a back seat, and substantial developments will be taking place elsewhere.94  
On the other side, it is argued that the main role of the Committee is to help “in some 
measure to outbalance inadequacies felt in the legal field. In this respect, it is more difficult to 
point to concrete results, since the Committee itself does not actually carry out space 
activities.”95 Changes within the space industry, including the relaxation of political tensions and 
the development of science and technology will “certainly renew, at some stage in the future, the 
traditional role of the United Nations and its Outer Space Committee as indispensable 
instruments for the further development of space law. Their universal nature is also the best 
guarantee that interests and concerns of all nations can be met and compromise be reached when 
philosophies, policies and strategies concerning the exploration and use of Outer Space continue 
to be opposed.”96 
Both views have not, at least by now, proved to be completely true. Although national 
legislation does play a more and more significant role in outer space activities, the international 
space regime remains the foundation for all national legislation. While national legislation, 
which is present in only a handful of States,97 deals with issues that have not been addressed at 
the international level,98 the Outer Space Treaty is the one to guarantee that outer space “shall be 
free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind,”99 the Registration 
Convention is the one mandating international registration of launched space objects, and the 
Liability Convention provides guarantees that victims would receive proper compensation for 
damage suffered notwithstanding any national legal provisions of the liable State. These issues 
are not the ones on the current agenda of the space community simply because they have already 
been settled. And without these basic features of the outer space legal regime, which could only 
have been agreed upon on an international multilateral level, all further legislation would have 
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hung in the air. Moreover, it has been noted that “growth of national space laws is a result of 
growing compliance with treaties and other international obligations,”100 confirming the 
foundational role played by international space law. 
At the same time, the most recent developments in science and technology, the end of the 
Cold War and the growth of the number of spacefaring nations have not led to transformation of 
COPUOS into an indispensable mechanism, in the absence of which the whole system of 
international cooperation would be ruined. It is unlikely that in the foreseeable future a dramatic 
change may occur. States determine the way international cooperation develops; the decline of 
one way of cooperation leads to creation of a new, different mechanism that is able to meet the 
needs and interests of cooperating States.  
The future of COPUOS has been under discussion both in an academic setting and within 
the Committee itself.101 COPUOS work is flawed in many ways, including a controversial 
consensus voting procedure,102 the representation of States by low-ranking diplomats without 
any specific knowledge of space law,103 and a decreasing level of attendance of sessions in 
general.104 The Committee, however, continues its work. Annual reports of the Committee show 
the ongoing discussion of contemporary issues pertaining to exploration and use of outer space, 
and new documents are being discussed and adopted.105  
The most important conclusion to be drawn at this stage is not about ways and means to 
reform or enhance the Committee’s working procedures, but about the role of cooperation in 
outer space exploration. With the first launch of a space object members of the United Nations 
realized that this whole new area – a true tabula rasa – needed to be addressed. It is notable that 
space activities almost immediately took a special place in the United Nations system. More 
broadly, international cooperation proved to be an immutable characteristic of outer space 
exploration and use from the early days of the space era. 
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1.2.2 UNISPACE Conferences 
Not long after the creation of COPUOS the first international universal conference  - the 
United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE) 
– was commenced in 1968 under auspices of COPUOS. It focused on practical benefits of outer 
space exploration and use, and considered the question of the level of non-spacefaring nations’ 
inclusion in the process of enjoying these benefits.106 The latter issue was the most critical for all 
States but the two leading spacefaring nations. The Outer Space Treaty had already been in 
force, so the question of the ‘benefit for all mankind’ was as acute as ever.  
By 1982 the second conference was convened, representing a growing number of the 
States involved. Ninety-four States and forty-five international governmental and non-
governmental organizations participated in the conference. And for the first time the private 
sector was participating in a space-related intergovernmental event.107 Although at that time 
private entities’ participation in outer space activities was limited, and many advocated that at no 
point could space become commercially available to private companies,108 COPUOS members 
saw the prospects and took a step toward greater inclusion of the commercial sector, at the very 
least just to raise awareness.   
UNISPACE-III, held in 1999 in Vienna, has been by far the grandest international space 
conference with over two thousand and five hundred participants from over a hundred States and 
thirty international organizations. The agenda of the conference, themed “Space Benefit for 
Humanity in Twenty First Century”, considered a broad number of questions, ranging from 
promotion of cooperation between spacefaring nations and States lacking access to space 
technology, to environmental issues and assistance during disasters.109 Since the adoption of the 
Vienna Declaration as a result of the Conference, an agenda item dealing with implementation of 
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the Declaration recommendations has been included in the agenda of the Scientific and 
Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS.110  
The Conference’s participation was far greater than the Committee’s membership even in 
its current extended version. That signals that not only spacefaring nations and those 
immediately affected by space activities are interested in cooperation on some level. States 
consider it important to speak and to be heard. No matter the non-binding nature of the 
UNISPACE decisions, these conferences are justly viewed as major events in outer space 
cooperation.111  
 
1.2.3 Regional Space Cooperation: ESA 
The European Space Agency (ESA) became a milestone in the development of 
international cooperation in outer space. Creation of ESA with its unprecedented level of 
coordination between the European States was a major development in international space 
cooperation, elevating the scope of cooperative activities to a new level. Since then several other 
regional space organizations have emerged, but for the purposes of the present analysis it is 
important to understand the reasons that have spurred regional cooperation in the first place.  
After World War Two cooperation between European States intensified, bringing 
sovereign nations closer to each other and thus requiring a legal basis for productive cooperation, 
which later evolved into the European Union. Simultaneously, with the growing success of the 
Soviet Union and the United States, Europe, despite its paramount role in the world economy, 
was failing to keep up in outer space activities. By the late 1950s it was clear that cooperation 
within Europe was necessary to match the financial, technical and intellectual resources available 
to the Soviet Union and the United States. Europe did not want to be left behind.112  
In the course of political debate the decision was made to create two separate 
organizations: the European Space Research Organization (ESRO)113 and the European Launcher 
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Development Organization (ELDO).114 The failed attempts to build and launch Europe-I and 
Europe-II satellites through coordination of these two organizations115 led to reorganization and 
creation of ESA pursuant to the Convention for the Establishment of the European Space 
Agency, which was opened for signature on May 30, 1975, and entered into force on October 30, 
1980.116  
The European Space Agency is a major actor in exploration and use of outer space:117 
current ESA activities are exceptionally broad and range from procuring scientific experiments 
on the International Space Station to the ambitious Galileo program.118 It also participates in 
formation of space law through the internal procedures that it has developed, through negotiation 
of international agreements and through its implementation of international space practices.119 
The Agency, being the most successful example of regional cooperation in outer space, 
has at least three underlying factors that predetermined its creation and development, thereby 
setting an example of prosperous regional space cooperation. The first factor is the economic, 
cultural, social, historical, as well as territorial closeness of European States. Outer space 
cooperation was launched against a background of an ongoing cooperation in other areas, thus 
preparing the ground for an unburdened flow of technology, personnel and equipment between 
the participating States.  
Second, European countries on their own, though preserving their dominance in world 
economy and political influence, were not able to provide the same volume of resources as the 
Soviet Union and the United States, with their populations of several hundred million, vast 
territories and endless mineral resources. Thus, only through cooperation, read through merger of 
their respective resources, could they compete with the two major spacefaring nations. 
Complementarity of relatively small States, where every State is able to contribute to the 
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program, be it by means of territory, intelligence, technology, people or high-quality materials, 
smoothed controversies and eased cooperation.  
Finally, a flexible approach is endorsed in the ESA Convention. On the one hand, it has 
established a firm ground for effective cooperation through mandatory participation, and on the 
other, has left States with considerable freedom to pick and choose projects they are interested in 
and are able to meaningfully to participate in, thus creating an inherently adaptive system of 
cooperation.120 Further it will be shown that ESA has more than one mechanism allowing States 
to adjust their level of involvement, at the same time stimulating broader participation.   
Though one might argue relative importance of one factor over the other, it is 
undisputable that all three contributed to the creation of ESA as we know it today, a leader 
among international organizations in outer space, expanding not only its membership, but also 
the number of programs and projects it is supervising.121 Other regional organizations have been 
created, albeit none of them can boast of success at a level even comparable to that of ESA. 
None of the other organizations created has all three factors in place, though, as it will be shown 
further, regional cooperation is always based on the idea of regional closeness, which can be a 
result of social and cultural homogeneity, economic interdependence or geographic proximity.122 
 
1.2.4 International Satellite Organizations 
The next major development in outer space cooperation occurred in the 1970s, when 
international satellite organizations, first universal and later regional, were created. “It was by the 
practical applications of space technology and the use of space telecommunications that the 
participation of private enterprises became an obvious fact.”123 Perspectives of commercial 
viability in the utilization of communications satellites instigated emergence of this type of 
organizations. All satellite organizations generally had a purpose of providing terrestrial satellite 
communications to end users, though each in addition contained organization-specific aspects. 
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For example, the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) was initially 
focused on providing space segment necessary for improving maritime communications, thereby 
alleviating distress and improving safety of life, and enhancing management of ships, public 
correspondence and radio determination capabilities.124 The Intersputnik International 
Organization of Space Communications (INTERSPUTNIK), created as a counterbalance to the 
International Telecommunication Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), which was established 
around the same time under aegis of the United States,125 had the purpose “to promote 
strengthening and development of comprehensive economic, scientific, cultural and other 
relations via communication, and radio and television broadcasting through artificial Earth 
satellites.”126  
Due to the specific, rather narrow purposes of these organizations in combination with 
the commercial character of their activities, they do not fit within the traditional notion of 
international cooperation of States. There are at least two features that distinguish international 
satellite organizations in this respect from other organizations, read more traditional ones. First, 
from the moment of establishment these organizations created and operated satellite 
communications systems, which meant international collaboration had to be developed in great 
detail at an altogether much more intensive level. Second, they had their own capital and worked 
based on the principle of financial self-sufficiency.127 
Most international satellite organizations created during the 1970s and the 1980s 
underwent a process of privatization in the early 2000s. On the one hand, this was caused by the 
inherent focus on financial self-sufficiency and the need to maintain capital and engage in other 
purely commercial activities. The cumbersome structure of a traditional international 
organization with its lengthy decision making procedures made this if not impossible at all, 
complicated at the very least.  
                                                        
124 See, D. Sagar and P. K. McCormick, “Inmarsat,” in P.K. McCormick and M.J. Mechanick (eds.), The 
Transformation of Intergovernmental Satellite Organizations: Policy and Legal Perspectives (2013), at 37. 
125 See, V.S. Veshchunov, “Legal Reform of INTERSPUTNIK in the Light of Commercialization of its Activity in 
International Organizations and Space Law,” in Proceedings of the Third ECSL Colloquium, Perugia, Italy 6-7 May 
1999 (1999), at 78. 
126 Документы, принятые Договаривающимися Сторонами по вопросу вступления в международную 
организацию космической связи «Интерспутник» [Documents Adopted by the Contracting Parties Regarding 
Accession to the International Satellite Organization “Intersputnik”], - М., 1984. С. 4. 
127 Cf., Стовбун В.Д. Особенности организации космической связи «Интерспутник» в качестве оперативной 
(эксплуатационной) организации [Specific Characteristics of the Satellite Organization «Intersputnik» as an 
Operational Organization]. Исторические, философские, политические и юридические науки, культурология 
и искусствоведение. – Тамбов: Грамота, 2009. № 3(4), С. 193. 
 44 
On the other hand, the 1990s were marked by a growing trend toward commercialization 
of outer space activities. Although until the 2000s this did not evolve into ‘pandemic’ 
commercialization, as this will be discussed below, the overall trend toward greater inclusion of 
private entities prompted international organizations to adapt to changing circumstances in order 
to compete effectively in a new market situation.128 As a result, by the 2000s three former 
international satellite organizations were transformed into private entities, at the same time 
preserving ‘residual international organizations’ in order to comply with their international 
obligations and thus creating a whole new environment for outer space activities.  
 
1.2.5 International Space Station 
The creation of the International Space Station (ISS) definitely altered the perception of 
space cooperation and space projects in general. The Space Station was a challenging project not 
only from a legal perspective. As one author explained, “differing specifications, standards, and 
assumptions call for cooperation and compromise among participating nations.”129 But legal 
issues were the ones to define and shape the dynamics of this ambitious project. “The reality is 
that while the ISS provides a site where nations can live together and participate in similar 
research, these nations have fundamentally different legal traditions. The question becomes: how 
can peaceful cooperation between the members of different states be guaranteed as they live and 
work together on the same Space Station? The initial answer: an International Space Station 
Agreement.”130 Overview and analysis of the ISS and its legal regime deserves a separate book. 
Here the discussion is limited to the effects of the ISS project on the space cooperation 
environment. What were the prerequisites for cooperation, and what have we learned about 
international cooperation of States in outer space with the launch of the Station? 
Development of the ISS project began with President Reagan’s announcement in 1984 
that the United States intended to build a permanently inhabited civil space station in Earth orbit 
with the proposed name ‘Space Station Freedom’.131 Other countries, including Canada, Japan 
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and European countries, were invited to participate in this project. After years of negotiations, in 
1988 an initial Intergovernmental Agreement,132 setting forth general principles for carrying out 
the ISS mission, was signed by the United States, member States of the European Space Agency, 
the Government of Japan and the Government of Canada. While the Soviet Union was not 
invited to join the Freedom project, the Reagan administration about the same time indicated its 
willingness to resume space cooperation and readiness “to work with the Soviets on cooperation 
in space in programs which are mutually beneficial and productive.”133 
Dismemberment of the Soviet Union in 1991 introduced changes not only to the lives of 
the former Soviet republics, but also to the ISS project. On the one hand, the ‘Evil Empire’, in 
President Reagan’s words, ceased to exist,134 thus cancelling an immediate communist threat and 
bringing Russia and other newly created States closer to the Western ideology and economy. On 
the other hand, Soviet and later Russian engineers and space specialists had the greatest 
experience in long-term manned space flights by way of experience in operating the Mir space 
station.135 Another factor, doubtless, played a role as well: in 1993 President Clinton ordered 
NASA to redesign the space station again to reduce costs. But it soon became clear that even 
spending US$ 9 billion in the next five years – the ceiling of the allowed spending – was not 
enough to build the space station. By adding Russia to the program, NASA asserted that a more 
capable space station would be ready sooner and at a less cost to the United States.136 
On September 2, 1993, the White House announced that preliminary agreement had been 
reached to merge the Russian and American space station programs. From then on a new phase 
in the ISS project has begun. A former Cold War enemy has become an indispensable partner in 
the new large-scale space mission.  
By 1996 NASA and its Russian counterpart prepared a Memorandum of Understanding 
that made Russia a full partner in sharing ISS accommodations, resources, responsibilities, and 
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costs.137 Having the Memorandum in place, the 1988 Agreement no longer reflected the actual 
situation, thus requiring its renegotiation.138 That might have been a simple question should only 
two States be parties to a treaty, but with a dozen more partners, whose relations with the former 
Soviet Union had been neutral at most,139 this task was a true test of the will to cooperate, 
negotiate in a friendly way, and work hard toward mutually acceptable terms.  
It took another two years, extending the overall negotiation period to long five years, to 
sign a new Intergovernmental Agreement in 1998, finalizing the legal basis for the space project 
featuring an “unprecedented technical, managerial, and international complexity,” making it 
perhaps the most complicated and difficult international peacetime effort ever undertaken.140 
The ISS regime is construed of four levels of legal agreements, where the 
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA)141 is the basis, and the Crew Code of Conduct is the most 
specific document. The multi-layered construction of the legal regime presupposed a complex 
system of cooperation, which at the same time was flexible enough to allow constructive 
collaboration of all States involved,142 in order to make this gigantic system actually work. For 
the purposes of this part of the book, just a few features representing exemplary cases of 
multilateral cooperation toward a common goal will be mentioned.  
In the IGA’s Preamble States declared their conviction that work on the ISS project “will 
further expand cooperation through the establishment of a long-term and mutually beneficial 
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relationship, and will further promote cooperation in the exploration and peaceful use of outer 
space.” The objective of the Agreement “is to establish a long-term international cooperative 
framework among the Partners, on the basis of genuine partnership.” The genuine partnership 
clause is further elaborated in articles dealing with registration, jurisdiction and control, 
providing for each Partner’s registration of the flight elements it delivers. In Article 6 this 
principle is furthered by a mutual obligation not to transfer ownership of the Station’s elements 
to non-parties without prior consultation and concurrence of all Partners, thereby creating 
stability and predictability in the Station’s operations.   
Management is organized on a multilateral basis, and consensus is acknowledged as a 
preferable method in the decision-making process. Article 9’s approach of a ‘fixed share’ of 
experimental time in exchange for provided services is another notable feature. Utilizing this 
scheme, the States effectively adopted a ‘barter’ approach to their services, where each 
transaction is not being scrutinized for its respective value, but is presumed to be as valuable as 
the other service rendered in exchange. By way of introducing this mechanism cooperating 
States eliminated time-consuming estimates of provided user elements and infrastructure 
elements, which were likely to cause conflicts and misunderstandings, thus leaving one less thing 
to argue about.  
In the same vein, the Partners have agreed to cooperate with regard to evolution of the 
project proposals,143 to consult in case of funding shortages,144 and have acquiesced to a broadly 
construed cross-waiver of liability.145 Effective regulation of questions of customs and 
immigration, intellectual property and criminal jurisdiction is another example of a successful, 
albeit lengthy, negotiation process in order to achieve a common goal through cooperation.  
Despite the general tendency toward equal partnership, consensual decision making and 
adherence to multilateral consultations as a way to resolve controversies, participation of fifteen 
States in construction, launch, exploitation and development of a permanently inhabited space 
station needs a point of gravity, that is someone responsible for coordination. The United States 
plays a central role in the cooperative scheme of the ISS, though not in a sense depicted by some 
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Russian scholars as an effective usurper of power thanks to its financial capacity,146 but as a 
mere coordinator of the Partners’ scattered activities. Article 1 of the IGA states: “Partners will 
join their efforts, under the lead role of the United States for management and coordination.” 
Notwithstanding the broad wording, the United States has not acquired ‘privileged’ rights 
compared to other partners. The special role of the United States includes responsibility “for 
overall program management and coordination,”147 for planning and managing “launch and 
return transportation services for the Space Station in accordance with the integrated traffic 
planning process”148 and for convening “multilateral consultations at the earliest possible time, to 
which it shall invite all the Partners” upon request of any Partner that the arisen matter is 
appropriate for consideration of all Partners.149 
In the end, the parties have managed to achieve the right balance between equal rights of 
each participating State and the practical need to coordinate efforts in order to use available 
resources most effectively. Keeping in mind the initial background behind the project and the 
lengthy negotiation between fifteen States that led not only to the successful development of the 
legal basis for cooperation, but indeed to outstanding practical results of cooperation that 
mankind has been observing for the last 15 years, the high appraisal of the project in legal circles 
is not surprising. Zhukov noted that “as a result of lengthy negotiation between delegations of 
Partners over the ISS, an unprecedented system of mutual legal obligations both in outer space, 
and on the Earth was created.”150 Another scholar characterized the IGA as an “unprecedented 
synthesis of politics and technical elements necessary for the named project.”151 
 
1.2.6 Contemporary Trends: Commercialization, Space Traffic Management, Space Debris 
During the past half century States have gone a long way from national hour-long space 
flights to multinational long-term permanently inhabited space stations, from the first satellites 
providing low resolution data available only to the national military to high resolution remote 
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sensing systems and publicly accessible positioning services, from rivalry to cooperation on a 
basis of genuine partnership. “Overall, the core of the paradigm-change affecting mankind’s 
activities in outer space can be summarized as follows: the development of new applications with 
a “down-to-earth”, practical orientation – that is, distinct from the politico-military or scientific 
orientation hitherto ruling the human space endeavor – in turn involving a shift in the categories 
of such participants.”152 
Cooperation, whether in the format of a multilateral forum promoting discussion of 
contemporary issues and development of treaties, or in the format of an international 
organization operating satellites, has always been a response to technical, scientific, economic 
and political changes. Extraordinary legal and physical characteristics of outer space spurred 
international cooperation of States in the area.153 As human knowledge about outer space 
expands, as humanity gets used to space technology and demands more innovations that space 
exploration can bring, as outer space exploitation becomes not only a lofty activity for the benefit 
of all mankind, but also a profitable business, new challenges, unpredictable only a decade ago, 
emerge.  
The most acute and most widely discussed modern trend in the space industry is 
commercialization. The generic term includes an array of planned and ongoing projects that 
include private entities as the major moving power. This group includes, among others, satellite 
ownership and operation by private companies, private manned space flights, construction and 
operation of cargo space ships by private companies and space tourism. The exciting prospect of 
having space flights as readily available as airplane flights thus seems more real than ever. But 
lawyers express concerns about development of an appropriate legal regime. 
Commercialization, whatever shape it takes, raises a whole set of unregulated issues. 
Commercial operation of satellites, and selling and buying satellites that are already in orbit pose 
questions of responsibility and liability.154 Space tourism,155 or trips of non-professional 
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astronauts to outer space, questions whether these tourists are eligible for a status of an astronaut 
as an ‘envoy of mankind’, or whether a status of a ‘flight participant’, whatever this legal term 
encompasses, is more adequate.156 The prospect of suborbital flights demands a decision on what 
outer space actually is and where it begins. Does it begin at 100 km, as Russia has argued 
multiple times,157 or maybe outer space begins at the ‘von Kármán Line’, the “point where 
aerodynamic lift yields to centrifugal force?”158 Multiple other suggestions have been made,159 
and this question was put up for discussion within the International Civil Aviation Organization 
even before the Sputnik I launch,160 but until now no conclusion has been reached.  
A logical extension to the previous issue is a prospective need for the space traffic control 
system akin to the modern air traffic control system. Despite the undoubted sovereignty of each 
State over its airspace, States are willing to ‘give up’ a part of their sovereign rights in order to 
achieve safety, predictability and a necessary level of coordination in airspace flights. No one 
questions the need for the International Civil Aviation Organization as an international 
coordinating and regulatory agency simply because it is not feasible to establish a similar regime 
of control and coordination by national means. It is then plausible to suggest that the same 
tendencies would work toward a unified international space traffic regime.  
Dealing with space debris is another matter on the international space agenda.161 It is 
estimated that currently there are 29,000 objects over 10 centimeters, 60,000 objects greater than 
5 centimeters, 700,000 objects bigger than 1 centimeter, and 200 million objects greater than 1 
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millimeter in orbit around the Earth.162 The geostationary orbit, being an extremely valuable and 
limited resource, requires an efficient system of operation. In the beginning of 2012 there were 
406 active satellites and 1307 systematically observed objects, where the number of active 
satellites increased by 10% in five years, and the number of observed objects increased by 
16%.163 While the International Telecommunication Union maintains efficient procedures for 
coordinating telecommunications with a view to ensure optimal, fair and rational use of the radio 
frequency spectrum,164 space debris continues to multiply even in this vitally important orbit. To 
make things worse, these counts are likely to increase, even if no more debris is created by 
human activity, because of what is called the ‘Kessler syndrome’: the collisional cascading 
process whereby large pieces of space debris get hit by smaller pieces, creating hundreds or 
thousands of new pieces of small debris, which can collide with other large pieces.165 
Relative success has been achieved by adoption of the Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines by COPUOS, which were endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in 
Resolution 62/217 in 2007.166 The success is relative because these are technical measures rather 
than legally binding rules. Scholars have opined, however, that due to increasing utilization of 
the guidelines by major spacefaring nations as the key element of licensing schemes in domestic 
context, thereby transforming them into binding law on the national level, both elements 
allowing identification of international custom will soon grow substantially sufficient to support 
formation of relevant customary legal obligation.167 Generally supporting the last opinion, the 
Guidelines are of somewhat limited influence on the contemporary state of outer space pollution 
because they are only applicable to the mission planning and the design of spacecraft and 
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orbiting stages that will be sent into Earth orbit,168 rather than aimed at eliminating debris that 
are already present in orbit. 
Prospective measures to deal with the space debris problem often include establishment 
of Space Situational Awareness, space traffic management akin to air traffic management 
discussed earlier, space debris removal mechanisms169 and the law of salvage adapted from 
international maritime law.170 Currently the issue is under discussion within the COPUOS 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee as a separate agenda item. In 2010 the Czech Republic 
introduced a Working paper suggesting review of the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines in 
order to transform these into a binding set of legal principles.171 The majority of the proposed 
and ongoing efforts in dealing with the space debris problem are conducted on an international 
multilateral level. Although only three countries, that is China, Russia and the United States, are 
responsible for 90% of all space debris,172 this is an issue that poses a potential threat to all 
States, and no State is capable of dealing with it on a national level.  
Prospective exploitation of celestial bodies is another field of the future use of outer 
space requiring international cooperation on a broad scale. The low level of support for the 
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,173 owing 
to the ambiguous wording of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ concept introduced in Article 
11, effectively prevented establishment of a legal regime concerning the Moon and other 
celestial bodies’ exploitation. Resolution of this deadlock is only feasible through international 
legal cooperation based on the methodology encompassed in Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty. Adoption of any other method would effectively put cooperating States in breach of the 
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Outer Space Treaty, which not only boasts wide support, but is also believed by many to have 
transformed into customary international law,174 thus binding all States except persistent 
objectors.  
 
1.2.7 Concluding Remarks 
Overall, international cooperation should be seen as one of the possible effective 
solutions to the issues discussed above. It has been suggested that “international cooperation is 
currently the most likely way forward in many fields, particularly given the vast investment that 
space activities require.”175 There might be an argument as to what extent such cooperation is 
necessary: would it be needed only as a first step toward new legal solutions, or should it be a 
full-scale cooperative effort with the aim of negotiating, developing and adopting a new 
mechanism of cooperation? Such debates aside, it is premature to underestimate the role of 
international legal cooperation in the future of space law. During the fifty-third session of the 
COPUOS Legal Subcommittee the view was expressed that international cooperation would 
continue to be a necessary basis for dealing with new challenges, such as ensuring long-term 
sustainability of space activities and promoting peace and security in order to enable sustainable 
development of all countries.176 
As has been mentioned above, States have created dozens of mechanisms, entities, 
documents and other means of cooperation in outer space. As it has been eloquently summarized, 
“the most outstanding character of the current international cooperation in the space field is its 
extent, from the simple exchange of information to the use of installations and the enforcement 
of programs common to two or more partners, and the extreme range of its forms and the very 
fragmented character of this cooperation in the present international order. The result of all this is 
a multiplicity of functions, a plurality of structures – which have been created for historical and 
political reasons or to satisfy the requirements of some users – with a probably unavoidable risk 
of conflicts of interests.”177 In other words, different goals of cooperation call for different 
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methods. A specific project involving only two States, development of a commercially viable 
satellite communication network or prevention of outer space militarization – all three require 
substantially different approaches to cooperation, where membership, forum, rules, structure, 
voting procedures, implementation, level of participation and compliance measures vary 
dramatically. 
In the light of the above, two spheres of international legal cooperation are excluded from 
the present research. First, questions of militarization will not be addressed here. Military and 
weapon-related issues are plagued by political conjuncture, financial bargains and other visible 
and secret considerations of the States involved. Although some methods employed in dealing 
with militarization issues would have been of interest for the legal analysis of mechanisms of 
cooperation (especially the United Nations Conference on Disarmament), this area is deliberately 
excluded to avoid the temptation to move into political assessments instead of focusing on legal 
issues that can and should be analyzed objectively.  
Second, international satellite organizations are excluded from the analysis. The 
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, the International Mobile Satellite 
Organization and the European Telecommunications Satellite Organization, being the major 
players in international satellite communications, share a similar history and face similar 
challenges. Initially, each of these organizations was created to operate organization-owned 
satellites and to provide communication services in accordance with their constituent documents. 
However, in 2001 all three underwent a major restructuring by transferring all assets to private 
entities, though simultaneously preserving structures of international organizations. Nowadays 
the residual international organizations fulfill very specific functions.178  
For example, the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization monitors and 
interfaces with Intelsat, Ltd., the commercial telecommunications entity it supervises, to ensure 
the availability of international public telecommunication services to all countries in the 
world.179 The International Mobile Satellite Organization oversees certain public safety and 
security communication services provided via the Inmarsat satellites, and the European 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization is ensuring that Eutelsat S.A. – the private entity that 
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owns all assets and conducts operational activities – observes principles of public service 
obligations, pan-European coverage of the satellite system, non-discrimination and fair 
competition.180  
This brief overview of the powers and functions of the three international satellite 
organizations, which can be justly characterized as residual, leads to the conclusion that they are 
very specific in both nature and scope of their activities. Unlike most international organizations, 
these three do not have a general mandate, neither do they have a special mandate in an 
international legal sense – their mandate is strictly limited to relations between the organization 
and the supervised private entity. Each organization has an important, but simultaneously narrow 
supervisory role: to ensure availability of international public telecommunication services on a 
non-discriminatory basis.181 
There are several other international satellite organizations, notably INTERSPUTNIK 
and the Arab Satellite Communications Organization (ARABSAT), that have not gone through a 
privatization procedure and thus retain ownership of satellites along with the broad powers of an 
international organization.182 These organizations will be excluded from the analysis as well, 
because they too have specific features that allow characterizing them as sui generis entities. For 
example, in 2005 within the INTERSPUTNIK system a private entity Intersputnik Holding was 
created. Although it has not gained control over the organization’s assets, it still participates in 
commercially oriented activities of the organization.183 ARABSAT currently operates without a 
private entity, and its constituent documents directly prohibit participation of private capital in 
organization’s financing.184 But new market realities might push it toward reorganization 
following the path of other international satellite organizations.  
By and large, these international satellite organizations, especially those that underwent 
reorganization, constitute a separate species in the system of international legal institutions. 
Although analysis of these international satellite organizations presents an interesting and 
challenging topic, the results of such an analysis are unlikely to be valuable for the purposes and 
goals of the present book. This is so mostly because of the high level of their specificity and the 
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low probability of reproducing such a structure in any other currently developed area of outer 
space exploitation apart from satellite communications.  
 
1.3. Analysis Criteria: A Way to Classify Mechanisms of Cooperation 
 
This part of the work will outline the methodological approach of the ensuing analysis. 
First, an overarching methodology of the analysis will be presented.  Particularly, it is argued 
that four broad categories of cooperation exist, but only three of those can be defined in 
sufficiently precise terms. The category of ‘soft law’, as argued above, is too amorphous to be 
defined and therefore to be a proper subject of the research aiming to analyze a variety of 
different mechanisms of cooperation using a uniform set of criteria, attempting to draw coherent 
and comprehensive conclusions as a result of such a research. Second, the criteria for the 
analysis of the mechanisms of cooperation in outer space will be proposed. Application of the 
proposed criteria will allow identifying distinctive features of each analyzed mechanism, along 
with general attributes characteristic for a category of cooperation it belongs to. Such features 
and attributes will also serve as a basis for the conclusions with respect to the intensity of 
cooperation within the respective mechanism and category of cooperation, and with respect to 
the limits of cooperation achievable using such a mechanism and respective category of 
cooperation. It should be underlined that application of the proposed criteria is not a goal in its 
own right, but rather an intermediary step in attainment of the general goal of the book, and thus 
should be viewed from such perspectives as appropriateness, effectiveness and overall success.  
At the outset the term ‘mechanism of cooperation’ should be defined. The OXFORD 
DICTIONARY defines a mechanism as “a natural or established process by which something takes 
place or is brought about.”185 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defines the term cooperation as a 
“voluntary coordinated action of two or more countries occurring under a legal regime and 
serving a specific objective.”186 Thereby, a mechanism of cooperation should be understood as 
an established process defining legal measures and methods for coordinated activities in 
achievement of a specific objective. A mechanism of cooperation is a process that can be 
described in precise legal terms, which creates a concrete procedure for achievement of a 
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specific objective. The latter characteristic means that the mechanism of cooperation is created to 
attain a particular goal, while a mere utilization of diplomatic and other ordinary means of inter-
State communication does not amount to a separate mechanism of cooperation. 
 
1.3.1 Methodology 
Cooperation is an abstract concept. Cooperation does not necessarily have tangible 
manifestations, nor would any tangible manifestations necessarily lead to a conclusion that 
cooperation exists. One consequence is that in order to analyze cooperation, one has to draw the 
limits of the subject matter. The other consequence is that any analysis is bound to be 
incomplete, because any definition of cooperation would most likely exclude certain incarnations 
of this abstract concept.  
International legal cooperation has been shaped by thousands of years of civilization, 
from ancient Rome and Greece and Egypt, all the way to the complex international networks of 
the twenty-first century. Modern international legal cooperation has not only become more 
complex and intricate, but also much more diverse. The recent decades have seen creations of 
forums, groups, committees, commissions and assemblies, pursuing cooperative goals with 
varying degrees of intensity and formalization. At the same time, traditional treaties and 
international organizations continue to be the pillars of international legal cooperation. 
Conceptually, international legal cooperation can be described as a continuum, where the 
starting point is the least formalized approach to cooperation, say informal bilateral talks 
between representatives of two States. Progressing along the continuum, more formal approaches 
to cooperation emerge. Political declarations made during an international conference are much 
more formal compared to informal bilateral talks, but they still lack legal force. A whole range of 
legally non-binding but politically important documents represent a significant part of the 
continuum. Institutional formalization of the cooperative process signals a new milestone on the 
continuum. Legal force of the documents is another milestone. Formalization of legal norms in 
the form of a treaty signals achievement of the second highest degree of formalization of the 
cooperative process. A traditional international organization that is entitled to adopt documents 
legally binding its members is the pinnacle of the cooperation continuum. 
There are several consequences stemming from such an understanding of cooperation. 
First, there are only four milestones that can be clearly identified, that is: informal non-
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institutionalized cooperation, informal institutionalized cooperation, formal non-institutionalized 
cooperation and formal institutionalized cooperation. In plain English that means that the 
continuum begins from ‘soft law’, continues to international conferences, then to treaties and 
concludes with international organizations.  
But there is a multitude of other approaches to cooperation, which would fall somewhere 
between these milestones, but which at the same time do not represent milestones themselves. 
For example, customary international law creates legal obligations, so should be very close to 
treaties; but because of its non-formalized nature, it should be placed before the treaties on the 
continuum. At the same time, a plausible argument can be made that ius cogens norms, despite 
their non-formalized nature (or better, origin), should be placed after the treaties, signifying their 
importance for the legal international order and underlining their special role in shaping legal 
norms and obligations. In the end, only the named four categories have their firm places on the 
continuum, while all other variations of cooperation should be understood and analyzed against 
these categories and consequently be placed on the continuum based on their legal and 
institutional characteristics as compared with these four milestones. 
Second, it has to be acknowledged that each identified category includes a variety of 
actual mechanisms, which may differ in certain elements and therefore fall into different places 
on the cooperation continuum. For example, an international organization not entitled to adopt 
legally binding decisions should be placed before the organization granted such right; however, 
both organizations should be on the right end of the continuum, following the treaties.  
Finally, there is a possibility that certain mechanisms of cooperation possess elements 
from different categories and do not belong to any category more than to another. For example, 
an impromptu conference organized without formalization characteristic for traditional 
international organizations, might fall somewhere between the ‘soft law’ and the conference 
milestones. It is up to the researcher to define the elements of each category in such mechanisms. 
And it is a matter of the vantage point whether the researcher concludes that the mechanism 
belongs to one or the other category; it is similarly plausible that it does not belong to any 
category and rather represents a sui generis category fusing elements of more traditional 
categories to produce the unique result of a non-institutional conference.  
This book analyzes international legal mechanisms of cooperation from international 
conferences all the way to international organizations. All cooperation to the left of the 
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conferences is excluded from the analysis. ‘Soft law’ is an amorphous category that does not 
have a precise definition and continues to be controversial in the theory of international law. 
Role of a legally non-binding, or a ‘soft law’, regulation in international law has been 
extensively analyzed,187 and up until now it remains a complex phenomenon that is not being 
understood uniformly.  
As a result, much of the discussion since the 1960s has aimed to evade 
formal lawmaking process and categorizations by referring to everything not 
fitting the classic model as ‘soft law’; the label has been attached to resolutions 
adopted by international bodies, to agreements involving non-state actors, to 
standards set outside the realm of clearly discernible law, to guidelines and codes 
of conduct emanating from international executive bodies, et cetera. While it is 
clear that much activity takes place here, it is not clear how the label ‘soft law’ 
helps to clarify things, and in fact, it may often even obfuscate things in that it 
suggests a legal relevance where none may be present, and without being able 
robustly to indicate why norms belong to either the hard law or the soft law 
category. Moreover, and arguably at least as important, the label of soft law 
sometimes suggests benevolence where, in actual fact, at issue is the management 
of society by executive bodies.188  
As the passage suggests, the term ‘soft law’ may be used to cover almost anything that 
does not fit into the traditional categories of conference, treaty and organization. ‘Soft law’ may 
be used as a term defining politically important but legally non-binding international documents, 
on a par with documents of purely private nature. Simultaneously, ‘soft law’ may exist only 
within the framework of informal relations between two States, and eventually evolve into a 
more formal instrument that is made public. In other words, ‘soft law’ may exist without the 
international community’s knowledge about it, apart from those directly involved. The fact that 
only two States know about such an arrangement does not mean that it is less of cooperation; it is 
simply an informal cooperation between these two States, which have chosen to keep their 
relations private.  
One can immediately see the problem here: when and how do we find out about such 
cooperation? But even if we are lucky and we do find out about this informal cooperation, how 
do we analyze it? There is no formal, or at least tangible product of such cooperation; there 
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might be even no minutes of the meeting. In such case the analysis would have to be based on 
the knowledge presumably available only to the author of the analysis, which his readers have no 
opportunity to check and verify. While the analysis might indeed be correct and insightful, 
academic writings cannot be credible unless the information it is based on is widely accessible.  
The other side of the ambiguity in the definition of ‘soft law’ is that no agreement exists 
as to what mechanisms actually belong to the category. As a consequence, depending on the 
point of view, a different number of mechanisms would fall into the category. It is not the goal of 
the present book to resolve the ambiguity. Striving to produce a comprehensive analysis of a 
representative number of modern mechanisms of international cooperation in outer space, this 
book will focus on the analysis of those mechanisms that are widely believed to be the tools used 
in the course of international outer space cooperation. The international conference, international 
treaty and international organization categories are the only three categories that have uniform 
denotations that the majority of international law scholars agree on. While there might be no 
consensus about the exact definitions of these three categories, the elements that have to be 
present in each category can be identified.  
The fourth category, ‘soft law’, lacks not only a widely accepted definition; it also lacks a 
uniform description. Analysis of this category, therefore, would always bear a mark of 
arbitrariness: with respect to the fact itself that such a category is identified, with respect to the 
mechanisms that belong to it, and with respect to elements that are deemed essential to the 
category in general and its mechanisms in particular. For this reason, the ‘soft law’ category is 
will not become the subject of the analysis of this book. 
At the same time, the term ‘soft law’ has become an indispensable element of the 
international legal vocabulary and therefore will be used in the course of this work to refer to 
international acts adopted by international organizations or concluded between States, or 
between States and international intergovernmental organizations that do not create legal rights 
and obligations enforceable on the international plane, but might have political and moral value. 
This definition is proposed solely for the purposes of this book and is not intended to serve as a 
uniform definition applicable in other contexts.  
As has been noted above, the other three categories of cooperation do not have uniform 
definitions accepted throughout the legal community, but there is a consensus about the elements 
these categories have to have. The definitions of a conference, treaty and organization as used in 
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this book will be addressed in the next part of the chapter. Based on these definitions, six criteria 
will be proposed that allow designating each analyzed mechanism to a category of cooperation. 
But that is not the only and not the primary purpose of these six criteria and the analyses using 
these criteria. 
Application of these criteria to each analyzed mechanism will highlight its distinctive 
legal and institutional features. Relying on the six criteria, the analysis will strive to discern the 
core values of cooperation using the analyzed mechanism of cooperation. Particularly, 
conclusions will be made about the intensity of cooperation achievable, about the results that 
have been achieved so far, about the results that can be effectively achieved, and about the 
changes that have to be made to make the mechanism the most effective. In other words, the 
virtues and the limits of the analyzed mechanism have to be understood.  
The book’s ultimate goal is to propose the most effective forms of cooperation for 
various activities in outer space. The analysis using six criteria will provide ample practical and 
theoretical material to draw the conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of each 
particular mechanism. These conclusions will serve as a bypass toward the conclusions the book 
is aiming at, namely suggesting the most appropriate forms of cooperation for different types of 
cooperative projects. It should be recalled that forms and mechanisms are not the same. The 
concluding chapter of the book will address the differences between the two in greater detail and 
will propose classification of the mechanisms into forms of cooperation, simultaneously 
suggesting the areas of outer space activities where these forms would prove most effective. But 
in order to arrive at this conclusion, a step-by-step analysis as explained above should be first 
performed. It should be again stressed that the definitions of the three categories and the six 
criteria analysis are just the tools used to achieve the ultimate goal of the book and should be 
treated as such.  
 
1.3.2 Definitions 
Definitions of the terms ‘international conference’, ‘international treaty’ and 
‘international organization’ should be agreed upon. An international conference is the least 
formalized way of cooperation. “There is an often heard precept: ‘The Conference is the master 
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of its own procedure’.”189 Thus, definition of a conference should fully reflect its procedural 
flexibility and inherent diversity.  
Generally, a conference is understood as “a large meeting, often lasting a few days, 
where people who are interested in a particular subject come together to discuss ideas.”190 In 
legal literature the term is defined with more precision. A prominent Russian scholar proposed a 
definition of an international conference that emphasizes three characteristics: it is temporary, it 
must have representatives of at least three States, and it has goals agreed upon by the 
participants.191 The second characteristic reflects a common understanding of a conference as a 
‘large meeting’, which is a rather arbitrary categorization. There are authors who argue that a 
conference exists only when at least four States are present,192 others argue that a bilateral 
conference is also a possibility.193 With no definitive argument in favor of a specific number of 
participants or in favor of an unspecific description as a ‘large meeting’ – apart from an 
overgeneralized perception about what a conference should look like – it is suggested to drop 
this characteristic.  
The following definition of the term ‘international conference’ is proposed for the 
purposes of the present book. An international conference is a temporary meeting consisting of 
official representatives of States and often intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organizations’ observers, following in its work an agreed-upon structure and rules of procedure, 
which has goals agreed upon by the participants, and is guided in its work by international law. 
‘International treaty’ is a more formalized concept and requires a precise definition. Such 
definition already exists in international law, is believed by the majority of authors to have 
become a norm of customary law and is widely accepted by States. Article 2(a) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties defines an international treaty as “an international agreement 
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied 
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in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation.”194 The definition limits the scope of the Convention to the treaties concluded only 
between States. In the present analysis such limitation should be considered unjustified.  
The Vienna Convention is a result of the United Nations International Law Commission 
multi-year work, where the compromises and due considerations while ‘packaging’ the 
Commission’s work product did not allow working on a broader topic combining international 
agreements with States-only participation and those with participation of international 
organizations.195 Moreover, the Commentaries to the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties in 
commentary to Article 1 explain that the decision to exclude treaties concluded by international 
organizations was made because “treaties concluded by international organizations have many 
special characteristics; and the Commission considered that it would unduly complicate and 
delay the drafting of the present articles if it were to attempt to include in them satisfactory 
provisions concerning treaties of international organizations.”196 
It is proposed to expand this widely respected definition of a treaty by incorporating a 
formula endorsed in the Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States that a treaty is “an agreement between two or more states or international 
organizations.”197 And surely the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations and between International Organizations,198 even though it has not 
yet entered into force, reaffirms that inclusion of international organizations as subjects capable 
of becoming parties to international treaties is legally justified. Thus, an international treaty is 
defined as an international agreement concluded between two or more States or international 
organizations in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation. 
One more caveat should be introduced. A growing practice of establishing institutional 
arrangements entrusted with the supervision of the implementation of a particular treaty, or with 
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review and development of such a treaty generally should not be considered a shift of a particular 
treaty into the realm of international organizations or conferences. It has been argued that such 
institutional arrangements commended with functions solely relating to the particular treaty are 
bodies not endowed with a distinct legal personality.199 Since such arrangements lack 
international legal personality, they should not be viewed as a separate mechanism, but rather as 
an ‘extension’ of the treaty mechanism. 
The definition of an international organization causes the most debates. Definitions range 
from a laconic: “International organization means intergovernmental organization,”200 to a page-
long description of possible variations within a structure of an organization.201 The Restatement 
of the Foreign Relations Law proposes a succinct definition of international organizations as 
“organizations that are created by an international agreement and have a membership consisting 
entirely or principally of states,”202 adding in the commentaries that “whether an activity 
undertaken jointly by states is an organization with international personality may be a matter of 
degree,”203 thus leaving a room for broad interpretation of the legal personality element. Some 
authors suggest identifying basic characteristics that distinguish an international 
intergovernmental organization instead of proposing a full-fledged definition. These 
characteristics are: “(i) establishment by some kind of international agreement among states; (ii) 
possession of what may be called a constitution; (iii) possession of organs separate from its 
members; (iv) establishment under international law; and (v) generally but not always an 
exclusive membership of states or governments, but at any rate predominant membership of 
states or governments.”204 
The balanced and authoritative definition proposed by the International Law Commission 
is suggested as the most appropriate one for the purposes of this book. A wide scholarly respect 
for this definition205 and appreciation of the Commission’s work in general206 underline 
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appropriateness of choosing it as the least controversial and as the most reliable one. In Article 
2(a) of the articles on Responsibility of International Organizations prepared by the Commission 
and endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly, an international organization is defined 
as “an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and 
possessing its own international legal personality. International organizations may include as 
members, in addition to States, other entities.”207 
As has been mentioned above, the definition of an international organization causes the 
most controversies among scholars. The following opinion explains, at least in part, why this is 
so: 
There are still no general rules or principles relating to international bodies 
corporate to which we can automatically turn when in search of their personal 
law. We have no recognized body of such rules or principles even as regards the 
existing types of international body corporate; as regards possible further types 
of international body corporate we are entirely in the realm of speculation. For 
the existing types we have the constituent instrument of each the bodies 
concerned, amplified somewhat by its constitutional practice, and calling for 
interpretation in accordance with the general principles of treaty interpretation 
recognized by international law. But we have no international equivalent for the 
common law relating to corporation or the modern statutory regulation of the 
various types of corporation.208 
In the absence of general rules applicable to each and every international organization, 
whatever definition is endorsed, there is always room for argument and disagreement. But while 
a clear-cut definition is a ‘matter of taste’, or more precisely is a matter of the purposes such a 
definition is being proposed for, particular characteristics embodied within the definition should 
be unambiguously explained and followed in a consistent way throughout the analysis.  
Another writer has reliably maintained that “there is no ‘law’ of international 
organizations, at least no widely accepted and uniformly interpreted law of international 
organizations, but there are ‘laws’ of international organizations. The implication is that, since 
the law governing each organization is to be found in or flows from its constitution and 
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constitutions are individualized instruments, there can be no general law nor general principles of 
law applicable to all or several organizations.”209 Therefore, the proposed definition will be used 
as a basis for a more precise and concrete analysis. The definition is not supposed to cover all 
variations, but merely to convey the understanding of a notion of an international organization in 
accordance with the widely supported scholarly views. 
 
1.3.3 Criteria of Analysis 
Next, it is proposed to focus on the following six criteria to distinguish these three 
identified categories: (1) membership/participation, (2) the secretariat, (3) international legal 
personality, (4) term of existence, (5) binding force of the relevant documents produced, and (6) 
existence of opportunities for States to modify their obligations. Each of these criteria will now 
be applied to the three categories of cooperation.  
 
1.3.3.1 1st Criterion - Participation 
The concept of an international conference has the least restrictive list of participants that 
might include non-governmental entities along with States and international organizations. But it 
is important to emphasize that since the focus of this analysis is cooperation of States, their 
participation is the crucial element in designating a gathering as an international conference in 
the international legal sense of the term. Thus, representatives of States must be present at the 
international conference, while representatives of international organizations and non-
governmental entities might also be welcome. 
Participation in international treaties pursuant to the adopted definition is limited to States 
and international organizations. An international treaty cannot have a private entity as a party, 
though it can affect rights and obligations of such actors.210 Membership of an international 
organization is even more restrictive. While both States and international organizations may 
become members of the organization, it should consist primarily of States. Although this 
‘primarily’ element is not an exact number or percentage, it is well accepted that international 
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organizations are created by and thereby are comprised of States, while for the benefit of the 
organization’s effective work other international organizations might become members.  
 
1.3.3.2 2nd Criterion - Secretariat 
The next criterion is the existence of a secretariat. Before proceeding with application of 
the criterion to the three categories, the notion of a ‘secretariat’ with a lower-case ‘s’ should be 
elaborated. Article 2(c) of the articles on Responsibility of International Organizations 
introduced the term ‘organ of an international organization’, which was defined as “any person 
or entity which has that status in accordance with the rules of the organization.”211 The Note to 
paragraph 221 of the Restatement explains that the term ‘organization’ is restrictive and includes 
such features as headquarters, staff and budget.212 German authors state that an international 
organization should have its own special organs to fulfill particular functions within the 
organization.213 It has been observed that all contemporary international organizations include an 
administrative organ, or a secretariat, which plays a central role in management of the 
organization and its activities.214 
These characteristics convey similar ideas, namely the presence of a permanent 
administration within the structure of the entity. Headquarters, budget and staff are all necessary 
prerequisites for the actual existence of organs of the organization simply because they need to 
be located in a certain place, be funded and have necessary personnel to fulfill its 
responsibilities. “The contemporary international secretariats are continuous and permanent; they 
perform diverse general functions.”215 Authors also note that secretariats of some international 
organizations “have not only technical and administrative functions, but also certain political and 
executive responsibilities which must, of course, be carried out in an impartial and neutral 
spirit.”216 This modern understanding of a secretariat should be distinguished from conferences’ 
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secretariats of the beginning of the 20th century, which performed purely technical functions and 
were not international in character.217 
While the latter views would be the theoretically correct one, in practice international 
organizations and consequently their secretariats vary significantly, where one organization is 
aimed at a narrow topic, for example the Cocoa International Organization,218 and thus its 
secretariat is fulfilling similarly limited functions, whereas the other, including the United 
Nations and the majority of its specialized agencies, were created to perform diverse functions, 
thereby requiring a secretariat with an extensive mandate. In other words, the breadth of 
secretariat’s functions is not indicative of its presence or otherwise. There are functions that have 
to be performed, normally administrative and organizational, for every international meeting, 
whether during a session of an international organization, treaty review meeting or an 
international conference. Every multilateral meeting has to be organized, papers should be 
distributed, rooms be arranged, translations secured and schedules maintained.  
The notion of a secretariat should be understood in terms of who is performing the 
functions, whatever these functions might be, though in most organizations secretariats are 
responsible for the day-to-day management of the organization. “Secretariats constitute the 
backbone of international organizations.”219 Most organizations have a single unified secretariat, 
which serves all organs, but some, for example the European Union, have a separate secretariat 
for each institution. Due to utter complexity of the European Union and institutions it is 
comprised of, and due to wide scope and diversity of functions performed by each institution, 
each one requires separate administrative support. For example, the European Council,220 which 
is charged with defining the priorities for the construction of Europe and indicating the direction 
to be taken by European policies, and the European Commission, which is empowered to 
propose legislation, enforce European law, set objectives and priorities for action, manage and 
implement European Union policies and the budget, and represent the Union outside Europe,221 
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obviously need separate secretariats to support the very different functions these institutions are 
performing. 
While the scope of functions of an international organization’s secretariat, as noted 
above, might vary from mere administrative functions to quasi-political ones,222 the one uniting 
feature should be the makeup of the entity performing them. When the Universal Postal Union 
was created, its secretariat, the International Bureau, was placed under the oversight of the Swiss 
government.223 This approach, however, was abandoned with respect to organizations created 
later. Currently it is presumed that a secretariat of an international organization should be 
comprised of a highly qualified staff not influenced by the will of member States to ensure that 
they are performing their functions independently and in the name of the organization.224 It is 
widely believed that the efficient functioning of international organizations is to a significant 
extent dependent on the quality of their secretariats and in particular on their ability to be 
perceived as truly international, namely independent and impartial and not as serving interests of 
a single member or a group of members.225  
Consequently, the secretariat of an international organization is a separate permanent 
organ within the structure of the organization, staffed by highly qualified employees discharging 
their functions independently of the will of member States and acting in the best interest and on 
behalf of the international organization. Despite the variations in the functions of secretariats of 
different organizations, there are several crucial characteristics that allow identifying the entity 
serving as an organization’s secretariat. These are the following: (1) a separate organ within the 
structure of the organization; (2) working on a permanent basis and financed from the 
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organization’s budget; (3) and acting independently from the will of member States and pursuing 
in its work goals of the international organization, thus possessing an international character.226  
With regard to the meetings that might be commenced in connection to a treaty, be it a 
treaty review meeting or an ad hoc meeting considering issues pertaining to the treaty 
implementation, a separate entity ensuring proper organization and administration of the meeting 
might also be present, but none of the above enumerated criteria of the international 
organization’s secretariat is met. While it might be a separate organ within an organization’s 
structure, it should be kept in mind that an organization and a treaty are not the same, and thus 
utilization of an organization’s secretariat for a treaty-concerned meeting does not make the 
organization’s secretariat the ‘treaty’s’ secretariat. The next two criteria should be analyzed 
along the same lines: the administrative organ is either not working permanently, or even if it is – 
if the organization’s secretariat is used – it is not working permanently ‘for the treaty’, it is 
working permanently for the hosting organization; and it is not working independently from the 
will of the States gathered, quite to the contrary, it is performing functions that the meeting 
deems necessary to be performed.  
The same is true for an international conference. Oftentimes a conference is utilizing 
administrative capacities of a hosting international organization, but that does not amount to 
transformation of the organization’s secretariat into the conference’s secretariat. While all 
characteristics of the organ performing functions of a conference’s secretariat might be present, 
one should keep track of the actual ‘owner’ of the analyzed conference’s secretariat. Other 
conferences, by contrast, might designate a hosting State or a committee comprised of States’ 
representatives as those responsible for secretarial functions. In this rather straightforward case, 
neither of the three enumerated secretariat’s characteristics is met, thus giving rise to the 
conclusion that the conference’s administrative organ does not amount to an international 
organization’s secretariat as it has been described above. Again, it should be kept in mind that 
functions per se do not add anything to the designation of the administrative organ as a 
secretariat, while only the structural characteristics identified above are relevant for the analysis. 
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Ways and means of achieving the goals may vary among the participants, thus an 
effective administration is necessary.227 An international conference, a treaty and an international 
organization alike all need an administrative capacity to pursue their respective goals in 
international cooperation. In this sense, all three need a ‘secretariat’, but only one has a 
secretariat in the international legal sense. International organizations possess a separate organ 
within their structure working on a permanent basis toward fulfillment of the organizations’ 
goals independent from the will of member States. International treaties and international 
conferences have the secretarial functions performed either by a secretariat of a hosting 
organization or by an ad hoc entity established solely for the duration of the meeting.  
 
1.3.3.3 3rd Criterion – Legal Personality 
The third criterion is the existence of international legal personality. International legal 
personality can exclusively be found in international organizations, and it is now generally 
considered to be their most important constitutive element that distinguishes them from other 
entities, which are nothing more than organs common to two or more States.228 At the same time, 
the concept of legal personality is subject to significant controversy in legal writings. Within this 
characteristic some distinguish between a legal standing – that is an ability to be a subject of 
international law, and a legal capacity – an ability to enter in international relations, for example 
to conclude treaties, establish diplomatic relations, bear responsibility for wrongful acts and 
suchlike.229 Both elements depend on the will of States creating an international organization, but 
legal standing is a necessary prerequisite for legal capacity.230 Alternatively, it is suggested that 
any international organization is created as a subject of international law, that is with legal 
standing, while legal capacity is determined based on the powers and the functions of the 
organization.231 Other authors do not distinguish two elements of legal personality, but take the 
view that presence of legal personality for an international organization is a question of positive 
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law and depends upon its constituent treaty. States are therefore free to accord legal personality 
to an organization, or to withhold it.232  
If the view is taken that international organizations are able to participate in international 
conferences and can become parties to a treaty, then the conclusion should be made that any 
international organization ipso facto is created as a subject of international law; otherwise no 
such participation would have been possible. But it is also undisputable that the powers of an 
international organization depend on the will of the creating States. While the United Nations has 
been created as an organization with a broad authority, the World Trade Organization has a 
rather limited mandate. The theoretical dispute about the scope, nature and source of 
international organization’s legal capacity is a complicated one and should be left to specialists 
in this area.  
Further, there are two basic approaches to the problem of international legal personality. 
“First, there are those who identify certain rights, duties and powers expressly conferred upon the 
organization, and derive from these the international personality of the organization.”233 This 
approach suggests deducing international legal personality from a general treaty-making power 
or from the presence of organization’s staff privileges and immunities. At the same time, both 
the treaty-making power and appropriate privileges and immunities are deduced from the very 
fact of international personality. “In other words, the reasoning is circular. To avoid such a 
consequence, it should be clearly understood that legal personality has no predetermined content 
in international law.”234 While international legal personality is a necessary attribute of any 
international organization, attribution of this quality to an organization does not authorize it to 
perform any specific acts.  
Thus, it is necessary to identify the features of an international entity as such that allow 
attributing international personality and qualifying it as an international organization, 
irrespective of the concrete functions that this entity is capable of performing. International legal 
personality is a prerequisite for the status of a subject of international law. Being a subject of 
international law means the capacity to possess international legal rights and duties: the capacity 
to possess, not the possession. Consequently, to identify presence of legal personality one needs 
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to analyze not the specific powers and rights of the entity, but to examine general characteristics 
conferred upon it by the founding States, since “the international legal personality of 
international organizations is based upon the will of the founders.”235 
This approach makes international legal personality of an international organization 
dependent on fulfillment of certain criteria. Sir Brownlie suggested that the following criteria 
should be present to determine existence of international personality: (1) a permanent association 
of States, with lawful objectives, equipped with organs; (2) a distinction, in terms of legal powers 
and purposes, between the organization and its member States; and (3) the existence of legal 
powers exercisable on the international plane and not solely within the national systems of one or 
more States.236  
This approach presents itself as a more practical one in terms of providing a realistic 
opportunity to apply the identified criteria to any particular international organization in question 
to determine whether the international personality is in place. This is so because currently there 
are dozens of international organizations created for completely different purposes, ranging from 
supervision over exploitation of a particular natural resource237 to a broad mandate of the United 
Nations. Having particular criteria in place, thus, as opposed to rather vaguely understood 
“rights, duties and powers expressly conferred upon the organization,” which in the end may not 
be expressly enumerated in any underlying document of the international organization, is 
analytically a more helpful tool applicable to the whole diversity of currently existing 
international organizations. Moreover, this approach allows avoiding circular reasoning 
discussed above and shifts the emphasis onto general characteristics that can be identified 
irrespective of the precise catalogue of rights and obligations the international organization in 
fact enjoys.  
One might point out that the third characteristic advocated by Sir Brownlie speaks 
precisely about “legal powers exercisable on the international plane,” while it has been advised 
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that specific rights and obligations should not be indicative of a legal personality attribution. A 
closer reading of the last characteristic reveals that it speaks not about particular powers that 
should be present, but rather intends to emphasize an international character of personality by 
juxtaposing powers exercisable on the international plane and on the national plane. Moreover, 
the fact that an attribution of legal personality does not ipso facto confer any specific rights and 
obligations does not mean that there is an international organization not enjoying any – simply 
because it would have been a surprisingly useless organization, which States are not likely to 
ever create. This only entails that there is no such list of legal powers of an international 
organization that are automatically bestowed on the organization by way of its creation as a 
subject of international law. 
To add authority to the advocated methodology in attributing international legal 
personality to an international organization, the only International Court of Justice case dealing 
specifically with this matter should be briefly referred to. Authors point out that in the 
Reparations Case the International Court of Justice identified legal personality of the United 
Nations based on examination of (1) several factors surrounding the establishment of the United 
Nations, (2) provisions of the United Nations Charter and (3) the subsequent practice of the 
international community in relation to the United Nations.238 Despite the multiplicity of views on 
the scope and applicability of the conclusions arrived at in the Reparations Case, it seems that 
the Court did in fact identify two criteria indispensable for an international organization 
possessing legal personality.  
First, it is an association of States or international organizations or both with lawful 
objectives and with one or more organs, which are not subject to the authority of any other 
organized communities. Second, a distinction exists between the organization and its members in 
respect of legal rights, duties, powers and liabilities on the international plane as contrasted with 
the national and transnational plane, thus making clear that the organization was intended to have 
such rights, duties, powers and liabilities.239 In essence, these criteria are compatible and reflect 
Sir Brownlie’s approach discussed above, although they are not identical. In the absence of the 
precise wording in the International Court of Justice’s ruling, the following understanding of the 
necessary criteria for identification of international organization’s legal personality is proposed. 
                                                        
238 See, C.F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (2005), at 81. 
239 Id. at 82-83. 
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For the purposes of this book the international legal personality should be understood as 
conveying the status of a subject of international law onto an international organization. To 
identify the presence of legal personality one needs to make sure that specific criteria are present. 
Combining the earlier cited academic approach of Sir Brownlie and the scholarly analysis of the 
criteria derived from the International Court of Justice decision, it is proposed that four criteria 
should be present to determine the existence of the international legal personality. These are the 
following: (1) it is an association of States or international organizations or both with lawful 
objectives; (2) with one or more organs, which are not subject to the authority of any other 
organized communities; (3) legal powers and purposes are distinct between the organization and 
its member States; and (4) it possesses legal powers exercisable on the international plane and 
not solely within the national systems of one or more States.  
It is logical to assert that the proposed characteristics, especially the third and the fourth 
ones are somewhat broadly worded, and thus guidance is necessary in their application. Here the 
international organization’s scope of powers would prove helpful. As it has been argued above, 
no ‘law of international organizations’ exists and the international legal personality as a status 
does not convey possession of any legal powers; there is only a number of ‘laws of international 
organizations’ and that makes impossible drawing any specific, concrete and irrefutable 
conclusions about the scope of powers characteristic for every international organization 
imaginable. But it has been persuasively argued that certain presumptions derived from a 
statistically correct analysis of numerous international organizations’ constituent documents 
about certain organizations’ capacities exist.  
International organizations exercise exclusive jurisdiction over their 
organs, have the capacity generally to conclude treaties and international 
agreements, exercise a certain jurisdiction over matters arising on and within their 
premises and concerned with the functions of the organizations and the official 
duties of staff, have an active and passive ius legationis, have power to convoke 
and participate in international conferences, may become members of other 
international organizations, may be the subject of active and passive 
responsibility, may bring claims, whether in respect of injuries to their staff or 
otherwise, and have claims brought against them and may engage in the 
settlement of their disputes by peaceful means.240 
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In line with the earlier conclusion about the absence of universal principles of the ‘law of 
international organizations’, the proposed list should not be viewed as either exhaustive or as 
containing items that must necessarily be attributed to every reviewed organization. The value of 
the proposed list lies in providing exemplary capacities of an international organization that 
signal presence of legal powers and purposes distinct between the organization and its member 
States, and so signal possession of legal powers exercisable on the international plane. 
Another indicator, as established by the International Court of Justice precedent, that can 
be used to identify presence of international legal personality is the following language of the 
organization’s constituent document: “The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its 
Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the 
fulfillment of its purposes.”241 Although this formula per se does not convey the status of a 
subject of international law, such wording of Article 104 of the United Nations Charter, along 
with other provisions of the Charter, prompted the International Court of Justice in the 
Reparations Case to conclude, among others, that the Organization was an international person, 
meaning that “it is a subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights 
and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims.”242 
Hence, identification of a similar provision or provisions to the same effect in constituent 
documents of the entity under consideration serves as a firm indicator in favor of a conclusion of 
an existing international legal personality.243 
By way of conclusion, every international organization is created as a subject of 
international law. This determination can be made by application of the four identified 
characteristics using evidence either based on the text of the constituent documents, or based on 
the practice when documents are silent or ambiguous regarding this matter. Alternatively, legal 
personality may be identified relying on the precedent of International Court of Justice in case 
the cited above language can be found in the constituent documents of the organization. 
                                                        
241 Art. 104 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
242 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, I.C.J. Rep (1949), at 178. 
243 Strictly speaking, the value of precedent in international law is quite different from that in the legal tradition of 
Anglo-Saxon law. Nevertheless, decisions of the Permanent Court of Justice and the International Court of Justice 
have been consistently considered authoritative in the international legal doctrine. The US Supreme Court has on 
some occasions denied the precedent value of the International Court of Justice decisions, while acknowledging it on 
other occasions. For an overview of the practice of US higher courts in this regard see, C.A. Bradley and J.L. 
Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law: Cases and Materials (2011), at 605-712. 
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 Neither a conference, nor a treaty is a subject of international law and thus neither has 
legal personality or any of the capacities enumerated above. It is well established in the theory of 
international law that subjects of international law are those possessing international rights and 
obligations, and whose actions are directly regulated by the norms of international law.244 
Traditionally, only sovereign States and international organizations are considered subjects of 
international law; the status of a subject of international law of individuals, companies, 
insurgents and national liberation movements, ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples is 
subject to argument and there is no unanimity in this regard.245 Neither international treaties, nor 
conferences are regarded in the theory of international law – and indeed cannot be regarded for 
common sense reasons – subjects of international law, therefore excluding them from the list of 
entities capable of possessing international legal personality.  
It should be noted that national legal personality is a separate issue. International 
organizations usually possess national legal personality for obvious reasons: to be able to rent or 
buy property, hire employees, maintain bank accounts and so on. The vast majority of 
constituent documents proclaim the power of international organizations to act as autonomous 
legal persons in national legal orders.246 An entity, which cannot be characterized as an 
international organization from an international legal perspective, may also be granted a status of 
a legal person depending on the host State’s national legislation.247 The scope of national legal 
personality, and the respective rights and obligations are regulated by municipal laws of the 
hosting State and do not affect the international legal nature of the entity in question. 
 
1.3.3.4 4th Criterion - Term 
The next criterion concerns the term of existence. An international conference is always 
temporary, and that is duly reflected in the definition. A conference may suspend and later 
                                                        
244 See, W.G. Vitzthum et al., Völkerrecht [International Law] (2007), at 212. 
245 Cf., P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (1997), at 91-108. 
246 For more information see, P. Sands and P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (2009), at 480-515. 
247 E.g., in accordance with 2005 Arrangement between Canada, the Republic of France, the Russian Federation and 
the United States of America Regarding the Headquarters of the International COSPAS-SARSAT Programme, the 
Programme is provided with the legal capacities of a body corporate under Canadian domestic law; in accordance 
with 2005 Understanding between the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme and the Government Du Québec Concerning 
Exemptions, Fiscal Advantages and Courtesies Accorded to the Programme, Representatives of Member States and 
Officials of the Secretariat, the Government Du Québec recognizes the Programme as an international governmental 
organization. 
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resume its work, it may last for months or even years, but there is always a foreseeable moment 
when the conference is over.248  
Treaties vary significantly in their duration clauses. Generally, “it is normal to provide 
for the duration of the treaty and the procedure by which a party may withdraw from it, or for the 
conditions under which it can be terminated, unless the treaty is such that the possibility is not 
envisaged.”249 Duration, withdrawal and termination clauses are most common for bilateral 
treaties, while multilateral treaties also often include such provisions. In case of a multilateral 
treaty the decision not to include respective provisions is often guided by the desire of drafters to 
underline the treaty’s envisaged permanent existence.250  
Unlike conferences and treaties, organizations are normally created for an indefinite 
period of time, though exceptions do exist.251 “While international organizations are generally 
created for longer periods of time, indeed usually even without any definite time period in mind, 
not all of them manage to survive indefinitely. Some simply disappear without being succeeded 
to in any way… In other cases, organizations are remodeled to cope with new or unexpected 
demands, or are succeeded by new entities providing similar functions to their predecessors.”252  
Overall, international conferences are always temporary, international treaties might 
explicitly provide for a duration term or are otherwise presumed to be established for an 
indefinite period, and international organizations are presumed to be created for an indefinite 
period unless explicitly provided otherwise.  
                                                        
248 For example, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea lasted for 12 years. However, from the 
very beginning it had a specific goal defined in the UN General Assembly resolution 2750 C (XXV) in relevant part 
stating the following: “Decides to convene in 1973, […] a conference on the law of the sea which would deal with 
the establishment of an equitable international regime – including an international machinery – for the area and the 
resources of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, a 
precise definition of the area, and a broad range of related issues including those concerning the regimes of the high 
sea (including the question of the continental shelf, the territorial sea (including the question of its breadth and the 
question of international straits) and contiguous zone, fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high 
seas (including the question of the preferential rights of coastal States), the preservation of the marine environment 
(including, inter alia, the prevention of pollution) and scientific research.” 
249 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2013), at 379. 
250 For example, while Article XVI of the Outer Space Treaty provides for an opportunity to withdraw from the 
treaty subject to a written notification and a one-year grace period, it is silent on the matters of duration and 
termination. 
251 For example, the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community entered into force in 1952 with 
validity period of 50 years. Upon its expiration the Treaty was renewed. Pursuant to the Treaty of Nice (2001) all 
assets of the institutions created by the Treaty were transferred to European Community effectively terminating the 
international organization. See, Alter, J. Karen and D. Steinberg, “The theory and reality of the European Coal and 
Steel Community,” in Meunier, Sophie, McNamara, Kathleen (Eds.), Making History: European Integration and 
Institutional Change at Fifty, R 8 (2007), at 89-104. 
252 J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2002), at 320. 
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1.3.3.5 5th Criterion – Legal Force of Documents 
The fifth criterion is the binding force of the relevant documents produced. The result of 
an international conference in principle is a non-binding document. Only if the produced 
document receives formal support of participating States by way of the required number of 
signatures or ratifications does such document move to the category of an international treaty. 
This is so because an international treaty is the proper way to take on responsibilities and assume 
rights that are enforced in accordance with international legal norms. A legally non-binding 
document does not fall within the treaty category as it has been defined earlier and does not 
necessarily fall within any category. At the same time, a legally non-binding document 
constitutes the only type of documents that can always be produced by an international 
conference.  
An international treaty is, as said, always legally binding and creates legal rights and 
obligations for the parties. An international organization can produce documents legally binding 
its members along with non-binding documents. In legal literature it is often stated that an 
international organization’s decisions dealing with procedural issues and budget are legally 
binding on the members, while other documents are not. This is an overly broad conclusion, 
because, for example, resolutions of the United Nations Security Council are legally binding and 
do not deal with procedural or financial matters.  
From a theoretical point of view, a better approach is to distinguish between the 
organization’s decisions dealing with internal issues and those producing effects outside the 
organization’s legal order. In the discussion of the legal personality criterion it has been noted 
that normally one of the capacities of an international organization as an entity possessing legal 
personality is the exercise of jurisdiction over matters arising within its premises and concerned 
with the functions of the organization. Consequently, international organizations are empowered 
to adopt legally binding decisions with respect to their internal matters, unless a constituent 
treaty expressly states otherwise.253  
On the other hand, it is largely agreed “that the power to adopt normative acts binding on 
members in the “external sphere” must be expressly stated in the organization’s instruments and 
                                                        
253 See, e.g. ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the UNAT (1954), at 56. 
 80 
may not be implied.”254 So while it should be agreed that international organizations are 
empowered to adopt both legally binding and non-binding documents, the exact scope of the 
organizations’ decisions that bind their members should be determined on a case-by-case basis, 
since it depends on their respective constitutive documents. Of course, international 
organizations almost by definition are established on the basis of such constitutive documents 
qualifying as treaties – treaties, which do not only lay down substantive rights and obligations for 
the State parties, but also create the organization itself and determine its role, functions and 
powers, including the power to enunciate binding or non-binding documents. Thus, the 
constitutive treaty itself is always binding, but other documents produced by the organization 
may or may not possess binding force depending on the treaty’s respective provisions.  
 
1.3.3.6 6th Criterion – Modification of Obligations 
The final criterion is the opportunity for States to modify their obligations; that is whether 
participating States have the right to modify or reject imposed obligations. With regard to 
documents adopted during an international conference the answer is straightforward owing to the 
lack of a legally binding nature of such documents (unless, of course, treaties are concerned). 
The absence of a legal obligation in the first place gives a State’s disagreement with the adopted 
document no more than a political or a moral value. While a clear statement of the State’s 
representative that his country does not agree with the proposed text, or maybe the measure in 
general, might serve long- or short-term political goals, from a strictly legal perspective it does 
not add or detract anything from the document in question.  
A State’s dissent with an international treaty, however, can affect its legal obligations. 
Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties pronounces: “A State may, when 
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless: 
(a) The reservation is prohibited by the treaty; (b) The treaty provides that only specified 
reservations, which do not include the reservation in question, may be made; or (c) In cases not 
falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the treaty.”255 It is important to note that reservations may lead to different sets of 
legal rights and obligations between different groups of States in cases regulated by Articles 20 
                                                        
254 P. Sands and P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (2009), at 285. 
255 Art. 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, entered into force January 27, 
1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 81 
and 21 of the Vienna Convention. But that does not alter the legally binding force of the treaty, 
while some articles may become enforceable against one State and not the other.  
The second procedure to modify obligations imposed by the treaty is amendment of the 
treaty.  Overall, this matter of the law of treaties is fairly settled in the theory of international law 
and for the purposes of the present analysis requires a mere reiteration of the general applicable 
rules. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties lays down the basic rules of the 
amendment procedure. “Article 39 states the general rule regarding the amendment of treaties, 
whether bilateral or multilateral: a treaty may be amended by ‘agreement’ between parties. The 
use of this word recognizes that it is perfectly possible to amend a treaty by an agreement that 
does not itself constitute a treaty or, possibly, by an oral agreement, the legal force of which is 
preserved by Article 3. A treaty can also be effectively amended by subsequent agreement 
between the parties regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty.”256 
Articles 40 and 41 of the Vienna Convention set forth a procedure for amendment of 
multilateral treaties that applies unless the treaty in question stipulates a different procedure. In 
the case of a multilateral treaty with a large number of parties, it becomes less likely that an 
amendment would be agreed upon and ratified by all original parties. This “has led to an 
increasing practice of bringing amending agreements into force as between those States willing 
to accept the amendment, while at the same time leaving the existing treaty in force with respect 
to the other parties to the earlier treaty. The consequence of this last consideration is […] that an 
amending treaty may well created two categories of States each bound by differing 
obligations.”257 
In sum, States have two chances to amend their obligations pursuant to a treaty: the first 
one upon the initial acceptance of the treaty by unilateral notification of such changes, and 
afterwards any time throughout the treaty’s duration, but this time exclusively by way of 
agreement with other parties. Both procedures – reservations and amendments – despite the 
former being a unilateral act and the latter a collective one, might lead to creation of different 
sets of obligations between different groups of State-parties to the treaty in question. This 
problem is especially acute, and thus should be duly considered in the following analysis, for the 
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multilateral treaties with numerous parties, the Outer Space Treaty being the most prominent 
example with over a hundred State-parties. 
As it has been established earlier, international organizations can adopt both legally 
binding and non-binding documents. In case of a legally non-binding document, an analogy to 
that of an international conference can be made: in the absence of a legal obligation, there is no 
way to modify what is non-existent, but a moral and political value can be attached to the State’s 
protest. When it comes to legally binding decisions no standard procedure akin to making 
amendments to a treaty can be found in general international law; such procedures are a matter to 
be decided on a case-by-case basis in the respective organization’s constitutive documents. That 
is a logical outcome given the fact that there is no generic ‘law of international organizations’. 
On the one hand, it is often suggested that once an international organization is created it 
becomes a separate entity with its own will distinguishable from the will of its members.258 
Thereby, when a legally binding decision is adopted, States are bound by way of their 
membership to abide by these rules no matter the individual view of a State on the matter. On the 
other hand, States are free to draft structure, procedure, voting rules, scope of powers of a new 
organization as they see fit. Thus, States are free to create a ‘law of this organization’, which can 
consequently provide for a mechanism of obligations’ modification or refrain from doing so.  
States are not restricted by an obligation to include a particular set of provisions in the 
organization’s constituent treaty. Depending on the goals of an organization, its membership, 
structure or any other considerations that States deem relevant, the organization might be 
endowed with certain legal powers and capacities and be deprived of the others; it might have a 
complex structure of organs or be functioning using merely a plenary organ and a secretariat; it 
might be empowered to adopt binding decisions on all questions under consideration or deprived 
of the right to adopt any binding documents. In the same vein, constituent documents might 
                                                        
258 See, G. Myrdal, Realities and Illusions in Regard to Intergovernmental Organization, in Hobhouse Memorial 
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provide for a States’ right to modify the imposed obligations or opt out altogether from the 
adopted documents, might withhold such a right or limit it to specific types of obligations.259 
It should be noted that the constituent treaty of an international organization, being a 
classic international treaty, is subject to provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, meaning that it might be changed using the procedures of reservations and 
amendments. The provisions regarding the amendment procedure of constituent documents of 
organizations are fairly common, as will be shown in the course of the analysis. The provisions 
allowing for reservations to constituent treaties of organizations, however, are much less 
common and will be encountered only once in the course of the book. Generally, the provisions 
allowing reservations to a constituent treaty of an organization are quite rare in international 
practice, with the Chemical Weapons Convention being one of the few well-known 
exceptions.260  
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in Article 20 stipulates: “When a treaty is 
a constituent document of an international organization and unless it otherwise provides, a 
reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that organizations.” The main 
difficulty with this provision is identification of the ‘competent organ’, since few constituent 
documents spell out which organ is deemed to be competent to deal with reservations. Moreover, 
it is not entirely clear whether reservations are compatible with international organizations’ 
constituent treaties: reservations to provisions establishing functions, organs, voting rights and 
many other provisions might well be deemed incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
treaty. The matter of reservations to international organizations’ constituent treaties is somewhat 
unsettled and is being shaped mostly by practice.261  
 
1.3.4 Purposes of Different Categories of Cooperation 
The final most general distinction between the three categories that should be drawn 
concerns the purposes. States have a choice between an international conference, a treaty or an 
                                                        
259 E.g., the World Health Assembly may adopt regulations on matters such as sanitary and quarantine procedures, 
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organization, and there is a reason why they choose one over the other in different 
circumstances. Although each case is special and should be treated as such, the doctrine of 
international relations has identified in most broad terms the reasons behind calling for a 
conference, developing a treaty or creating an organization. 
An international conference, being the least institutionalized and the least formalized 
category of cooperation, presupposes a greater variability of the goals States are trying to achieve 
as a result of the conference. One author explained: “If one wishes to make a broad division one 
can say that intergovernmental conferences are deliberative, legislative, or informational, and 
sometimes two or three of these at the same time: 
- a deliberative conference concentrates on general discussions and exchanges of 
points of view on certain topics; 
- a legislative conference endeavors to make recommendations to governments or 
makes decisions which are binding upon governments, or may even result in treaties; 
- an informal conference has as its main purpose the international exchange of 
information of specific questions.”262 
This quoted view should be read in context : in the cited book the author focuses on 
conference diplomacy, not the analysis of a conference as a mechanism of cooperation. 
Conference diplomacy is analyzed as an internal mechanism of multilateral diplomacy, which 
can take place within a classical conference, within the United Nations General Assembly 
session or an annual meeting of the United Nations specialized agency. If analyzed from this 
perspective, any gathering of States, be it a part of international organization’s work, an ad hoc 
conference or a treaty negotiation is considered a conference. In the present work, however, strict 
limits have been established by way of defining each category. From the previous analysis it is 
clear that a conference cannot produce documents or make decisions that are binding upon 
governments (unless treaties are concerned, which are of course addressed here as a separate 
category).  
The earlier cited scholarly opinion suggests that there are two types of conferences: 
deliberative and informal. For an informal conference a desirable outcome might be described as 
exchange of views, establishment of closer relations between States and their representatives, 
understanding of respective States views on matters under consideration and the like. A 
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deliberative conference should be considered successful when States are able to exchange 
information and relevant scientific and technical data, understand mutual problems and agree to 
work toward their solution, and more generally when a conference is able to promote 
intergovernmental cooperation on various levels.263 Hence, neither type can be described in 
definitive terms as having a precise purpose and corresponding explicit result, and therefore such 
a distinction should be characterized as rather artificial and difficult to uphold in practice.  
International conferences constitute the least formalized category of cooperation; each 
conference is unique in its background, participation and proclaimed purposes. Therefore, no 
precise scale to measure a conference’s success can and should be proposed, and each 
conference should be analyzed and evaluated on a case-by-case basis. At the same time, a 
successful conference is generally the one that triggers, incentivizes further dialogue and 
cooperation, and not the one producing first-class concluding acts and documents. In other 
words, material results of the conference are of less importance when evaluating the conference’s 
success. The adoption of concluding documents as a result of a conference is not by itself 
evidence of its success or otherwise. Any document adopted as a result of a conference may 
either remain a concluding document without more, or it may become a basis for further 
cooperative activities. If and when provisions of the concluding document are transformed into a 
cooperative agenda of conference’s participants and they are being implemented through their 
concerted activities, the concluding document transforms into evidence of a conference’s 
success.   
An international treaty by way of definition always has a goal of establishing legally 
enforceable rights and obligations of the parties. As one of the distinguished international law 
scholars Kelsen stated, a treaty is an agreement normally entered into by two or more states 
under general international law. “An agreement is an act of coming into accord, or the state of 
being in accord – accord of opinion or will. A treaty is a manifested accord of will of two or 
more states.”264 Thus, a treaty is only possible when there is an accord of will of parties to the 
treaty. 
It has been proposed that an international treaty is to be defined as a proclamation of at 
least two subjects of international law aimed at “justification, amendment or cease of 
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international relations.”265 This view corresponds to the one expressed in the beginning of the 
twentieth century that only such treaties are a source of international law that “stipulate new 
rules for future international conduct or confirm, define, or abolish existing customary or 
conventional rules.”266 A treaty is said to require an intention of the parties to create legal rights 
and obligations or to establish relations governed by international law.267 Simultaneously, the 
agreement is presumed to be non-binding where the substance of the agreement is no more than a 
description of policy, purpose or intent, and when the text of the agreement lacks precision.268  
A reasonable conclusion can be drawn that a treaty has a purpose of formalizing the 
matching will of participating States to justify, amend or cancel international relations by way of 
creating specified legal rights and obligations.  
Now purposes of an international organization as a way of cooperation shall be explored. 
Former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurt stated:  
Nation states are … incompetent. None of them, not even the United 
States as the single remaining super-power, can adequately provide for the needs 
that its citizens now articulate. The extent of that incompetence has become 
sharply clearer during this century. The inadequacies of national governments to 
provide security, prosperity or a decent environment have brought into being a 
huge array of international rules, conferences and institutions; the only answer to 
the puzzle of the immortal but incompetent nation state is effective cooperation 
between those states for all the purposes that lie beyond the reach of any one of 
them.269 
It is thus plausible to suggest that States unite in international organizations pursuing a 
goal that would be achieved faster, more effectively or efficiently through collaboration with 
other States.270 “International organizations, in the opinion of those who have studied the matter 
in the socialist countries, offer outstanding possibilities for co-operation between States in 
specific fields, and organizations such as the United Nations and certain regional organizations 
offer excellent means of settling inter-State disputes.”271 
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Writers tend to divide organizations by their activities into general and specialized 
organizations and political and technical ones; others use a threefold division: military/security, 
political and economic organizations; another three-fold approach distinguishes between 
economic and technical arrangements, arrangements for defense purposes and arrangements 
providing frameworks for consideration of broad political issues.272 Whatever classification is 
favored, it is safe to conclude that States utilize international organizations for achieving a 
variety of goals, which, first, require a certain level of continuous cooperation and coordination, 
and second, can be better or more efficiently solved through a mechanism of organization. More 
broadly, whatever the specific goals pursued by States in creating an international organization 
are, the primary objective “is to institutionalize their cooperation in different fields and, to that 
end, to establish structures for the coordination of their policies or for the execution of common 
projects and actions.”273 
Based on the preceding analysis, it is possible to draw general conclusions about the 
matters most effectively addressed using an international conference, or an international treaty or 
an international organization. An international conference, being the least formalized method of 
cooperation, should be deemed effective in addressing broad issues: either the issues 
encompassing a multitude of topics that have to be discussed among multiple subjects, or the 
issues that by virtue of their novelty do not yet have a precise list of topics for discussion and the 
general exchange of views is deemed most beneficial, or the issues that by virtue of their 
controversial nature should be discussed in a somewhat less formal manner, or any other issues 
discussion of which in a multilateral setting targeting a particular matter under consideration – as 
opposed to plenary organs or large forums with open-ended mandates – would be beneficial for 
promoting greater understanding and cooperation.  
Treaties are most effective when there is a need to formalize respective rights and 
obligations of the parties, to mandate compliance with the outlined rights and obligations and to 
provide an opportunity to enforce stipulated provisions using appropriate procedures. 
International organizations are a way to institutionalize cooperative activities of States in 
achievement of the goals that are better or more easily achieved collectively. This not only 
means that international organizations are effective in addressing matters that are considered 
                                                        
272 See, C. Archer, International Organizations (1992), 53. 
273 P. Sands and P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (2009), at 291. 
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‘concerns of the whole international community’, for example environmental issues; but also 
international organizations, being subjects of international law, are capable of formally 
addressing complex issues on a continuous basis, and are capable of taking steps toward 




Throughout this chapter the process of international space cooperation evolution has been 
reviewed and the overarching characteristics that define different ways in which States cooperate 
in the area have been addressed. A significant number of mechanisms of cooperation created 
during the space era require that a unified theoretical approach be proposed to analyze, classify 
and evaluate them in a comprehensive manner. In the subsequent chapters the mechanisms of 
international legal cooperation of States in outer space will be analyzed based on the proposed 
set of criteria and the general understanding of the purposes of cooperation using either the 
international conference, the treaty or the international organization category.  
By way of conclusion, the following summary of the six criteria is proposed. 
1. The membership/participation criterion refers to the subjects that enjoy the primary status 
within a particular mechanism of cooperation, as opposed to an ad hoc visitor’s status.  
a. International organization’s membership: primarily States, but intergovernmental 
organizations might also become members. 
b. International treaty’s participation: primarily States, but intergovernmental 
organizations might also become participants.  
c. International conference’s participation: primarily States, but intergovernmental 
organizations and non-governmental entities might also become participants.  
2. The secretariat criterion refers to the ‘entity’/’entities’ performing the administrative or 
any other required functions within a particular mechanism of cooperation.  
a. An international organization’s secretariat – usually considered as a true 
‘Secretariat’ – possesses the following characteristics: (1) a separate organ within the 
structure of the organization; (2) working on a permanent basis and financed from the 
organization’s budget; (3) and acting independently from the will of member States and 
pursuing in its work goals of the international organization, thus possessing an 
international character of work. 
b. A secretariat of a meeting commenced with connection to an international treaty: 
(1) is an ad hoc entity not meeting the characteristics of the organization’s secretariat; (2) 
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or is a secretariat of a hosting international organization working as a meeting’s 
secretariat on a temporary basis. 
c. International conference’s secretariat: (1) is an ad hoc entity not meeting the 
characteristics of the organization’s secretariat; (2) or is a secretariat of a hosting 
international organization working as a conference’s secretariat on a temporary basis. 
3. The international legal personality criterion refers to the extent a status of subject of 
international law is provided to a particular mechanism of cooperation and the main entities 
involved in it.  
a. Usually, for existence of an international organization’s legal personality four 
criteria should be fulfilled: (1) it is an association of States or international organizations 
or both with lawful objectives; (2) it has one or more organs, which are not subject to the 
authority of any other organized communities; (3) legal powers and purposes are distinct 
between the organization and its member States; and (4) it possesses legal powers 
exercisable on the international plane and not solely within the national systems of one or 
more States. This determination can be made either based on the text of the constituent 
documents or based on the practice when documents are silent or ambiguous regarding 
this matter. 
b. An international treaty does not possess international legal personality. Only its 
participants – certainly the states involved, to some extent also IGOs – do have legal 
personality; which is reflected here mainly by formalized and attested powers to conclude 
a treaty. 
c. An international conference does not posses international legal personality. Only 
its participants – certainly the states involved, to some extent also IGOs – do have legal 
personality; which is not reflected however by specific functional privileges and 
immunities as with IGOs but only by the standard diplomatic privileges and immunities 
for state representatives. 
4. The term of existence criterion defines the period in which the particular mechanism of 
cooperation formally exists and, therefore, works.  
a. An international organization is presumed to be created for an indefinite period 
unless explicitly provided otherwise.  
b. An international treaty might explicitly provide for a duration term or is otherwise 
presumed to be established for an indefinite period. 
c. An international conference is created for a limited term, which can be defined by 
way of setting the exact dates of the conference’s work or by setting a goal the 
conference should achieve.  
5. The criterion of binding force of the relevant documents produced. 
a. An international organization might be capable of producing both legally binding 
and non-binding documents. Constituent documents of a particular international 
organization determine the power to enunciate binding or non-binding documents.   
b. An international treaty by definition is always a legally binding document. 
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c. An international conference normally produces legally non-binding documents. 
Political or moral value of the produced document does not affect it legal nature. 
6. The existence of opportunities for States to modify their obligations. This criterion 
determines whether a participating State has the right to modify or reject imposed obligations. 
a. In an international organization the opportunity to modify imposed obligations 
depends on the international organization’s constituent documents: they might provide 
for a right to modify or reject the imposed obligations, might withhold such a right, or 
limit it to specific types of obligations. 
b. International treaty obligations can be modified using the mechanism of 
reservations as defined and regulated by Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of the Treaties.  
c. An international conference does not normally produce legally binding documents 
(otherwise, those would be ruled under the regime applicable to treaties as per the above) 
and thereby does not impose legal obligations. No right to modify obligations is 
necessary. 
 91 




The late Judge Manfred Lachs noted: “The body of space law is impressive. Some of its 
provisions may be inadequate, some may constitute the mere scaffolding of the law of tomorrow, 
but many of them have matured at a very great speed, [and] have caught up with time. This new 
branch of international law is a telling testimony of the vitality of law in relations among states. 
Though the horizon may be clouded from time to time and doubts may be cast, it constitutes a 
reaffirmation of the claim that peaceful cooperation is possible only if all states submit to a 
universal rule of law in all dimensions.”1 
It has been contended that the United Nations treaties constitute the first of two layers of 
legal norms applicable to outer space activities of States and international intergovernmental 
organizations. It has been further noted that the United Nations core of international space law 
must be completed by other space organizations and numerous agreements on international 
cooperation in this field.2 In this chapter the core of international space law will be analyzed, 
particularly the Outer Space Treaty and three elaborating conventions. Although the Moon 
Agreement is in force, none of the major space-faring countries are currently inclined even to 
sign it, “and a well founded rumor has it that at least one ratifying state (Australia) has seriously 
contemplated withdrawal,”3 hence it will be excluded from the scope of the present part of the 
book.  
Over the years distinguished scholars have extensively analyzed these treaties, providing 
an interested reader with a collection of outstanding academic legal analyses of their substantive 
provisions, their evolution in the light of new challenges in exploration and use of outer space 
and possible paths of their further development in the years to come. In this book the focus will 
be on their institutional analysis, concentrating on the foundations these treaties have laid for 
                                                        
1 M. Lachs, “Foreword,” in N. Jasentuliyana and R.S.K. Lee, Manual on Space Law, Vol. I (1979), at xii. 
2 See, V. Kopal, Comments and Remarks, in Proceedings of the Workshop on Space Law “Disseminating and 
Developing International and National Space Law: The Latin America and Caribbean Perspective” (2005), at 25, 
cited in T.C. Brisibe, “A Normative System for Outer Space Activities in the Next Half Century,” in Proceedings of 
the International Institute of Space Law 2013 (2014), at 5.  
3 F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 178-79. 
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cooperation in outer space. Although neither the Outer Space Treaty, nor the three elaborating 
conventions have per se created a ‘machinery’ for cooperation, they should be duly considered 
for two reasons: first, they are the basis of the whole international legal regime in outer space; 
and second, they are the mechanisms of cooperation themselves and, thus, even though no doubt 
exists about the category of cooperation they should be attributed to, an in-depth analysis based 
on the six proposed criteria is an essential part of a comprehensive research this book is aimed at.   
Since the substantive provisions of the four analyzed treaties will not be scrutinized, as 
has been mentioned above, the analysis will follow from the review of the treaties’ negotiation 
processes as reflected in travaux préparatoires, to the substance of the principle of cooperation 
as it has been established in the treaties, and will be concluded by the overview of the practice of 
the relevant provisions’ application in modern international legal cooperation in outer space. 
 
2.1.1 Drafting History 
“Our peace is sealed by treaties – the Latin word for allies, foederati, comes straight from 
the word for treaties, foedera.”4 Thereby, it is interesting to note that the two antagonistic 
superpowers of that period despite their Cold War rivalry, were not only able to promote and 
lead development of international regime of outer space, “but were actually able to arrive at a 
general understanding that outer space should remain outside of the arms race as much as 
possible and by contrast should remain free and open for (in particular) scientific exploration, 
and finally that international law was to play a crucial role in guaranteeing such an outcome.”5  
Other authors also pointed out the crucial role played by States other than the two major 
space powers in ascertaining the need for a secure outer space exploitation environment. “While 
most smaller countries exhibited little concern about the possible consequences of opening 
Antarctica to exploration and exploitation, their attitude has from the very beginning been quite 
different in relation to space. Concern for security, more than any other value, has dominated 
their actions and reactions in the international arena. While convincing evidence of the great 
benefits that space may yield is still from the perspectives of many participants is most 
immediate. In this omnipresent fear that outer space may be used by the contending powers as 
means for power enhancement, including possible obliteration of whole communities, we may 
                                                        
4 V. Lowe, International Law (2007), at 8. 
5 F.G. von der Dunk, “International Space Law,” in F.G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 35. 
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perhaps find the explanations for demands that outer space be “demilitarized” and used for 
“peaceful purposes only” and for the “benefit of all mankind”.”6 
In reality, of course, the process of space treaties negotiation was not particularly smooth 
and uncontroversial. Vigorous debates, which were mostly anticipated, were concluded by 
concessions on all ends of the negotiation table. The Soviet Union proposed in 1962 that there 
should be a treaty on space law. The United States at first agreed only to have a General 
Assembly resolution, what resulted in the United Nations General Assembly resolution 1962 
(XVIII) of 1963 setting out legal principles governing States activities in exploration and use of 
outer space. “Negotiations towards a treaty went on desultorily for several years. As late as 
October 1965, the United States was still against a general treaty on space.”7 Less than a year 
later, however, in September 1966 the United States considered that the need for such a treaty 
was “all the more urgent because of man’s recent strides toward landing on the moon.”8 In the 
end, the willingness of States, or at least one State to work toward a space treaty development 
was prompted by the perceived practical needs of outer space exploration. 
It was stated that “the unique characteristics of outer space require a special lawmaking 
mechanism which should allow technical experts, government representatives and lawyers 
specializing in this field to interact together to accommodate both political and legal concerns in 
regulating space activities.”9 The fact that the Outer Space Treaty was drafted and negotiated 
within the COPUOS framework thus supports the above-cited opinion. “Although the Soviet 
Union was the country which most persistently urged codification of the principles of space law 
enunciated in United Nations resolutions, particularly in the Declaration of Legal Principles of 
1963, it was the initiative of the United States that set negotiations on the Space Treaty in 
motion.”10 Following the May 7, 1966 statement by President Johnson in which he proposed 
early discussion of a treaty governing the exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies, on 
June 17, 1966 the Permanent Representative to the United Nations of the United States tabled the 
Draft Treaty Governing the Exploration of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies containing 
                                                        
6 M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 20. 
7 B. Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (1997), at 205. 
8 Id.  
9 H. Qizhi, The Outer Space Treaty in Perspective, 25 J. Space L. 91 (1997), at 95.  
10 I.A. Vlasic, The Space Treaty: A Preliminary Evaluation, 55 Cal. L. Rev. 507 (1967), at 508.  
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nineteen articles that in effect elaborated twelve points outlined in the initial President Johnson’s 
proposal.11 
In less than a month the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Soviet 
Union addressed a letter to the Chairman of the Legal Subcommittee requesting “to circulate this 
letter as an official document of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space” containing the Soviet draft of the Treaty on Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies. The draft contained twelve articles and as evidenced by its name was not 
limited to celestial bodies but also included provisions applicable to activities in outer space, in 
contrast to the US proposal. “A comparison of the two drafts reveals that both heavily relied in 
their substantive provisions upon the principles contained in the Declaration of Legal Principles 
and the General Assembly Resolution 1884 which banned the stationing of weapons of mass 
destruction in outer space. In addition, both seem to have borrowed from the Antarctic Treaty the 
concept of inspection to ensure that no prohibited activities would take place on celestial 
bodies.”12 
With the submission of these two drafts the work on the Outer Space Treaty had 
commenced. It was negotiated by the then twenty-eight-member Legal Subcommittee of 
COPUOS during its Fifth Session held in Geneva from July 14 to August 4, 1966, and in New 
York from December 12 to 16, 1966. During the first few days of the Geneva round of the 
Subcommittee’s Fifth session a belief was expressed that a treaty regulating the conduct of States 
on celestial bodies and in outer space should be agreed upon as soon as possible. Most of the 
delegations felt that the principles set forth in the US and Soviet drafts were “a starting point and 
would be applied in practice later – in particular in the field of liability and the return of 
astronauts. It was therefore essential to define and codify now the largest number of points of 
agreement.”13 Representative of the United Kingdom Lord Caradon expressed the view that “the 
United States and the USSR were to be congratulated, not only on their dazzling achievements in 
                                                        
11 United Nations General Assembly, Letter Dated 16 June 1966 from the Permanent Representative of the United 
States of America addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/AC.105.32. 
12 I.A. Vlasic, The Space Treaty: A Preliminary Evaluation, 55 Cal. L. Rev. 507 (1967), at 510. 
13 P.G. Dembling and D.M. Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. of Air L. and Commerce 419 
(1967), at 428. 
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the conquest of space, but also on having come forward with proposals for international 
cooperation.”14  
He also noted that “the two texts under consideration were notable for their similarities,” 
but as further work showed there were enough differences to reconcile. Authors point at different 
positions of the two drafts and ensued argument within the Subcommittee with regard to the use 
of military equipment on celestial bodies, the principle of assistance and return of astronauts, the 
provision protecting outer space and celestial bodies from contamination and pollution, 
provisions contained in current Article X, the obligation to report outer space activities and 
participation of international organizations in the Outer Space Treaty.15 Some issues, as 
evidenced by travaux préparatoires proved to be more contentious than the others,16 but for the 
purposes of the present book attention will be paid to negotiation of the treaty provisions 
establishing and elaborating the principle of cooperation. The general debate, it should be noted, 
“ended in a spirit of great cooperativeness on the part of both space powers, each declaring its 
readiness to consider the possibility of incorporating in its own draft features not covered therein 
that appeared in the other’s proposal.”17 
Almost from the beginning of the negotiations the Soviet Union accepted the principles 
of freedom of and international cooperation in scientific investigations as proposed in the US 
draft.18 During the Fifth session Mr. Vinci of Italy expressed a view that “the United States draft 
treaty stated one of the major principles to be asserted: namely, the need for international 
cooperation and the need to make freely available the results of research in space.”19 He 
continued to suggest that “a new phase of international cooperation might begin, under United 
Nations auspices, in matters concerning outer space.”20 Mr. Ruda of Argentina elaborated on the 
theses his country believed to be a part of the principle of cooperation. By virtue of this principle 
“every State should: (1) assist other States carrying on activities in space; (2) help astronauts in 
                                                        
14 United Nations General Assembly, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcommittee, Fifth 
Session, Summary Record of the Fifty-Seventh Meeting, Page 17, A/AC.105/C.2/SR.57. 
15 Cf., P.G. Dembling and D.M. Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. of Air L. and Commerce 419 
(1967), at 440-53. 
16 Outer Space Treaty travaux préparatoires are available at 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treatyprep/ost/index.html. 
17 B. Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (1997), at 222. 
18 Id.  
19 United Nations General Assembly, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcommittee, Fifth 
Session, Summary Record of the Fifty-Eight Meeting, Page 6, A/AC.105/C.2/SR.58. 
20 Id. 
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their activities; (3) inform other States of activities taking place in space; (4) make available to 
other States the results of its research or exploration; (5) seek to prevent any contamination of the 
earth from space and of space from the earth; (6) seek to cooperate in scientific research 
conducted in that field; and (7) return to other States objects belonging to them or used by them 
in the exploration of space.”21 These views, thus, confirm the great importance of the principle of 
cooperation in the Outer Space Treaty negotiation, and especially the last one underscores the 
grand expectations of States from its application in outer space exploration and use.  
Despite the discussion held during the Fifth session, authors unanimously acknowledge 
that the Preamble and the first three articles of the Outer Space Treaty “were generally 
acceptable to the members of the Subcommittee and provoked little disagreement as to wording. 
The texts of these provisions were taken almost entirely from the Preamble and Articles I, II and 
III of the Soviet draft.”22 A prominent scholar has noted in this respect importance of the two 
preambular paragraphs explaining the purposes of the Treaty: the desire “to contribute to broad 
international cooperation in the scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use 
of outer space for peaceful purposes;”23 and the belief “that such cooperation will contribute to 
the development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between 
States and peoples.”24 Both these provisions rely heavily on the principle of cooperation in the 
hope for peaceful and beneficial for the whole international community exploration and use of 
outer space, and “both adequately reflect the historical conditions of the origin of the Outer 
Space Treaty, which was not only a response to the scientific and technical needs of that epoch, 
but also a substantive contribution to a détente in the cold war.”25 
Additionally, the technological sphere was surrounded by a complex set of political 
conditions, including the fact that the space technology was driven forward by military 
requirements, that the exploration of outer space immediately became the stage of the East-West 
conflict with a constant struggle for ‘space firsts’. “It is in the light of these aspects that the 
drafting of the Outer Space Treaty has to be understood. The foremost controversies in its text, 
                                                        
21 United Nations General Assembly, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcommittee, Fifth 
Session, Summary Record of the Sixtieth Meeting, Page 2-3, A/AC.105/C.2/SR.60. 
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where “free exploration”, is demanded next to activities “for the benefit and the interests of all 
countries irrespective of their degree of economic and scientific development” and “exclusively 
peaceful uses”, reflect the ambivalence and relative insecurity of the times.”26 
Interestingly, discussions about the need to work on a legal regime for assistance and 
return of astronauts and space vehicles, and liability for damage caused by objects launched into 
outer space historically preceded deliberations on the overall legal regime of outer space and 
celestial bodies exploration and use.27 During the very first meeting of the Legal Subcommittee 
the topics of liability and assistance and return of astronauts were put on the agenda along with 
the task of preparing a text on general principles relating to States’ activities in outer space,28 but 
the following sessions mainly dealt with the first two issues. When the Outer Space Treaty 
negotiations commenced, Mr. Goldberg of the United States pointed out that the draft treaty 
proposed by the United States “did not deal with the problem of liability for damage caused by 
space launchings, partly because its complexity seemed to make it an appropriate subject for 
separate agreement.”29 But representatives of developing countries, particularly Mr. Krishna of 
India expressed regret “that the two conventions on assistance and liability, which were of far-
reaching importance for the developing countries, had not yet been drafted in final form by the 
Subcommittee.”30 In the end, it was expected that more detailed negotiations on these issues 
would be continued after the Outer Space Treaty was finalized, and it was decided to limit 
provisions of the Treaty to basic principles that were further expounded in the elaborating 
conventions.31 
By way of conclusion, it took States another year and a half to negotiate the Agreement 
on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into 
Outer Space, which was opened for signature on April 22, 1968 following the first fatal accidents 
in space exploration. It had been another four years before the Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects was opened for signature on March 29, 1972, due 
                                                        
26 M. Benkö and K.-U. Schrogl, “’Free Use of Outer Space’ vs. ‘Space Benefits’,” in G. Lafferranderie and D. 
Crowther (eds.), Outlook on Space Law over the Next 30 Years (1997), at 47. 
27 See, United Nations General Assembly, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcommittee, 
Third Session, Summary Record of the Twenty-ninth to Thirty-seventh Meetings, A/AC.105/C.2/SR.29-37. 
28 United Nations General Assembly, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcommittee, Fifth 
Session, Summary Record of the Fifty-Seventh Meeting, Page 5, A/AC.105/C.2/SR.57. 
29 Id. at Page 8. 
30 Id. at Page 18. 
31 See, V. Kopal, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States, in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (2008), at 4. February 1, 2015 www.un.org/law/avl. 
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to the position of the Soviet Union that such a treaty was superfluous, which, on the other hand, 
was counterbalanced by the favorable attitude of the United States and a majority of non-space 
powers. And another three years had passed before the Convention on Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space was developed and opened for signature on January 14, 1975. These, 
however, are still remarkably short periods of time for negotiating and drafting of the treaties that 
by and large regulated a completely new area of activity, where only the most general principles 
were established by way of the Declaration of Legal Principles of 1963 and the recently 
negotiated Outer Space Treaty. Overall, it has been suggested that three factors facilitated 
development of international space law in such a short period: a felt need for the new rules, a 
propitious political climate and due representation of the interests involved, where the last one 
basically means that agreement of the United States and the Soviet Union was crucial for 
success.32 
Authors point out that the astoundingly fast pace in negotiation of the Outer Space Treaty 
can in part be explained by the fact that it was basically a treaty of principles, and most of these 
principles had already been drafted in the abovementioned Declaration and had secured 
unanimous support of the United Nations member States.33 Others claim that the “extraordinary 
speed at which the Space Treaty was concluded was due unquestionably to the need of such an 
agreement in advance of man’s landing on the moon.”34 A rather unique and fortunate 
geopolitical constellation should also be mentioned as a contributing factor. “Usually a set of 
legal rights and obligations appreciated by the one superpower already for that very reason alone 
would look suspicious to the other superpower. Yet, in the particular context of mankind’s first 
exploits in outer space both superpowers apparently perceived the legal constraints under 
discussion to be restraining the opponent more than themselves.”35 
                                                        
32 Cf., B. Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (1997), at 205-11. 
33 Cf., P.G. Dembling and D.M. Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. of Air L. and Commerce 419 
(1967), at 425; V. Kopal, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States, in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (2008), February 1, 2015 www.un.org/law/avl; I.A. 
Vlasic, The Space Treaty: A Preliminary Evaluation, 55 Cal. L. Rev. 507 (1967). An opposing view was also 
expressed: “OST was the intelligent foreseeing of the need for legal regulation of a new set of problems and was a 
major attempt to lay down ground rules for the future worked out by a group of experts and then submitted to the 
General Assembly for its action. There may have been an element of compromise of interest in some of its terms, 
but the fundamental principles of space law were considered largely prospectively in an absence of existing rule, 
albeit with a harbinger of the General Assembly Resolutions.” F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise 
(2009), at 77.  
34 B. Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (1997), at 216. 
35 F.G. von der Dunk, “International Space Law,” in F.G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 35. 
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2.1.2 Principle of Cooperation and its Manifestations 
Based on these preliminary considerations a conclusion can be drawn that the Outer 
Space Treaty has pronounced the principle of cooperation as the basic principle of international 
space law and outlined the ways it should be implemented by States when using and exploring 
outer space.36 “The Outer Space Treaty is therefore also often hailed as the “Magna Carta of 
Outer Space”; the quasi-constitutional document laying the foundation for all rules further (to be) 
established with respect to outer space. At the same time, its other nickname – the Principles 
Treaty – makes clear that much of its contents remain very basic indeed, requiring further 
elaboration and precision on many counts.”37 It was in fact stated: “By a principle, or a general 
principle, as opposed to a rule, even a general rule, but which underlines a rule, of law is meant 
chiefly something which is not itself a rule, but which underlies a rule, and explains or provides 
the reason for it. A rule answers a question “what”; a principle in effect answers the question 
“why”.”38 
That is to say that the preambular provision calling for “broad international cooperation 
in the scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful 
purposes” is elaborated in greater detail in other provisions of the treaty requiring States not to 
place in orbit around the Earth objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons 
of mass destruction (Article IV), to regard astronauts as envoys of mankind and provide all 
possible assistance (Article V), to bear international responsibility for national activities in outer 
space (Article VI), to avoid harmful contamination and adverse changes to the environment 
(Article IX), to afford an opportunity to observe flight of space objects (Article X), to inform 
about activities in outer space (Article XI), and to open space stations, installations, equipment 
and space vehicles to other States (Article XII).  
Further, these provisions were extended and deepened in the three elaborating 
conventions. This was done using one of the two ways. First, by a straightforward expansion of 
                                                        
36 This conclusion is supported by the viewpoint expressed in, V. Kopal, Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States, in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
(2008), at 2, February 1, 2015 www.un.org/law/avl. 
37 F. von der Dunk, “The Undeniably Necessary Cradle – Out of Principle and Ultimately Out of Sense,” in G. 
Lafferranderie and D. Crowther (eds.), Outlook on Space Law over the Next 30 Years (1997), at 404. 
38 G.G. Fitzmaurice, “The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of 
Law,” 92 Recueil des cours (1957), at 7, cited in H. Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (2014) at 94. 
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provisions contained in the Outer Space Treaty by adding greater detail about, for example, the 
scope of State responsibility and liability for damage caused by activities in outer space, by 
establishing a procedure of compensation claims resolution and so on. Second, it was done by 
way of creating a legal basis for implementation of the enumerated principles. For example, the 
Registration Convention established the registration procedure that allowed efficient fulfillment 
of the obligations pertaining to return of astronauts to representatives of a launching authority. 
These United Nations outer space treaties “provide the mechanism for States parties to consult 
one another and to cooperate in solving problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, 
or in the application of, the provision of the agreements, and that such consultations and 
cooperation may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the 
framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the Charter.”39 
For example, with regard to Article I of the Outer Space Treaty it has been noted that 
“most authors in space law agree that this provision does not constitute the basis for specific 
claims regarding participation, but should be understood as a more philosophical notion, a 
programmatic principle. It is not self-executing but requires further implementation.”40 In 
accordance with Articles VI-VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, States receive important rights and 
privileges, but at the same time are required to fulfill certain obligations. These provisions of the 
Outer Space Treaty by providing for a regime of liability for damage caused by a space object 
and fixing the responsibility to authorize and supervise space activities, thereby, “shut the door 
on the avoidance of liability and duties as to control and supervision. However, the Treaty is 
imprecise as to the nature of the liability for damage.”41 Therefore, these articles had to be 
complemented by separate Conventions in order to provide them with substance, procedure, and 
a mechanism of implementation. “Combined they constitute another pillar of space law, although 
not all scientific and commercial possibilities are covered.”42  
Overall, the principle of cooperation as established in the Outer Space Treaty can be only 
understood when the Treaty is read as a whole. Scarce references to ‘cooperation’ in articles 
providing for certain rights and obligations give guidance about the nature of connection 
                                                        
39 T.C. Brisibe, “A Normative System for Outer Space Activities in the Next Half Century,” in Proceedings of the 
International Institute of Space Law 2013 (2014), at 27. 
40 U. Bohlmann, “Legal Aspect of the “Space Exploration Initiatives”,” in M. Benkö (ed.), Essential Air and Space 
Law (2005), at 235. 
41 F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 105.  
42 G. Lafferranderie, “Basic Principles Governing the Use of Outer Space in Future Perspective,” in M. Benkö (ed.), 
Essential Air and Space Law (2005), at 16. 
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between the principle of cooperation established in Article I and the following articles, but 
nowhere in the Treaty such a connection is clearly articulated.  More so, scholars believe that, 
analyzed comparatively, the principle of cooperation contained in the Outer Space Treaty is less 
obligatory than the one of, for example, dissemination of information, and is similarly somewhat 
indefinite as the principle of avoidance of harmful contamination or interference.43 But the 
overall flow of the Treaty and its interconnectedness with the three elaborating conventions 
create the legal ground and understanding of the way States should behave to be in compliance 
with the thrust of cooperation in exploration and use of outer space. With regard to the practical 
consequences of the cooperative framework stipulated by the Outer Space Treaty and the three 
elaborating conventions some authors are skeptical. “Reference to cooperation, consultation and 
due regard for the interests of other states recur throughout the Treaty. Cooperation has, 
however, been patchy and encouraged by economic and financial considerations rather than the 
aspiration of the [Outer Space Treaty]. However, such considerations are not to be despised. One 
result has been the International Space Station.”44 
The last statement is in full compliance with the view expressed earlier. The Outer Space 
Treaty introduced cooperation as a necessary element of peaceful exploration and use of outer 
space for the “benefit of all mankind.” At the same time it did not impose an obligation to 
cooperate in its pure version: nowhere in the Treaty can such a wording be found. If one looks at 
Article I, the exact wording pertinent to cooperation obliges States to facilitate cooperation in 
scientific investigation in outer space. By no means can that phrase be regarded as mandating 
States to cooperate generally in exploitation of outer space. While ‘scientific investigation in 
outer space’ is a broad enough term to cover some parts of the current activities, for example 
scientific experiments carried out on board the International Space Station,45 a reasonable 
argument cannot go far enough to expand the quoted wording so as to apply to specific Earth 
observation programs or launch of communication and broadcasting satellites.  
Similarly, none of the discussed articles providing for more specific rights and 
obligations as an extension of the general thrust of cooperation goes far enough to impose 
obligation to cooperate in the ‘obligation of result’ dimension even in the most narrow area. To 
                                                        
43 Cf., B. Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (1997), at 252-56. 
44 F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 58. 
45 See, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Reference Guide to the International Space Station (2010), 
February 6, 2015, http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo11658/508318main_ISS_ref_guide_nov2010.pdf 
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the contrary, these articles, and by extension the elaborating conventions create a ‘legal order’ 
where States have rights and obligations toward the whole international community, for example 
to register its space objects. But these obligations are of such a nature that they are aiming at 
preserving order, providing information to others again to preserve order in planned or ongoing 
space activities, and preventing chaos, when interested States are neither aware of what other 
States are doing, nor are aware of any responsibilities on their side. In other words, they do not 
create an immediate obligation to cooperate – in either the ‘obligation of effort’ or the 
‘obligation of result’ dimension of the principle of cooperation – for one particular State toward 
the other particular State, but they secure the ‘atmosphere of cooperation’ through legal means.  
It has been maintained that “many laws are established in order to create some kind of 
justice, or at least work towards it; the creation of many others has been motivated by an urge to 
create some ‘rules of the road’; still many more have element of both.”46 In the light of the 
above-said, the second motivation seems predominant, at least as applied to the concept of 
cooperation included in the Outer Space Treaty. That being said, it by no means signals that 
considerations of justice are absent from the Treaty; quite to the contrary, especially as 
evidenced by opinions of representatives of developing countries during the Treaty negotiation, 
preservation of an opportunity to explore and use outer space by those countries in the future was 
one of the paramount issues on the deliberations agenda.47 Thus, both motives can and should be 
found in the text of the Treaty. With this perspective on the motivation of the Article I principle 
of cooperation, indeed international legal cooperation in outer space has been sparse and driven 
by economic, political and strategic considerations of cooperating States and not the broadly and 
ambiguously worded aspiration of the Outer Space Treaty and the three elaborating conventions.  
Based on the analysis of the practice of States some authors contend that fundamental 
principles of the Outer Space Treaty have acquired the status of norms of customary international 
law. “Independent of the formal participation in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, all States should 
                                                        
46 F.G. von der Dunk, The Role of Law with Respect to Future Space Activities, Space Policy 12:1 (February 1996), 
at 5. 
47 See, F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 57. (“It was also important to have the 
concurrence of as many countries as possible for the sake of universality of the Treaty: as space treaty of limited 
membership would have been less than useful. In 1967 most UN members did not have a space-faring capability, 
but this represented the vast majority of the votes in the Assembly. They therefore had a bargaining lever; a 
universally acceptable treaty would not be adopted without their concurrence. Essentially these states wanted to 
preserve their future options for when they obtained space technology and became actors in space. In principle they 
wanted future rights to use outer space equal to the rights of the then current space powers. They therefore sought 
and got the principle of equality in the use of outer space, particularly in the language of Art. I.”) 
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observe the obligations arising from its provisions because these provisions are binding as rules 
of customary law.”48 Such arguments generally refer to ‘fundamental principles’ of the Outer 
Space Treaty that are of such nature that they have become customary norms, so further 
elaboration of the contents of this category is necessary. It has been persuasively maintained that 
the ‘fundamental principles’ that have passed into customary law are the following: that 
international law applies in outer space (Article III), that outer space, including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by any means (Article II), that 
outer space is free for exploration and use by all (Article I), but such exploration and use is to be 
for the benefit of all (Article I), that States are responsible for national activities and the activities 
of their nationals in outer space, that they are under a duty to authorize and a continuing duty to 
supervise such activities (Article VI), and that States are liable for damage caused to other States 
by such activities (Article VII).49 
The last two provisions are directly relevant to the preceding discussion. It is evident that 
the principle of cooperation per se is not present in the list of the ‘fundamental principles’ that 
have transformed into custom, while the provisions elaborating the way the principle should be 
fulfilled in State practice are present in the list. Cooperation of States in exploration and use of 
outer space, as formalized by the analyzed treaties, is not about an obligation to cooperate in a 
broad sense, is not about promotion of cooperation in all areas of space exploitation, and is not 
about the ways and means States must use in their cooperative efforts. Cooperation is about 
preserving order, ‘rules of the road’ by way of compliance with the established norms. And 
similarly, the customary space law norms do not pertain to the principle of cooperation the way it 
is understood in general international law, rather to the specific manifestations of a cooperative 
spirit exhibited by compliance with the registration requirement, bearing responsibility and 
liability for national space activities.  
Customary norms can only be derived from State practice. Fitzmaurice observed that “it 
is believed to be a sound principle that, in the long run it is only the actions of States that build 
up practice, just as only the practice (‘constant and uniform’, as the Court has said) that 
                                                        
48 V.S. Vereshchetin and G.M. Danilenko, Custom as a Source of International Law of Outer Space, 13 J. Space L. 
(1985), at 32, cited in T.C. Brisibe, “A Normative System for Outer Space Activities in the Next Half Century,” in 
Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 2013 (2014), at 7. 
49 See, F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 71.  
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constitutes a usage or custom, and builds up eventually a rule of customary international law.”50 
Based on this nowadays undisputed evaluation of the role of States in customary norms 
formation, it is safe to conclude that the principle of cooperation in the broad sense,51 and even 
more so the obligation to cooperate in exploration and use of outer space in its ‘obligation of 
result’ sense, with the caveat of a mandatory result-oriented cooperation in the maintenance of 
international peace and security, could not have become a norm of customary international law: 
precisely because of lacking practice in support of such an obligation. Notwithstanding, the 
Outer Space Treaty being a treaty of principles has effectively introduced the concept of 
cooperation in international space relations, albeit by way of obligating States to comply with 
certain provisions, which are the embodiments of the principle of cooperation as it was detailed 
in the Treaty. Thus, certain repercussions of this principle have become a custom, while the 
principle itself as applied to cooperation in outer space activities remains in the ‘unsteady’ status 
of a declaratory norm States are encouraged to comply with.  
Authors also point out that in the absence of real evidence of ‘persistent objectors’ 
combined with plentiful practice of compliance with Articles IV and VII even by non-parties to 
the Outer Space Treaty, there is “considerable strength in the argument of Carl Q. Christol that 
the fundamental principles of the [Outer Space Treaty] now come into the category of ius 
cogens, principles of a law that cannot be receded from, any attempt to legislate to the contrary 
being void.”52 During the Legal Subcommittee’s discussions two proposals – from the Soviet 
Union and Australia – were tabled regarding relations between the Outer Space Treaty and 
subsequent treaties. The Soviet proposal effectively advocated making the Outer Space Treaty 
for space what the United Nations Charter was in the area of the maintenance of international 
peace and security, probably even attempting to provide a conventional status of ius cogens for 
the Treaty.53 The proposal stated: “This Treaty shall not be construed as affecting the right of 
States Parties thereto to conclude any international agreements relating to the activities of States 
                                                        
50 G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-54: General Principles and 
Sources of Law, 30 British Yearbook of Int’l L. 1 (1953), at 68. 
51 The principle of cooperation in the broad sense includes both the ‘obligation of effort’ and ‘obligation of result’. 
52 F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 80. 
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all or parts of the Treaty into ius cogens norms would depend on the view with respect to the legal effect of Art. 103 
of the UN Charter. Cf., J. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other 
Rules of International Law (2003), at 337-38. 
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in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, provided that such agreements do not conflict 
with provisions of this Treaty.”54 Article 103 of the United Nations Charter provides: “In the 
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the 
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations 
under the present Charter shall prevail.” This clause, just as the clause proposed by the Soviet 
Union for the Outer Space Treaty, unconditionally prohibits conclusion of subsequent treaties 
concluded in derogation from the Charter,55 making all incompatible treaties illegal.56  
The Australian proposal, by contrast, merely stipulated that provisions of the Outer Space 
Treaty were without prejudice to future specific agreements. Despite substantive differences of 
the two proposals, both suggestions did not spur significant controversy. After all, the Outer 
Space Treaty was drafted to establish the overarching outer space legal regime, and most would 
agree that unilateral departing from the Treaty’s provisions by way of a new agreement was an 
undesirable scenario. The proposals, however, came at the very last stage of the discussions in 
the Legal Subcommittee and thus received little attention. In the end, no provision on the subject 
was included in the text, but the record of this discussion supports the view that devoting a 
special place for the Outer Space Treaty in the hierarchy of space law norms was on the agenda 
of the drafting States. Absence of relevant provisions in the final text, however, might as well 
signal doubts as to peremptory nature of the Treaty’s provisions. But the statements made during 
the negotiations, especially those by the United States and Soviet Union representatives 
effectively acknowledging the manifested understanding that the Treaty was without prejudice to 
the subsequent agreements but was a centerpiece of the outer space legal regime, incline toward 
a conclusion that the Outer Space Treaty provisions were indeed seen as having a somewhat 
unique status. 
Acknowledging the far-reaching nature of the suggestion that at least some provisions of 
the Outer Space Treaty can be classified as ius cogens norms, and acquiescing to the possibility 
                                                        
54 United Nations General Assembly, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcommittee, Fifth 
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Sadat-Akhavi, Methods of Resolving Conflicts Between Treaties (2003), at 89-91. 
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of existence of persuasive divergent arguments, it is suggested to merely recognize existence of 
such a view and use it only as a contention in support of the earlier made inference about the 
customary legal nature of the norms described as manifestations of the principle of cooperation 
in the Outer Space Treaty.57 The described discussion about the Treaty’s relations with 
subsequent agreements is additional evidence theretofore.  
 
2.2 Six-Criteria Analysis 
 
With these preliminary considerations about the negotiation history of the Outer Space 
Treaty and the three elaborating conventions and the asserted scope of the principle of 
cooperation, the analysis based on the six criteria can be performed. Although, as it has been 
stated earlier, there is no doubt in the theory of international law about the treaty nature of the 
analyzed documents, such an analysis is a logical path toward the ‘purpose-result’ analysis and 
provides valuable data for the following conclusions about the effectiveness of the treaty 
category of cooperation in regulating current and future outer space activities. 
 
2.2.1 Membership/Participation 
Participation in the four analyzed treaties was decided in slightly different ways. All four 
explicitly declare that “this Agreement shall be open for all States for signature,”58 while the 
three elaborating conventions add language allowing for international organizations to declare 
“its acceptance of the rights and obligations provided for in this Agreement and if a majority of 
the States members of that organization are Contracting Parties to this Agreement and the Treaty 
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.”59  
                                                        
57 United Nations General Assembly, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcommittee, Fifth 
Session, Summary Record of the Sixty-Seventh Meeting, Page 11, A/AC.105/C.2/SR.67. 
58 Art. XIV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; Art. 7 of the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of 
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space; Art. XXIV of the Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects; Art. VIII of the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space. 
59 Art. 6 of the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space. See also, Art. XXII of the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by 
Space Objects; Art. VII of the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space. 
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During the Outer Space Treaty negotiation the Soviet Union was the most vocal opponent 
to allowing international organizations’ participation in the Treaty. The 1962 Report of the Legal 
Subcommittee registered that one of the Soviet proposals was to provide that activities in space 
‘shall be carried out solely and exclusively by States’.60 The political objection boiled down to 
the Soviet concerns that such international organizations “were mere instruments of United 
States aggressive or monopolistic designs. From a juridical point of view, it and other States 
within the Soviet block adopt[ed] what may be regarded as an extremely cautious attitude toward 
treating international organizations as subjects of international law.”61 As the representatives of 
the United Kingdom noted, it was a matter of justice to bind international organizations by 
imposing certain obligations only in case they were entitled to benefits in outer space activities 
similar to those of States.62 Simultaneously, it is also simple justice not to demand that State-
parties subscribe to recognition of legal personality of each and every international organization 
wishing to accede to the Treaty. Thereby, an intermediate approach had to be elaborated for the 
following conventions, which, on the one hand, allowed a certain level of international 
organization’s participation, and on the other, guaranteed that only those international 
organizations recognized and created by State-parties to the treaties were entitled to such 
participation. 
The ‘acceptance’ procedure had been initially invented during the Rescue Agreement 
negotiation, but only the Liability Convention travaux préparatories thoroughly demonstrated 
the scope of disagreement between the Soviet-bloc countries and the Western-bloc members of 
the Legal Subcommittee in regard this issue.63 The former argued that it was not necessary for an 
organization to be a party to the Convention for it to be bound by its provisions and that it was 
sufficient for the Convention to merely declare that organizations were subjected to its terms. 
Representatives of the Soviet Union, Romania, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria further expressed 
their regard of international organizations as entities inferior to States on the international plane, 
and therefore were not prepared to let them either become parties to the Convention or enjoy the 
                                                        
60 See, C.W. Jenks, Space Law (1965), at 60. 
61 B. Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (1997), at 240. 
62 See, United Nations General Assembly, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcommittee, 
Summary Records of the Sixty-Sixth Meeting, A/AC.105/C.2/SR.66. 
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same status as States. The delegates from Australia, Canada, Japan, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, on the other hand, maintained the view that for an international organization to be 
bound by the Convention, it was necessary for it to become a party to the Convention or at least 
to declare its acceptance of rights and obligations under the Convention.64  
Based on the exact wording used in all three elaborating conventions and views 
expressed during the Liability Convention negotiation, which by extension can be applied to the 
Rescue Agreement and the Registration Convention, the following conclusion about the status of 
international organizations should be supported. “Although international intergovernmental 
organizations may accept the obligations imposed and the rights conferred by the Convention, 
they do not become parties to the Convention. This status is reserved exclusively for states; 
organizations are merely placed in the same position as states for certain purposes.”65 To be more 
precise, intergovernmental organizations were granted status of ‘quasi-parties’ because their 
possibilities “(a) are limited to the material clauses of the treaty at issue and do not encompass 
for example the right to propose amendments; (b) are subject to the requirement that the 
individual member States of such an organization can always be held responsible in conformity 
with Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty if the organization itself fails to appropriately answer 
to such responsibility; and in the case of Liability Convention (c) exclude the possibility for 
direct claims by an intergovernmental organization whilst allowing claimants against such an 
organization to address the individual member States in case the organization itself fails to 
rapidly solve the claim.”66 The same is true for the Rescue Agreement, where an international 
                                                        
64 See, United Nations General Assembly, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcommittee, 
Summary Records of the Fifty-Second Meeting, A/AC.105/C.2/SR.52; United Nations General Assembly, 
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organization’s rights and duties are those of a launching authority, and not those of a contracting 
party. 
The conclusions with regard to the participation criterion, therefore, are rather 
straightforward. Only States are eligible for ‘full’ participation in all four treaties, whereas 
international organizations might declare acceptance of the rights and obligations provided in the 
three elaborating conventions becoming ‘second-tier’ participants as explained above. Thus, an 
international organization might declare acceptance of rights and obligations stemming from the 
elaborating conventions, which in turn are based on the relevant provisions of the Outer Space 
Treaty, but is not provided with a conventional mechanism to accept the rights and obligations 
provided in the latter.  
As it has been explained above, complete exclusion of possibility of international 
organizations’ participation in the Outer Space Treaty was dictated by the political situation, and 
more precisely by an intransigent position of the Soviet Union. Although Soviet denial of the 
status of subject of international law to international organizations was not completely overcome 
in the following treaties, a compromise had been found. By and large, it can be presumed that 
every international organization that has declared acceptance of rights and obligations provided 
by the elaborating convention has also declared acceptance of the Outer Space Treaty provisions. 
A conclusion to the contrary would have been incompatible with basic rules of logic: if the more 
detailed provisions of the elaborating conventions, which are extensions of the general 
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, are accepted, then the basic provisions are accepted as 
well. If one accepts the laws of astronomy, then he undoubtedly accepts that the Earth is moving 
around the sun, but not necessarily vice versa. 
 
2.2.2 Secretariat 
Treaties sometimes provide for review meetings, which would require an organ 
performing secretarial functions. Such organs, as it has been established in the first chapter, 
might either be an ad hoc entity, or a secretariat of a hosting international organization temporary 
performing secretarial functions for the treaty meeting. The Liability Convention (Article XXVI) 
and the Registration Convention (Article X) each have a provision calling for such review 
meetings. The relevant articles state that ten years after the entry into force of the convention, 
“the question of its review shall be included in the provisional agenda of the United Nations 
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General Assembly in order to consider, in the light of past application of the Convention, 
whether it requires revision.” Review conferences of State-parties can be convened after the 
convention has been in force for five years upon request of one third of State-parties and a 
majority of States’ concurrence.  
No revision has ever been formally undertaken. “In both instances the UN did ‘review’ 
the Convention, but did not go on to revisions. That could indicate that these treaties are 
satisfactory, or that there is indifference as to their contemporary suitability, or simply that other 
matters have taken the attention of the international community. Of these explanations the last 
appears most cogent. An alternative, however, could be that to re-open them would be to open 
the proverbial can of worms and end up with an unacceptable mess. It is unlikely that anything 
approaching unanimity or consensus would be arrived at were these matters to be re-
negotiated.”67 Additionally, the reluctance of States noted earlier to accept any more legally 
binding obligations pertinent to outer space activities, also contribute to both undesirability of 
initiating these treaties’ revisions and unlikelihood of securing a majority support in favor of 
such revisions. In the end, even in the improbable event of commencing a review meeting for 
either of the conventions, it is safe to presume that an entity performing secretarial functions 
would have been the United Nations Secretariat – simply because the United Nations General 
Assembly is envisioned as conducting the revision, and its activities are supported by the United 
Nations Secretariat.  
 
2.2.3 International Legal Personality 
Neither of the treaties possesses legal personality, and only their participants do have 
legal personality, which is reflected by formalized and attested powers to conclude a treaty. For 
example, the United States Department of State provides the following chronology of the Outer 
Space Treaty ratification: “Signed at Washington, London, Moscow, January 27, 1967; 
  Ratification advised by U.S. Senate April 25, 1967;   Ratified by U.S. President May 24, 1967; 
  U.S. ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow October 10, 1967  ; 
Proclaimed by U.S. President October 10, 1967;   Entered into force October 10, 1967.”68 
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2.2.4 Term of Existence 
All four treaties are obviously legally binding and are created for an unlimited period of 
time. The Outer Space Treaty’s nickname – the Treaty of Principles – could not have appeared 
should any of these characteristics have not been met. The principle, in the quoted words of 
Fitzmaurice, answers the question ‘why?’ and hence constitutes a basis of knowledge, or legal 
regulation, and for that reason alone is intended to continue indefinitely. In the same vein, no 
scholarly discussions about these treaties’ contemporariness, effectiveness for regulating new 
areas of outer space activities, about their future and possible enhancements could have been 
possible if any of the treaties have been envisioned as remaining in force only for a limited 
period. 
 
2.2.5 Binding Force of Documents Produced 
While all four treaties are quite obviously legally binding on the international plane, they 
do not provide for an opportunity to adopt any further documents, whether legally binding or 
‘soft law’. The review meetings provided for in the Liability Convention and the Registration 
Convention should be concerned, as discussed above, with the review of the texts of the 
respective treaties and hence do not envision adoption of any separate documents.  
 
2.2.6 Existence of Opportunity to Modify Obligations 
Finally, as most international treaties, the Outer Space Treaty’s and three elaborating 
conventions’ obligations can be modified using the mechanism of reservations as defined in and 
regulated by Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The texts 
of the treaties do not establish special rules for formulation of reservations; hence, the general 
rules of the Vienna Convention apply. No reservations have been filed up until now; it is 
therefore not likely that any acceding State would consider it necessary to disrupt the general 
agreement with the provisions of the treaties. In this context it is appropriate to address the issue 
of amendments, which have not ever been introduced but remain a possibility, and which in 
principle might lead to modification of obligations by one group of States and not the others. 
 It has been suggested that with regard especially to the Outer Space Treaty “amendments 
are undesirable unless all parties accept them simultaneously. As a general proposition space law 
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would be not well served were divergent versions of the O[uter] S[pace] T[reaty] to be the law as 
between a variety of parties. The Treaty sets out Principles. Their integrity should be 
preserved.”69 Article XV of the Treaty, however, permits a majority of States to amend the treaty 
with a binding effect on those who accept the amendment. During the Treaty drafting 
negotiations the Romanian representative pointed out that it hardly seemed appropriate that in a 
treaty designed to lay down basic principles governing activities in outer space, a situation could 
be created in which some States would be bound by one version of the treaty, while others were 
bound by a different one.70 And the Swedish intervention suggested that in accordance with the 
Article XV provision “it would be possible for the amendments to come into force without 
support of space Powers.”71 Despite these valuable remarks the provision in question received 
little attention during the discussion,72 and formally the Outer Space Treaty can be amended 
upon acceptance of an unqualified majority of contracting States.  
In the light of the above discussion about the status of the Treaty’s provisions as 
customary norms, nowadays introduction of amendments pertinent to those provisions would not 
create two sets of rules for those States accepted the amendments and those not.73 But at the time 
of drafting and adoption, and for a certain number of years following the Outer Space Treaty 
adoption before its relevant provisions presumably transformed into international custom, such a 
threat remained real. The importance of the Outer Space Treaty coupled with its eminence for 
outer space exploration stability and the wide support of States ensured that the Treaty of 
Principles remained homogeneous providing uniform principles for all States. The Rescue 
Agreement (Article 8), the Liability Convention (Article XXV) and the Registration Convention 
(Article IX) contain identical amendment clauses, thereby leaving open the opportunity for 
                                                        
69 F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 58. 
70 United Nations General Assembly, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcommittee, Fifth 
Session, Summary Record of the Sixty-Ninth Meeting, Page 4, A/AC.105/C.2/SR.69. 
71 Id.  
72 See, B. Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (1997), at 263. 
73 While international treaties may be terminated by States, customary norms may be amended only by State practice 
accepted as law. Since certain provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, namely the ‘fundamental principles’ that 
presumably constitute the legal foundation of international space law, have transformed into custom, their 
amendment can only be effectuated by a virtually uniform State practice accepted as law. Amendment of relevant 
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty would not affect the contents of respective customary norms. Therefore, 
amending the Treaty using the Article XV procedure without unanimous support, or support of the major 
spacefaring nations, nowadays does not threaten to create several legal regimes of outer space exploration and use, 
at least as established by the aforementioned ‘fundamental principles’ of the Outer Space Treaty. For an in-depth 
discussion of the ways to amend general international law, customary law and treaties see, G. Tunkin, Is General 
International Law Customary Law Only?, 4 EJIL 534 (1993). 
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introduction of changes into the outer space legal regime. But as discussed above with regard to 
the review meetings, introduction of any amendments, whether through the revision or 
amendment procedure, nowadays is unlikely. 
 
2.3 Evaluation and Conclusions 
 
Not much can be added in the concluding section of the present review to what has 
already been said over the course of the Outer Space Treaty and the three elaborating 
conventions’ existence. Some authors focus on imperfections and omissions of these treaties, 
others unconditionally praise them as outstanding instances of international lawmaking. As it 
usually happens, the truth is probably somewhere in between. These four international space 
treaties are unquestionably remarkable achievements of States, the United Nations, the art of 
diplomacy, astounding eloquence and uncompromising willingness for concessions. Political 
climate, science and technology developments, political ambitions, sovereign concerns over its 
nation’s prosperity and security, all also played a role in carving the norms that became 
commonly known as corpus juris spatialis internationalis.  
In the early years of the international space law development an agreement was reached 
that due to rapid and unpredictable development of space technology, and also owing to 
uncertainties of the Cold War rivalry, a comprehensive space agreement would be premature. It 
was suggested that “the most probable trend in the modalities of prescription with respect to 
most of the new problems created for the general community by access to space can, therefore, 
be expected to be away from explicit formulations in special conferences and multilateral 
agreements and more representative of the gradual processes of building shared expectations 
through customary development.”74 Fortunately, space law development took a different 
evolutionary path, and today the pure outcome is indisputable: States aimed to regulate outer 
space activities by way of creating a universal regime of its exploration and use and ensuring that 
outer space will not become a theater of war, and this result has been achieved through the most 
stable and respectable form of behavior regimentation, the treaty. 
While some might disagree that the military-related purpose has indeed been achieved 
given the limited scope of the demilitarization provisions contained in the Outer Space Treaty, 
                                                        
74 M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 115. 
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the net result is still true – outer space has not become a theater of war, at least as of yet. And 
work in this direction is still being done, within the United Nations Disarmament Conference, by 
introduction of the Russo-Chinese draft of the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of 
Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat of Force against Outer Space Objects, by drafting and 
negotiating the Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. And all these efforts are based on 
the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty banning placement of weapons of mass destruction in 
outer space and on celestial bodies, which might be considered imperfect from the modern 
legalistic perspective failing to attribute the deserved value to the difficulties of negotiating 
disarmament provisions in the midst of the Cold War.  
The 1968 Rescue Agreement is said to be a classic example of how not to make a treaty 
because the haste in which the text was prepared and rushed through the United Nations resulted 
in a poorly drafted instrument, achieving virtually nothing and yet creating at the same time a 
host of unresolved problems and difficulties.75 Nor was the Liability Convention praised as an 
outstanding legal document, while, undoubtedly, it had been drafted more carefully, and was 
able to establish a more or less comprehensive regime of liability and claims settlement 
procedure in outer space activities. The Registration Convention’s definition of the launching 
State until today induces dissatisfaction, eloquent discussions and analyses, and at times real full-
fledged practical problems. Having said that, it is hardly disputed that legal precision and clarity, 
being a very important characteristic of any legal document, cannot guarantee the document’s 
success: no treaty, however well drafted, would be effective, unless the parties observe it in good 
faith. “While it is important to work toward judicial purity, legal perfectionism which ignores 
political reality would result in the elaboration of magnificent texts which would never come into 
force. Instead, it is important to continue to find the right balance between political requirements 
and possibilities and the need for precise legal wording.”76 
“The Outer Space Treaty has weathered many storms and has proven to be leak free. The 
question, however, can and must be asked whether in the coming thirty years the old vehicle of 
the Outer Space Treaty can still live up to the speed required. It is up to the international 
regulators to continue their efforts with the shining example of the Outer Space Treaty 1967 to 
                                                        
75 See, B. Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (1997), at 285. 
76 N. Jasentuliyana, International Law and the United Nations (1999), at 41. 
 115 
offer the legal framework ensuring fair access and fair trade. This will lead to a fair space.”77 To 
achieve a fair space attention must be given not only to substantive rules, which probably should 
be left untouched, but the machinery of coordination, cooperation and, where necessary, 
supervision.78 Substantive rules of the Outer Space Treaty have been effectively regulating outer 
space exploration and use for almost fifty years; and throughout half a century the Treaty has 
been instigating mostly rapturous evaluations of scholars – are not these persuasive arguments in 
favor of preserving the Treaty in its original version? More so, the ever-complicating political, 
economic, financial, environmental, social atmosphere of international relations prompts the 
conclusion that we are better off with the old proven rules. The proverb goes: “Don’t bite the 
hand that feeds you.” Or: “Half the loaf is better than no bread.” Let us not open the proverbial 
can of worms and Pandora’s box.  
“The basic ideas behind the space treaties are maintenance of international peace and 
security and the promotion of international cooperation and understanding.”79 All these are basic 
ideas, not the end results that had to be achieved. And if viewed from this angle, the Outer Space 
Treaty and the three elaborating conventions have fully accomplished their basic ideas. Every 
mechanism of cooperation in outer space exploration and use is based on and relies on their 
provisions. The UNISPACE conferences, the International Space Station, bilateral treaties, the 
European Space Agency, all mechanisms of cooperation in the end draw inspiration and legal 
basis from the Outer Space Treaty and the conventions that provided for a more detailed and 
comprehensive version of the Treaty of Principles’ provisions. And this contributes to the 
accomplishment of their basic ideas. 
                                                        
77 R. P. Kröner, “International Agreements and Contracts,” in G. Lafferranderie and D. Crowther (eds.), Outlook on 
Space Law over the Next 30 Years (1997), at 47.  
78 Cf., B. Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (1997), at 264. 
79 N. Jasentuliyana, International Law and the United Nations (1999), at 40. 
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The United Nations and its Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) have 
been hailed as the focal point for international cooperation in outer space and for the 
development of international space law.1 In a sense, COPUOS is indeed a progenitor of all outer 
space cooperation not only because historically it was the first international forum for 
cooperation, but also due to its extraordinary role in development of the body of international 
space law as we know it today. COPUOS continues to be an important part of the international 
space cooperation system, although its regulatory role along with its influence has been 
diminishing over the past years.  
In this chapter the genesis and evolution of this mechanism of cooperation will be 
reviewed. By looking at the Committee’s composition, rules of procedure and methods of work, 
strengths and weaknesses of this mechanism of cooperation will be identified and its current role 
in international space cooperation will be evaluated in order to outline areas and issues in 
exploration and use of outer space, which currently can be best addressed using the COPUOS 
mechanism. The Committee is a unique forum where the representatives of States have the 
possibility of raising any topic related to the use of outer space.2 Despite certain drawbacks in 
COPUOS’ recent history, it is only in the interest of all States concerned to utilize this unique 
mechanism of cooperation to their greatest benefit.  
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution ‘International Co-operation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ for the first time recognized the status of the United Nations as a 
focal point for international cooperation in exploration and use of outer space.3 It laid “a good 
foundation for the UN to become the center of coordination in this field,”4 while the first step in 
establishment of the primary role of the United Nations in regulation of outer space activities 
                                                        
1 See, N. Jasentuliyana, International Space Law and the United Nations (1999), at 3. 
2 Cf., K.-U. Schrogl, Is UNCOPUOS Fit for the Future: Reflection at the Occasion of the 50th Session of its Legal 
Subcommittee 2011, 60 ZLW 93 (2011), at 93.  
3 UNGA Res. A/RES/1721(XVI), 20 December 1961.  
4 L. Minwen, “Evolution from Policy towards Law: International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,” 
in Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 2013 (2014), at 626. 
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was made in 1958 with the creation of an ad hoc Committee. This step was prompted when the 
Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations addressed a letter to the 
Secretary General requesting that an item ‘Programme for International Cooperation in the Field 
of Outer Space’ be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly at its thirteenth session in 
1958. The letter called for the Assembly to establish an ad hoc Committee to “make the 
necessary detailed studies and recommendations as to what specific steps the Assembly might 
take to further man’s progress” in outer space and “to assure that outer space will be used solely 
for the benefit of all mankind.”5 On December 13, 1958 the General Assembly adopted a 
resolution establishing an ad hoc Committee despite the dissent of the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia and Poland.6 By 1959, COPUOS was transformed into a permanent organ. 
The establishment of a new body, however, did not go flawlessly. “The Soviet Union first 
boycotted the Committee for not being sufficiently representative, also asking that its decisions 
be made by consensus rather than by majority vote as the West had suggested.”7 A Soviet 
scholar opined that it was only natural that the Soviet Union, other socialistic countries along 
with India and the United Arab Republic refused to participate in the Committee’s work with its 
initial membership, when out of eighteen member States of the Committee twelve were US allies 
in military blocks.8 The Soviet bloc countries confirmed their dissatisfaction with the COPUOS 
composition despite the declaration of the Committee’s President that “the Committee will never 
be permitted to act in any sense whatsoever as an instrument of the cold war,” echoed by 
statements of the representative of the United States.9  
“An agreement was finally reached to create a Committee of 24 members that was 
designed as a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, to which it was to report, thus 
underlying its strongly political character. Cold War politics were also decisive in attributing 
leadership in a Committee in which a careful balance between East and West was to be achieved. 
Austria, a neutral country, was chosen to take the chair of the main Committee, now called 
                                                        
5 See, N. Jasentuliyana, International Space Law and the United Nations (1999), at 2. 
6 Cf., P.C. Jessup and H.J. Taubenfeld, The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 
53  Am. J. Int’l L. 877 (1959), at 877. 
7 P. Jankowitsch, “The Background and History of Space Law,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space 
Law (2014), at 11. 
8 See, Верещетин В.С. Космос. Сотрудничество. Право [Outer Space. Cooperation. Law.]. М.: Наука. 1974. C. 
91-92. 
9 See, P.C. Jessup and H.J. Taubenfeld, The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 
53  Am. J. Int’l L. 877 (1959), at 877. 
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COPUOS; the other members of the bureau being Romania as Vice-Chair and Brazil as 
Rapporteur. A certain balance between East and West was also maintained in attributing the 
chairs of two Subcommittees of COPUOS, the Legal Subcommittee long having been chaired by 
a representative of Eastern countries, while the chair of Scientific and Technical Subcommittee 
remained in hands of the Western group of countries.”10 The first session of the full Committee 
took place only in March 1962. 
At the first session the new Chairman Ambassador Franz Matsch “read into the record a 
carefully drafted statement, which had resulted from extensive US-Soviet negotiation, to the 
effect that the Committee would endeavor to proceed by consensus wherever possible and 
dispense with the need for voting subject to the understanding that the General Assembly rules of 
procedure, making voting possible, would continue to apply.”11 In practice, consensus has been 
uninterruptedly used since 1962. “The UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was the 
first UN standing body to use this procedure in its purest form.”12  
While the principle of consensus has been probably the most widely discussed feature of 
the Committee’s constitution, it was born as a concession to Soviet demands, which had 
predominantly political, not legal underpinnings. The consensus voting procedure has led to 
multifaceted results. On the one hand, it was suggested that consensus was absolutely essential 
because only two space powers existed and every decision had to be agreed first and foremost 
with them; for the rest of the States it would be rather impracticable to adopt regulations which 
were contrary to the views of the real space powers, otherwise a legal rule on outer space would 
probably never be applied or would be useless anyway.13 In the same vein, it was argued that 
consensus was a desirable way of achieving international accord because the process of seeking 
agreement continued with patience and was not cut off suddenly by a vote which could defeat a 
discussion that might have come to fruition had more time been taken with the give-and-take 
process of consensus.14 
                                                        
10 P. Jankowitsch, “The Background and History of Space Law,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space 
Law (2014), at 11. 
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12 Id. at 12. 
13 See, E.R.C. van Bogaert, Aspects of Space Law (1986), at 263. 
14 See, E. Galloway, “Creating Space Law,” in N. Jasentuliyana and R.S.K. Lee (eds.), Manual on Space Law, Vol. I 
(1979), at 248. 
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On the other hand, “it is often a long and exhausting way from the identification of a 
legal problem by UNCOPUOS to the adoption of relevant legal norms which are either 
incorporated into an international agreement for consideration by the UN General Assembly or 
an UNGA Resolution.”15 Hence, drafting of even ‘soft law’ documents, which end up being 
adopted in the form of a General Assembly resolution, might take years without any guarantee 
that they actually would be complied with. By and large, despite all criticism, development and 
adoption of major space treaties using the consensus procedure provided them with broad 
international acceptance, particularly from the major space powers, which could, thus, identify 
with the compromise solutions found in the Committee.16 
The Committee at its second session in 1962 created two subcommittees, the Legal 
Subcommittee and the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, “to assist it in the study of the 
many specific proposals and suggestions concerning scientific, technical and legal studies made 
by members of the Committee for the development of international cooperation in the field of 
space exploration for peaceful purposes.”17 In the end, the work of the Committee was allocated 
between three separately functioning bodies: the Legal Subcommittee, the Scientific and 
Technical Subcommittee, and the Main Committee. The three bodies are meeting separately: the 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee usually meets for a two-week session in February, the 
Legal Subcommittee meets for its two-week session in early spring, and the Main 
Subcommittee’s meeting takes place in early summer. The timeline of their work allows for the 
Main Committee to review Reports from both Subcommittees, but at the same time no specific 
procedure has been established to facilitate communication between the Subcommittees.  
 
3.2 Six-Criteria Analysis 
 
3.2.1 Membership/Participation 
COPUOS is a traditional intergovernmental body allowing exclusively States to become 
members. Procedurally, addition, and presumably exclusion – though that has never happened – 
                                                        
15 M. Benkö and K.-U. Schrogl, International Space Law in the Making: Current Issues in the UN Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (1993), at 9. 
16 See, P. Jankowitsch, “The Background and History of Space Law,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of 
Space Law (2014), at 12. 
17 N. Jasentuliyana, International Space Law and the United Nations (1999), at 24-25. 
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of new members requires a General Assembly resolution to that effect. In 1959 the Committee’s 
membership was limited to eighteen States,18 but it has been steadily growing ever since. 
Nowadays, the Committee has evolved into one of the largest committees in the United Nations. 
In accordance with the United Nations General Assembly decision 70/518 of 2015, it includes 
representatives of eighty-three States.  
From the beginning the Committee has also allowed participation of intergovernmental 
and nongovernmental entities dedicated to international space cooperation in the status of 
observer.19 Since 1962, thirty-four international entities with proven interest in space activities 
have been granted the status of observer. It should be noted, however, that while this status as of 
2016 has been granted to nongovernmental organizations, the private sector has been excluded 
from participation in COPUOS.20 
The greater involvement of a growing number of States in outer space activities, 
particularly in the recent years, has understandably prompted more States to seek COPUOS 
membership.21 Since the beginning of the twenty-first century Committee’s membership has 
increased by thirteen States, making COPUOS not only very representative, but also harder to 
manage. In 1972, when the last widely supported treaty was drafted, the Committee had twenty-
eight States. In 1979, when the last legally binding treaty was adopted, its membership had 
grown to forty-seven States. If one agrees that arriving at a mutually acceptable text of a treaty is 
hard enough between two dozens States, reaching an agreement with over eighty States present 
seems an almost impossible task.  
 
3.2.2 Secretariat 
A large committee needs an advanced secretariat. COPUOS is supported and serviced by 
a special unit in the United Nations General Secretariat, the United Nations Office for Outer 
                                                        
18 UNGA Res. 1348 (XIII), December 13, 1958. 
19 Cf., S. Marchisio, The Evolutionary Stages of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 31 J. Space L. 219 (2005), at 223. 
20 See, K.-U. Schrogl, Is UNCOPUOS Fit for the Future: Reflection at the Occasion of the 50th Session of its Legal 
Subcommittee 2011, 60 ZLW 93 (2011), at 99. 
21 In the first decades of the COPUOS existence, however, inclusion of the new members was justified not by the 
increasing number of States active in space activities, but by the growing membership of the United Nations. For 
example, the UNGA Resolution 3182 (XXVIII) of December 18, 1973 that resulted in addition of new 9 members to 
COPUOS stated: “Bearing in mind that, since the establishment of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space in 1961, the membership of the United Nations has been considerably increased and a corresponding 
enlargement of the Committee is therefore desirable.” 
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Space Affairs in Vienna, Austria.22 The Office for Outer Space Affairs, however, is not 
specifically dedicated to acting as the COPUOS secretariat. It is also responsible for 
implementing the United Nations Secretary-General’s responsibilities under international space 
law and maintaining the United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space; it is 
responsible for implementation of the United Nations Programme on Space Applications; it 
maintains a 24-hour hotline as the United Nations focal point for satellite imagery requests 
during disasters; it manages the United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for 
Disaster Management and Emergency Response; and, finally, it serves as a secretariat of the 
International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems.  
Thereby, it is quite clear that acting as the COPUOS secretariat is not the only and not the 
main function of the Office. Although sessions of the Main Committee and the Subcommittees 
last only six weeks, preparation of these sessions, facilitation of communication between 
members and communication of necessary information continues throughout the year 
necessitating day-to-day functioning of the secretariat. But despite the various responsibilities 
performed by the Office for Outer Space Affairs, it has been able to provide excellent secretarial 
support for all COPUOS activities, including in conjunction with three UNISPACE conferences, 
which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
In its functions performed for COPUOS, the Office has a dual objective of supporting the 
intergovernmental discussions in the Committee and its Scientific and Technical Subcommittee 
and Legal Subcommittee, and of assisting developing countries in using space technology for 
development. Secretarial functions are performed by the Committee, Policy and Legal Affairs 
Section of the Office. The Section has two-fold functions: that of a substantive secretariat, and of 
an expert research group preparing documents on the COPUOS request. The reports and studies 
prepared by the Office for the use of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies have ranged from 
background information to comprehensive studies in various fields of space research, including 
practical applications of space technology, space law and organizational questions relating to 
international cooperation in those fields.23  
 
                                                        
22 Cf., M. Benkö and K.-U. Schrogl, International Space Law in the Making: Current Issues in the UN Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (1993), at 6. 
23 For more information on reports and studies prepared by the Office see, United Nations Office for Outer Space 
Affairs official website www.unoosa.org. 
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3.2.3 International Legal Personality 
During the 1959 session of the United Nations General Assembly, COPUOS received a 
permanent status and was entrusted with the mandate “to review, as appropriate, the area of 
international cooperation, and to study practical and feasible means for giving effect to programs 
in the peaceful uses of outer space, which could appropriately be undertaken under United 
Nations auspices” and “to study the nature of legal problems, which may arise from the 
exploration of outer space.”24 Furthermore, the resolution requested the Committee to submit 
reports on its activities to subsequent sessions of the General Assembly. While this Resolution 
provided only a sketchy outline of the Committee’s functions, it mirrored the hope that the 
United Nations through the newly created committee might become a pivotal element in the 
international coordination of space activities.25 From an institutional perspective, this resolution 
firmly established subordination to the General Assembly of the Committee, making the latter 
responsible to the former. 
Generally, COPUOS is a committee within the structure of the United Nations created by 
way of the General Assembly resolution. Thereby, COPUOS, despite its eminent role in 
development of international space law, institutionally is an organ of an international 
organization. The 1949 Reparation Case unequivocally stipulated that the United Nations is an 
international legal person possessing international legal personality. This characteristic, however, 
only stands for the United Nations as a whole, not for its organs or subdivisions. Without further 
ado, it should be concluded that COPUOS does not have international legal personality on its 
own, institutionally being an organ of an international organization. 
 
3.2.4 Term of Existence 
The General Assembly Resolution 1472 (XIV) in paragraph 1 stated that the Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space consisting of eighteen States, whose members would serve 
for the years 1960 and 1961, was to be established. Literal reading of the text suggests that 
members of these twenty-four States were required to serve a two-year term, presumably 
allowing for change of the Committee membership in 1962. A contextual reading, however, also 
                                                        
24 UNGA Res. 1472 (XIV) of December 12, 1959. 
25 Cf., M. Benkö and K.-U. Schrogl, International Space Law in the Making: Current Issues in the UN Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (1993), at 2-3. 
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suggests a conclusion that the Committee was created for a two-year period – since an organ can 
hardly exist without any members. 
The General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI) commended States for adherence to the 
principle of prohibition of outer space national appropriation, noted with satisfaction progress in 
meteorological and communication capabilities and requested that COPUOS commences 
cooperation with the World Meteorological Organization and the International 
Telecommunication Union. Further, the resolution states: “Noting that the terms of office of the 
members of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space expire at the end of 1961, … 
Decides to continue membership of the Committee on the Peaceful Purposes of Outer Space as 
set forth in General Assembly Resolution 1472 (XIV) and to add Chad, Mongolia, Morocco and 
Sierra Leone to its membership in recognition of the increased membership of the United 
Nations since the Committee was established.” Reading of the two resolutions together suggests, 
therefore, that in 1959, when the Committee was created, technically, it was created for an 
indefinite period of time, while the tenure of its members was limited to two years. And the 1961 
resolution, in its initial parts addressed certain requests to the Committee as if it was obvious that 
the Committee was going to continue its work, and only in the concluding part recalled that the 
tenure of the Committee’s members – not the Committee itself – was about to expire, and 
decided to extend their membership, this time for an indefinite period. 
Strictly speaking, therefore, the Committee at the outset was created for an indefinite 
period, but initially had its membership composition to be limited to a two-year term. 
Negotiations that took place between 1959 and 1961 allowed arriving at a decision that the 
Committee membership would not be rotating, and that States initially invited in COPUOS 
should continue their work. As of 2016, the Committee has been working uninterruptedly and is 
likely to continue working, at least in the foreseeable future. Overall, a conclusion is offered that 
COPUOS has been created for an indefinite term.  
 
3.2.5 Binding Force of Documents Produced 
The General Assembly Resolution 1472 (XIV) in outlining functions of the Committee 
limited regulatory influence of the new body to “study [of] the nature of legal problems which 
may arise from the exploration of outer space,” thereby not providing it with any law-making 
authority. In practice, COPUOS is authorized to produce two types of documents: internal 
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documents in the form of Committee’s or Subcommittees’ reports, and drafts of documents to be 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. The former are legally non-binding internal 
documents that rarely include any substantive decisions, and generally serve as a review of 
activities undertaken by the Committee or the Subcommittees during the session. The latter were 
the texts that later on became the five outer space treaties and four sets of principles.  
Procedurally, development of every document, or a draft, that is intended for further 
General Assembly endorsement has to go through several steps. First, the issue should be 
included in the agenda of either the Legal Subcommittee or the Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee. Just before the UNISPACE-III conference the German delegation together with 
several other delegations presented a new structure for the work of the two Subcommittees.26 
The proposal envisioned four categories of agenda items: standing items, including “General 
exchange of views” and “Status of the outer space treaties”; single issues, which are decided 
upon the preceding year and which are generally discussed only for one year in the plenary; 
items covered by a multi-year work plan are discussed within working groups; and an item on 
future issues, where issues can be proposed for becoming either single issues or items covered by 
a work plan. Inclusion of any new item requires consensus of all delegations present, which, 
along with the requirement that any item becoming a part of a work plan has to first go through a 
plenary discussion in a status of a single issue item, has assuaged wariness of inclusion of a 
contentious issue in the long-term work of either Subcommittee.  
 “With ‘single issues’ and ‘multi year workplans’ the almost grotesque fear of delegations 
that any issue that could make it to the agenda of one of the Subcommittee might ultimately and 
inescapably lead to political disaster, was appeased. A decade in the [Legal Subcommittee] with 
just one new agenda item obviously was too much even for the most frightened delegation, and 
so establishing categories of agenda items with clear goals and durability … brought new wind 
into the discussions.”27  
                                                        
26 For the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee see, the Working Paper presented by Germany on behalf of 
Austria, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Morocco, Romania, the Russian 
Federation, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/L.227 of 25 
February1999. For the Legal Subcommittee see, the Working Paper presented by Germany on behalf of Austria, 
Canada, France, Greece, India, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States, UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.217 and 
Corr.1 of 3 March 1999. 
27 K.-U. Schrogl, Is UNCOPUOS Fit for the Future: Reflection at the Occasion of the 50th Session of its Legal 
Subcommittee 2011, 60 ZLW 93 (2011), at 95. 
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Indeed, Subcommittees’ reports of the recent years have seen the addition of new agenda 
items and modification of those already under discussion,28 so it was even suggested that the 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee “almost hyperactively submerged itself into structured 
work” nearly transforming its sessions into a technical congress and not an intergovernmental 
committee.29 Therefore, today, unlike some fifteen years ago, inclusion of a new issue into a 
Subcommittee’s agenda is not seen anymore as being confronted with an insurmountable 
obstacle.  
The next step is actual work on the issue in the Subcommittee, possibly within a specially 
created Working Group, drafting, discussions, re-drafting and some more discussions. The 
consensus voting procedure is used throughout the Committee, so the future text should endure 
the test for compatibility with views of seventy-seven diplomats and their respective 
governments from all over the world representing developed, developing and under-developed 
countries. It took the Committee over five years to agree on the Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines, which in turn were built on the guidelines released by the Inter-Agency Space Debris 
Coordination Committee,30 despite their legally non-binding nature and not particularly stringent 
standards. This case is exemplary of the complexities of the Committee’s internal procedure for 
document negotiation.  
Upon adoption by the Subcommittee, the document is passed to the Main Committee for 
endorsement. In the recent years the Main Committee has been willing to endorse 
Subcommittees’ reports and proposals and to transfer them to the General Assembly for its 
endorsement. In the first decades of COPUOS work, however, when legally binding treaties were 
drafted and presented, their texts caused more passionate debates. Depending on the legal nature 
of the proposed document, then, different levels of scrutiny should be expected. A disclaimer 
should be added, however, that nowadays a legally binding document, or, more precisely, a 
                                                        
28 E.g., in 2012 the Legal Subcommittee included a new agenda item ‘Review of International Mechanisms for 
Cooperation in the Peaceful Exploration and Use of Outer Space’ under a five-year workplan; and the Subcommittee 
also agreed to include a new agenda item ‘National Legislation Relevant to the Peaceful Exploration and Use of 
outer Space’ as a new regular item on its agenda. Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its fifty-first session, held in 
Vienna from 19 to 30 March 2012, A/AC.105/1003. 
29 Cf., K.-U. Schrogl, Is UNCOPUOS Fit for the Future: Reflection at the Occasion of the 50th Session of its Legal 
Subcommittee 2011, 60 ZLW 93 (2011), at 96. 
30 Cf., N.R.F. Al-Rodhan, Meta-Geopolitics of Outer Space: An Analysis of Space Power, Security and Governance 
(2012), at 181-82.  
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proposal of such a document, probably would not even pass the ‘agenda item’ stage of the 
process.  
The final stage of the process is the United Nations General Assembly endorsement; and 
in the case of a legally binding document a process of ratification should also be completed. 
Overall, the Committee does not have a law-making authority; the Main Committee and the 
Subcommittees are entitled to adopt legally non-binding internal documents, for example reports 
of their sessions. Adoption of a ‘higher level’ legally non-binding document and, of course, a 
treaty can only be done through the procedure of the General Assembly endorsement and further 
national ratification in the case of a binding treaty. In other words, for a COPUOS-drafted 
document to gain any level of political, more so legal, value, it has to be approved on the 
Assembly- and State-level.  
In the 1970s a scholar opined: “Due to the universal membership and proclaimed goals of 
the UN and its organs, including the Outer Space Committee, it is the most appropriate place for 
international legal regulation of States activities in outer space.”31 It is no secret, though, that 
COPUOS has not drafted a single treaty in thirty-five years. Judging by the tone and contents of 
its annual reports, there is little prospect that this trend may change in the near future. It has been 
repeatedly noted that a movement back to legally binding commitments should be initiated, 
particularly to address “the most important and pressing problem of space flight and exploration, 
namely the mitigation of space debris.”32 
More broadly, COPUOS as the main platform for agreeing on space law development is 
said to have gone through four phases. In the first phase, COPUOS produced several legally non-
binding Resolutions with considerable political and moral force.33 The second, law-making 
phase, was premised on the understanding that establishment of a legal foundation for space 
activities was a matter of urgency, and culminated in development and adoption of five outer 
space treaties, which outlined legal principles of outer space exploration and use. The Moon 
Agreement34 marked conclusion of the law-making phase and the next, the soft law principles 
                                                        
31 Верещетин В.С. Международное сотрудничество в космосе [International Cooperation in Outer Space]. М.: 
Наука. 1974. C. 113. 
32 S. Hobe, Celebrating 50 Years of Legal Work in the United Nations’ Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space, 61 ZLW 2 (2012), at 2. 
33 See, F. G. von der Dunk, “International Space Law,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), 
at 38. 
34 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done 18 December 1979, 
entered into force 11 July 1984, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3.  
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phase, followed. During that period COPUOS focused on further development of the space law 
regime as established by the five treaties through negotiation of a set of Principles, each 
concerned with a rather specific area of space applications.35 “In this sense, the intention of the 
drafters of the Principles was exactly to adopt mere declarations not binding per se.”36 
The fourth phase in COPUOS development is characterized by efforts to broaden the 
acceptance of the existing space treaties and to provide comprehensive assessment of the practice 
of their application.37 At the same time, the current state of space activities has transformed from 
the government- and military-focused industry to an increasingly private sector-oriented sphere 
with multiplying practical down-to-Earth applications, which have already become an integral 
part of modern society. “The result was an overall lessening of the coherence of all international 
law relevant to space” as a consequence of transformation of the United Nations treaties into the 
‘foundation’ of contemporary space law, and elevation of other legal regimes, including 
constitutions and other regulations of international space organizations, specific regimes created 
for specific space projects, multilateral and bilateral treaties addressing a specific realm of space 
activities, to a prominent role in modern international space law.38 Not surprisingly, this shift 
causes concerns about the future role of COPUOS in development of international space law and 
its relevance altogether.39 
 
3.2.6 Existence of Opportunity to Modify Obligations 
As it has been noted above, COPUOS is not authorized to adopt legally binding 
documents. The only type of documents that the Main Committee and its Subcommittees adopt 
on their own behalf is the sessions’ reports. The reports cover procedural matters, including 
adoption of current agenda, membership and attendance, and provide an overview of the 
                                                        
35 Principles Governing the Use of States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television 
Broadcasting, UNGA Res. 37/92, of 10 December 1982, A/AC.105/572/Rev.1; Principles Relating to Remote 
Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, UNGA Res. 41/65, of 3 December 1986, A/AC.105/572/Rev.1; Principles 
Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, UNGA Res. 47/68, of 14 December 1992, 
A/AC.105/572/Rev.1; Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the 
Benefit and in the Interest of all States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries, UNGA 
Res. 51/122, of 13 December 1996, A/RES/51/122.  
36 S. Marchisio, The Evolutionary Stages of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 31 J. Space L. 219 (2005), at 232. 
37 Id. at 224-25.  
38 F.G. von der Dunk, “International Space Law,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 
106-07. 
39 Id.  
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substantive issues under consideration. Sections of the reports addressing particular substantive 
issues that are being discussed, however, only provide a review of topics brought up for the 
discussion, presentations made by delegations, and of general exchange of views. No decisions 
on substantive issues under consideration are being adopted; the only type of precisely 
formulated decisions that can be found in the reports concerns the items of agenda to be 
discussed during the next session. 
In the absence of a law-making authority and in virtual absence of any decisions 
concerning substantive issues, no procedure to modify obligations is necessary. Moreover, 
recalling that COPUOS has been uninterruptedly using the consensus voting procedure since 
1962, the very concept of unilateral modification of decisions adopted by the Committee is at 
odds with the adopted methods and ethics of COPUOS’s work. 
 
3.3 Evaluation and Conclusions 
 
In considering the legal nature of COPUOS, it should be noted that the Committee is 
classified as a standing subsidiary organ of the General Assembly in accordance with Article 
7(2) of the United Nations Charter. Consequently, “its composition and functions are established 
by a decision of the plenary organ, which can always modify UNCOPUOS membership and its 
mandate by an act of the same nature, without amending the United Nations Charter.”40  
Therefore, COPUOS is a part of the United Nations, an international intergovernmental 
organization, and, strictly speaking, cannot possess any other characteristics, as analyzed using 
the six criteria, than that of the United Nations. The Committee has States-only membership; 
functions of the COPUOS secretariat are performed by another United Nations organ; 
COPUOS’s term of existence is limited only by the will of States and currently should be 
presumed to be indefinite. Being an organ within an organization, the Committee cannot possess 
international legal personality despite the unquestioned status of the United Nations as a subject 
of international law. The Committee is not authorized to adopt legally binding documents or 
impose any, even political, obligations on its members; hence, there is no need to provide for an 
opportunity to modify obligations. 
                                                        
40 S. Marchisio, The Evolutionary Stages of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 31 J. Space L. 219 (2005), at 221. 
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The status of a subordinate body of the General Assembly underlines the political nature 
of the COPUOS operation, on the one hand, and reaffirms its dependence on decisions adopted 
by all members of the United Nations, on the other. In the end, the General Assembly has the 
ultimate authority over COPUOS, its membership, rules of procedure and even existence. 
 
3.3.1 Institutional Weaknesses: Analysis and Proposals 
A former British diplomat who had much to do with the United Nations wrote: “The 
United Nations is a mirror of the world around it, and if the reflection is ugly, the organization 
should not be blamed.”41 
This conclusion applies to COPUOS only to a certain extent. In the 1990s COPUOS 
“became a rather lame institution with a static agenda and almost no output, facing the risk of 
sclerosis or implosion.”42 There is little doubt that this transformation was mainly caused by 
States themselves, by their reluctance to develop more legally binding norms, by the continuous 
struggle between developed and developing countries on the question of forced cooperation and 
transfer of resources and technologies, which culminated in and was resolved by the 1996 Space 
Benefits Declaration, by the growing military uses of outer space triggered by further 
enhancement of relevant technologies, and by active participation of more States in exploration 
and use of outer space causing geopolitical tensions and growing security concerns. The list can 
undoubtedly be continued.  
But there are more subtle reasons that cannot be completely attributed to particular 
States’ behavior. Any intergovernmental body is an ‘artificial’ entity comprised of 
representatives of States, and in this sense only States can be responsible for organizations’ 
success or failure. An intergovernmental body, at the same time, is more than a sum of its 
members; behavioral dynamics of a group are dramatically different from that of an individual, 
as it has been noted by almost every sociologist and psychiatrist since Freud. And there are at 
least three issues, which in combination with other factors contributed to the Committee’s 
downturn, which could and should have been addressed on the entity level. After all, the 
Committee Services and Research Sector of the Office for Outer Space Affairs has provided 
excellent research services to COPUOS over the years, preparing exhaustive overviews and 
                                                        
41 C. Archer, International Organizations (1992), at 27. 
42 K.-U. Schrogl, Is UNCOPUOS Fit for the Future: Reflection at the Occasion of the 50th Session of its Legal 
Subcommittee 2011, 60 ZLW 93 (2011), at 93. 
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comprehensive analyses on a variety of topics; questions of procedure and organization could 
have been easily handled by this experienced organ.43 
 
3.3.1.1 Membership 
The most obvious weak spot of the Committee is its large membership. It is true that 
more and more States are getting active in outer space and, thus, would like to be represented in 
COPUOS. Essentially, membership of COPUOS mirrors the United Nations membership as a 
whole, having countries from all regions of the world and countries in every stage of 
development.44 It has been shown earlier that COPUOS was most productive when it had 
twenty-eight members. Without doubt, the number of members was not the sole or the main 
reason behind the Committee’s success, but it should not be disregarded as completely irrelevant. 
Quite prosaically, a large number of members makes organizational and procedural issues more 
complicated; a crowd of eighty-three diplomats is not easy to manage. It was also noted that in 
the 1960s and 1970s the Committee’s success, at least in part, was attributed to close personal 
relations between the States’ representatives, who had known each other for years and had come 
to understand and respect each other.45 While one can have personal relations with twenty 
people, with eighty it will take a lot of time only to get acquainted. 
It is true, though, that large groups are beneficial in regulatory frameworks, when there is 
no right answer, and the group is searching for the best one. Centuries-long history of 
parliamentary institutions is the vocal proof. But the bigger the group, the slower it works, the 
more there are ways in which the process of group decision-making can go wrong, and, finally, 
without good organization, a decision-making group can fail badly.46 Here the analogy to a 
national legislature is helpful: while it is required that it has enough members to be 
representative, it has significant problems of organization, which are handled through 
parliamentary procedures, including most importantly voting rules. Thus, there is a choice to 
make: either you have a larger group with excellent organization and precise voting rules, or you 
                                                        
43 See e.g., Preparations for the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (UNISPACE III) by the Advisory Committee fir UNISPACE III, A/AC.105/685. It was prepared by the 
UNISPACE III Secretariat, whose functions were performed by the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs in 
accordance with the UNGA Resolution 51/123 of 13 December 1996.  
44 Cf., S.N. Hosenball, The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Past Accomplishments 
and Future Challenges, 7 J. Space L. 95 (1979), at 95. 
45 Cf., F. Lyall and P. B. Larsen, Space law: A Treatise (2009), at 21-22. 
46 Cf., C. Pavitt, Small Group Communication: A Theoretical Approach (1998), at 54-55. 
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have a smaller group with a more relaxed organizational procedure, and here a consensual voting 
might prove very efficient.  
COPUOS has adopted and effectively used a consensus procedure when it included 
twenty-eight members. As the membership grew, however, the procedure has not been changed 
or adapted to new circumstances. Today COPUOS has a membership more comparable to that of 
national legislatures; but hardly any national legislature works using a consensus voting 
procedure. 
Further, the COPUOS composition presupposes a limited number of participants. The 
two Subcommittees were created to establish “a dialogue between law, science and technology at 
a crucial point of the development of all of them, a dialogue so essential in many other spheres of 
international relations. It was clear that these two disciplines were inseparable and had to evolve 
together to ensure that space activities continue to serve the interest of all States and humanity as 
a whole.”47 But at the same time no procedure of communication or coordination between the 
two Subcommittees had been formally established; the Main Committee was and remains the 
only cohesive element. Nevertheless, it did not preclude COPUOS and the Subcommittees from 
drafting five space treaties, all of which required a combination of legal and scientific expertise.  
In some instances, it has been noted, informal ‘hallway discussions’ are more important 
than those taking place during the session.48 While that might not at all be true for COPUOS 
circa the 1970s, informal conversations are always a part of the process, a part of coordination, a 
part of the dialogue between representatives, organs or organizations. The limited number of 
members, thereby, provided members of the Committee more opportunities for such informal 
discussions, whereas informal discussions among eighty-plus members seem more unlikely. And 
in this sense communication between the two Subcommittees also becomes more cumbersome 
on an informal level, and complicated on the formal one.  
The Committee, being a specialized body of the United Nations General Assembly, might 
have benefitted from a more compact membership. With all due respect, participation of 
representatives of Sierra Leon or Chad or Niger, which each have only one Intelsat satellite 
functioning over their territory,49 cannot be considered crucial. While the records of the Outer 
                                                        
47 N. Jasentuliyana, International Space Law and the United Nations (1999), at 24-25. 
48 Cf., J. Kaufmann, Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis (1988), at 52-53. 
49 For more information see, the Central Intelligence Agency, the World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/wfbExt/region_afr.html. 
 132 
Space Treaty deliberations bear witness to the fact that among the members of the Legal 
Subcommittee the representatives of States not engaged in space activities played a very active 
part and put forward many constructive proposals eventually incorporated into the final text,50 
such recollections should be put into context.  
That period was dramatically different from the current circumstances in at least two 
respects. First, today the general principles of outer space law celebrate their golden jubilee. The 
body of international space law, while far from being comprehensive, has created a firm legal 
foundation for further development of the legal regime and advancement of outer space 
exploration and use. Second, the geopolitical situation has changed dramatically. In the early 
years of the space era basically only two States were actively engaged in exploration and use of 
outer space, leaving other States under pressure to secure a legal regime that would guard their 
future interest in outer space exploration and use without any opportunity to influence 
development of space law apart from that within the COPUOS framework. Being excluded from 
the practice of outer space exploitation, regulatory and political leverage was the only option. So 
it came as no surprise that States other than the two ‘space superpowers’ were eager to be a part 
of COPUOS and of a law-making process, thereby, guaranteeing their future ‘place in the sun’. 
Nowadays, more and more States are being engaged in space activities; private 
companies from all over the world see the doors open to their entrepreneurial skills and zeal for 
exploration of outer space, and the threat of two superpowers having the whole outer space to 
themselves no longer exists. Basically, this means that the majority of States are interested in 
effective legal regime of outer space, and this group will only continue growing.51 That, 
however, does not necessarily mean that the Committee should continue growing as well. A 
representative, rotating membership would allow for an adequate embodiment of interests that 
are attributable to the whole group of States already active in space and those exploring 
prospects of space activities. In other words, the growing number of States with interests in space 
exploration and use, which presumably at some point would include all States, can be effectively 
represented by a smaller group without a threat of inadequate representation of one or more 
                                                        
50 See, M. Lachs, The Law of Outer Space: An Experience in Contemporary Law-Making (2010), at 130. 
51 COPUOS documents and scholarly works, however, are not at all consistent with respect to outlining COPUOS 
functions and its role in legal regulation. The Space Benefit Declaration, for example, characterized COPUOS “as a 
forum for the exchange of information on national and international activities in the field of international 
cooperation.” (A/RES/51/122, December 13, 1996, para. 7) If such a view of COPUOS role is accepted, then a 
numerous COPUOS membership seems unnecessary and unjustified. As noted above, the wording of the UNGA 
Resolution, establishing COPUOS mandate is somewhat ambiguous and is open to varying interpretations.  
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groups or interests. A representative COPUOS subject to ‘checks and balances’ provided by the 
General Assembly might prove effective.  
Members of the European Space Agency often entrust communication of their views to 
one designated State, Ecuador often makes statements on behalf of the Group of Latin American 
and Caribbean States and Kenya occasionally represents the Group of African States; so the 
possibility of rotating participation of just one member of these groups in Committee sessions 
might also be put up for consideration in the effort of reducing the number of COPUOS 
members. Moreover, COPUOS is not a plenary organ akin to the General Assembly, which is 
designed to represent all States and provide an equal opportunity to vote; it is a specialized 
Committee, which has a specific, albeit not especially narrow, mandate and is intended to fulfill 
preparatory – research and drafting – functions in order to pass the result to the plenary organ for 
decision; and at that point participation of each and every State becomes essential.  
The International Civil Aviation Organization is an example to the point. Every State has 
a keen interest in effective and orderly regulation of civil aviation, and the Organization’s 
membership of 191 States reflects this interest. Not the Organization’s Assembly, however, is 
responsible for drafting and adoption of International Standards and Recommended Practices 
incorporated as Annexes to the Chicago Convention. The Council, an organ comprised of thirty-
six States elected by the Assembly for a three-year term is charged with drafting Standards and 
Recommended Practices, which essentially define the civil aviation international legal regime.52 
The Council represents three groups of States: States of chief importance in air transport; States 
which make the largest contribution to the provision of facilities for international civil air 
navigation; and States ensuring geographic representation. Such a composition guarantees that, 
on the one hand, the most influential States have their votes in the Council, and on the other, that 
the principle of geographic representation is followed, and at the same time the organ’s 
membership is not too numerous.53 The Council is responsible to the Assembly, it submits 
annual reports to the Assembly and carries out the directions of the Assembly.54  
                                                        
52 Convention on Civil Aviation, signed December 7, 1944; entered into force April 4, 1947, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. 
Article 54 in relevant part states: “The Council shall: … (l) Adopt, in accordance wit the provisions of Chapter VI of 
this Convention, international standards and recommended practices; for convenience, designate them as Annexes to 
this Convention; and notify all contracting States of the action taken.” 
53 It should be noted, though, that sociology traditionally recognizes a group of 5 (or 4.6 to be precise) as the most 
optimal number of group members, and it has been proved that with the increase of the number of members both the 
individual members’ satisfaction and the effectiveness of the group dropped. The so-called Ringelmann effect 
confirms that adding more people to the group leads to rise of the total force of the group, but the average force 
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General Assembly Resolution 1472 (XIV) specifically requested “the Committee to 
submit reports on its activities to the subsequent sessions of the General Assembly.”55 Moreover, 
the Committee, unlike the International Civil Aviation Organization Council,56 is not entitled to 
adopt any binding decisions; every drafted document is subject to the General Assembly 
endorsement and, in case of a legally binding treaty, ratification by States. Although the analogy 
between COPUOS and the International Civil Aviation Organization Council does not suggest 
that these two organs are substantively similar, the lesson to be learned is that even in the area 
where all States have a direct interest in proper regulation, development of regulatory documents 
does not necessarily require participation of all or even the majority of States; a representative 
organ elected by all member-States of the organization can competently perform these functions. 
As has been noted above, in a large group a proper organization and particularly clear 
voting rules are essential for its effective work. Consensus is an effective method but it has its 
limits. COPUOS as it stands today has two features – a large number of members and a 
consensus voting procedure – which are both effective on their own but cannot properly work 
together. So if the size of the Committee is preserved, it necessitates amendment of the voting 
rules and revival of the General Assembly rules of procedure, making voting possible.  
This, though, is not the best option from both legal and organizational perspectives. From 
the legal point of view, consensual decision-making incentivizes dialogue between cooperating 
States; thus, it increases the chances of adoption of a decision satisfactory to all parties 
concerned and so strengthens the chances that the rule of law would be followed in a good faith 
manner by a majority of States. From the organizational point of view, consensus has always 
been a keystone of the Committee’s work. Achievement of consensus on texts of all outer space 
treaties has been a Committee’s distinctive feature and a reason for pride. Abolishment of the 
consensus voting procedure would mean abolishment of the most praised tradition of this organ, 
and would likely have detrimental consequences for the spirit of cooperation. After all, any 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
exerted by each group member declines. For more information see, J.S. Mueller, Why individuals in larger teams 
perform worse, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (2011). 
54 Art. 50, 54 of the Convention on Civil Aviation. 
55 General Assembly Resolution 1472(XIV), International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, RES 
1472 (XIV) (12 December 1959), para. 2.  
56 Here the reference is to the Council’s authority to adopt legally binding international standards pursuant to 
provisions of Article 12 of the Chicago Convention. Other types of international standards and recommended 
practices adopted as Annexes to the Chicago Convention are not considered legally binding in the strict legal sense. 
See, infra, at 358-359. 
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voting rule always leads to obvious winners and obvious losers, and that is not a constructive 
distinction in international relations. 
 
3.3.1.2 Subcommittees 
The second institutional weak point of COPUOS is communication, or lack thereof, 
between the two Subcommittees. In 1962, with the creation of the two Subcommittees no 
procedure for their coordination was established, and, as the Committee matured, their 
separateness has been preserved. In the mid 1980s the Subcommittees were praised as an 
effective mechanism within COPUOS that “have provided an excellent framework for 
accomplishment of their delicate tasks.”57 Nowadays the situation has changed. The two 
Subcommittees “are currently more or less islands in the UNCOPUOS setting. They do not 
interact with each other, even though this might be necessary, and they are not really guided by 
the Main Committee.”58 If COPUOS is to undertake a transformation to revive its status as the 
prominent international space forum, the division of work between the two Subcommittees, 
which were established to promote dialogue between law and science, might prove to be a barrier 
too high to overcome.  
One option is to abrogate the division of the Committee’s work altogether and 
concentrate all activities within the Main Committee. Since both Subcommittees and the Main 
Committee have the same membership it will not affect States’ participation in COPUOS 
activities. Periods formerly allocated to Subcommittees’ sessions may be added to the Main 
Committee’s sessions’ duration, resulting in six weeks of continuous work. Examination of 
specific topics might be organized using ad hoc Working Groups established by the Main 
Committee and reporting to each Committee’s session until completion of their respective work 
plans.59 
There is one problem in this scenario. Abolishment of the Subcommittees does not mean 
that collaboration between scientists and lawyers can also be abolished; quite to the contrary, the 
main idea is to promote closer cooperation and communication between the specialists both 
during the Main Committee sessions and the Working Group meetings. But at this point it is hard 
                                                        
57 E.R.C. van Bogaert, Aspects of Space Law (1986), at 264. 
58 K.-U. Schrogl, Is UNCOPUOS Fit for the Future: Reflection at the Occasion of the 50th Session of its Legal 
Subcommittee 2011, 60 ZLW 93 (2011), at 101. 
59 Id.  
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to imagine how sessions of the Main Committee would look like: each State would have at least 
two representatives – one diplomat and one scientist, though States’ delegations of course could 
be larger – what already amounts to an impressive one-hundred sixty-six participants. 
Organization of these meetings is not the primary concern: the Office for Outer Space Affairs 
has successfully organized UNISPACE-III, which saw over two thousand attendants. But the 
question of voting probably would cause some disturbances. 
Today specialists in science and technology meet separately; they separately discuss 
issues pertaining to their areas of competence, and separately work toward Committee-wide 
consensus on issues of science and technology. The same is true for the Legal Subcommittee. 
But if the two bodies were merged, how would discussion and voting be arranged? For example, 
if the question of space traffic regulation is considered within the Committee, discussion of 
technical matters is inseparable form the legal ones. The questions of applicability of air law 
regime to suborbital flights are not purely legal since construction and design of two types of 
crafts should be taken into consideration. Simultaneous discussion of legal and scientific issues 
of the topic under consideration might not prove particularly constructive. The bottom line is that 
abrogation of the Subcommittees would require significant re-evaluation and re-organization of 
Committee’s working procedures. It would necessarily trigger revision of the agenda, because if 
the agendas of the two Subcommittees were simply combined, the new agenda would have an 
unmanageable total of twenty items. Recalling the earlier discussion of States’ reluctance to add 
new items on the agenda, a major reworking of the overall COPUOS agenda might prove to be a 
challenge.  
The second option is preservation of the current structure of the Committee accompanied 
by establishment of formal procedures for the Subcommittees’ communication. One way is to 
provide for triennial joint sessions of the two Subcommittees. In accordance with the new 
structure for the two Subcommittees proposed by Germany, a three-year period is generally 
allocated for multiyear work plans; hence, subject to certain concurrency in Subcommittees’ 
work, triennial joint meetings would serve a helpful tool in ensuring compatibility of their results 
and coordination of future work plans.  
Another way, though not necessarily excluding the first one, is to establish Working 
Groups on issues under consideration in both Subcommittees. For example, the ‘Space Debris’ 
agenda item in the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee agenda 
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item ‘General exchange of information and views on legal mechanisms relating to space debris 
mitigation measures, taking into account the work of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee’ 
can be easily merged and transformed into a joint Working Group on space debris. Some agenda 
items, by contrast, are clearly either legal or technical; for example, discussion of the item 
‘Status and application of the five United Nations treaties on outer space’ within a joint Working 
Group or a joint session would hardly prove worthwhile.  
Therefore, a narrowly tailored approach is necessary when reassessing coordination of 
the Subcommittees’ activities, discerning the ones requiring collaborative effort of both 
Subcommittees and those better off when considered within the respective Subcommittee. By 
and large, both the elimination of the Subcommittees and their reorganization are viable 
alternatives to the current state of ‘island-like’ work of the Subcommittees and the Main 
Committee. Both options would require thorough planning and attention to details, particularly in 
procedural matters; and both options, if properly executed, are capable of filling the 
communicational gap within the COPUOS structure and enhance its overall productivity. 
Consideration of such topics as space traffic management, suborbital flights and space debris 
mitigation would undoubtedly benefit from combination of efforts of the two Subcommittees. 
 
3.3.1.3 State-Centricity 
Finally, it would be useful to reconsider COPUOS State-centricity. A few preliminary 
remarks should be made. First, the Committee was created as a subsidiary body of the General 
Assembly, and so obtained not only a political but also a State-focused character. Being an 
intergovernmental entity, COPUOS should preserve its integrity and abstain from blanket 
invitation of all interested parties, including nongovernmental entities, to participate in its 
sessions. Second, intergovernmental and nongovernmental entities have participated in COPUOS 
sessions since 1962 in the status of observer, although the private sector has never been granted 
access to the Committee. Third, the era of “government-focused, politico-military” space 
activities has long passed,60 and space applications have become not only a profitable business, 
                                                        
60 F.G. von der Dunk, “International Space Law,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 
106. 
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but also an important tool for international organizations, including those in the United Nations 
system, in fulfilling their goals.61 
With these remarks in mind, it is suggested that COPUOS would benefit from inclusion 
of intergovernmental and nongovernmental entities into its work. This proposal is two-fold: on 
the one hand, it is advocated that COPUOS acquires a role of ‘the space center of the United 
Nations’ coordinating, or at least, registering space-related activities of all institutions within the 
United Nations system; and on the other, invitation of representatives of the private sector would 
add another point of view to the discussion.  
The Legal Subcommittee’s agenda item ‘Matters relating to the definition and 
delimitation of outer space and the character and utilization of the geostationary orbit, including 
consideration of ways and means to ensure the rational and equitable use of the geostationary 
orbit without prejudice to the role of the International Telecommunication Union’ unequivocally 
confirms interdependence and interconnectedness of COPUOS activities with those of the United 
Nations specialized agencies.62 The goal of the Committee in this regard should be to focus on 
preservation of the international space regime consistency in the light of the activities and 
internal documents of respective international organizations.  
This is not to suggest that COPUOS should serve a ‘guardian’ of space law stability, 
which is by itself a utopian goal. Nor a broad supervisory role of the Committee, including 
support and guidance of space applications in the United Nations institutions, is advocated.63 
Currently the Committee has more pressing internal issues, particularly the need to enhance 
inter-State cooperation to ensure the entity’s relevance for the years to come. Moreover, 
COPUOS does not possess the necessary institutional structure and uninterrupted permanent 
character of work that would be desirable to perform supervisory functions. Rather, COPUOS 
should become the ‘point of reference’ that is timely informed of all regulatory and practical 
activities within the United Nations system. This would ensure COPUOS’s awareness of the 
                                                        
61 Cf., K.-U. Schrogl, Is UNCOPUOS Fit for the Future: Reflection at the Occasion of the 50th Session of its Legal 
Subcommittee 2011, 60 ZLW 93 (2011), at 99. 
62 The relevant Scientific and Technical Subcommittee agenda item is entitled ‘Examination of the physical nature 
and technical attributes of the geostationary orbit and its utilization and applications, including in the field of space 
communications, as well as other questions relating to developments in space communications, taking particular 
account of the needs and interests of developing countries, without prejudice to the role of the International 
Telecommunication Union’. 
63 Cf., K.-U. Schrogl, Is UNCOPUOS Fit for the Future: Reflection at the Occasion of the 50th Session of its Legal 
Subcommittee 2011, 60 ZLW 93 (2011), at 100. 
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latest trends and ultimately would facilitate carrying out one of the contemporary Committee’s 
tasks, namely assessment of the five United Nations space treaties, in a more effective way 
taking into consideration practice of both States and international organizations.  
Inclusion of the private sector is another element in shifting the COPUOS exclusive focus 
from State activities in outer space. Preservation of COPUOS’s integrity as an intergovernmental 
entity is of utmost importance; hence, participation of commercial entities in Committee’s 
sessions should have certain restrictions. First, a status of commercial entities should be decided; 
whether it would be a status of observer or any other status, the choice must be satisfactory to all 
States. Second, commercial entities’ participation should be authorized on a case-by-case basis 
and might be done as a one-time concession for a specific entity, or as an open-ended invitation 
to all interested entities, possibly meeting certain criteria, to participate in a particular session. 
Third, it is suggested that initially participation of the private sector should be limited to the 
sessions of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee.  
Compliance with these parameters would, on the one hand, ensure that the primary role 
of States is preserved, and, on the other, ensure that the matter of private sector participation is 
approached in a cautious manner, thereby providing States sufficient control over who and when 
is allowed to attend COPUOS sessions. The proposal to at first open only sessions of the 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee is dictated by two reasons: first, presence of the private 
sector at these sessions would be less contentious due to the nature of subjects under 
consideration, as opposed to the Legal Subcommittee where delicate political issues are more 
likely to arise; and second, the Subcommittee’s agenda includes issues like remote sensing, 
disaster management support, navigation satellite systems and others, where nowadays private 
sector’s expertise would be most valuable. Overall, even with the enumerated limitations, which 
can be eliminated as the practice of commercial entities participation becomes more common 
and its benefits become more visible, occasional participation of the private sector would add a 
practitioner’s perspective to the discussion, hopefully steering COPUOS toward practically 
feasible and thoroughly deliberated decisions. 
By and large, introduction of the three proposed changes into the COPUOS institutional 
system would create a favorable milieu for substantive changes, whether by way of addition of 
new topics for consideration, including the most prominent issues relating to space activities 
commercialization, or by way of focusing on development of widely supported documents, even 
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if non-binding ones, on the issues currently on the COPUOS agenda. For example, during the 
2015 session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee some delegations “expressed the 
view that it was necessary to continue improving the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the 
Committee and that the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee 
should cooperate with the aim of developing legally binding rules relating to space debris.”64 A 
more compact Committee armed with necessary methods of coordination between the 
Subcommittees and with information provided by States, international organizations and the 
private sector might well succeed in drafting new, more stringent and specific rules on space 
debris mitigation. These changes, however, are not likely to persuade States that binding treaties 
are indeed necessary.  
 
3.3.2 Future Role of COPUOS 
Turning to this part of the analysis, first, the purpose, or ambition behind the creation of 
COPUOS should be understood. One author suggested: “Looking at the founding resolution, one 
might easily understand that the main tasks of the Committee were not legal or institutional. In 
fact, it was established in order to consider the activities and resources of the United Nations; the 
specialized agencies and other international bodies relations to the peaceful uses of outer space; 
international cooperation; and, programs in the field that could appropriately be undertaken 
under United Nations auspices and within its organizational arrangements to facilitate 
international space cooperation. From this perspective, UNCOPUOS has been the focal point for 
all space-related cooperative programs furthered by the United Nations since the early 1960s.”65 
Indeed, a fairly unspecific wording of resolutions drew a very broad competence for the 
newly created organ that might well cover matters of coordination within the United Nations 
system. Supervisory activities, however, have never been a centerpiece of COPUOS activities.66 
Creation of the UN-SPIDER Program is rather an exception than a rule. Nowadays, there is no 
                                                        
64 Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its fifty-second session, held in Vienna from 2 to 13 
February 2015, A/AC.105/1088, para. 96. 
65 S. Marchisio, The Evolutionary Stages of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 31 J. Space L. 219 (2005), at 222. 
66 E.g. see, Каменецкая Е.П. Космос и международные организации: международно-правовые проблемы 
[Outer Space and International Organizations: International Legal Problems]. М., 1980. C. 115 (COPUOS can 
hardly fulfill functions of the permanent operative world center of international cooperation in exploration and use 
of outer space, because even today, when there is a relatively small number of international space organizations and 
UN organs empowered with dealing with outer space exploration issues, occasionally it might struggle to fulfill its 
purposes.). 
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indication that COPUOS is ready or willing to adjust its predominantly regulation-oriented work. 
The exceptional success of COPUOS in negotiating and drafting five United Nations treaties 
affirmed its primarily regulatory mission.  
The 1472 (XIV) resolution included the language mandating the Committee to consider 
“legal problems which may arise in the carrying out of programs to explore outer space,” 
unequivocally including a regulatory legal role within the COPUOS mandate, albeit putting the 
respective language at the very end of the Resolution.67 In this area the Committee has seen great 
successes for which it will be praised for the years to come; but currently its regulatory function 
has come to a standstill. It has been asserted that nowadays the COPUOS’s main focus in the 
legal regulatory area of its activities is the assessment of the existing legal regimes and the 
formulation of non-binding documents that are based upon the rights and obligations as provided 
by the treaties already in force.68 It is suggested that these two tasks, strictly speaking, are neither 
regulatory, nor legal in nature.  
The task of ‘assessment of the existing legal regimes’ does not bear regulatory meaning 
since an assessment would not include the revision of existing legal norms or the development of 
authoritative interpretations to the space treaties; rather, the task would be limited to “the 
analysis of problems and shortcomings with respect to the application of existing rules of space 
law.”69 It, undoubtedly, is a helpful instrument to facilitate exchange of information and share 
best practices. But neither COPUOS has the power to provide authoritative interpretations of 
existing texts, nor is it empowered to ‘create’ new law relying on the Anglo-Saxon concept of 
precedent. It is also doubtful that ‘assessments’ are supposed to be concluded by a set of 
guidelines summarizing best practices and offered to States to be followed on a voluntary basis.70 
The only way this task might have substantive regulatory value is by way of creation of a 
compilation of State practice that can be used to establish norms of international custom. Such a 
                                                        
67 A disclaimed should be made that the term ‘regulatory’ as applied to activities, functions, or role of COPUOS 
here is understood narrowly as entailing COPUOS’s authority to draft legally binding and non-binding documents 
requiring further endorsement by the General Assembly and, in case of legally binding documents, ratification by 
States. Supra, para. 3.2.5. 
68 See, S. Marchisio, The Evolutionary Stages of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 31 J. Space L. 219 (2005), at 237. 
69 Id. 
70 E.g., a draft resolution Application of the Concept if the ‘Launching State’, G.A. Res. 59/155 (Dec. 10, 2004), 
reminded that it did not constitute an authoritative interpretation of, or proposed amendments to the Liability and 
Registration Convention, and mainly recommended that States consider enacting national legislation on 
authorization and supervision of space activities by private entities and the conclusion of agreements with respect to 
joint launches.  
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compilation would have to cover the general practice and identify the subjective element – 
opinio juris – in order to facilitate establishment of customary norms.71  
The other question in this regard is: what actions can the Committee take, should its 
assessment conclude that the existing legal regimes are unsatisfactory? Based on the 
contemporary goals of COPUOS as outlined above, there is nothing that can be done, legally 
speaking. Even formulation of non-binding documents is supposed to be based on already 
existing rights and obligations enunciated in the outer space treaties; so a ‘soft law’ solution to 
address the existing regimes’ imperfections is not possible. Therefore, the second line of 
COPUOS activities would also have minimal effect on the regulatory landscape both due to 
subject-matter limitations and due to the legally non-binding force of any adopted documents. 
Today the most pressing issues are of such nature that they require more than a recommendation 
containing broad principles. For example, the issue of space traffic regulation can hardly be 
effectively dealt with using General Assembly resolutions, which are the culmination of the 
regulatory COPUOS process, for many reasons, including their political orientation, imprecision 
of formulations and lack of collaboration in the drafting process with other relevant 
organizations, including the International Civil Aviation Organization.  
By and large, the legal regulatory role of COPUOS should be reinforced for the 
Committee to remain a prominent space forum. It has been emphasized that in the years to come 
COPUOS has to take up the issues requiring its legislative function based on outer space law, 
halting attempts of other institutions to independently develop international law, which touch 
upon the status of outer space and the principles of its use.72 Not all, however, share this 
sentiment, and an opinion favoring a limited regulatory role of COPUOS was also voiced.73 It 
has been noted that “the idea of drafting by both COPUOS sub-committees on an ordinary 
functional basis of international recommendations and standards is certainly fascinating, but 
would require profound changes from the institutional point of view.”74 
                                                        
71 This topic is currently under consideration in the United Nations International Law Commission. Two basic 
elements of international custom are extensively discussed in the Second Report of Special Rapporteur Sir Michael 
Wood. See, International Law Commission, sixty-sixth session, Second Report on Identification of Customary 
International Law (2014), A.CN.4/672.  
72 See, K.-U. Schrogl, Is UNCOPUOS Fit for the Future: Reflection at the Occasion of the 50th Session of its Legal 
Subcommittee 2011, 60 ZLW 93 (2011), at 101. 
73 Cf., S. Marchisio, The Evolutionary Stages of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 31 J. Space L. 219 (2005), at 241-42. 
74 Id.  
 143 
Overall, there is a general agreement that the revival of the prominent role of COPUOS in 
space activities regulation would have been desirable. At the same time, there is also a general 
understanding that the Committee in the way it is structured and is functioning today cannot 
undertake ambitious tasks and satisfactorily perform them. There might be a multitude of 
opinions as to the most appropriate ways of COPUOS’s transformation to meet today’s needs. 
Institutionally, the Committee would have benefitted from a smaller number of members, closer 
monitoring of Committee’s structure and utilization of appropriate procedures to ensure 
procedural adequacy and efficiency, and involvement of governmental and nongovernmental 
entities, including private sector actors, preferably in the status of observer granted on a case-by-
case basis. It is suggested that these institutional changes might significantly affect the substance 
of COPUOS work by adding certain flexibility and mobility in inter-Committee relations, 
ensuring adequacy of adopted procedures, and adding a new perspective to traditionally State-
centered discussions, which might indeed ease finding that compromise that would satisfy all 
parties concerned and would provide a much-needed regulatory framework for the swiftly 
developing space activities.  
A lot has been said about modern COPUOS weaknesses, and it is time to point at its 
strengths. First and foremost, it is an intergovernmental body offering States an opportunity to 
discuss in a controlled setting any issue pertaining to exploration and use of outer space. That 
feature gives COPUOS a unique opportunity to engage States in a dialogue about the most 
pressing issues and the issues that only a handful of States consider important. The development 
of such a dialogue is a whole different story, but the opportunity is there, and it is the States’ 
responsibility to engage other members of the Committee in the discussion they are initiating.  
Second, COPUOS’s intergovernmental nature is both its weakness and its strength. On 
the one hand, it limits the topics the Committee might take up for the discussion, but on the 
other, it provides an opportunity to discuss international legal issues in their purity, without 
putting them into commercialization, or licensing, or intellectual property rights contexts. 
Acknowledging interconnectedness of all these issues in a modern space industry, there is still a 
line, which though having become very thin and almost transparent over the years, is still there, 
that delimits international public law from international private law, or more precisely private 
law in the international context. Hence, there should be a forum concerned primarily with the 
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public element of international space law, ensuring its consistency for the sake of building an 
international private space law regime on a stable public law foundation. 
Third, over the years COPUOS proved that it is capable to develop and to adapt to new 
circumstances. As discussed above, the Committee is not an example of an entity exhibiting an 
immediate reaction to new conditions; in some areas it proved to be completely stagnant. 
Nevertheless, the very fact that is has been changing throughout over fifty years of its existence, 
that States continuously participate in its sessions, that the documents it has drafted have mostly 
been greeted with wide support and appreciation; all are suggestive of the COPUOS’s ability to 
maneuver in the ever-changing international environment. With some help and a grain of States’ 
initiatives COPUOS might well transform once again to retain its important position in the 
system of international space cooperation.  
COPUOS was designed to be the center of international cooperation in exploration and 
use of outer space for peaceful purposes,75 and although its role has not remained unchanged 
over the years, it is still a unique institutional system functioning on an intergovernmental level 
supported by the United Nations machinery. It is suggested that there are several areas that can 
be effectively addressed by COPUOS, preferably a COPUOS that has already undergone the 
necessary transformation. In the realm of practical applications, the Committee might 
successfully deal with the issue of space debris mitigation. While it has already achieved certain 
results in this area by way of adoption of the 2007 Guidelines and, hence, sees itself as a leader,76 
concurrence among States regarding the need to address this issue in a comprehensive manner 
also exists, as suggested by the recent Committee reports.77 The Code of Conduct for Outer 
Space Activities prepared by the European Union used to be considered a step forward in dealing 
with the problem of space debris, but the Code has lost momentum and as of writing the process 
of its drafting and adoption has come to a standstill.78 And that gives COPUOS a chance to seize 
the initiative and become the central forum for addressing this pressing issue.  
                                                        
75 Cf., Каменецкая Е.П. Космос и международные организации: международно-правовые проблемы [Outer 
Space and International Organizations: International Legal Problems]. М., 1980. C. 60. 
76 See, K.-U. Schrogl, Is UNCOPUOS Fit for the Future: Reflection at the Occasion of the 50th Session of its Legal 
Subcommittee 2011, 60 ZLW 93 (2011), at 98. 
77 E.g., Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Fifty-seventh session (11-20 June 2014), 
A/69/20, para. 123. 




In the regulatory field, two items of the Legal Subcommittee’s agenda could be most 
effectively addressed within the COPUOS framework. The item ‘Status and application of the 
five United Nations treaties on outer space’ should include COPUOS activities targeted at the 
universal acceptance and compliance with the outer space treaties, and provide an overview of 
State practice in implementation of these treaties. The latter element would allow identifying two 
elements of an international customary norm, and also would direct toward the matters at the 
center of States’ activities and those causing most legal and practical controversies. In addressing 
the item ‘Review of international mechanisms for cooperation in the peaceful exploration and 
use of outer space’ COPUOS could play an important role in clarifying the different approaches 
to cooperation in space activities and, thereby, facilitate international space cooperation by way 
of providing a catalogue of different ways and means of cooperation, where each State would 
find the method most appropriate for its project, level of involvement and willingness to 
compromise.  
Other issues might be added to this list subject to member-States’ readiness to consider 
them in a constructive way, preferably leading to drafting of a document that could be adopted 
by consensus. Generally, nowadays the primary role of COPUOS is to propose visions on law. 
“Space law today is built largely outside COPUOS, which is not always informed or consulted. 
COPUOS’s role should be set more upstream, to be creative, imaginative, to anticipate legal 
questions and to offer thoughts that require debates, particularly for achieving consensus on texts 
which could not enter into force or would attract few Parties.”79 
In a more distant perspective the Committee might also consider transforming its 
institutional system to also undertake the supervisory role within the United Nations system. 
Even more ambitious plans can be drawn for the COPUOS development, but ultimately it’s the 
member-States’ choice whether to reinforce the Committee’s mandate in the changing 
circumstances or to restrict COPUOS performance to its common tasks.  
In the Declaration on the Fiftieth Anniversary of Human Space Flight and the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space it was recognized that the 
Committee had for the past fifty years served as a unique platform at the global level for 
international cooperation in space activities. Further it was acknowledged that the Committee 
                                                        
79 G. Lafferranderie, “Basic Principles Governing the Use of Outer Space in Future Perspective,” in M. Benkö (ed.), 
Essential Air and Space Law (2005), at 21. 
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and its subsidiary bodies stood at the forefront in bringing the world together in using space 
science and technology to preserve the Earth and the space environment and ensuring the future 
of human civilization.80 
Even if time proves that the role of COPUOS has already been mostly completed, and if 
the future does not bring the breath of fresh air to revive the Committee and its role in 
development of international space law, it will nevertheless retain its celebrated place in the 
history of space law. “It was with the establishment of UNCOPUOS that states themselves, the 
prime makers and breakers of international law, acknowledged that establishment of a coherent 
legal regime for outer space was fundamental enough to require attention. Moreover, it signaled 
that a considerable measure of coordinated and cooperative effort, rather than individual 
sovereign action, was considered justified and required. Thus, the mere establishment and 
continued existence of UNCOPUOS symbolized, even personified, the special character of space 
as a legal area.”81
                                                        
80 UNGA Res. A/RES/66/71, Annex, para. 8, 9 December 2011.  
81 F. von der Dunk, “The Undeniably Necessary Cradle – Out of Principle and Ultimately Out of Sense,” in G. 
Lafferranderie and D. Crowther (eds.), Outlook on Space Law over the Next 30 Years (1997), at 401. 
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It was stated that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, the ‘space superpowers’, 
really wanted the first UNISPACE Conference in 1968 or the second Conference – UNISPACE 
82 – to take place.1 “Third World pressure dictated otherwise, however, and the United States as 
well as U.S.S.R. participated in both.”2 To make this account up-to-date it should be noted that 
the two countries participated in all three UNISPACE conferences, including the latest one held 
in 1999.  
In this chapter UNISPACE Conferences will be analyzed. The first two Conferences will 
be reviewed briefly, while the analysis will focus on UNISPACE III. This approach is preferred 
because only the latest Conference reflects the modern state of international space cooperation. 
The first two Conferences were convened when the current legal regime, namely the four core 
treaties and the four sets of principles,3 had not yet been established. The 1996 “Space Benefit” 
Declaration4 marked the elimination or at least smoothing of the North-South conflict lines,5 
summarized the content of the principle of cooperation, confirming that international cooperation 
should not be forced onto countries, thereby alleviating the tensions surrounding the scope of 
cooperation required in exploration and use of outer space.6 Additionally, the structure and the 
                                                        
1 See, The second U.N. Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE 1982), August 9-21, 1982: 
report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (1983), at 20. 
2 Id.  
3 The Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television 
Broadcasting, UNGA Res. 37/92 of 10 December 1982; The Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth 
from Outer Space, UNGA Res. 41/65 of 3 December 1986; The Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power 
Sources in Outer Space, UNGA Res. 47/68 of 14 December 1992; The Declaration on International Cooperation in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular 
Account the Needs of Developing Countries, UNGA Res. 51/122 of 13 December 1996. 
4 Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the 
Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries, GA res. 51/122, UN Doc. 
A/AC.105/572/Rev. 1 (1996). 
5 See, M. Benkö, K.-U. Schrogl, Space Law at UNISPACE III: Achievements and Perspectives, 49 ZLW (2000), at 
74-75. 
6 For the discussion about the arguments surrounding negotiation and drafting of the Space Benefit Declaration and 
summary of views of developing and developed nations see, M. Benkö and K.-U. Schrogl (eds.), International 
Space Law in the Making: Current Issues in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (1993); M. 
Benkö and K.-U. Schrogl, Space Law at UNISPACE III: Achievements and Perspectives, 49 ZLW (2000). 
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economy of outer space exploration and use in the 1980s, not to mention the late 1960s, differed 
significantly from its modern version where commercialization has become the most notable 
trend.  
 
4.1.1 UNISPACE I 
As early as 1959 the General Assembly approved the principle “of convocation under the 
auspices of the United Nations of an international scientific conference for the exchange of 
experience in the peaceful uses of outer space.”7 The Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space in its 1964 report stated that it decided “to set up a working group composed of all the 
members of the Committee to examine the desirability, organization and objectives of an 
international conference or meeting to be held in 1967 on the exploration and peaceful uses of 
outer space, as well as to make recommendations on the question of the participation in the said 
meeting of the appropriate international organizations.”8 In its 1967 Report the Committee 
proposed the conference to be held in Vienna from 14 to 27 August 1968. It was reported that the 
Committee discussed the organization, agenda and participation of the Conference.9  
Two primary objectives of this conference were formulated as follows. The first objective 
was to undertake an examination of the practical benefits to be derived from space research and 
exploration on the basis of technical and scientific achievements and the extent to which non-
space powers, especially the developing countries, may enjoy these benefits, particularly in terms 
of education and development. The second objective was to engage in an examination of the 
opportunities available to non-space powers for international cooperation in space activities, 
taking into account the extent to which the United Nations may play a role.10  
The Conference was held in Vienna in August 1968. The session of the COPUOS 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee was in effect substituted by the Conference.11 That was 
the first and the largest international space conference, and utilization of sophisticated United 
Nations administrative capacities ensured its proper organization. 
                                                        
7 C.W. Jenks, Space Law (1965), at 54. 
8 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, General Assembly Official Records, 19 th Session, 
A/5785 (1964). 
9 See, Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, General Assembly Official Records, 22nd 
Session, A/6804.Add.1 (1967). 
10 See, Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, General Assembly Official Records, 23rd 
Session, A/7285 (1968). 
11 Id. 
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The results of the Conference were summarized in the Documentation on the United 
Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space appended to the 1968 
COPUOS report. “Although this conference produced few tangible results, it generated two 
proposals that were carried out: one to create a United Nations Space Applications Program, 
which provides technical assistance to developing nations through workshops, seminars, and 
training, and second to establish working groups in COPUOS to study questions such as remote 
sensing, and direct broadcast satellites.”12 That being the case, however, even these modest 
results should be highly appraised taking into consideration that it was the first experience of 
convening an international space conference of such a grand scale, and the minimal involvement 
of States, all except for two, in outer space activities. What is even more important is that despite 
the profound differences of the Cold War era, both in economic and ideological spheres, States 
were able to get together for the discussion of one of the most acute issues. 
 
4.1.2 UNISPACE 82 
“The rapid progress of space exploration and technology that followed the 1968 
Conference suggested to some that a second conference was necessary to exchange information 
and experience, and to assess the adequacy of institutional and operative means that were being 
used to realize the benefits of space technology.”13 The proposal for a second conference was 
made by the COPUOS Scientific and Technical Subcommittee as early as 1974,14 and it took 
another four years for the United Nations General Assembly to agree to convene the next 
UNISPACE Conference.15 Again both the United States and the Soviet Union were not among 
the supporters of the next space conference.  
The purpose of UNISPACE 82 was outlined in United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 34/67 of December 4, 1979. It recalled that the intervening period since the first 
UNISPACE Conference had seen rapid progress and growth in space exploration and 
development of space technology and its applications. In 1979 it was noted that while only few 
nations possessed the capability to launch equipment into outer space, 148 of the world’s 157 
                                                        
12 United States, Office of Technology Assessment, Congress, UNISPACE ’82: a context for international 
cooperation and competition: a technical memorandum (1983), at 31. 
13 Id. 
14 See, United Nations, Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, Vienna, 9-21 August 1982, A/CONF.101/10. 
15 See, UNGA Res. 33/16, November 10, 1978. 
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States either participated actively in outer space or shared directly in the benefits of space 
application.16 “The General Assembly considered that there was a need to assess these 
developments, to exchange information and experience on their present and potential impact and 
to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of institutional and cooperative means of realizing the 
benefits of space technology.”17 Some States undertook attempts to include consideration of 
‘legal aspects’ in the list of conference’s goals, but this proposal was dropped. It was argued that 
addition of ‘legal aspects’ to the agenda “would change the character of the conference form a 
scientific and technically oriented meeting to one of political debate thus possibly frustrating the 
major purpose for which the conference was designed.”18  
The official US records summarizing results of UNISPACE 82 stated: “The Conference 
provided a timely opportunity for the United States and other space powers to exchange views on 
the state of space science and technology and its applications, and for developing countries to 
familiarize themselves with and better understand the often complex language of space.”19 A 
clearer representation of the view taken by the United States in regard to the second Conference 
can be found in the official US objectives for UNISPACE 82: “To promote the image of the 
United States as No. 1 in space, to improve government-industry relations worldwide, and to 
limit damage to the official US position on space militarization, the geostationary orbit, access to 
remote sensing, and the UN Center for Outer Space Applications.”20 In the absence of reliable 
and open sources outlining official position of the Soviet Union delegation, it is still plausible to 
assume that the Soviet Union also resorted to the tactics of ‘damage limitation’, which is 
similarly likely to boil down to continuous assertion of the Soviet Union as No.1 in space and to 
limitation of interference with national military-related space activities. In such an atmosphere 
with two major players in the outer space exploration taking a defensive position, the second 
UNISPACE Conference was bound to produce minimal practical results.  
UNISPACE 82 was held in Vienna from 9 to 21 August 1982. This time the Conference 
did not substitute for the Subcommittee’s session, but instead was convened as a separate event 
in the Hofburg Palace.  
                                                        
16 See, D.D. Smith, Space Stations: International Law and Policy (1979), at 63-64. 
17 Id. at 441. 
18 S.N. Hosenball, The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Past Accomplishments and 
Future Challenges, 7 J. Space L. 95 (1979), at 105. 
19 The second U.N. Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE 1982), August 9-21, 1982: report 
submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (1983), at 1. 
20 Id. at 2. 
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The summary of the Conference discussions strikes as a somewhat vague and unspecified 
enumeration of the latest developments in outer space science and technology, and of persisting 
unresolved issues followed by similarly indeterminate recommendations to work together toward 
their solution. Plenary sessions were devoted to ‘general discussion’ and to the most problematic 
questions of the geostationary orbit utilization and outer space militarization. With regard to the 
former it was acknowledged that the International Telecommunication Union was the 
appropriate forum for discussion, while it was noted that “the debates might affect the coming 
Plenipotentiary meeting.” The latter issue was effectively removed from the agenda owing to the 
persistent US position that ‘militarization’ was essentially the wrong word – as military actions 
did not equal to non-peaceful actions. The US delegation insisted on transfer of the discussion to 
the Conference on Disarmament, where just recently the United States had blocked creation of 
the working group on outer space militarization issues.  
Discussions in three Conference committees similarly did not produce a lot of results. 
The first committee charged with discussion of the state of space science and technology was not 
expected to produce more than an overview of the recent developments in the relevant area. The 
committee on applications of space science and technology, not being able to resolve the issue of 
the geostationary orbit utilization handed this agenda item to the Plenary. The remote sensing 
issue was discussed mostly as pertaining to meteorological and land observation. “Access to data 
was a major issue discussed at the Conference, and the report also stressed the importance of 
complementarity and compatibility of data systems to avoid redundant experiments and 
minimize costly changes of ground equipment.”21 
Within the third Conference committee working on the agenda item “International 
Cooperation and the Role of the United Nations”, participants found a generally positive picture 
in assessing multilateral and bilateral cooperation. But it was also noted that more extensive 
cooperation was necessary in creating regionally or internationally owned systems for 
communications in various fields of space science; for assuring international availability of 
space-derived data; for coordination of national, regional and international systems; and for joint 
planning of scientific missions.22  
                                                        
21 See, The second U.N. Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE 1982), August 9-21, 1982: 
report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (1983), at 14. 
22 Id. at 15.  
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The main practical achievement of the Conference was expansion of the United Nations 
Space Applications Programme’s mandate. The Programme translated the elements of its 
expanded mandate into operation activities in space science and technology, in particular for the 
benefit of developing countries. “During the period 1971-1997, the Programme organized: 143 
workshops, training courses and meetings of experts, which benefited approximately 7500 
participants. Following up on the recommendations of some of the workshops, the Programme 
focused on education and training and in particular in establishing regional centers for space 
science and technology education, affiliated with the United Nations, in each of the regions 
covered by the regional commissions.”23 As of 2014, the Programme has organized 
approximately three hundred training courses, workshops, seminars and conferences and has 
provided funding support for more that eighteen thousand participants, mainly from developing 
countries.24 
It is safe to conclude that UNISPACE 82 was a more robust, comprehensive and well-
managed event compared to the first Conference that had been attended by a growing number of 
participants. Allocation of special time and place for the Conference and a thoughtful division of 
work into Plenary and three committees are the signs of a growing importance of the Conference. 
And even though it did not produce any results of long-term importance, it attained a significant 
political value and was seen as a meeting capable of influencing further discussions, even if not 
further development of the outer space legal regime.  
 
4.1.3 UNISPACE III 
By the end of the twentieth century it was decided to convene the next worldwide 
conference on peaceful uses of outer space. While the first two UNISPACE conferences should 
be appraised as important steps toward greater international cooperation and understanding, 
neither of them had produced long-standing results, or contributed anything to the international 
space law development owing to exclusion of this topic from the agendas of both conferences. 
By the end of the twentieth century the world political climate had changed thanks to the end of 
the Cold War and booming involvement of developing nations in international affairs, and 
                                                        
23 United Nations, Report of the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (Vienna, 19-30 July 1999), A/CONF.184/6, at p. 24. 
24 See, UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, UN Programme on Space Applications, 
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/ST_SPACE_52_Rev1.pdf. 
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prospects of effective international cooperation were as real as ever. The next UNISPACE 
conference was called for. “There were two main arguments for this coming together: primo, the 
rules as we have them have been made about thirty years ago, and the question has been asked 
whether they should be modernized (or not); secundo, outer space affairs are on the threshold of 
privatization, and present-day rules do not envisage private parties as lawful actors in outer 
space.”25 
During the 1992 COPUOS session the first proposal to convene a third UNISPACE 
Conference was made. Based on the advice of the Committee, the General Assembly in its 
resolution 47/67 of December 14, 1992 recommended that States might discuss the possibility of 
holding a third Conference during the next session of COPUOS. At the Committee’s 1996 
session the decision was made that UNISPACE III, open to all States members of the United 
Nations, should be convened at the United Nations Office at Vienna. The United Nations 
General Assembly in its resolution 52/56 of December 10, 1997 agreed that UNISPACE III 
would take place from 19 to 30 July 1999 as a special session of COPUOS.  
The purpose of the Conference was to “review and highlight the significant advances of 
space science and technology that had taken place since 1982 with a view to promoting their 
greater use in particular by developing countries, in all areas of scientific, economic, social and 
cultural development.”26 A more specific set of Conference objectives was announced: 
promoting effective means of using space technology to assist in the solution of problems of 
regional or global significance; and strengthening the capabilities of Member States, in particular 
developing countries, to use the applications of space research for economic, social and cultural 
development. An attentive reader would notice that despite the great breadth of the goals of the 
Conference, despite inclusion of “all areas of scientific, economic, social and cultural 
development,” which presumably covers almost any imaginable activity, not a word was spent 
on making space law a part of the discussion.  
Work of the Conference was structured into Plenary sessions, two Committees, the 
Technical Forum and the Space Generation Forum. A comprehensive report on the results of 
UNISPACE III gives an impression that questions of science and technology were the focal point 
                                                        
25 W. P. Heere, Reports of Conferences: Vienna, Unispace III, 19-30 July 1999, 24 Air & Space L. 268 (1999), at 
268.  
26 United Nations, Report of the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (Vienna, 19-30 July 1999), A/CONF.184/6, at para. 55. 
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of the discussion, where great attention was paid to the equitable and sustainable utilization of 
geostationary orbit27 and the need to work toward greater availability of remote sensing data due 
to its importance for a wide arrays of activities, including agriculture, mineral prospecting, water 
resource management, forestry and other environment-related activities.28 Issues of greater 
inclusion of developing States in enjoyment of space technology benefits were the next recurring 
theme in participants’ statements.29 Voices were heard about the benefits stemming from 
international and particularly regional cooperation, and suggestions were made toward its 
promotion.30  
Only a thorough reading of the 157-page conference report allows spotting the scarce 
references to space law, while it is hard to believe that space law was indeed such an 
insignificant part of the discussion. During the general exchange of views it was noted that the 
Liability Convention dispute settlement mechanism had to be strengthened,31 and appreciation 
for the work of COPUOS in development of international treaties and principles that constituted 
core of international space law was expressed.32 The presentation of the results of deliberations 
of several preparatory meetings and a four-day workshop on Space Law in the Twenty First 
Century, prepared by the International Institute of Space Law, was proffered in the framework of 
the Technical Forum.33 Additionally, two background papers were tabled, one on the Highlights 
in Space 1998: Progress in Space Science, Technology and Applications, International 
Cooperation and Space Law,34 and the second one entitled “United Nations Treaties and 
Principles on Outer Space: A Commemorative Edition.”35 Hence, one might deduce that space 
law was indeed a part of the conference’s deliberations, albeit intermingled with and somewhat 
overshadowed by the featured theme of space science and technology.  
The Conference was concluded by adoption of the Vienna Declaration. It enumerated six 
major challenges that had to be addressed by the international community and further specified 
                                                        
27 Id. at para. 473. 
28 Id. at para. 459. 
29 Id. at para. 462, 466-68. 
30 Id. at para. 456-67, 465, 470  
31 Id. at para. 475. 
32 Id. at para. 472. 
33 Id. at para. 549. 
34 Background paper Highlights in Space 1998: Progress in Space Science, Technology and Applications, 
International Cooperation and Space Law, A/CONF.184/BP/14. 
35 Background paper United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space: A Commemorative Edition, 
A/CONF.184/BP/15. 
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thirty-three actions that should be taken in achievement of the global strategy. In most general 
terms the Declaration called for: improved utilization of space-based technologies in Earth 
observations and minimizing damages incurred by space activities; enhancing medical, 
educational, transportation and communications capabilities using space-related technologies and 
greater inclusion of space technologies in disaster prevention and relief; protection of space 
environment along with expansion of scientific knowledge of outer space, including orbit 
prediction and near-Earth objects monitoring; ensuring public awareness of the importance of 
space activities; strengthening the role of the United Nations system in outer space activities, 
with special emphasis on reaffirming the role of COPUOS and importance of acceding to the 
outer space treaties; and, finally, to promote international cooperation by way of inviting States 
and appropriate international organizations to participate on a voluntary basis in implementation 
of the Conference recommendations.36 “Everything taken together, it can be said that Unispace 
III succeeded in stimulating good debates on the basis of both expert preparatory papers, and the 
presence of many of those space lawyers who know their job.”37 
Based on the States’ survey conducted by COPUOS and its Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee from 1999 to 2001, the Committee created twelve initiative groups led by a 
volunteered State, or in some cases an international organization, in order to implement the 
measures acknowledged as paramount. Additionally, a separate agenda item designated as 
“Implementation of the recommendations of the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE III)” has been included in the 
agenda of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, and has ever since been a part of its 
annual sessions.38 UNISPACE III prompted an initiative and thus contributed to the creation of 
the International Charter “Space and Major Disasters”, which is an international agreement 
aimed at providing space-based data and information in support of relief efforts during 
                                                        
36 See, The Space Millennium: Vienna Declaration on Space and Human Development, in United Nations, Report of 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Vienna, 19-30 July 
1999), A/CONF.184/6. 
37 W. P. Heere, Reports of Conferences: Vienna, Unispace III, 19-30 July 1999, 24 Air & Space L. 268 (1999), at 
268. 
38 At 2013 session the Subcommittee agreed that the agenda item on the implementation be renamed as “Space 
technology for socioeconomic development in the context of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
Development and the post-2015 development agenda”. United Nations, Report of the Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee on its fiftieth session, held in Vienna form 11 to 22 February 2013, A/AC.105/1038. 
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emergencies caused by major disasters.39 Today it unites fifteen space agencies and seven 
nongovernmental entities, and as of 2015 was activated to cover four hundred forty-seven 
disasters in over one hundred and twenty countries worldwide.40 Although as such the 
International Charter is not the direct outcome of the Conference, UNISPACE III played an 
important role in spurring discussion on the issues of disaster prevention and relief, thus 
incentivizing the Canadian Space Agency and the European Space Agency to come up with this 
‘soft law’ measure that nowadays has evolved into an effective cooperative system. 
 
4.2 Six-Criteria Analysis 
 
4.2.1 Membership/Participation 
The participation criterion as applied to the international conferences category was 
described in Chapter 1 as: “Primarily States, but intergovernmental organizations and non-
governmental entities might also become participants.”  
Seventy-eight States and thirteen international organizations attended the first 
UNISPACE Conference. UNISPACE 82 was taken seriously by both States and international 
organizations, what was evidenced by a growing participation. Representatives of ninety-four 
countries, eight United Nations specialized agencies, six United Nations programs and fifteen 
intergovernmental organizations attended the event. Additionally, a large number of concerned 
non-governmental organizations in consultative status with the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council were represented by observers. Notably, a committee of about 30 interested non-
governmental organizations was established to provide an opportunity for their representatives to 
participate in discussions and decisions concerning the future of the human race in space. That 
became the first occasion when non-governmental entities were invited to participate in an 
international space conference.  
Although private entities were ‘secluded’ in a special committee separate from forums 
with States’ and international organizations’ participation, it was still a notable development. It 
                                                        
39 Charter On Cooperation To Achieve The Coordinated Use Of Space Facilities In The Event Of Natural Or 
Technological Disasters, Rev.3 (25/4/2000). 
40 UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, International Charter ‘Space and Major Disasters’: Toward Universal Access 
(2012), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/stsc2013/tech-48E.pdf. The most up-to-date information on Charter 
activations is available at the official website of the International Charter “Space and Major Disasters” at 
www.disastercharter.org. 
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was a first hint indicating that commercial actors would play an increasingly important role in 
outer space exploitation. By the time of UNISPACE 82 a few international satellite organizations 
were already in place,41 thereby giving a reason to anticipate that in the near future commercial 
component would become an indispensable part of space activities. And though during this 
conference non-governmental observers were the minority and were not given an opportunity to 
take part in the inter-State discussions, the very fact of their presence was the signal that the era 
of the 1990s space commercialization was already at the threshold. 
Over two thousand five hundred participants attended UNISPACE III, including 
representatives of one hundred States, twenty-nine international organizations, and a large 
number of representatives of national non-governmental organizations and space industries 
invited by their governments.42 Thus, in terms of participation the UNISPACE Conferences 
depict a classic international conference: States are the primary participants, though engagement 
of international organizations and non-governmental organizations is also substantial, and is 
growing from one Conference to the other. What is notable is that the decision to invite private 
sector to the 1982 and 1999 Conferences was unanimous, and during the latter States were the 
ones taking initiative and inviting representatives of non-governmental actors.  
With regard to the private sector participation it has been noted earlier that their presence 
during UNISPACE 82 should be understood as an indication of States’ growing awareness of 
greater future involvement of commercial components in outer space activities. By the time of 
UNISPACE III, commercialization of space activities had become not only apparent, but had 
already established itself as the prominent feature in outer space exploitation. This was duly 
noted during the general discussion, and some representatives welcomed the active participation 
of the private sector in the conference opining that it “reflected the growing government-private 
sector complementarity at the national, regional and international levels.” 43  
During the next years participation of private actors in exploration and use of outer space 
would increase exponentially, and nowadays the private sector represents a major force in space 
activities development. Hence, it is safe to conclude that the next UNISPACE conference, or any 
other similarly universal and representative international space conference should include private 
                                                        
41 INTELSAT was established in 1964, INTERSPUTNIK in 1971, EUTELSAT in 1977. 
42 The complete list of Conference participants is given in the document A/CONF.184/INF/3. 
43 United Nations, Report of the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (Vienna, 19-30 July 1999), A/CONF.184/6, at para. 459. 
 158 
actors in the participants list in order to secure a relevant discussion that covers the most 
remarkable developments in space exploitation; and that would be unattainable if the private 
sector and its activities, which are already grand and ambitious, are excluded from deliberations. 
The UNISPACE Conferences cleared the road for the private sector participation, proved that it 
is an important addition to international space conferences, and convinced most States and the 
academic community that their example should be followed. 
 
4.2.2 Secretariat 
In addressing the secretariat criterion the following question should be answered: Who is 
performing administrative or any other required functions during and in between the meetings? It 
has been earlier established that the exact scope of performed functions is not indicative of the 
legal attribution of the administrative entity, though this characteristic should not be completely 
overlooked since the breadth of the functions performed and the quality of the services provided 
serve as an additional indication in favor of utilizing one structure of an administrative entity 
over the other. 
Preparation, organization and holding of the UNISPACE I Conference were conducted 
by COPUOS; the procedures and agenda were negotiated and agreed upon by the Working 
Group established within the Committee; and necessary preparatory communications were held 
through the United Nations machinery.  
UNISPACE 82, which was held in Hofburg Palace in Vienna, Austria, similarly, was 
prepared and administered using Committee’s and United Nations Secretariat’s capabilities. The 
General Assembly designated COPUOS as the Preparatory Committee for the Conference; and 
the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, which acted as the Advisory Committee to the 
Preparatory Committee, had established in 1976 an informal working group to consider various 
proposals regarding the Conference.44 As a result of four sessions of the Preparatory Committee 
the rules of the procedure were drawn and the officers to be elected by the Conference were 
proposed. 45 The Secretary General formulated a 132-page draft report for the Conference’s 
discussion and approval based on the outline approved by the Preparatory Committee and taking 
                                                        
44 See, United Nations, Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, Vienna, 9-21 August 1982, A/CONF.101/10, at p. 439. 
45 See, The second U.N. Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE 1982), August 9-21, 1982: 
report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (1983), at 5. 
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into account the information in the background papers and the views expressed in the national 
papers and regional seminars.46 The same path as with UNISPACE I, thereby, was chosen in 
terms of conference’s arrangement, what provides indirect evidence in favor of a conclusion that 
utilization of the United Nations secretarial structures proved to be an effective solution for a 
universal conference with numerous participants. 
COPUOS during its 1996 session decided that the Committee and the Scientific and 
Technical Subcommittee would act as the Preparatory Committee and the Advisory Committee 
for UNISPACE III, respectively, and the Office for Outer Space Affairs would act as the 
executive secretariat. Therefore, yet again the United Nations machinery was employed to 
service the Conference. 
The UNISPACE Conferences represent a typical case of ‘borrowing’ administrative 
capacities of the hosting international organization for the duration of the conference. In each 
case secretarial functions were performed by COPUOS and its Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee and the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. In 1962 and 1999 the 
Conferences were held at the United Nations office in Vienna, and in 1982 the space – Hofburg 
Palace – was provided by the hosting country. In each case preparatory work was supported by 
permanent United Nations staff, and Conferences’ officers were elected by the participants from 
the States’ representatives just for the duration of the Conference. Budget, similarly, was 
allocated from the United Nations funding.  
It should not be presumed, however, that responsibilities of all three UNISPACE 
Conferences’ secretariats were automatically conferred upon the appropriate United Nations 
divisions. To the contrary, as it has been shown above, each conference was called for separately 
and had a unique line of preparatory meetings and negotiations. Both the second and the third 
Conferences were postponed several times in the absence of the COPUOS members’ support; 
UNISPACE 82 and UNISPACE III boasted comprehensive preparatory regional meetings, while 
formats and locations of these events were different;47 UNISPACE 82 was held in Hofburg 
Palace by contrast to the other two conferences, whereas the very issue of the Conference’s 
                                                        
46 See, United Nations, Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, Vienna, 9-21 August 1982, A/CONF.101/10, at p. 452. 
47 E.g., for UNISPACE 82 regional preparatory meetings were conducted through the UN Space Applications 
Programme seminars, see United Nations, Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Vienna, 9-21 August 1982, A/CONF.101/10, at p. 451. UNISPACE III Preparatory 
Meetings were conducted in the form of regional conferences held in Kuala Lumpur in May 1998, in Rabat in 
October 1998, in Concepción in October 1998, and in Bucharest in January 1999. 
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location became a reason for a fierce argument between the Western and the Soviet-bloc 
countries;48 even the participation fluctuated substantially from one meeting to the other, where 
the last Conference attracted over two thousand participants, a number that was unimaginable for 
the first UNISPACE Conference.  
Hence, while each UNISPACE Conference utilized administrative capacities of the 
United Nations system, based on the enumerated discrepancies in the three conferences’ 
organizational matters a conclusion should be drawn that each time the choice of the entity 
performing secretarial functions was made specifically pertaining to the arranged conference. In 
other words, at no point in time did States made a decision to use the United Nations Secretariat 
for all further UNISPACE conferences. That being the case, a tendency is evident: each time 
COPUOS and the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs were chosen as the proper 
organs that can be charged with conferences’ secretarial functions. And each time these 
designated organs proved that they were the right choice, that they were capable of handling the 
whole mass of paper and organizational work that is characteristic for a universal international 
organization. Moreover, despite the growing number of participants, despite the increasing 
private sector participation, which of course should be duly noted when arranging the 
conference’s schedule and course of work,49 the next Conference had always surpassed the 
previous one in terms of organizational flawlessness and smoothness of overall work. 
The conclusion is offered that utilization of the United Nations secretarial capacities was 
beneficial for all three UNISPACE Conferences securing a required preparatory work, high level 
of administration, efficient meetings’ organization and scheduling and effective document 
flow.50 
 
                                                        
48 Cf., The second U.N. Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE 1982), August 9-21, 1982: 
report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (1983), at 9. 
49 Cf., United Nations General Assembly, Note by the Secretary-General, Review of the Implementation of the 
Recommendations of the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 23 
July 2004. A/59/174. (It was acknowledged that “while the engagement of non-governmental entities in the process 
of implementing the recommendations of UNISPACE III was considered important, engaging the private sector by 
identifying appropriate and meaningful ways and means for it to work with Governments and international 
organizations as partners has turned out to be a challenge.” By extension, it is likely that the Conference’s secretariat 
was facing similar challenges.) 
50 2018 "UNISPACE+50" THEME OF STSC, LSC and COPUOS, Note by the Past, Present and In-coming Chairs of 
COPUOS (2015), at para. 2, A/AC.105/C.1/2015/CRP. 
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4.2.3 International Legal Personality 
One of the defining criteria is the international legal personality. In Chapter 1 it has been 
concluded that international conferences do not possess international legal personality, and 
international organizations are the only mechanisms of cooperation enjoying international 
personality. It has been further concluded that international legal personality is a prerequisite for 
a status of subject of international law, and that four characteristics should be met in order to 
determine existence of such a status.  
With respect to the UNISPACE Conferences, none of the characteristics is met. First, 
UNISPACE 82 and UNISPACE III both had non-governmental entities as their participants, 
while legal personality, as defined earlier, is characteristic only for associations of States or 
international organizations or both. Further, following the definition of an international 
organization, it is clear that non-governmental entities cannot be a part of such an organization. 
Second, none of the UNISPACE Conferences had an organ that was not subject to authority of 
any other organized community. With respect to the secretariat criterion it has been concluded 
that the UNISPACE Conferences were utilizing secretarial structures of the hosting organization 
for the benefit of the conference, and that the decisions to ‘borrow’ United Nations 
administrative capacities were made on case-by-case basis. Hence, neither of the Conferences 
had possessed or obtained in some way an independent, ‘its own’ secretariat that answers only to 
the Conference.  
Moreover, even actions taken as a result of the Conferences, for example, the creation of 
the Programme on Space Applications was also carried out through the means of the United 
Nations, thus reaffirming the conclusion that not a single permanent institution had been created 
for or as a result of the UNISPACE Conferences. All organs that acted for the benefit of the 
Conference or have been performing functions as per Conference’s decisions retained the status 
of an organ of the United Nations and thus were subject to the United Nations authority.  
Third, no legal powers of the Conference can be identified: none of the three Conferences 
was entitled to produce legally binding documents. Fourth, in the absence of legal powers, 
application of any other powers bestowed onto the entity on the international or national plane is 
irrelevant for the legal analysis. Taken together, these considerations allow concluding that none 
of the UNISPACE Conferences possessed legal personality.  
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4.2.4 Term of Existence 
Although the conclusions pertaining to the fourth criterion, the term of existence, are 
rather straightforward, a few considerations should be added. Each Conference was called for 
separately, and all three UNISPACE Conferences were convened for a specific period 
determined in advance. Despite usage of the same name, changing only the prefix indicating 
either the ordinal number of the conference or the year of the conference, the UNISPACE 
Conferences were all commenced on an ad hoc basis. There was no predetermined frequency of 
the Conferences, and there was not a set number of subjects for discussion: whereas the first 
Conference was focused on a greater inclusion of developing States into enjoyment of space-
related technologies, the last one covered numerous issues, which were relevant for all States 
notwithstanding their level of economic development.  
It is suggested that, generally speaking, such stand-alone, specifically convened and 
organized conferences are most potent because each conference is called for only when there is a 
broad agreement about its timeliness and relevance, the States are free to modify and adapt the 
agenda depending on the contemporary needs and issues, and last but not least the resources are 
spent efficiently, thereby incentivizing States to participate only if they find it beneficial to them 
and only to the extent they can afford.  
 
4.2.5 Binding Force of Documents Produced 
The first two Conferences did not produce any concluding documents apart from the 
COPUOS Reports, which were legally non-binding. UNISPACE 82 adopted only one resolution 
at its closing plenary meeting entitled “Expression of Gratitude to the Host Country”.51 With all 
due respect and appreciation to the government of Austria, the named resolution cannot be 
regarded as a legally binding one. 
Over time the UNISPACE Conferences’ agendas have shifted from purely technical and 
scientific issues discussed during the first two Conferences to a greater inclusion of legal aspects 
in the work of UNISPACE III. Although it might be an exaggeration to assert that “international 
space law was a prominent part of deliberations in the Intergovernmental Conference and the 
Technical Forum alike,”52 the mere fact of inclusion of law-related issues in the topics under 
                                                        
51 United Nations, Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space, Vienna, 9-21 August 1982, A/CONF.101/10, at p. 605. 
52 M. Benkö, K.-U. Schrogl, Space Law at UNISPACE III: Achievements and Perspectives, 49 ZLW (2000), at 76. 
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considerations was a notable shift compared to the first two UNISPACE Conferences. This, 
however, did not alter the orientation of the Conference toward promotion of a greater dialogue 
on the questions of space technology application and harmonization of worldwide efforts in 
space technology utilization. Furthermore, greater focus on legal issues did not alter the nature of 
the adopted documents. Just as in 1968 and 1982, UNISPACE III was concluded by adoption of 
the final act in the form of a COPUOS Report, which was of a legally non-binding nature.  
The conference adopted three resolutions, including the one summarizing results of 
UNISPACE III and outlining a strategy to address global challenges in outer space exploration 
and use entitled “The Space Millennium: Vienna Declaration on Space and Human 
Development.” The Vienna Declaration was an innovation compared to the first two 
Conferences, but again it should be characterized as a political commitment, not as a legally 
binding one. In Chapter 1 it has been suggested that the agreement is presumed to be non-
binding where the substance of the agreement is no more than the description of policy, purpose 
or intent, and when the text of the agreement lacks precision.53 The Vienna Declaration 
undoubtedly is a promulgation of general policy since it expressly proclaims that it “declares a 
strategy,” “recognizes the tremendous achievements of space science and technology,” and 
“emphasizes that objective of sustainable development will require action.” Similarly, the short 
text aimed at promotion of an ample number of goals was not able, or more accurately was not 
intended to prescribe particular measures toward achievement of the enumerated goals. In spite 
of the legally non-binding character of the Declaration, it is widely acknowledged that it has a 
remarkable political value.54  
Proper attention should be paid to ‘tangible’ results produced by the three Conferences: 
UNISPACE I established the United Nations Programme on Space Applications, UNISPACE 82 
extended its mandate, the Vienna Declaration prompted States to create 12 initiative groups to 
fulfill some of its recommendations, and a separate agenda item was included in the work of the 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee. These results, however, should not be misleading with 
regard to the legal nature of the documents produced by the Conferences. The United Nations 
Programme on Space Applications has been created and maintained not by the States, but within 
                                                        
53 See, H.J. Hahn, “International Organizations, Resolutions,” in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 2 
(1997), at 1334. 
54 M. Benkö, K.-U. Schrogl, Space Law at UNISPACE III: Achievements and Perspectives, 49 ZLW (2000), at 76. 
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the United Nations system,55 thus excluding the possibility of imposition of legal obligations 
onto participating States. Participation in the initiative groups created for Vienna Declaration’s 
measures implementation was voluntary and was not triggered by any legal obligation. Finally, 
inclusion of a separate agenda item was not prescribed by any document adopted during the 
Conference, rather it was recommended,56 and members of the Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee adopted this decision during the Subcommittee’s session using the appropriate 
procedure.57  
While important discussions took place during all three UNISPACE conferences and they 
all had practical results, albeit of a different scale and importance, none of them produced legally 
binding documents. Practical achievements in implementation of the Conferences’ 
recommendations should be attributed to the initiative and zealousness of particular volunteered 
States and international organizations, and to promotion of implementation of their 
recommendations by COPUOS and its Subcommittees, but not to a legally binding nature of any 
of the adopted decisions.  
 
4.2.6 Existence of Opportunity to Modify Obligations 
Having determined that none of the Conferences produced legally binding documents and 
imposed obligations on the participating States, application of the final criterion leads to a 
conclusion that neither the opportunity to modify obligations was provided for, nor the right to 
modify obligations was necessary.  
 
4.3 Evaluation and Conclusions 
 
4.3.1 Purposes and Results of UNISPACE I and UNISPACE 82 
The main goal of UNISPACE I may be summarized as stimulation of interest in both 
developed and developing nations in space and its applications. It is important to keep in mind 
                                                        
55 See, UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, UN Programme on Space Applications, 
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/ST_SPACE_52_Rev1.pdf. 
56 United Nations, Report of the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (Vienna, 19-30 July 1999), A/CONF.184/6, Resolution I “The Space Millennium: Vienna Declaration on 
Space and Human Development”, part I, para. 1(e)(v). 
57 See, United Nations, Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Official Records, Fifty-fifth 
Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/55/20). 
 165 
that the first UNISPACE Conference was convened when international space law was still in a 
process of formation and development. It comes as no surprise that space law was not a separate 
item on the Conference’s agenda; drafting and negotiation of outer space treaties were 
concentrated within the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee, and the Conference was apparently 
deemed an inappropriate venue for legal discussions. Rather, the Conference focused on practical 
considerations, on issues of greater inclusion of all States in benefitting from outer space 
exploration then and for the time to come. Thereby, establishment of the United Nations 
Programme on Space Applications and establishment of working groups in COPUOS to study 
questions such as remote sensing, and direct broadcast satellites as the only tangible results of 
UNISPACE I fit logically in the priorities of the Conference. In the absence of agreements 
pertaining to specific issues of outer space exploration and use, and in the absence of detailed 
recommendations aimed at States, rather than institutional entities within the United Nations 
system, this Conference should be characterized as a deliberative conference that focused on 
general discussions and exchange of points of view on certain topics.58 
UNISPACE 82 “was convened to allow wider participation of Member States in the 
activities of the United Nations in outer space and to assess the new developments, to exchange 
information and experiences on their present and potential impact, and to assess the adequacy 
and effectiveness of institutional and cooperative means of realizing the benefits of space 
technology.”59 The work of the Conference was focused on three core subjects: the state of space 
science and technology, current and potential applications of space technology, and international 
cooperation and the role of the United Nations. The question of space technology applications 
was undoubtedly the focal point of deliberations. Participants emphasized the need for greater 
cooperation to create communications systems; access to data was another paramount issue, 
especially for developing countries. The issue of geostationary orbit utilization was as 
controversial as the issue of space demilitarization. But again, if timing is kept in mind, 
concentration of the Conference on practical applications is not at all surprising: none of the four 
sets of principles regulating these and other practical matters had been adopted yet, and still only 
two States were able to fully benefit from outer space exploitation.  
                                                        
58 Cf., J. Kaufmann, Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis (1988), at 6-7. 
59 United Nations, Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space, Vienna, 9-21 August 1982, A/CONF.101/10, at p. 7. 
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The Conference did not consider space law as a special topic during the official 
deliberations – precisely due to unresolved conflicts at that time,60 especially in areas of 
disarmament and peaceful uses of outer space, but geostationary orbit exploitation and data 
accessibility legal concerns were also among the restricted ‘grey’ areas, where technical 
questions were permissible and legal issues were not even touched upon. So while the legal 
issues were left to COPUOS, technical questions became the cornerstone of the Conference. 
UNISPACE I and UNISPACE 82 were both dedicated to promotion of greater inclusion 
of non-spacefaring and developing States in the enjoyment of space technology and space related 
benefits. As it was pointed then out, “in several aspects UNISPACE 82 was typical of other 
conferences dealing primarily with developing country issues.”61 In this respect both 
Conferences should be viewed as successful in taking steps toward achievement of the stated 
goal. Although both Conferences had little to add to space law, it should not be viewed as their 
weakness, quite to the contrary. COPUOS in the 1970s and 1980s negotiated and drafted three 
out of five space treaties and three out of four sets of principles62 – is not this a persuasive 
argument that the Committee was then living through its most fruitful period? Despite all the 
tensions of the Cold War, despite the controversies between the developing and the developed 
States, despite the undeniable supremacy of two States in outer space exploration and use, 
despite all these obstacles the Committee was as effective as it ever was. So why disrupt the 
process? 
It is not to imply that UNISPACE 82 was a useless gathering that was not entrusted with 
a noble and complex issue of legal documents drafting; to the contrary, it was a timely event that 
concentrated on the issues that were of interest to all participants, on the issues where open 
exchange of views did not necessarily lead to irreconcilable controversies and a meeting 
deadlock, namely the technical and scientific issues. And most importantly it was able to provide 
States with a comprehensive overview of legal and technical developments, giving an 
                                                        
60 See, M. Benkö, K.-U. Schrogl, Space Law at UNISPACE III: Achievements and Perspectives, 49 ZLW (2000), at 
76. 
61 United States, Office of Technology Assessment, Congress, UNISPACE ’82: a context for international 
cooperation and competition: a technical memorandum (1983), at 49. 
62 The Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television 
Broadcasting, UNGA Res. 37/92 of 10 December 1982; The Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth 
from Outer Space, UNGA Res. 41/65 of 3 December 1986; The Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power 
Sources in Outer Space, UNGA Res. 47/68 of 14 December 1992; The Declaration on International Cooperation in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular 
Account the Needs of Developing Countries, UNGA Res. 51/122 of 13 December 1996. 
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opportunity to voice concerns and ask questions, and so reminding each participant that outer 
space remained the province of all mankind no matter your space capacities, thereby alleviating 
fears and concerns of non-spacefaring States of their exclusion from outer space exploitation.  
Making legal issues a part of the discussion would have been a mistake for several 
reasons. First, a conference is a meeting limited in time, where the time pressure might 
sometimes incentivize participants to work on schedule, but when the conference was not from 
the very beginning arranged to discuss legal questions, it would lead to detrimental haste and 
muddle. Second, at that time too many legal questions were still unresolved, so opening up a 
discussion about this interconnected bundle of legal mayhem in addition to time constraints 
could hardly promote constructive discussion. Third, during that period procedures and working 
methods of COPUOS and its Subcommittees were most effective and fruitful; hence, it would 
have been counterproductive to disrupt the work of the Committee by way of involving the 
conference into law-making activities. Overall, the Conference was able to address those issues 
that could be discussed in a good faith manner without provoking additional controversies, and 
to avoid other matters that were better dealt with at a different time and place.  
 
4.3.2 Results of UNISPACE III: Lessons to Be Learned 
UNISPACE III considered a broad scope of issues as reflected in the theme of the 
Conference “Space Benefits for Humanity in the Twenty-First Century”. On the one hand, the 
shift from an almost exclusive consideration of the issues relevant for developing countries was 
the result of the “Space Benefit” Declaration adoption in 1996, which was in substantial part 
devoted to promotion of greater consideration of developing States’ interests and their inclusion 
in the process of international space cooperation.63 On the other, such shift was caused by 
adoption of four major outer space treaties, which were absent when the first UNISPACE was 
commenced, and four sets of principles, which were adopted only after the second Conference, 
thus resolving the most pressing legal issues of outer space exploration and use. But more 
importantly, it was a result of a greater inclusion of private entities into the process of outer 
space exploitation that ultimately led to blurring of State borders and prospective involvement of 
every State in outer space activities. Commercialization made outer space exploitation a 
transborder activity, not a State-centered one. 
                                                        
63 Supra, para. 1.1.4.  
 168 
The purpose of the Conference was to “review and highlight the significant advances of 
space science and technology that had taken place since 1982 with a view to promoting their 
greater use in particular by developing countries, in all areas of scientific, economic, social and 
cultural development.”64 While the wording resembles the phrasing used in formulating 
UNISPACE 82 purposes, this one strikes as a broader one: while emphasis on space science and 
technology and interests of developing States is still present, it is counterbalanced by a broad 
formula covering “all areas of scientific, economic, social and cultural development,” thus giving 
an impression that space science and technology are now viewed as an indispensable part of 
scientific and economic, social and cultural areas of life alike.  
The results triggered by UNISPACE III prove that in the twentieth century outer space 
ceased to be a matter for engineers and scientists, that it has become a part of the everyday life. 
In addition to the immediate results already covered, many more indirect results can be 
identified, particularly in the areas of education, promotion of regional space-based systems 
compatibility, environment protection and disaster prevention, even control over illicit narcotic 
crops and standardization of land mapping.65 It was suggested that the success in implementation 
of UNISPACE III recommendations was possible due to prioritization of work, flexibility in 
conducting work throughout the year, maximizing opportunities to meet and communicate, 
coordination and distribution of work, and strong leadership and support of the United Nations 
secretariat.66 Acknowledging the important part played by all these factors, especially the 
flexibility and proper coordination, in successful implementation of the Conference’s 
recommendations, there is more to it. 
First and foremost, space technology has become an indispensible part of modern life. 
Agriculture, manufacturing, minerals prospecting, transportation, communications, fundamental 
high-technology scientific research and analysis – all these and many more areas of modern 
economy are dependent on space-based technology. That is why most recommendations 
enumerated in the Vienna Declaration turned out to be practically achievable, and even more so 
– they turned out to be beneficial to many States, they resonated with the values and goals 
                                                        
64 United Nations, Report of the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (Vienna, 19-30 July 1999), A/CONF.184/6, at para. 55. 
65 See, United Nations General Assembly, Note by the Secretary-General, Review of the Implementation of the 
Recommendations of the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 23 
July 2004. A/59/174. 
66 Id. at para. 170. 
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promoted by States, international organizations and non-governmental entities, which 
volunteered to lead these recommendations implementation.67  
Space ceased to exist in an abstract reality akin to quantum physics; it appeared here and 
now, relevant for most States, numerous international organizations, hundreds of commercial 
entities and millions of people. Globalization of the world economy and greater 
interconnectedness of people’s lives all over the globe, effectiveness of space technology in 
addressing humanitarian situations, environmental issues and responding to natural disasters – all 
these factors stimulated States’ readiness to put into action Vienna Declaration 
recommendations. And lastly, space technology became accessible for many countries, finally 
giving space exploration a worldwide perspective, allowing States to cooperate as equal partners, 
unite in their cooperative efforts in bringing space benefits to Earth. In other words, accessibility 
of space technology to dozens of States made cooperation on a large scale practically feasible, 
mutually beneficial, and finally commercially viable, thus introducing an immutable 
characteristic of a compelling international activity - profitability. 
Based on the review of the UNISPACE Conferences and particularly UNISPACE III, a 
conclusion about the necessary prerequisites for a successful multilateral international space 
conference can be drawn. In the beginning of the space era, when only a handful of States were 
able to meaningfully participate in outer space exploration and use, the major trend was the 
inclusion of a broader number of States in space activities. Nowadays the main concern is proper 
communication. The growing number of spacefaring States, broad-scale participation of the 
private sector in all types of outer space activities, development of ambitious future projects, 
both on governmental and private level; all these factors are contributing to the need for effective 
collaboration mechanisms. UNISPACE III with its extensive preparatory meetings, rigorous 
schedule and excellent administrative support provided a successful forum for discussions, 
                                                        
67 Action teams established by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space implemented the following 
recommendations of UNISPACE III: develop a comprehensive, worldwide environmental monitoring strategy; 
improve the management of the Earth’s natural resources; enhance weather and climate forecasting; improve public 
health services; implement an integrated, global system to manage natural disaster mitigation, relief and prevention 
efforts; improve knowledge-sharing through the promotion of universal access to space-based communication 
services; improve universal access to and compatibility of space-based positioning systems; promote sustainable 
development by applying the results of space research; improve the international coordination of activities related to 
near-Earth objects; enhance capacity-building by developing human and budgetary resources; increase awareness 
among decision makers and the general public of the importance of space activities; identify new and innovative 
sources of financing to support the implementation of the recommendations of UNISPACE III. 
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deliberations and networking between States, international organizations and non-governmental 
actors.  
It has been said that “without adequate preparation of necessary conference services and 
facilities, chaos and confusion, and possibly complete failure of the conference are difficult to 
avoid.”68 This is as true as it can be: organizational matters, while often overshadowed by 
brilliant speakers and cutting edge issues under consideration, are the foundation of any 
successful meeting. This is even more true for the conferences with numerous participants 
coming from different countries, cultures, areas of specialization, and having different statuses, 
where their collaborative work becomes a challenge, and only those with necessary experience 
are capable of handling it in a sensible manner.  
Based on the UNISPACE Conferences experience, it can be concluded that excellent 
conference services are the mandatory prerequisite for a successful international conference. 
Moreover, utilization of an international organization’s secretarial capabilities plays to the 
advantage, giving the conference necessary administrative support, relieving participants from 
the task of handling organizational matters and thus providing them enough time and space to 
concentrate on the substantial matters. The only concern in this regard is the possibility of an 
undesirable influence of the hosting organization on the flow of the discussion and accessibility 
of the rostrum for certain participants. The answer to that is as follows: there is always a chance 
that a secretariat might unduly interfere precisely because organizational matters are capable of 
both elevating the quality of a meeting and downgrading it to an incomprehensive sequence of 
monologues; and States have found a way of mitigating, or at least diminishing such a risk by 
way of introducing a rigorous selection procedure of the secretariats’ staff and endowing them 
with a status of international civil servant requiring independence and commitment to the 
organization’s values.69 Thereby, it is suggested that utilization of a hosting international 
organization’s secretariat is desirable to ensure conference’s effectiveness. At the same time, 
                                                        
68 J. Kaufmann, Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis, (1988), at 33. 
69 See, International Civil Service Commission, Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service 2013, 
UNGA Res. 67/257 (The international civil service bears responsibility for translating into reality aims of the United 
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while the secretariat’s importance should be acknowledged, there are numerous other factors that 
influence the conference’s effectiveness, and so ‘borrowing’ an organization’s secretariat is by 
no means a panacea. 
Additionally, in spite of the end of the Cold War, tensions between States, albeit on a 
smaller scale, still exist. On a bilateral level such States might be unable to negotiate in a good 
faith manner, while a multilateral platform creates a different atmosphere, where a lack of 
understanding is counteracted by a large number of participants. For example, nine amendments 
were introduced to the text of the Vienna Declaration, including those from Chile, Canada, 
Bolivia, Australia, Venezuela, Russia and India.70 Despite these States’ different levels of 
involvement in outer space activities, despite differences in their levels of economic 
development, in the end the compromise was reached, and as it has been shown above, steps 
were taken toward implementation of provisions resulted from these trade-offs. This, surely, 
being not a legal characteristic of a conference, still should be considered when drawing 
conclusions about the areas where an international universal conference is an effective way to 
cooperate.  
As demonstrated by the UNISPACE Conferences experience, there are two elements to 
an international conference’s success: organizational and substantive. From the organizational 
standpoint, a widely attended conference, first, requires extensive planning. Preparatory 
meetings, preliminary formal and informal consultations ensure that matters important for 
different regions, for States at varying levels of involvement in outer space activities, for 
international organizations dealing with specific aspects of outer space exploitation and for 
private entities representing different divisions of the space industry, are all a part of the 
conference agenda.  
Second, a conference should boast an excellent organization, possess effective 
administration and defer to efficient rules of procedure, which at the same time are acceptable for 
the majority of participating States. While UNISPACE III was utilizing secretarial capacities of 
the United Nations, participants were nevertheless immediately involved in drawing up rules and 
procedures of the Conference. Pre-Conference consultations were held a day before the 
Conference opening and were open to all member States to reach an informal agreement on the 
                                                        
70 United Nations, Report of the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (Vienna, 19-30 July 1999), A/CONF.184/6, Annex I. 
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recommendations of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference on organizational and 
procedural matters. At the first plenary meeting the Conference adopted provisional rules of 
procedure recommended by the Preparatory Committee for the Conference modified by the 
agreement reached in the pre-Conference consultations.71 
There are two substantive elements that contribute to the universal conference’s success. 
Unlike procedural aspects, however, these can only be sketched in broad terms because for every 
particular conference contents would vary depending on the specifics of the conference in 
question. First, an established legal regime should be present, but the latest developments in 
science should be posing new issues that have to be discussed to ensure that the legal regime is 
not falling behind the practice. In the UNISPACE III context this element was undoubtedly 
present: on the one hand, the general legal regime of outer space exploration and use had already 
been in place by 1999, and on the other hand, rapid commercialization of space activities 
demanded that the emerging legal issues of private sector presence in space were addressed.  
Second, the agenda of the conference should reflect the practical state of affairs in the 
area. It has been earlier shown that exclusion of legal issues from the UNISPACE 82 agenda was 
a wise move allowing participating States to exchange views and share information about 
technical components of outer space exploitation, at the same time preventing legal controversies 
from emerging during conference deliberation for the sake of continuing fruitful work going on 
in COPUOS. The UNISPACE III broad agenda, by contrast, did not specifically exclude any 
particular area from the Conference’s consideration because, as it has been explained above, the 
legal, economic, social and technological climate had changed opening the door for greater inter-
State space cooperation and understanding. The trick here is the right balance between the needs 
and capabilities, between what is already a non-controversial issue and what should and can be 
discussed without undue disruption to positive tendencies in cooperation, legal regulation or 
technological collaboration. 
Comparison of the first two UNISPACE Conferences and UNISPACE III thus shows that 
modern universal international conferences are called to work on a broad agenda, which does not 
single out interests of particular States or groups of States, but which rather covers issues 
relevant for the whole community engaged in the activity made the centerpiece of the 
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Space (Vienna, 19-30 July 1999), A/CONF.184/6, para. 440. 
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conference. In the present analysis it means that an international space conference is open to 
every interested State, various international organizations and non-governmental actors, and that 
every participant can expect that issues important for him would be discussed as extensively as 
any others.  
In such circumstances universal international conferences are most helpful in promoting 
open deliberations, working toward enhancement of cooperation and creating partnership climate 
among participating subjects. The grand gatherings akin to UNISPACE III with a broad agenda 
attended by over two-thousand and five-hundred participants from over a hundred States and 
thirty international organizations, that do not result in a legally binding document should not be 
expected to result in immediate actions of participating States; neither can one anticipate a 
booming cooperation. But a successful conference, the one that covered the issues that actually 
were on the mind of most participants, would incentivize and stimulate cooperation, and results 
would reveal themselves, sooner or later.  
2018 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the first UNISPACE Conference and it was 
proposed that this could be a fitting time to evaluate contributions of the three UNISPACE 
Conferences to global space governance. During its 2015 session, COPUOS had before it a note 
by the Secretariat entitled “Fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations Conference on the 
Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: theme of the sessions of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, its Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and its Legal 
Subcommittee in 2018,” which was welcomed and endorsed by the Committee.  
The note prepared by the past, present and incoming Chairs of COPUOS suggests that the 
fiftieth anniversary of the first UNISPACE conference is an “opportunity to consider the current 
status and chart the future role of COPUOS at a time when more actors, both governmental and 
non-governmental, are increasingly involved in ventures to explore space and carry out space 
activities. It has been 15 years since UNISPACE III that was, by all accounts, a success both 
substantively and organizationally. UNISPACE III was also the last United Nations global 
conference of the millennium. Much has changed in the space enterprise since the beginning of 
the 21st century and it is appropriate for the global space community to take stock of what has 
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been accomplished and what can be expected for the future, including through looking into the 
results of the multi-year review of the implementation of UNISPACE III (UNISPACE III+5).”72 
The Note prepared by the Secretariat proposes inclusion of five broad topics for 
consideration in the agenda of UNISPACE III+5: governance, including the United Nations 
treaties and principles on outer space; capacity-building, including activities of members of 
COPUOS and work undertaken by the Office for Outer Space Affairs on space science and 
technology education; resiliency, including matters related to the ability to depend on space 
systems and to respond to the impact of events such as adverse space weather; interoperability, 
including work done by the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems and 
other coordination mechanisms; and space for sustainable development.73 It is noteworthy that 
consideration of legal issues is put at the forefront of the Conference’s tentative agenda. 
Further, the Note makes clear that the next Conference requires a different and more 
simplified approach than that used for the previous UNISPACE Conferences “due to the current 
nature of space affairs and financial situation.” It is suggested that UNISPACE III+5 would be 
held in place of the Main Committee session and that no additional funding would be allocated 
for the cause. Further, the group of members of the bureau of the Committee, the chairs of the 
working groups and the Director of the Office for Outer Space Affairs would be serving as the 
steering committee for the preparations for UNISPACE III+5.  
All preparatory activities are to take place during COPUOS and its Subcommittees’ 
sessions in 2015-2017, effectively eliminating the need for additional financing of the 
Conference arrangements. At the same time, “All Member States of the United Nations and the 
broader space community, including United Nations entities, other international 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and the private sector, should be invited 
to participate in a dedicated commemorative segment of the Committee in June 2018.”74 Keeping 
in mind that COPUOS membership is limited to seventy-seven States, at this point it is not 
entirely clear how preparatory activities restricted to the Committee framework might be 
effective in preparation of a conference with a wide State and non-State participation. 
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Quite clearly, the details of the conference are yet to be elaborated. At this point two 
reflections should be added. First, the initiative to commence the UNISPACE Conference to 
review achievements of the past half a century and to pave a road ahead should be applauded. 
Second, the UNISPACE III experience underlined that a conference with a large and diverse 
participation requires excellent preparation and management. Hopefully, in spite of the financial 
constraints, COPUOS and the Office for Outer Space Affairs, having by now gained extensive 
experience in organization of meetings and conferences of varying scope and duration, would 
succeed in stretching the funds available a long way toward effective and successful conference.
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“Curiously, the importance of the ITU [] now remains largely unacknowledged although 
without [it] international communications would not exists. In general [it] works well, and, 
working well, [it is] taken for granted.”1 Indeed, the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) is one of those international entities performing activities vital for the proper operation of 
the world, as we know it today, but at the same time remaining on the low radar of international 
attention. Nevertheless, it is suggested that the ITU is one of the key players not only in 
international telecommunications in general, but also in the developing and changing landscape 
of outer space activities. Greater involvement of the private sector in satellite-related business 
would only further increase the importance of effective regulation of international 
communications.  
Simultaneously, it is likely that an increasing importance of national space law,2 
especially that pertaining to regulation of private entities’ activities, will not result in a 
corresponding diminishing role of the ITU in regulation of telecommunications as far as outer 
space is concerned. “For there to be international communication connections it is both sensible 
and desirable that systems and procedures are agreed between the states concerned and that they 
are complied with. Once that happens there is little point in the internal communication systems 
of a state differing unnecessarily from the relevant agreed international system. Effectively the 
internal variant would be redundant. The result is that internationally agreed arrangements are 
considerably determinant of national systems at least in their technical aspects.”3 
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Despite the not-so-obvious connection of the ITU with international space cooperation, a 
closer look leaves no doubt about a prominent role played by the Union in modern cooperative 
space activities. First and foremost, space activities are unthinkable without telecommunications 
being involved; they all need interference-free access to usable radio frequencies. “And indeed, 
always has the legal framework for dealing with radio frequency usage, as developed in the 
context of the International Telecommunication Union, been discussed by the space lawyers, 
often even considered part of space law much as, from the ITU perspective, satellite 
communication forms only one relatively minor point of the scope of activities.”4 
Functions performed by the ITU are fundamental to virtually all space endeavors. 
Although it has been rightfully noted that “the feature of overwhelmingly significant policy 
relevance is of course the vastness – the boundlessness, the inexhaustibility – of space, with its 
easy accessibility from any part of the earth, making it pre-eminently suitable for shared use by 
multiple participants with a minimum mutual interference,”5 in the realm of the ITU activities 
even such a colossal expanse as outer space is never free from interference. 
“Telecommunications are the nervous system of all activities in space.”6 Satellite tracking, 
telemetry and control, and all message transmission to and from satellites cannot exist without 
radio. But radio communication to and from a satellite must be as free as possible from 
interference. “Unless there is agreement on the use of radio through ITU conferences, and 
compliance with the mechanism of the ITU to ensure that interference is kept to a minimum, a 
satellite is so much expensive junk. The sanction is applied by the inexorable laws of physics, 
not some fallible legal mechanism, and that is a strength of the system.”7  
In this chapter the structure and internal procedures of the ITU will be reviewed, paying 
special attention to the Union’s space-related activities. It is not feasible to even briefly touch 
upon every feature of the ITU, its methods of work and employed ways of international 
coordination within the scope of the present chapter. Therefore, the review will be limited to an 
institutionally centered analysis performed as a part of the international space law research. First, 
a brief overview of the history of the ITU, dating back to the middle of the nineteenth century, 
                                                        
4 F. G. von der Dunk, A New ‘Star’ in the Firmament – Teaching Space and Telecoms Law as a Post-Graduate 
LL.M. Programme, Korean J. of Air & Space L. (June 2011), at 419-20.  
5 M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 195. 
6 C.W. Jenks, Space Law (1965), at 251. 
7 F. Lyall, “The Role of the International Telecommunication Union,” in G. Lafferranderie and D. Crowther (eds.), 
Outlook on Space Law over the Next 30 Years (1997), at 253-54. 
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will be provided, accompanied by the outline of legal developments of the past half a century. 
Second, institutional features, including membership rules, the structure of the ITU organs and 
the binding force of adopted documents, will be addressed. Finally, taking into consideration the 
purposes of the Union as defined in its constituent documents and as coined over the decades of 
its work, conclusions as to effectiveness of the ITU as a method of international space 
cooperation will be proposed, emphasizing its relevance in the changing landscape of outer space 
activities for the years to come. 
 
5.1.2 History and Institutional Structure 
International coordination in the field of telecommunications was an absolute necessity 
from the time that telegraphic communications were first used on an international scale. By a 
treaty of December 30, 1855 the “Union Télégraphique de l’Europe Occidentale” was 
established. The Treaty of Paris of May 17, 1865 founded the International Telegraphic Union.8 
The Treaty included provisions that assured to everyone the right to correspond by means of 
international telegraph, provided for the secrecy of telegraphic correspondence and required 
uniformity of tariffs and regulations.9 The session of the Union in Berlin of 1885 adopted a 
decision by which it was accepted that the activities of the Union should also include telephone 
communications. The Treaty of Berlin of November 3, 1906 brought the establishment of the 
International Union for Radiotelegraphy. The institutions were amalgamated by the Treaty of 
Madrid of December 9, 1932 and transformed into the International Telecommunication Union. 
A single International Telecommunication Convention was the fusion of the Telegraph 
Convention of 1875 and the Radiotelegraph Convention of 1927, containing principles common 
to telegraph, telephone and radio services.  
The Union was profoundly reformed by the Treaty of Atlantic City of October 2, 1947,10 
which was also severely amended later. The 1947 Treaty altered the general structure of the ITU 
to conform to the usual United Nations pattern.11 It also for the first time expressed the goal of 
                                                        
8 Documents diplomatiques de la conférence télégraphique internationale de Paris. Paris : Imprimerie impériale, 
1865, available at the official ITU website http://handle.itu.int/11.1004/020.1000/4.1. 
9 See, J.H. Glazer, The Law-Making Treaties of the International Telecommunication Union Through Time and In 
Space, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 269 (1961-1962), at 272.  
10 International Telecommunication Convention, Atlantic City, 1947, available at the official ITU website 
http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/oth/02/09/S02090000065201PDFE.PDF. 
11 See, F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 203.  
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the ITU to ensure the effectiveness of telecommunications while ‘fully recognizing the sovereign 
right of each country to regulate its telecommunications’. Shortly thereafter the ITU became a 
Specialized Agency of the United Nations on approval of its special convention by the General 
Assembly on November 15, 1947,12 thereby asserting its affiliation to the prominent political 
international organization, which led to “a greater emphasis [] placed on politics, an area long 
avoided by the Union.”13 
Generally, “within the ITU the governments and the private sector coordinate the 
establishment and operation of telecommunication networks and services. This worldwide 
organization is responsible for the regulation, standardization, coordination and development of 
international telecommunications as well as the harmonization of national policies. Its goal is to 
foster and facilitate the global development of telecommunications for the universal benefit of 
mankind, through the rule of law, mutual consent and cooperative action.”14 
The Union deals with electrical wired and radio communication and with optical 
communication systems. First formally defined for international purposes in 1932, 
‘telecommunication’ is: “Any telegraph or telephone communication of signs, signals, writings, 
images, and sounds of any nature, by wire, radio, or other systems or processes of electric or 
visual [semaphore] signaling.”15 The scope of the ITU mandate presupposed the unique level of 
cooperation exhibited by States in negotiating relevant regulations, thereto often requiring 
concessions from all parties concerned. “The ITU operates as a necessary organization since 
behind it stands the Law (or Laws?) of Physics. Physics cannot be avoided, altered or repealed 
by international agreement even were that agreement to be forged by the most high and 
significant plenipotentiaries.”16 
Against this background, it came as no surprise that the new United Nations specialized 
agency attracted all United Nations member-States and continued expanding as the number of 
sovereign States was growing in the 1950s and 1960s. Already in 1944, “when the subject of 
space telecommunication was left to writers of science fiction, and when the world had 
considerably fewer sovereign partners sharing in the management of the frequency spectrum as 
                                                        
12 See, E.R.C. van Bogaert, Aspects of Space Law (1986), at 192. 
13 J.H. Glazer, The Law-Making Treaties of the International Telecommunication Union Through Time and In 
Space, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 269 (1961-1962), at 283. 
14 N. Jasentuliyana, International Space Law and the United Nations (1999), at 283. 
15 F. Lyall, International Communications: The International Telecommunication Union and the Universal Postal 
Union (2011), at 13-14. 
16 Id. 
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well as radiocommunication stations opting for occupancy in it, the transfer of some “rule-
making” functions from the cumbersome mechanism of the ITU conference body was considered 
an administrative necessity.”17 In the following years the growing membership, diversification of 
membership that required due consideration of interests and views of the newest members, 
increasingly swift technology development and the introduction of space communications to the 
Union mandate,18 all foreshadowed an imminent need for institutional changes. 
“Dissatisfaction with the structure and the organizational abilities of the Union rose to a 
climax in the 1980s. A Plenipotentiary Conference in Nice in 1989 was very conscious that the 
swiftly changing telecommunications environment required the ITU to alter its structures and 
procedures. … On the basis of the report of the High Level Committee, the 1992 Geneva Extra-
Ordinary Plenipotentiary Conference of the International Telecommunication Union adopted 
major structural changes to the ITU.”19 The newly developed Constitution and Convention, 
which substituted the previous basic single constituent document, were further revised and 
amended in some details by the Final Acts of the 1994 Kyoto Plenipotentiary Conference, 1998 
Minneapolis Plenipotentiary Conference, 2002 Marrakesh Plenipotentiary Conference, 2006 
Antalya Plenipotentiary Conference and 2010 Guadalajara Plenipotentiary Conference.20  
The Geneva decisions, however, were the ones to give the ITU its present form. 
Generally, the new system detailed the required schedule of work for both the Union-wide 
organs and those of the Sectors. The intention of these changes was the promotion of efficiency, 
cost-effectiveness and a most prompt response to the regulatory need of a rapidly changing 
international telecommunication environment.21 
A scholar correctly noted a mere two years after the 1992 Plenipotentiary Conference that 
the Geneva decisions would come to be seen as a watershed in the history of the Union.22 The 
new Constitution and Convention profoundly changed the structure of the ITU, whereas 
introduction of the three Sectors had a twofold importance: on the one hand, it acknowledged the 
                                                        
17 J.H. Glazer, The Law-Making Treaties of the International Telecommunication Union Through Time and In 
Space, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 269 (1961-1962), at 305. 
18 Cf., F. Lyall, International Communications: The International Telecommunication Union and the Universal 
Postal Union (2011), at 130. 
19 F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 204-05. 
20 Final Acts of all ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, from 1865 to present, are available at the official ITU website 
http://handle.itu.int/11.1004/020.1000/4. 
21 Cf., F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 204-05.  
22 Cf., F. Lyall, International Communications: The International Telecommunication Union and the Universal 
Postal Union (2011), at 131. 
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need to involve the private sector to a much greater extent in regulation of international 
telecommunications; and on the other, creation of the Telecommunication Development Sector 
came as an answer to developing nations’ concerns about their influence over the future 
development of international telecommunications, and as a tool of coordination between 
developed and developing nations, ensuring that a dialogue continued to be a bedrock of the 
Union despite the existing differences. And although the mechanics of the ITU were altered 
greatly, the original purpose of the institution remained inviolable, stimulating international 
agreement regarding technical arrangements for the sake of international telecommunications 
prosperity.23 
Currently, according to Article 7 of the Constitution, the ITU has a complex structure and 
is composed of seven major organs. The Plenipotentiary Conference, which is the supreme organ 
of the Union, the Council, which acts on behalf of the Plenipotentiary Conference, the world 
conferences on international telecommunications, and the General Secretariat comprise the 
pinnacle of the ITU institutional system. Two of those, namely the Plenipotentiary Conference 
and the world conferences on international telecommunications, perform the most important 
functions from a regulatory perspective but do not work on a permanent basis, leaving the 
Council and the General Secretariat to perform Union’s day-to-day functions, which are quite 
massive given the ITU authority over all international telecommunications.  
Article 8.1 of the Constitution provides that the Plenipotentiary Conferences should be 
held every four years, and if possible, both location and dates of the next meeting should be 
determined by the previous conference. In accordance with Article 7.a of the Constitution, the 
Plenipotentiary Conference is the supreme organ of the Union composed of delegations 
representing all member States, where each member has one vote. The many responsibilities of 
the Plenipotentiary Conference are set out in Article 8 of the Constitution, including those of 
determination of general policies, establishment of the basis of the budget of the Union and 
provision of general directions regarding staffing. 
The Plenipotentiary Conferences elect members of the Council with ‘due regard to the 
need for equitable distribution of the seats on the Council among all regions of the world’. The 
membership of the Council should not exceed twenty-five percent of the total number of member 
States. This provision, aiming at preservation of Council’s operability and efficiency by way of 
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limiting its membership, falls short of fulfilling the task allowing for a 49-member Council. An 
executive organ should possess operational flexibility and be able to work promptly, what 
necessarily requires a limited in number membership. Although any number would be an 
arbitrary choice – after all, international arrangements and their functions are different – it is 
suggested that a body of thirty members can both ensure representativeness and preserve an 
ability to work most effectively.24  
The Council meets annually in Geneva, although an additional session is a possibility. 
The general functions of the Council include facilitating the implementation of the ITU 
Constitution and Convention together with the Administrative Regulations, and of decisions of 
the Plenipotentiary Conferences and other conferences, as may be required. In the intervals 
between the Plenipotentiary Conferences and within the powers designated to it, the Council acts 
on its behalf as the governing body of the Union.25  
The General Secretariat is headed by the Secretary General, who is assisted by a single 
Deputy Secretary General. Each Sector also has a secretariat-like entity – the Bureau, headed by 
the Director, who is elected by the Plenipotentiary Conference. “The Secretary General, Deputy 
Secretary General and the three Directors of the Bureaus of the Sectors partake of the privileges 
of the 1947 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, as it may 
have been incorporated into national legislation.”26  
Article 27 of the Constitution lays down general principles as to elected officials and 
staff. The paramount consideration in the election of officials and in staff recruitment is “the 
necessity of securing for the Union the highest standards of efficiency, competence and 
integrity” while bearing in mind the “importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographic 
basis as possible.” Further, no elected official or staff should seek or accept any instructions from 
their home State or any other entity, nor should any Member or Sector Member seek to influence 
them.27 In effect, all ITU officials and staff are provided with guarantees of independence to 
ensure their international unbiased character of work; and functional privileges and immunities 
are provided to the officials representing the Union and its organs on the international plane. 
                                                        
24 Cf., C. Pavitt, Small Group Communication: A Theoretical Approach (1998), at 54-55. 
25 See, F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 216. 
26 F. Lyall, International Communications: The International Telecommunication Union and the Universal Postal 
Union (2011), at 153. 
27 Id. at 145. 
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The 1992 Geneva Conference introduced three new organs to the ITU structure: the 
Radiocommunication Sector, dealing with the use of the frequency spectrum and, thus, most 
important for the present analysis; the Telecommunication Standardization Sector dealing with 
technical harmonization and development; and the Telecommunication Development Sector 
charged with supporting entering and presence of developing States in the international 
telecommunication community.28 Each entity, under its Director’s guidance, works through a 
variety of working groups, study groups, regional conferences and world conferences and 
assemblies.29 Rigorous procedural regulation and scheduling of Sectors’ functioning is essential: 
currently there is a total of over seven hundred Sector members working in twenty-eight Sectors’ 
study groups.30 
The Radiocommunication Sector is the one most relevant for the space law analysis. 
Chapter II of the Constitution and Section 5 of the Convention cover functioning of the Sector. 
Its purpose is to ensure “the rational, equitable, efficient and economical use of the radio 
frequency spectrum by all radiocommunication services, including those using the geostationary 
satellite orbit, and to carry out studies without limit of frequency range.” This has two aspects: 
studies and work on the Radio Regulations, and the administration of the Master International 
Frequency Register.31 
The Telecommunication Development Sector does not directly deal with space related 
issues, but nevertheless should not be completely overlooked. “The new Telecommunication 
Development Sector is to deal with all telecommunications development matters within the 
purview of the Union. The concentrating of development matters in the new Sector is significant. 
It recognizes the importance of Development within the responsibilities of the Union, gathers 
much that was already under way under different wings of the Union, places that work on a 
much more coherent basis, and gives it significant standing within the Union.”32 
Undoubtedly, coherent and comprehensive study of the questions of development is of 
great importance for the organization dealing with an ever-changing matter of 
telecommunications, which came all the way from a telegraph to high-speed online conference 
                                                        
28 See, F. G. von der Dunk, “Legal Aspects of Satellite Communications,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of 
Space Law (2014), at 464. 
29 Cf., F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 218. 
30 For more information see, official website of the ITU, www.itu.int. 
31 See, F. Lyall, International Communications: The International Telecommunication Union and the Universal 
Postal Union (2011), at 157. 
32 F. Lyall, The International Telecommunication Union and Development, 23 J. Space L. 22 (1994), at 28. 
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calls. And in this context the questions of development are no less important for space related 
technologies than they are for radio communications. Commercialization of space activities 
raises not only questions of proper international and national regulation and supervision, but also 
questions of what lies ahead, and how the concept of ‘public good’ would be incorporated in 
regulation of space-based telecommunications of the future, and how interests of all mankind 
would be addressed when the telecommunication side of outer space exploration and use is 
concerned.33  
Two additional bodies were introduced to the ITU structure during the 1992 reform. The 
first one is the Radio Regulations Board, which is comprised of nine members serving on a part-
time basis “not as representing their respective Member States, or a region, but as custodians of 
an international public trust,” as provided in Article 14.3.1 of the ITU Constitution. The Board 
approves the Rules of Procedure under which registration of frequency assignments is made and 
considers matters that cannot be solved by the application of these Rules by the Director and the 
Bureau of the Sector. 
“Another important decision taken at the [Plenipotentiary Conference 1994] was the 
establishment of a ‘World Telecommunication Policy Forum’, thereby signaling a strategic shift 
on the part of the ITU, from its more traditional role in conventional technology to a more 
modern policy-oriented approach in international telecommunications. The objective of the 
Forum is to discuss and exchange views and information on broad telecommunication policy 
issues, technological issues, technological advances, service options and opportunities, 
infrastructure development and financial business considerations.”34 The first such Forum was 
held in Geneva in October 1996.35 
Overall, nowadays the Union boasts an extensive institutional structure that represents 
three methods of inter-State cooperation: the world radio conferences, the Plenipotentiary 
Conferences and the World Telecommunication Policy Forum represent an all-inclusive 
approach to cooperation providing each State with one vote, thus, resembling a democratic 
                                                        
33 For a more detailed discussion see, F. Tronchetti, “Legal Aspects of Satellite Remote Sensing,” in F. G. von der 
Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 490-92. For an opinion that the doctrine of ‘public good’ is not likely 
to constrain activities in exploration of space resources see, M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law 
and Public Order in Space (1963), at 934-35. 
34 N. Jasentuliyana, International Space Law and the United Nations (1999), at 285. 
35 The Fifth World Telecommunication Policy Forum was held in Geneva, Switzerland, in May 2013, for a duration 
of 3 days and looked at International Internet-related public policy matters. For more information see, official 
website of the ITU, http://www.itu.int/en/wtpf-13/Pages/default.aspx. 
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parliament; three Sectors allow for both inter-State, and State and non-State cooperation 
regarding a specific subject under consideration within the Sector in a controlled environment of 
study groups and other analogous organs; and the Radio Regulations Board and the Council 
represent a type of executive organs composed of elected officials and charged with performance 
of tasks important to all stakeholders, but entrusted to a smaller representative group of 
members. 
 
5.2 Six-Criteria Analysis 
 
5.2.1 Membership/Participation 
Turning to the question of the ITU membership, it should be noted that while the ITU is a 
traditionally State-centered institution “in that only states at the highest level are parties to the 
ITU Constitution and ITU Convention, some allowance had to be made for involving private 
operators at least in the practical decision-making and policy-setting processes.”36 
In membership the ITU has ‘regard to the principle of universality and the desirability of 
universal participation in the Union’. “Membership of the ITU has two different forms, state 
membership and Sector membership. State membership (full membership) is open only to states. 
… Sector membership is membership of one or more of the three Sectors established by the 
1992/4 reconstructions, either as a full or as an associate Sector member.”37 These apart, there 
are also other arrangements under which certain other entities take some part in ITU activities. 
For example, ‘to protect the Rights of Papua New Guinea’ the status of that country was 
preserved as an Associate Member, though the 1992 arrangements abolished the status of an 
Associate Member of the ITU. Particular provisions have been also made for Palestine.38 
In accordance with Article 2 of the ITU Convention, a State may become a member of 
the Union in one of three ways: any State-member of any ITU Convention prior to the 1992 
Constitution and Convention; any United Nations member acceding to the 1992 arrangements; 
                                                        
36 F.G. von der Dunk, “Legal Aspects of Satellite Communications,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of 
Space Law (2014), at 462. 
37 F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 208.  
38 See, F. Lyall, International Communications: The International Telecommunication Union and the Universal 
Postal Union (2011), at 142-43. 
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and any non-United Nations member which applies for membership, secures the approval of 
two-thirds of the existing ITU members and then accedes to the 1992 arrangements.39 
All State members can take part in all conferences, are eligible for election to the ITU 
Council and can nominate nationals as candidates for election as officials of the Union or as 
members of the Radio Regulations Board. They all are also Sector members as of right, but their 
participation in the Sectors is not compulsory.  
A Sector member may be a Full Member or an Associate Sector Member, the latter 
introduced at the 1998 Minneapolis Plenipotentiary Conference, open to non-State entities and 
allowing for the entity to participate in a single study group.  
The decision of the 2010 Guadalajara Plenipotentiary Conference resolved “to admit 
academia, universities and their associated research establishments concerned with the 
development of telecommunication/information and communication technology to participate in 
the work of the three Sectors.”40 Generally, academia can participate in all conferences and other 
meetings, including all study groups, except for the Plenipotentiary Conferences and the world 
radiocommunication conferences, but they do not have a role in decision-making, particularly the 
adoption of resolutions or recommendations.  
By and large, the ITU has an extensive and representative membership allowing for 
different points of view to be heard and considered. In this sense, the ITU is undoubtedly a 
pioneer: it was one of the first international actors inviting the private sector to participate on a 
permanent basis in the decision-making process, albeit limited to those of the Sectors. Inclusion 
of academia in the list of possible Sector members resonates with the multiple United Nations 
General Assembly and COPUOS documents emphasizing the importance of education;41 
furthermore, participation of academia has apparently proved beneficial to the work of the 
Sectors and to the ITU in general and shall be continued beyond the trial period. In accordance 
                                                        
39 Id. at 139-40. 
40 Resolution 169 “Admission of Academia, Universities and Their Associated Research Establishments to 
Participate in the Work of the Three Sectors of the Union,” in Final Acts of the Plenipotentiary Conference, 
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41 E.g., Resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 5 March 2015 “Education for Democracy”, 
A/RES/69/268; Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Legal Subcommittee, Report of the United Nations 
Expert Meeting on Promoting Education in Space Law (Vienna, 3-4 December 2007), A/AC.105/908; Draft Report 
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A/AC.105/C.2/2014/CRP.8. 
 187 
with the Guadalajara decision on admission of academia to the three Sectors of the Union, 
academia was initially admitted for a trial period until the next Plenipotentiary Conference. 
Resolution 158 of the 2014 Plenipotentiary Conference in Busan instructed the Council “to 
review the current methodologies and study the development of a future vision for the 
participation of Sector Members, Associates and Academia in the activities of ITU.”42  
Despite the justified characterization of the ITU as a trailblazer in active involvement of 
international organizations, private sector and now also academia in its work, arguments have 
been made favoring further expansion of the non-State actors’ association with the Union, and 
more specifically favoring enlargement of the international organizations’ influence on the 
lawmaking process. It has been suggested that “in the next thirty years it would be good to see 
full membership given to the major international organizations that operate space 
telecommunications. Such bodies have telecommunication skills, and are well financed through 
their revenues. Their finances and their technical competence are greater than many state 
members of the ITU. Their competences should be recognized and profited from by allowing 
them full membership of the ITU.”43 Although the international satellite organizations referred to 
have gone through the process of privatization44 and nowadays they are not likely to seek ITU 
membership, the future possibility of other international organizations becoming influential 
enough to request admission to the ITU as full members should not be disregarded.  
Fulfillment of this proposal would effectively allow international organizations to have 
an equal vote in the process of adoption of decisions, which, as it will be shown further, are 
legally binding on States. That might face significant resistance for two reasons. First, it would 
essentially mean equalizing the international statuses of a State and an international organization. 
Despite the great importance of international organizations in modern international order, 
traditional international law doctrine still considers international organizations ‘inferior’ subjects 
of international law compared to States, and this view is likely to retain broad support in the 
foreseeable future.  
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Second, it would raise an issue of ‘double vote’, when members of an international 
organization eligible for the Union membership in effect would obtain the possibility to vote 
twice. Acknowledging that an abundance of counter-arguments can be made, starting with the 
definition of an international organization that does not equate an entity to a mere sum of its 
members, and concluding by the emphasis on the importance of the level of financial 
contributions, on the one hand, and corresponding responsibilities, on the other,  this issue might 
cause controversies and disagreement among ITU members, particularly triggering discontent of 
developing countries. Hence, as long as these two considerations continue to be perceived by 
many States as an obstacle, it is preferable to leave the ITU membership rules unchanged.  
 
5.2.2 Secretariat 
The ITU General Secretariat is one of the main organs of the Union. Functions of the 
Secretariat, in accordance with Article 11 of the Constitution, include coordination of the 
activities of the Union, reporting to the Council on policies and the Strategic Plan adopted by the 
Plenipotentiary Conference for the Union, coordination of the implementation of that Plan and 
taking all actions required to ensure the economic use of the resources of the Union. During the 
2006 Antalya Plenipotentiary Conference a provision was added designating the Secretary 
General a legal representative of the Union. 
As has been established in Chapter 1, a secretariat of an international organization 
possesses the following characteristics: (1) a separate organ within the structure of the 
organization; (2) working on a permanent basis and financed from the organization’s budget; (3) 
and acting independently from the will of member States and pursuing in its work goals of the 
international organization, thus possessing an international character of work. In Chapter 1 it has 
been emphasized that what makes an administrative organ a secretariat is not the functions it is 
tasked with, but rather its composition and the extent of its international independency. The 
latter, however, should not be understood as independence from the organization it is serving or 
member-States of the organization – though a certain degree of autonomy is desirable – but as its 
ability to be active on the international, and oftentimes national, plane on its own behalf in 
representation of the organization’s interests.  
With respect to the ITU General Secretariat, all three criteria of a secretariat of an 
international organization are met. First, as per provisions of Article 7 of the Constitution, the 
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General Secretariat is enumerated in the list of the organs comprising the structure of the Union. 
Second, Article 5 of the Convention enumerates functions of the General Secretariat, which can 
only be performed subject to a permanent nature of the Secretariat’s functioning. For example, 
the first two subparagraphs of the Article provide that the Secretary-General shall be responsible 
for the overall management of the Union’s resources, requiring him to coordinate the activities of 
the General Secretariat with a view to assuring the most effective and economical use of the 
resources of the Union. The following subparagraphs further specify the scope of the activities to 
be performed by the General Secretariat, including implementation of the strategic plan, 
preparation of a rolling operational plan of activities and so on. In other words, the General 
Secretariat under guidance and supervision of the Secretary-General is tasked with the ‘overall 
management’ of the Union, the task achievable only through day-to-day, everyday work. 
It is one of the main functions of the General Secretariat to prepare and submit to the 
Council a biennial draft budget. The budget is based on information regarding expected 
expenditures as provided by the Sectors, members’ notifications as to extent of their financial 
contributions in the coming financial period and financial limits laid down by the Plenipotentiary 
Conference, and should be prepared in cooperation with the Coordination Committee. Given the 
primary responsibility of the General Secretariat in the development of Union’s budgets, the only 
reasonable conclusion is that expenditures for functioning of the Secretariat are a part of the 
Union’s budget.  
Third, both the Secretary-General and the Secretariat staff possess international character 
of work. Article 27 of the Constitution, providing for guarantees against undue influence on the 
Union staff from their home State or any other entity, coupled with privileges and immunities 
enjoyed pursuant to provisions of the 1947 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
Specialized Agencies ensure a level of independency necessary for international civil servants. 
Furthermore, the decision of the 2006 Antalya Plenipotentiary Conference to designate the 
Secretary-General a legal representative of the Union affirmed the existence of specific legal 
rights and obligations exercisable by the Secretary-General and by the General Secretariat, as 
represented by its head, on the international plane.  
Thereby, a conclusion should be drawn that the ITU possesses a ‘true’ secretariat, or a 
traditional secretariat of an international organization, performing various functions, ranging 
from purely administrative to political tasks, staffed with employees working as representatives 
 190 
of the Union, not their home States, and possessing certain rights and obligations on the 
international plane.  
 
5.2.3 International Legal Personality 
An extensive institutional structure coupled with the breadth of the ITU mandate, 
presumably, indicates presence of international legal personality of the Union. Article 31 of the 
Constitution entitled ‘Legal Capacity of the Union’, the only relevant provision of the ITU 
constituent documents, is rather ambiguous in this regard. It reads: “The Union shall enjoy in the 
territory of each of its member States such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of 
its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.” Recalling the decision of the International Court 
of Justice in the Reparations Case that concluded that the United Nations was an international 
person possessing international legal personality based on a similar wording of Article 104 of the 
United Nations Charter,45 it is logical to suggest that the Union similarly possesses international 
legal personality. 
The international legal personality of the ITU, alternatively, may be identified based on 
the four criteria outlined in Chapter 1. The Union is clearly an association of States with lawful 
objectives. The Sector membership being open to international organizations, private sector and 
now academia, as it has been argued above, does not alter the fact that ‘full’ Union membership 
is available exclusively to States, and does not amount to inclusion of non-State actors in the list 
of subjects ‘constituting an association’ for the purposes of the international legal personality 
identification. As it has been shown above, the ITU possesses an extensive structure of organs 
performing functions on behalf and for the benefit of the Union. The ITU has been created to 
fulfill a rather peculiar goal, a goal of coordination of telecommunications in a uniform manner. 
Therefore, it was entrusted with powers going beyond capabilities of any national 
telecommunication agency, particularly with the power to develop and adopt normative 
documents legally binding on both national and international levels.  
While one might argue that the ITU does not have a mechanism to enforce compliance 
with the provisions of its documents and, thus, does not comply with the final criterion of 
international legal personality, the Union possesses other powers clearly exercisable on the 
international plane, particularly rights granted by the 1947 Convention on the Privileges and 
                                                        
45 Supra, para. 1.3.2.3. 
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Immunities of the Specialized Agencies. Therefore, the Union complies with all four criteria of 
international legal personality and should be regarded an international legal person.  
 
5.2.4 Term of Existence 
A hundred and sixty-year history of the ITU hardly leaves any doubt as to permanent, or 
at the very least, long-lasting term of its existence. It should be noted, however, that the number 
of years of existence per se does not affirm an indefinite period of the intended existence of the 
mechanism in question – though a century and a half is an impressive duration, making any 
doubts strictly theoretical – since, for example, the United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea lasted over a decade, an unusually long period for an international conference.   
The constituent documents of the Union are silent on the matter of the term of existence; 
it is only logical to suggest that in 1992, when both the Constitution and the Convention were 
adopted, States saw little value in a provision asserting an indefinite period of the Union’s 
existence. Chapter IX of the Constitution and Article 42 of the Convention elaborate the 
procedure of the constituent documents ratification, acceptance or approval, entry into force, 
accession to them, and their amendment and procedure of denunciation. With regard to the latter, 
the Constitution specifies that every member “which has ratified, accepted, approved or acceded 
to this Constitution and the Convention shall have the right to denounce them” by way of 
notifying the Secretary-General, which shall take effect at the expiration of a period of one year 
from the date of receipt of such notification. Utilizing a standard formula for membership 
termination, the Convention confirms a similarly traditional approach to the term of existence, 
which is presumed to be indefinite unless stated otherwise.46 
More importantly, the decisions adopted by the Union along with undertaken activities 
unequivocally confirm the long-term future-oriented attitude. Establishment of the 
Telecommunication Development Sector is one such step exemplifying the Union’s concern 
regarding future sustainability of international telecommunications, which encompasses both 
facilitation of developing States’ modernization and the broader utilization of 
telecommunications for a variety of humanitarian and environmental purposes. Such resolutions 
of the Plenipotentiary Conferences as “ITU’s role in the development of 
                                                        
46 Cf., J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2002), at 320-22. (International organizations 
are normally created with no particular term in mind, and, generally, failure to include a dissolution clause is due to 
intention to create an organization with view to its performance, rather than that with a view to its demise.”) 
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telecommunications/information and communication technologies, in providing technical 
assistance and advice to developing countries, and in implementing relevant national, regional 
and interregional projects,” “The use of telecommunications/information and communication 
technologies for monitoring and management in emergency and disaster situations for early 
warning, prevention, mitigation and relief” and “Next-generation network deployment in 
developing countries” have far-reaching goals and are aiming at providing long-lasting solutions 
in addressing relevant issues.  
Overall, in addition to a respectful background of the Union dating back to the nineteenth 
century, its modern activities and initiatives, striving to use the ITU capabilities toward 
achievement of enduring positive effects on the global level, create a firm basis for a conclusion 
about an expected indefinite period of the ITU existence.  
 
5.2.5 Binding Force of Documents Produced 
The ITU is the most well known of the United Nations specialized agencies that is 
engaged in space lawmaking.47 Although the Union is not, clearly, an entity specializing in 
regulation of space activities, such a characterization is still competent. On the one hand, the 
mandate of the ITU unequivocally includes functions in the space-related area, particularly 
allocation and allotment of frequency bands and, if relevant, associated orbits and orbital slots, 
and on the other, it is empowered to adopt legally binding regulations, including those pertaining 
to space-related activities. The ITU lawmaking authority will now be reviewed in greater detail. 
The Constitution and the Convention are the constituent documents of the Union. They 
are supplemented by the Administrative Regulations comprised of the International 
Telecommunication Regulations and the Radio Regulations. These regulate international 
telecommunications,48 whereas the former deal with standards and procedures in international 
telecommunications generally, and the latter with radio matters. In accordance with Article 54 of 
the ITU Constitution, they ‘further complement’ the Constitution and Convention, and both sets 
of Regulations have a treaty status. At the same time, in accordance with Article 4 of the ITU 
Constitution, in case of inconsistency between these documents, provisions of the Constitution 
shall prevail.  
                                                        
47 See, N. Jasentuliyana, International Space Law and the United Nations (1999), at 6. 
48 Cf., F. Lyall, International Communications: The International Telecommunication Union and the Universal 
Postal Union (2011), at 134. 
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State members of the ITU are required, therefore, to abide by the provisions of the 
Constitution, the Convention and the Administrative Regulations, to adopt adequate national 
legislation that includes, as the basic minimum, the essential provisions of these international 
documents,49 and also to require the observance of the ITU rules by any operational agency they 
authorize in all telecommunication activities that relate to international services or in those 
capable of causing interference to the radio services of other countries. The only exemption from 
the binding nature of the ITU regulations and decisions is contained in Article 48 of the 
Constitution: State members retain freedom in regard to military radio installations.50 
The Radio Regulations, the Table of Allocation of Frequencies and the Master 
International Frequency Register are the documents defining the day-to-day functioning of 
international telecommunications; hence, it is necessary to determine whether all these 
documents are equally legally binding. The Radio Regulations are a part of the Administrative 
Regulations and, therefore, are legally binding on ITU members. At the world radio conferences 
ITU members “may partially or, in exceptional cases, completely revise the Radio 
Regulations.”51 “In effect, this means that, as technical, economic and other developments 
change the (perceived) need for certain bandwidth, at the WRCs it will be decided to ‘reserve’ 
new frequency bands for specific services and/or ‘take away’ certain bandwidth from others 
apparently not so much in need thereof.”52  
The cases of the Table of Allocation of Frequencies and the Master Register are not as 
straightforward, though “it is of increasing importance in particular with a view to the on-going 
globalization, commercialization and privatization of the sector to precisely determine to what 
extent the sovereign member states of the ITU would be legally bound by that outcome, or would 
rather have to consider them as guidelines to which it makes simply – usually – sense to 
adhere.”53 
In 1970 Leive opined that the ITU was the most competent United Nations specialized 
agency to plan and coordinate orbital slots.54 He further characterized the exercise of the 
                                                        
49 Cf., Y. Henri and A. Matas, “The ITU Radio Regulations and WRC-15 Challenges Related to Space Services,” in 
Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 2013 (2014), at 248. 
50 See, F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 207.  
51 Art. 13(1), ITU Constitution.  
52 F.G. von der Dunk, Maintaining the Master International Frequency Register, Int’l Regulations of Space Comm.  
(2013), at 5.  
53 Id. at 14.  
54 Cf., O.O. Ogunbanwo, International Law and Outer Space Activities (2013), at 185. 
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authority of the ITU through international radio conferences representing all ITU members, 
which allocate the usable portions of the spectrum to different communications services, as a 
‘legislative’ and ‘regulatory’ process of ordering the international use of the frequency 
spectrum.55 In other words, in that classic work56 activities of the Union pertaining to allocation 
and presumably allotment of radio spectrum were considered ‘regulatory’ and ‘legislative’, 
pointing toward a legally binding nature of relevant ITU documents, particularly the Table of 
Frequency Allocations and the Master International Frequency Register.  
The Table of Frequency Allocations, formally being based on the legally binding Radio 
Regulations and being an integral part thereof, constitutes binding law that legally requires 
adherence by member States including, as necessary, domestic legal implementation. With 
respect to the Master International Frequency Register the conclusion is not as forthright. The 
Convention and the Radio Regulations, however, do mention the Register, suggesting its legally 
binding nature and encouraging States and private operators to honor the rights attached to the 
registered frequencies and their usage.57 The official ITU website explains that any frequency 
assignment recorded in the Master Register shall have the right to international recognition, 
meaning that other administrations shall take this into account when making their own 
assignments, in order to avoid harmful interference.58  
An ITU official also opined that frequency spectrum allocations and international 
recognition of frequency assignments rights and obligations were main elements of the ITU legal 
regime codified through the ITU Constitution and Convention, including the Radio 
Regulations,59 effectively treating the Table of Allocation of Frequencies and the Master 
Register as integral parts of the ITU legal regime, and the legally binding Radio Regulations in 
particular. By and large, in the absence of legal evidence and State practice to the contrary, it 
might be presumed that both documents impose legal obligations on member States, though, as it 
                                                        
55 Cf., M. Hofmann, “ITU Instruments under the Perspective of General International Law,” in Proceedings of the 
International Institute of Space Law 2013 (2014), at 329. 
56 Referring to, D.M. Leive, International Telecommunications and International Law: The Regulation of the Radio 
Spectrum (1970). 
57 See, F.G. von der Dunk, Maintaining the Master International Frequency Register, Int’l Regulations of Space 
Comm. (2013), at 15.. 
58 Master International Frequency Register, official website of the ITU, http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
R/terrestrial/broadcast/Pages/MIFR.aspx. 
59 H. Yvon, Orbit/Spectrum Allocation Procedures Registration Mechanism, World Meteorological Organization 
Workshop (October 2002), available at 
https://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/www/TEM/RFworkshop/ITUorbitSpectrumProcedures.doc. 
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was rightfully noted by Leive over forty years ago, “As in most other areas of international law, 
while rights and obligations may be established, the machinery for enforcement is either weak or 
non-existent.”60 And in this sense, of course, common sense and practical convenience are more 
persuasive arguments in favor of compliance with these documents than a legally binding nature 
of a document taken separately can ever be.  
It has been noted earlier in the chapter that the ITU functioning, and thus its relevance, is 
based on the laws of physics that cannot be avoided, altered or repealed by any international 
agreement,61 and so adherence to the ITU regulations is triggered by the same irrefutable factors. 
One eminent scholar rightfully explained: “Even with their imperfections, provisions in the ITU 
Radio Regulations are to a great extent self-enforcing. Nations avoid these regulations only if 
they are prepared to have their own radiocommunications disrupted by other nations injured 
through that avoidance.”62 
 
5.2.6 Existence of Opportunity to Modify Obligations 
Striving to maintain a uniform set of general principles and obligations binding ITU 
members, no reservations are permitted to the substantive provisions of the Constitution or 
Convention or to amendments to them. In the light of the highly technical nature of the 
Administrative Regulations, however, reservations to these documents are admissible. The 
provision of the ITU Constitution Preamble, on the one hand, reaffirming “the sovereign right of 
each State to regulate its telecommunications,” and on the other, “having regard to the growing 
importance of telecommunication for the preservation of peace and the economic and social 
development of all States,” lays the ground for the divergent approaches toward reservations to 
the constituent documents and the Administrative Regulations. While consistency and uniformity 
in utilization of limited resources is essential for the preservation of peace and sustainable 
development, States retain sovereignty and control over their natural resources and should be 
provided with an opportunity to deviate from a general rule in case of necessity subject to formal 
communication of such a digression.  
                                                        
60 D.M. Leive, International Telecommunications and International Law: The Regulation of the Radio Spectrum 
(1970), at 24, cited in O.O. Ogunbanwo, International Law and Outer Space Activities (2013), at 185. 
61 See, F. Lyall, International Communications: The International Telecommunication Union and the Universal 
Postal Union (2011), at 13-14. 
62 J.H. Glazer, The Law-Making Treaties of the International Telecommunication Union Through Time and In 
Space, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 269 (1961-1962), at 314. 
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The ITU Final Acts, which are adopted as a result of the Plenipotentiary Conferences, are 
always accompanied by statements, declarations or reservations made by delegations on 
signature or sometimes when a State later transmits its notification of its ratification of the 
documents.63 A multitude of views, opinions, reservations, declarations and other statements 
allow the Council, when performing actions ordered by the Plenipotentiary Conference, to be 
properly informed of the possible digressions and give them due consideration. At the same time, 
the inclusion of declarations and reservations ensures proper communication thereof between 
ITU members. For example, the majority of reservations and declarations to the Final Acts of the 
2010 Plenipotentiary Conference reserved the right of the respective government to take any 
actions to safeguard its interests should any Member State not share in defraying the expenses of 
the Union or fail, in any way, to comply with the provisions of the ITU Constitution and 
Convention, or should any reservation of other Member States jeopardize its telecommunication 
services or lead to an increase in its financial contribution.64 
Unlike reservations, amendments to the constituent documents are permitted. In 
accordance with Article 55 of the Constitution, an amendment to the Constitution may be 
proposed by any member of the Union not later than eight months prior the opening date of the 
next scheduled Plenipotentiary Conference or at any time during the Conference. Adoption of an 
amendment requires a two-thirds majority vote of all members present, subject to the quorum of 
at least one-half of ITU members. The amendment enters into force “at a date fixed by the 
conference between Member States having deposited before that date their instrument of 
ratification, acceptance or approval of, or accession to, both this Constitution and the amending 
instrument.” Again, striving to maximize uniformity of obligations among ITU members, the 
Constitution requires that all amendments be adopted by the Plenipotentiary Conference as a 
whole in the form of one single amending instrument, and that “ratification, acceptance of 
approval of, or accession to, only a part of such an amending document be excluded.” Article 42 
of the Convention establishes a procedure for amendment of the Convention, which resembles 
that of the Constitution with an exception of the required majority for the amendment approval, 
which in this case is a simple majority of a half of delegations present. 
                                                        
63 Cf., F. Lyall, International Communications: The International Telecommunication Union and the Universal 
Postal Union (2011), at 136. 
64 International Telecommunication Union, Final Acts of the Plenipotentiary Conference (Guadalajara, 2010): 
Decisions, Resolutions (2010), at 21-79. 
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It is notable, however, that neither document provides for a procedure in case a member 
fails to ratify the amendment. Although no precedents have been registered as of yet, it leaves a 
possibility open that different groups of members would be bound by varying sets of obligations.  
While the laws of physics prompt States to comply with ITU documents in most times and would 
likely continue doing so, the laws of physics are virtually powerless in encouraging ratification 
and further compliance with, for example, amendments regarding the level of financial 
contributions to the Union, or the composition of the Council, or procedures of frequencies’ 
allocation, allotment and assignment. Therefore, it is important for the sake of the Union’s 
integrity to carefully negotiate and formulate amendments, ensuring that in case contentious 
issues are brought up, a widely acceptable solution is found.  
 
5.3 Evaluation and Conclusions 
 
5.3.1 Role of ITU in Space Cooperation 
Generally, following the six-criteria analysis no doubt is left that the ITU is a traditional 
international intergovernmental organization allowing only States as full members, enjoying an 
elaborate institutional structure supported by the General Secretariat, possessing international 
legal personality and empowered to adopt legally binding decisions, some of which allow for 
States’ reservations. Despite the many particularities in the ITU structure and its methods of 
work, institutionally the Union is still a conventional international intergovernmental 
organization that has been adapted to meet the needs of its specific mandate and evolving 
landscape of international telecommunications. 
As based on the ITU Constitution and Convention, “the ITU plays a fundamental role in 
ensuring that cross-border radio communications can operate as interference-free as possible – 
and this requires, in the context of satellite communication, also de facto coordination of orbits 
respectively orbital slots.”65 The Report of the COPUOS predecessor in 1959 postulated that 
availability of radio frequencies which “will not be interfered with by terrestrial radio 
transmissions is a matter of life and death to the progress of space activities.”66 But regulation of 
                                                        
65 F.G. von der Dunk, Maintaining the Master International Frequency Register, Int’l Regulations of Space Comm. 
(2013), at 3. 
66 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A 4141/25 (1959), at 42. 
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space-based telecommunications, and particularly allocation, allotment and assignment of orbital 
slots are just a part of the Union’s activities that were incorporated into then already-existing 
procedures once space telecommunications became a reality. The history of inclusion of space 
telecommunications into the ITU mandate will be now briefly explored, further looking at the 
possible roles the ITU might play in international space cooperation. As in other chapters, the 
analysis will be concluded by suggestions about strengths and weaknesses of the ITU mechanism 
of cooperation, and more particularly about the appropriateness of its institutional structure in 
addressing space matters today and for the years to come. 
“Against this bizarre setting of spectrum availability, the radio signals of Sputnik I 
announced not only the dawn of Space Age but the threshold of a future in the affairs of men 
where demands for, and requirements of, radiocommunication promise to exceed anything 
known in the past.”67 Almost immediately after the first artificial Earth satellite had been 
launched, space began to be used for the purposes of telecommunications. “The true age of space 
telecommunications, however, began with the 1963 launch, by the United States, of the first 
geostationary satellite, Syncom 2. The growth of the space communications field was swift. 
Within a few years, space telecommunications systems were rapidly established, including 
operational navigation and maritime communication systems.”68 
As soon as satellites came into picture, it was only a matter of logic, expertise and 
efficiency for the ITU to deal with satellite frequencies along the same lines as it dealt with radio 
spectrum frequency allocations. “Space telecommunications cannot be dealt with separately from 
telecommunications generally because of this crucial fact that all telecommunications are in 
competition for use of limited radiospectrum available.”69 The importance of 
telecommunications for space activities was reflected in one of the first United Nations General 
Assembly resolutions on the International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space of 
1961, which – in parallel to the central principles of the registration of space objects and the 
demilitarization of outer space – devoted an entire section to space communications and 
welcomed the calling of a special conference of the International Telecommunication Union to 
                                                        
67 J.H. Glazer, The Law-Making Treaties of the International Telecommunication Union Through Time and In 
Space, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 269 (1961-1962), at 284. 
68 N. Jasentuliyana, International Space Law and the United Nations (1999), at 281. 
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arrange for allocation of radio frequency bands for outer space activities.70 Since technologically 
and logically there is no difference between a transmitter in space and one on the ground, radio 
frequency allocation through the ITU radio conferences, and the registration of assignments to 
satellites and their ground links were fitted into existing ITU procedures.71  
In 1959, during the World Administrative Radio Conference, the first frequency bands 
were allocated to space communications and the ITU Radio Regulations were amended to 
include definitions of an ‘earth station’, a ‘space station’, a ‘space service’ and an ‘earth/space 
service’.72 Four years later the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference was already 
dedicated specifically to space, thereby “extending the ITU’s regulatory reach into outer space. 
This created a binding legal basis for an ITU outer space jurisdiction that preceded the entry into 
force of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty establishing the specific UN legal authorization to regulate 
aspects of outer space activities.”73 And within eight years another ITU conference specifically 
dedicated to space again took place.74 From then on, the ITU has firmly taken its place among 
the mechanisms of international space cooperation, albeit with its traditional technology-oriented 
perspective.  
Nowadays the Radiocommunication Sector of the ITU might not be as widely discussed, 
praised or critiqued as impressive and flamboyant space projects of various private entities, as 
the somewhat stagnating United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, as the 
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, whose destiny remains largely uncertain; but it is 
the one affecting each and every space project, even if in a non-direct way. “Though the ITU 
regime for coordinating the use of satellite frequencies and attendant slots or orbits has 
undeniably worked rather well so far, it is increasingly coming under pressure from various 
angles as a result of the involvement of increasing numbers of, in particular, private commercial 
operators and the ‘traditional’ character of the ITU regime as an intergovernmental construct 
sometimes coming close to a ‘gentleman’s arrangement’.”75  
                                                        
70 See, M. Hofmann, “ITU Instruments under the Perspective of General International Law,” in Proceedings of the 
International Institute of Space Law 2013 (2014), at 328. 
71 See, F. Lyall, “The Role of the International Telecommunication Union,” in G. Lafferranderie and D. Crowther 
(eds.), Outlook on Space Law over the Next 30 Years (1997), at 255. 
72 See, F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 250. 
73 L.E. Martinez, “The ITU’s Evolving Regulatory Role for Space Debris ‘Rules of the Road’: Implications for 
Space Communications Regulation,” in Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 2013 (2014), at 279. 
74 Cf., F. G. von der Dunk, A New ‘Star’ in the Firmament – Teaching Space and Telecoms Law as a Post-Graduate 
LL.M. Programme, Korean J. of Air & Space L. (June 2011), at 421-22. 
75 F. Tronchetti, “Legal Aspects of Satellite Remote Sensing,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law 
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Commercialization of outer space activities, undoubtedly, is the main challenge for the 
continuous effectiveness of the ITU procedures of allocation, allotment and assignment of radio 
frequencies and orbital slots. For example, it was noted that not so long ago that 6° of separation 
between satellites was considered crowded; today, in some of the most desired orbital slots, the 
separation has been reduced to 0.5° by the use of advanced technologies ensuring against signal 
interference.76 With the growing interest in space based technologies and a full-scale commercial 
exploitation of these technologies by private entities, the pressure on the ITU and its ability to 
manage access to orbital slots and radio frequencies, at the same time ensuring interference-free 
work of the equipment will only grow.  
The same processes simultaneously raise concerns of developing nations about 
availability of orbital slots in future, prompting them to challenge the ‘first come – first served’ 
principle of orbital slots and frequencies allocation used within the ITU system. By and large, 
this principle, being premised on the notion of equality, is justified from both practical and legal 
perspectives, but, surely, it is flawed in its inability to secure unrestricted access to all States – 
those already active in space and those that might become active in future.  
The 1992 reordering of the ITU institutional structure did not involve a major review of 
the Union’s financial arrangements. Since the 1989 Nice Plenipotentiary Conference, financial 
contributions of ITU members might range from a 40 unit class to a 1/16th unit class – a range in 
which the minimum is 1/640th of the largest. Each State voluntarily chooses the class of its 
contributions,77 which is different from a more traditional practice of international organizations 
to calculate States’ contributions based on their gross domestic product, not allowing States to 
pick-and-choose the level of their financial obligations. The ITU system of financial 
arrangements, nevertheless, leads to a similar result as the financial system generally used in 
other international organizations: although a particular State’s contribution might amount to a 
quarter of the organization’s budget, it still has one vote just as a State contributing less than one 
percent of the budget. In the end, both in the ITU and in the organizations with the gross-
domestic-product-based contributions’ calculation, a cluster of small contributors can wield a 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(2014), at 485. 
76 Letter dated 4 September 2009 from the permanent representative of Canada to the Conference on Disarmament 
addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the report of the Conference organized by 
UNIDIR entitled «Space Security 2009: moving towards a safer space environment» held from 15 to 16 June 2009 
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77 Art. 28 (3) of the ITU Constitution. 
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large voting power, without significant responsibility. “As a result, voting power is becoming 
grotesquely divorced from its financial implications.”78 
Although no feasible alternative to such financial arrangements has been proposed within 
the United Nations system,79 other international organizations, even universal ones, have adopted 
a weighted-voting system. “Arrangements such as those of INTELSAT and INMARSAT, where 
in their important organs contribution is linked to voting power, should be examined. Even a 
modified recourse to such strategies might be wise. Some countries are starting to consider 
whether the ITU is as necessary an organization as it used to be. … An ill-considered use of 
voting power by developing countries to give what the developed countries could consider an 
undue prominence to ‘development’ could damage, and, at worst, destroy a valuable and under-
sung organization, whose general utility has been obvious for one and a third centuries.”80 
Another issue marring the picture of the ITU overall success is the problem of ‘flags of 
convenience’ in outer space. The notorious Tongasat case, where the government of Tonga 
applied for sixteen orbital slots, which later should have been sold or leased for profit instead of 
using them directly for satellite telecommunication services, was a singular and rather peculiar 
precedent, which, nevertheless, revealed weaknesses of the imprecise ITU regulations and 
highlighted the actual possibility of the system’s misuse. In addressing these concerns, it has 
been proposed to create a world licensing and regulatory authority, presumably based on or 
working as a part of the ITU Radiocommunication Bureau, empowered to make decisions 
regarding the use of frequencies and orbits, taking into consideration the risk of transferring of 
‘flags of convenience’ to space, while taking full account of the interest of the world as a whole.  
“Were such a development to occur, an application for a license should be made jointly 
by the operator and the state which, under the Outer Space Treaty, will be responsible in law for 
the supervision of the activity. The regulator should be given the discretion to decline proposals, 
which are without substantive connection with the proposing state. It should also be able to reject 
proposals from states whose competence in space or radio matters is questionable. In licensing 
the regulator should deal with technical requirements and act in the best interests of the world as 
a whole, taking into due account the well-being of both the developed and the less developed 
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states. Proposed rulings should be published, and opportunity be given to interested parties, and 
to those with an interest in such matters (the two are not the same), to intervene. The efficient use 
of the radio spectrum and of orbital positions would thereby be facilitated.”81 
Counter-arguments to this proposal are numerous, including the unfitness of the Bureau 
mandate for the task, institutional incompetency of the Bureau to undertake the laborious process 
of applications review and assessment, prolonged terms of applications consideration should the 
system be put in place, and, of course the argument of sovereignty, labeled by the author of the 
proposal as the ‘dispositive’ one. Indeed, is the organ of an international organization properly 
placed to evaluate the level of competence of national agencies in space and radio matters? 
Probably the most persuasive argument against this proposal is the arbitrariness of the criteria 
against which the applications for allocations should be weighted, particularly the criterion of 
‘interests of the world as a whole’.  
At the same time, an unbalanced concentration of the ITU efforts on technical aspects of 
telecommunications neglecting or at lest significantly diminishing the importance of policy-
related reflections in the adopted regulations, might be detrimental to the effectiveness of the 
promoted standards, and generally harm reputation and continuing relevance of the Union. The 
continuing relevance of the Union requires that policy consideration take their important role in 
the process of the ITU decision-making; that, however, does not amount to transformation of the 
ITU from a technical-oriented organization into a political international entity with technical 
functions. 
 Similar sentiment as applied to regulation of space-related activities was echoed by a 
prominent scholar: with the ITU focus being very much in practical-technical and operational 
aspects, and its inability to preclude major non-technical/operational factors from frequently 
impacting the use of outer space for all mankind as mandated by Article I of the Outer Space 
Treaty in the context of satellite operations, its traditional leadership role in the sector is 
increasingly challenged through other legal regimes, both internationally and domestically.82 
Conceptually, therefore, the problem of ‘flags of convenience’ is much wider than it initially 
appeared to be when the Tongasat issue came up, revealing broader, overarching issues within 
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the ITU decision making practice. The exclusive ITU focus on technical issues, while ensuring 
the highest level of technical standards advanced by the ITU, fails to pay adequate attention to 
policy considerations, at first letting calculating minds behind the Tongasat case to trick itself, 
and now increasingly allowing “other legal regimes, both internationally and domestically,” to 
challenge the ITU leadership role. 
 
5.3.2 Future Role of ITU in Space Cooperation 
The four named issues: commercialization that puts increasing pressure on the system of 
frequencies and orbital slots allocation, concerns of developing nations regarding the ‘first come 
– first served’ principle, the inequality (and maybe ineffectiveness) caused by the existing 
structure of financial contributions, and certain weaknesses of the regulatory framework 
exemplified by the ‘flags of convenience’ problem, – are all interconnected and all have been 
amplified to become a matter of concern by the same set of prerequisites. Commercialization has 
led to a significantly increased demand on radio frequencies and orbital slots, requiring that the 
process of frequencies allocation becomes as efficient as possible. Simultaneously, the greater 
demand aggravated the chances that this limited resource could be used up by the time 
developing nations create space capabilities, alerting developing States of the need to advocate 
for practices ensuring that a part of the resources is preserved for future generations, thereby 
making the voting system imperfections a possible tool in asserting their rights without the 
necessary degree of respective responsibility. High demand, at the same time, made the 
frequencies and orbital slots a highly valuable resource that can be traded for profit, incentivizing 
the most calculating minds to look out for gaps in the legal regime; and when they were found, 
though later the provisions in question were amended to prevent similar situations in future, 
broader questions about the adequacy of technical regulations to the policy considerations have 
arisen. 
This brings up the question of whether the ITU has a satisfactory institutional structure to 
maintain its effectiveness in the changing field of space activities and preserve its leading role. It 
is suggested that a universal international organization is the most appropriate form of 
cooperation in attainment of the ITU goals as they are established in Article 1 of the ITU 
Convention for two reasons. The first one is rather straightforward and is common for most 
universal international organizations, namely, the aim at a worldwide regulatory scope of their 
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activities, which obviously requires universal or almost universal participation of States. The 
second one is specific to the ITU. As has been noted earlier on several occasions, the nature of 
the ITU mandate dictates the need for an all-encompassing international regulation that 
supersedes, and essentially makes redundant, national regulation of the same matters. 
International telecommunications are only possible when they are uniformly regulated and 
properly coordinated to prevent interference. Laws of physics again take the center stage here, 
predetermining the only possible level of cooperation.  
This, however, does not necessarily mean that an international organization is the only 
feasible form of cooperation. Hypothetically, in the absence of the ITU, a less formal mechanism 
of cooperation uniting a majority of States could have proved effective due to the 
abovementioned physical characteristics of radio signals. It has been noted earlier that even if the 
Table of Frequency Allocations and the Master International Frequency Register were not legally 
binding, it still was simple logic for States to adhere to the established allocations. Therefore, an 
informal mechanism of cooperation not empowered to adopt legally binding decisions might 
have had a chance to succeed in performing, at least partially, functions of the ITU.  
Fortunately, the international community has been lucky enough to have managed to 
create and maintain an international organization uniting world experts in international 
telecommunications, developing competent regulations and empowered to adopt a broad number 
of legally binding documents that States are generally willing to comply with. It is advocated that 
a skillful well-financed international organization with lawmaking authority is the better recourse 
for international regulation of telecommunications, which ultimately is an undeniable necessity. 
Although frequency allocations for space-based and terrestrial telecommunications are 
not fundamentally different from a technical point of view, they have somewhat varying policy 
implications. As it has been shown above, commercialization of satellite communications and 
corresponding increasing demand on orbital slots pose new challenges to the ITU regulatory 
regime as applied to space matters. These issues would have to be addressed to preserve the 
Union’s effectiveness; at the same time, currently they have not precluded the ITU from proper 
performance of its functions, rather providing a basis for stimulating academic discussions. 
Moreover, keeping in mind that allocation of frequencies for space-based telecommunications is 
just a fraction of the ITU activities, and that the ITU has been tremendously successful in 
regulation of all means of wired and wireless international communications for over a century 
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now, the conclusion is offered that the Union possesses an effective institutional structure to 
perform its broad functions, and has been victorious in achieving its main goal – harmonization 
of the member-States’ activities and promotion of “fruitful and constructive cooperation and 
partnership between Member States and Sector Members’ in the improvement and rational use of 
telecommunications of all kinds.”83  
“Also from the perspective of space law, the ITU regime stands out as being of totally 
different origin and role than the UN outer space treaties. Developed long before the space 
treaties and long before man entered into outer space, and without any overriding focus on space 
activities, it soon turned out to be – and to this day remains – crucial for all space activities.”84 
Hence, despite the strive of space lawyers to portray their area of specialization as absolutely 
unique and unparalleled in its singularity and complexity by any other area of law, in this 
instance the supremacy of the ITU regime must be acknowledged: while the Union could have 
existed without space, space activities would not have a chance the other way around.  
At the same time, a progressing reliance on space-based telecommunications might result 
in a profound change in the ITU activities in the next decades, making space matters a primary 
concern of the Union, thereby demanding that appropriate institutional changes are made. “The 
ITU could be developed to play a world role, acting as a global F[ederal] C[ommunications] 
C[omission] for space matters. It has much of the infrastructure. Already it is the body through 
which frequencies are allocated for space and other uses. Terrestrial systems could continue to be 
dealt with nationally, but space systems, and terrestrial systems such as micro-wave and 
television, which can have impact on space, could and should be dealt with on a global basis.”85 
As ambitious as it sounds, the fact that the ITU has been ‘requested’ to serve as the 
Supervisory Authority for the UNIDROIT Space Assets Protocol, in view of its long-standing 
experience with registration of satellite orbits and frequencies, is suggestive of a growing 
appreciation of the Union as a prominent player in outer space regulation, and ultimately as an 
effective foothold for technically-oriented space cooperation.86 The ITU, and more specifically 
the Radiocommunication Sector Bureau, has been praised as a suitable candidate to act as a 
                                                        
83 Art. 1(1) of the ITU Constitution. 
84 F. Tronchetti, “Legal Aspects of Satellite Remote Sensing,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law 
(2014), at 492-93. 
85 F. Lyall, “The Role of the International Telecommunication Union,” in G. Lafferranderie and D. Crowther (eds.), 
Outlook on Space Law over the Next 30 Years (1997), at 264. 
86 Cf., F. Tronchetti, “Legal Aspects of Satellite Remote Sensing,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space 
Law (2014), at 493. 
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registry for security over space assets, which would be required under the Protocol. “At present 
the Bureau possesses data in the Master International Frequency Register on satellites and their 
orbits. It would not be an immense step also to record security interests in satellites, in 
appropriate instances even before a satellite is launched. Alternatively, if the operation of 
registry is consigned to a commercial entity, as has been done under the Aviation Protocol, the 
ITU should certainly be the body to act as its supervisor.”87 
Overall, the ITU is a remarkably effective international organization that has proved its 
leadership more than once. Although the Union and its institutional structure are not flawless, as 
it has been shown above, it is notable for its ability to develop and adapt. Being founded as a 
relatively small organization tasked with overseeing just one method of communication, over a 
hundred and fifty years of its existence it has undergone at least five major reorganizations, 
expanding its mandate when new means of communication were created, and restructuring when 
old structures ceased to be adequate. Timely inclusion of non-State actors in the decision-making 
process; structuring and scheduling of activities within the Sectors, working groups, assemblies, 
world and regional conferences; swift adaptation of the legal regime to new challenges: all these 
are exemplary of the Union’s ability to keep up with the changing environment it regulates and 
exists in.  
The ITU institutional system “encompasses both the legal reality of sovereign states and 
the practical reality of operations, which in most cases are now undertaken by private operators 
interested in technical/operational transparency and consistency of regulation above everything 
else – and tries to reconcile the two.”88 While unsolved issues remain, and probably it would take 
several years for them to be properly addressed – after all, the ITU is a large universal 
international intergovernmental organization, which, no matter how adaptive and flexible it is, is 
still a big bureaucratic machine – the case of space matters, which almost burst into the well-
settled ITU processes in the late 1950s, contributed to the growing need for changes in the 1980s, 
and now again are pushing toward rearrangements necessitated by commercialization of 
international telecommunications, showed with all clarity that the ITU mechanism is a reliable 
tool of international cooperation. 
                                                        
87 F. Lyall, International Communications: The International Telecommunication Union and the Universal Postal 
Union (2011), at 21-22. 
88 F.G. von der Dunk, Maintaining the Master International Frequency Register, Int’l Regulations of Space Comm. 
(2013), at 13.  
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“There can be no doubt that the ITU will continue. If it did not exist something very like 
it would have to be invented. World-wide standardization of the technical and administrative 
sides of electrical communication systems has had immense benefits.”89 And, of course, the laws 
of physics will persist to be the ultimate trigger for uniform regulation of international 
telecommunications. 
                                                        
89 F. Lyall, International Communications: The International Telecommunication Union and the Universal Postal 
Union (2011), at 193.  
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At the invitation of US President Franklin Roosevelt fifty-two States convened in 
Chicago from November 1 to December 7, 1944 for an International Civil Aviation Conference. 
In the invitation the President said: “I do not believe that the world today can afford to wait 
several years for its air communications. There is no reason why it should. As we begin to write 
a new chapter in the fundamental law of the air, let us all remember that we are engaged in a 
great attempt to build enduring institutions of peace. These peace settlements cannot be 
endangered by petty considerations, or weakened by groundless fears. Rather, with full 
recognition of the sovereignty and juridical equality of all nations, let us work together so that 
the air may be used by humanity, to serve humanity.”1 Currently ongoing extensive discussion of 
the need and perspectives of space traffic regulation makes this invitation all the more 
contemporary, albeit with a modification of the subject under discussion. 
In this chapter the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and its role in outer 
space activities regulation will be reviewed. The Organization was created to regulate and 
coordinate activities pertaining to international civil aviation, and therefore space transportation 
regulation does not easily fall within its functions.2 Inclusion of this area into the ICAO powers, 
hence, should be rigorously thought through. To that end the structure and internal procedures of 
ICAO will be reviewed, paying special attention to the methods and procedures employed in 
establishing international standards of civil aviation safety. Further, the scope of prospective 
space traffic management regime will be reviewed to evaluate whether ICAO is indeed the best 
choice to undertake space transportation regulation. Additionally, within the framework of the 
‘purpose-result’ analysis it will be decided whether the original ICAO purposes and goals 
correspond with the goal of the space traffic management regime.  
                                                        
1 R. Abeyratne, International Civil Aviation Day: Towards Global Peace and Development, Daily News, 8 
December 2011, available at http://archives.dailynews.lk/2011/12/08/fea01.asp. 
2 Preamble of the Convention on Civil Aviation states: “Therefore, the undersigned governments having agreed on 
certain principles and arrangements in order that international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly 
manner and that international air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and 
operated soundly and economically.” 
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The International Civil Aviation Organization came into being on April 4, 1947 upon 
entry into force of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, commonly known as the 
Chicago Convention after the city where it was negotiated and drafted in 1944.3 During the 
deliberations four approaches to the new organization were presented: Australia advocated the 
internationalization of all civil aviation, the United Kingdom proposed an organization with 
extensive economic and technical authority, the United States supported freedom of air and pro-
competitive environment, and Canada recommended an organization with broad economic 
authority regulating international air services.4 As a result, ICAO, an international organization 
with technical standard setting responsibilities and general supervisory functions, was 
established. Such an outcome does not strike as a true compromise since three out of four 
proposals supported a broader mandate of the future organization, mainly in the economic area. 
All economic issues, except for fares, rates and tariffs, which are to be regulated multilaterally by 
industry conferences subject to government approval, are to be decided on a bilateral level. 
Basically, the outcome can be summarized as follows: air must remain a free and competitive 
environment, but technical guidance is necessary to facilitate growth of the market of air 
transportation by way of ensuring safety and stability.  
The Convention’s preamble enunciates that development of international civil aviation 
can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and understanding among nations, that 
cooperation between nations and peoples is desirable, and that the pronounced principles will 
facilitate establishment of safe and orderly international air transport services on the basis of 
equality of opportunity, and sound and economical operation. Article 44 of the Chicago 
Convention sets forth the objectives of the Organization that include development of principles 
and techniques of international air navigation and fostering of the planning and development of 
international air transport in order to ensure safety and orderly growth of international civil 
aviation, encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation for peaceful purposes, encourage the 
development of airways, airports, and air navigational facilities, and generally to promote the 
development of all aspects of international civil aeronautics.5 
                                                        
3 Convention on Civil Aviation, signed December 7, 1944; entered into force April 4, 1947, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. 
4 Cf., L. Weber, International Civil Aviation Organization: An Introduction (2007), at 1-2. 
5 Other objectives include: to meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and economical 
air transport; to prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable competition; to insure that the rights of contracting 
States are fully respected and that every contracting State has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines; to 
avoid discrimination between contracting States; to promote safety of flight in international air navigation. 
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The wording of Article 44 underlines the predominantly technical orientation of the 
Organization’s activities, however, leaving room for effective policy-oriented regulation as well. 
While the “development of principles and techniques” is unquestionably a technical task, for 
example, the “fostering of the planning and development of international air transport in order to 
encourage the development of airways, airports, and air navigational facilities” coupled with 
provisions of Chapter XV outlining rights of the ICAO Council to facilitate and effectively take 
part in construction and development of airports, leaves an opportunity for actions on behalf of 
ICAO in the areas of economy and development.  
This inference is further supported by the characterization of the Organization’s mandate 
in historical perspective as the one focused primarily on the rebuilding of international civil 
aviation after the devastating results of the Second World War, which effectively halted 
international civil aviation.6 Promotion of safety and security were undoubtedly the central 
element in rebuilding international relations in the area, in restoration of mutual trust and 
understanding. Technical measures without more, however, were hardly capable of achieving 
these goals. The crucial element here is the authoritativeness of the established standards of 
safety and security, and ultimately the authoritativeness of the Organization itself. The latter has 
been achieved by the highest level of the Organization’s technical specialists, by constant 
monitoring of technology requirements, and by continuous dialogue between the Organization 
and member-States. In justification of this statement, the ICAO structure and employed methods 
of work will now be explored. 
The Organization has three primary permanent organs: the Assembly, the Council and the 
Secretariat. The Assembly is a collective organ, where each member-State has one representative 
and one vote. It meets triennially to elect its President and other officers, to elect members of the 
Council, to vote on the budgets and to review expenditures. It also considers proposals for the 
Convention amendment, has the right to delegate necessary powers and authority to the Council 
for the expedient discharge of the duties of the Organization, and is entitled to deal with any 
other issues that have not been specifically assigned to the Council. As per the Convention’s 
provisions, all decisions require a majority vote in favor, however, in practice a formal vote is a 
rarity and most decisions are made by consensus.7 
                                                        
6 See, A.D. Groenewege, Compendium of International Civil Aviation (1999), at 18. 
7 Id. at 19.  
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The Council has administrative, quasi-legislative and judicial functions. Within its 
administrative competence it manages finances of the Organization, appoints the Secretary 
General and other Secretariat personnel, collects and disseminates information on air navigation 
and air transport services, and submits annual reports to the Assembly.8 The quasi-legislative 
functions include development and adoption of international standards and recommended 
practices, and for convenience, their designation as Annexes to the Convention. 
To facilitate and expedite discharge of the Council’s functions, in accordance with 
Article 54, the Council established an Air Transport Committee and a number of other 
committees, including the Finance Committee, the Technical Support Committee and the Legal 
Committee. The latter was established by the Assembly in 1947 and is tasked with advising the 
Assembly and the Council on legal matters. The Committee is comprised of representatives of all 
member-States and adopts decisions by a majority vote. The primary responsibility of the 
Committee is preparation of drafts of international conventions or protocols. Although the 
Convention does not mention any competences of the Organization over development and 
adoption of treaties, organs of the Organizations, and primarily the Legal Committee are 
responsible for drafting of international law documents, while from a legal point of view the 
drafts are being adopted by the Diplomatic Conferences convened under ICAO auspices.9 This is 
another quasi-legislative function performed by the Council, albeit one established by long-
standing practice and not the provisions of the Convention.10 
Finally, the Council is also charged with judicial functions. It adjudicates disputes 
between contracting States relating to the interpretation or application of the Convention and the 
Annexes. “In practice and in accordance with the ICAO Rules for the Settlement of Differences, 
the Council has, to the extent possible, acted as a mediator between the parties which have 
                                                        
8 Articles 54 and 55 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
9 Id. at 37. 
10 Using this procedure the following conventions were drafted and adopted: Convention on the International 
Recognition of Rights in Aircraft, signed on 19 June 1948; Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to 
Third Parties on the Surface, signed on 7 October 1952; Convention, Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention, for 
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person Other than the 
Contracting Carrier, signed on 18 September 1961; Convention on Offences and Certain Other Actions Committed 
on Board Aircraft, signed on 14 September 1963; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 
signed on 16 December 1970; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, signed on 23 September 1971; Convention on the Making of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection, signed on 1 March 1991; Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by 
Air, signed on 28 May 1999; Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, signed on 16 November 
2001.  
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brought complaints before the Council.”11 While the goal is to achieve a settlement, the Council 
has not hesitated to take clear procedural decisions in adversarial situations.12 But it has been 
suggested that the Council seems much better suited to mediation than to its adjudicative 
function. This is so because mediation is assigned to a five-member committee instead of the 
hearing in front of the whole Council, and mediation is normally required in disputes between 
sovereign States. The typical dispute requiring adjudication, by contrast, according to the 
representative of Canada at the Chicago Conference, “would involve complaint by Country A of 
a violation by an airline of country B,”13 and disputes of such sorts are better dealt with on a 
bilateral and technical level. Overall, there is no unanimity with regard to the dispute settlement 
mechanism evaluation; at least one distinguished scholar opined that the Council was ill-
equipped for this role.14  
The third permanent organ is the Secretariat headed by the Secretary General, which will 
be discussed in detail below.  
Article 59 entitled “International Character of Personnel” states that the President of the 
Council, the Secretary General and other personnel “shall not seek or receive instructions in 
regard to discharge of their responsibilities from any authority external to the Organization.” It 
further urges contracting States to respect international character of personnel and not to attempt 
to influence them in discharge of their official responsibilities. Article 60 requires that the 
Organization’s officials be accorded immunities and privileges “which are accorded to other 
public international organizations.” Due to the ICAO status of the United Nations Specialized 
Agency, the ICAO personnel enjoy privileges and immunities in accordance with the 1947 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies.15 
 
6.2 Six-Criteria Analysis 
 
                                                        
11 L. Weber, International Civil Aviation Organization: An Introduction (2007), at 24. 
12 E.g., The Decision of the Council to reject the Preliminary Objections of the 15 Member States of the EU in: 
United States v. 15 States of the European Union (2000), C-DEC 161/6. 
13 Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago, Illinois, November 1 – December 7, 1944, at 
480. Available at the ICAO official website http://www.icao.int/ChicagoConference/Pages/proceed.aspx. 
14 See, D. Goedhuis, Questions of Public International Air Law, 81 Recuel de Cours 205 (1952), at 222-24. 
15 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, signed November 21, 1947; entered 
into force December 2, 1948, 33 U.N.T.S. 261. See also, A. Reinisch, Convention on the Privileges and Immunities 
of the United Nations; Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, United Nations 
Audiovisual Library of International Law (2009), www.un.org/law/avl. 
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6.2.1 Membership/Participation 
ICAO is a States-only organization. Although the Chicago Convention does not explicitly 
limit membership solely to sovereign States, Articles 91 through 93 bis establishing procedures 
of adherence and admission to the Convention are based on the premise that only sovereign 
States are eligible for membership. Article 92 states: “This Convention shall be open for 
adherence by members of the United Nations and States associated with them, and States which 
remained neutral during the present world conflict.” Also provisions of Articles 93 and 93 bis 
condition membership in ICAO to the membership in the United Nations. Since only sovereign 
States are eligible for United Nations membership,16 the same conclusion is true for ICAO.  
Further, the State-only ICAO membership precludes international organizations from 
becoming members. In 2003 the European Community, being the regional integration 
organization that had been conferred upon by its members part of their sovereign functions and 
powers in civil aviation, requested admission to ICAO with the right to vote. “In the view of 
Articles 91 to 93 bis and the structure of the Convention, this is not possible de lege lata.”17 The 
only possibility was to amend the Convention so as to allow membership of international 
intergovernmental organizations, or, narrower, of regional economic integration organizations. 
Due to the stringent procedure for the Convention amendment set forth in Article 94, “it has been 
regarded as preferable on the part of the European Community not to seek membership in ICAO, 
for the time being, but to participate in ICAO’s work through a resident observer.”18 
 
6.2.2 Secretariat 
The Secretariat is one of the three main organs of ICAO. Organizationally, the Secretariat 
is divided into the Air Navigation Bureau, the Air Transport Bureau, the Legal Affairs and 
External Relations Bureau, the Bureau of Administration and Services, and the Technical 
Cooperation Bureau. The Secretariat is located in the ICAO headquarters, the location of which 
in accordance with Article 45 of the Convention was to be determined at the final meeting of the 
Interim Assembly of the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization set up by Interim 
                                                        
16 Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations states: “Membership in the United Nations is open to all other 
peace-loving states which accept obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the 
Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.” [emphasis added] 
17 L. Weber, International Civil Aviation Organization: An Introduction (2007), at 17. 
18 Id.  
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Agreement on International Civil Aviation signed at Chicago on December 7, 1944. The 
headquarters of the Organization and thus the ICAO Secretariat are located in Montreal, Canada.  
In 1945, taking into consideration that “the operational and technical problems inherent 
in different parts of the world varied considerably, it was logical that the planning and 
implementation of the required ground services should be carried out on an area or regional basis 
- the geographical limits of which should be such as to encompass air route stages having a 
certain degree of homogeneity, and therefore entailing a somewhat uniform set of 
requirements,”19 ten original regional offices of the Secretariat were established. The current 
regional structure was established in 1980 and today it includes nine regions, which have been 
delimited based mostly on the coverage of the international air route network. To provide the 
most adequate coverage and communication with regional offices, the Secretariat regional 
offices have been established in Bangkok, Cairo, Dakar, Lima, Mexico, Nairobi and Paris. An 
estimated 700 employees work at the ICAO Secretariat, whereas approximately 575 are located 
in the headquarters, and the rest are positioned in the Secretariat regional offices.20 
Overall, secretarial functions within the ICAO structure are performed by the Secretariat, 
which meets all the characteristics of an international organization’s secretariat. It is a separate 
organ within the Organization’s structure with an elaborate structure of its own, created to 
facilitate performance of its comprehensive functions. It works on a permanent basis and is 
financed from the general ICAO budget.21 As stipulated in Article 59 of the Convention, the 
Secretariat shall discharge its responsibilities guided solely by internal interests of the 
Organization, thus possessing an international character of work.  
 
6.2.3 International Legal Personality  
ICAO possesses both national and international legal personality. Article 47 is the basis 
for the former: “The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each contracting State such legal 
capacity as may be necessary for the performance of its functions.” This wording, as per 
                                                        
19 International Civil Aviation Organization Secretariat, Regional Offices, http://www.icao.int/secretariat/Pages/ro-
historical-background.aspx. 
20 See, L. Weber, International Civil Aviation Organization: An Introduction (2007), at 32. 
21 E.g., in 2013 expenditures for Management and Administration were 16.145.000 CAD, 
http://www.icao.int/annual-report-2013/Pages/financial-results-financial-higlights-2013.aspx. 
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International Court of Justice precedent, might also be regarded as a basis for establishment of 
international legal personality.22 
International legal personality of the Organization might also be identified using the four-
criteria analysis proposed in Chapter 1. It is undisputed that ICAO is an association of States 
with lawful objectives that has three independent organs, which are not subject to the authority of 
any other organized communities, as provided by Article 60. Legal powers of the Organization 
lie primarily in the field of development and adoption of technical international standards and 
recommended practices to ensure safety, security, development and lately also sustainability of 
international civil air transport. While the end results of the Organization’s activities – safety, 
security, development and sustainability of international civil aviation – can be qualified as goals 
of each ICAO member-State, neither member-State taken separately is capable of achieving 
these goals acting unilaterally. National aviation standards will always remain a matter of 
internal law, which, of course, might be duly noted and considered by international community 
should they prove to be effective, but are highly unlikely to be uniformly followed on the 
universal level. Thereby, the conclusion is drawn that the legal powers of the Organization and 
its members are distinct and distinguishable, putting ICAO in compliance with all four criteria 
necessary for identification of international legal personality. 
It has also been established in Chapter 1 that certain rights, including the right to 
conclude international agreements are indicative of an existing legal personality of an 
international organization. Article 65 of the Chicago Convention provides for the right of the 
Council on behalf of the Organization to enter into agreements with other international bodies 
“for the maintenance of common services and for common arrangements concerning personnel 
and, with the approval of the Assembly, may enter into such other arrangements as may facilitate 
the work of the Organization.” While there was little doubt regarding ICAO’s status as the 
subject of international law, the above considerations establish in a conclusive way its existing 
international legal personality. 
 
6.2.4 Term of Existence 
A thorough examination of the need to provide for international regulation of commercial 
aviation commenced almost simultaneously in the United States and the United Kingdom in 
                                                        
22 Supra, at para. 1.3.2.3. 
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1942. As the war situation improved, negotiations between the two countries revealed that a 
solution of problems of international civil aviation was not only highly desirable, but also 
achievable. In 1944, in Chicago an agreement on some basic principles was achieved. “And on 
one issue almost everyone agreed: there was a fundamental need for a permanent international 
organization to oversee the healthy development of international air travel.”23 
Proposals with respect to the need to create an international aviation organization had 
been voiced since the moment the Wright brothers succeeded in the first powered flight, and by 
1944 an organization like ICAO “just made sense.”24 By that time, except for opponents in the 
commercial sector, it was widely understood that only a permanently functioning international 
organization could achieve the necessary level of regulatory stability in the civil aviation sector. 
Nowadays, the necessity of a permanently working ICAO, with its elaborate structure and highly 
qualified personnel, has only become clearer. Civil aviation, despite its century-old history, 
continues to evolve and develop. It was estimated that in 2014 for the first time we saw more that 
100,000 flights per day.25 
With these statistics in mind, taking into consideration the breadth of ICAO activities, 
which include safety, air navigation capacity and efficiency, security, economic development of 
air transport and environmental protection as main strategic objectives, and recalling the seventy-
year history of the Organization, the conclusion is drawn that ICAO has been created for an 
indefinite period.  
 
6.2.5 Binding Force of Documents Produced 
Two organs within the ICAO structure are authorized to adopt documents, which have a 
varying level of binding force. The first decision-making organ is the Assembly. Strictly 
speaking, Assembly decisions, which are made in the form of a resolution, are legally non-
binding. In the absence of a clear statement to the contrary in the constituent documents, it is 
presumed that decisions of plenary organs of international organizations fall within the ‘soft law’ 
category.26 It has been noted, however, that ICAO Assembly resolutions “are more than 
                                                        
23 D. MacKenzie, ICAO: A History of the International Civil Aviation Organizations (2010), at 13. 
24 Id. at 24. 
25 Air Transport Action Group, Aviation Benefits Beyond Borders, April 2014, available at 
http://aviationbenefits.org/media/26786/ATAG__AviationBenefits2014_FULL_LowRes.pdf. 
26 Cf., H.J. Hahn, “International Organizations, Resolutions,” in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 2 
(1997), at 1333-43. 
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hortatory. They are designed to set global norms in a field where there is widespread 
acknowledgment of the need for ordered conduct. They are adopted by a plenary body, with the 
shared expectation that States will follow them to the extent that they are able to. They clearly 
are not binding, but they have a sufficient channeling effect to place them well above the low 
point on a continuum of normative instruments ranging form non law to true law.”27 The practice 
also evidences that regardless of uncertainty with regard to the resolutions’ legal force, “the 
persuasive nature of the material used in such resolutions, the high degree of expertise on which 
it is usually based, and the general acceptance at the time of adoption usually have the effect of 
ensuring their implementation.”28 Hence, it is more or less settled that the Assembly’s 
recommendations are not legally binding strictu sensu, but are very authoritative and should not 
be regarded as pure recommendations not bearing any legal significance. 
As noted above, the Council also has a decision-making power, which should be 
characterized as a ‘quasi-legislative’ authority. Some authors suggest that these functions are 
purely legislative;29 but, legally speaking, there is no evidence to support this broad conclusion. 
The Council is empowered to adopt two types of documents: international standards and 
recommended practices. Article 37 expressly states that member-States undertake to “collaborate 
in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity” in regard to the adopted international 
standards and recommended practices. Such phrasing indicates that these documents are to be 
complied with only to the ‘extent possible’ and not at all times.  
The recommended practices by virtue of their designation, and also due to the 
Convention’s silence about the procedure for States’ notification of deviations from these, are 
considered merely suggestions. In practice, the recommended practices and the international 
standards have been clearly distinguished: while the main body of Annexes typically consists of 
the international standards, any paragraphs of the text which have the status of a recommended 
practice will be visibly set out.30 Determination of the legal force of the international standards is 
more complicated. 
                                                        
27 F.L. Kirgis, “Aviation,” in O. Schachter and C.C. Joyner (eds.), United Nations Legal Order, Vol. 1 (1995), at 
840. 
28 L. Weber, International Civil Aviation Organization: An Introduction (2007), at 20. 
29 E.g., L. Weber, International Civil Aviation Organization: An Introduction (2007), at 22; R. Jakhu, T. Sgobba, P. 
Dempsey (eds.), The Need for an Integrated Regulatory Regime for Aviation and Space: ICAO for Space? (2011), at 
40-41. 
30 Cf., L. Weber, International Civil Aviation Organization: An Introduction (2007), at 35. 
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On the one hand, travaux préparatoires contain a statement that “the Annexes are given 
no compulsory force,” and Article 54 of the Chicago Convention states that standards and 
recommended practices are designated as Annexes for convenience. On the other, it has been 
pointed out that such a debate is purely academic, and regardless of their binding nature in the 
treaty law sense, provisions in the Annexes are highly authoritative in practice and are generally 
followed for the sake of safety and security.31 At the same time, Article 12 in the relevant part 
pronounces: “Over the high seas, the rules in force shall be those established under this 
Convention.” Since rules applicable over the high seas are contained in Annex 2 to the 
Convention, thereby becoming a part of the Convention, and are promulgated in the form of an 
international standard, not a recommended practice, these rules are deemed mandatory, and 
“ICAO does not recognize any right to opt out of these standards.”32  
Therefore, there is only one instance where compliance with documents adopted by the 
Council is indeed mandatory, namely with respect to rules applicable in airspace over high 
seas.33 It is then only logical to characterize functions of the Council as quasi-legislative: it is 
empowered to adopt binding documents pertaining to one area, and most other documents are 
being complied with on a voluntary basis despite their ‘soft law’ status. 
Pursuant to Article 37 each contracting State is required to collaborate in securing the 
highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations and practices. Since extensive 
collaboration and compliance with the established standards have not always been the case, thus 
posing threats to safety of civil aviation, in 1998 the Assembly established the Universal Safety 
Oversight Audit Program effective January 1, 1999. The program, among others, sanctions 
regular, mandatory, systematic and harmonized safety audits carried out by ICAO. While 
establishment of this Program does not entitle the Organization to enforce compliance with the 
adopted standards and recommended practices, it incentivizes States to comply with relevant 
documents to the greatest extent possible and underlines the importance attached to uniform 
compliance with the ICAO documents.  
                                                        
31 Cf., R. Abeyratne, Regulation of Commercial Space Transport: The Astrocizing of ICAO (2015), at 146-47. 
32 F.L. Kirgis, “Aviation,” in O. Schachter and C.C. Joyner (eds.), United Nations Legal Order, Vol. 1 (1995), at 
833. 
33 “Even the SARPs do not represent ‘hard law’ in view of the condition stipulated in the Convention. They do not 
possess a legal force equal to that of the Convention and they are not subject to the international law of treaties.” M. 
Milde, International Air Law and ICAO (2008), at 164. 
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By and large, despite the limited scope of documents that are legally binding in the strict 
sense of the term, the ICAO documents possess significant political value due to the high quality 
of the promoted regulations and thanks to the measures taken by the Organization itself to ensure 
wide support and compliance. 
 
6.2.6 Existence of Opportunity to Modify Obligations 
Due to varying legal force of the documents adopted within the ICAO framework, 
different standards for modification of obligations imposed by these documents exist. Article 38 
establishes the right for the State to opt out of an international standard, even the one already in 
force, in case it deems compliance with the standard impractical and duly notifies the 
Organization. In one instance, however, as noted above, opting out is prohibited: Article 12 
pronounces standards pertaining to aviation over the high seas mandatory and prohibits any 
departures. The recommended practices, along with documents adopted by the Assembly, are 
legally non-binding and no formal procedure for modification of their provisions is established. 
It is understood, though, that derogation from their provisions is permissible at any time. 
The Chicago Convention, creating the legal basis for cooperation and establishing general 
obligations of State-members, set forth a noteworthy procedure of Convention amendment. 
Article 94 stipulates that any amendment “must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the 
Assembly and shall then come into force in respect of States which have ratified such 
amendment when ratified by the number of contracting States specified by the Assembly. The 
number so specified shall not be less than two-thirds of the total number of contracting States.” 
Recalling that ICAO has 191 members as of January 1, 2015, any amendment can come into 
force only after its ratification by 128 States, which quite likely would take years.  
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states: “A party may not 
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” 
Thereby, internal procedures are irrelevant on the international plane, and the fact that a State 
cannot properly ratify an international treaty that it has consented to be bound by has no effect on 
this State’s international obligations. But the Chicago Convention has made entry into force of 
an international obligation dependent on compliance with national ratification procedures. And 
that, undoubtedly, made amending the Convention more difficult. But the authors pointed out 
that the subsequent record of amendments to the Convention showed that, broadly speaking, its 
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provisions were well suited for their purpose, and only two amendments to substantive 
provisions of the Conventions were made over its seventy-year history.  
The first substantive amendment inserting a provision on lease, charter and interchange 
of aircraft in Article 83 bis was proposed in 1980 and entered into force seventeen years later. 
The second amendment, which inserted a provision prohibiting the use of force against civil 
aircraft in flight except in cases of self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter, was proposed in 1984 and entered into force fourteen years later. 
Another consideration should be added in this regard. Paragraph (b) of Article 94 states: 
“If in its opinion the amendment is of such a nature as to justify this course, the Assembly in its 
resolution recommending adoption may provide that any State which has not ratified within a 
specified period after the amendment has come into force shall thereupon cease to be a member 
of the Organization and a party to the Convention.” In effect this procedure forces a difficult 
choice on the member unwilling to accept an amendment, for the only alternative available is to 
leave the organization. This is a notable provision that nowadays effectively forces a State, 
should the procedure enunciated in paragraph (b) be utilized, to ratify the amendment 
notwithstanding the reasons that might have precluded a State from doing so. This outcome is the 
result of the universal nature of ICAO, which currently supervises and regulates all international 
civil air transport; and possible exclusion from ICAO serves as a strong deterrent for opposition. 
Such a procedure, moreover, ensures that an anomalous situation detrimental to the safety of 
international civil aviation, where members have different obligations, is avoided.34 
Overall, the stringent amendment procedure contributed to the Convention’s stability. It 
forces States to introduce amendments only when they are absolutely necessary and when a 
broad support in favor of the amendment is viable. Article 94 disciplines, but probably it also 
limits: the over-complexity of the procedure might as well compel States to abstain from 
introducing an amendment even if it might have enhanced quality of the Convention’s 
provisions. 
 
6.3 Evaluation and Conclusions 
 
                                                        
34 Cf., M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 970-71. 
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6.3.1 ICAO and Space Traffic Management 
It is not the goal of this chapter to scrutinize and evaluate effectiveness of the ICAO 
mechanism of cooperation for international regulation of international civil aviation, though it is 
doubtful that much criticism as to its success can be reasonably offered. The ensuing analysis 
will focus on the examination of the ICAO mechanism appropriateness for achievement of the 
goal that the academic writings have been suggesting handing over to the Organization, namely 
the regulation of space traffic, including the suborbital flights.35  
It should be noted that currently functions in the realm of space traffic regulation are 
performed both on national level – by way of relevant States’ efforts to ensure that planned 
launches and reentries of spacecraft do not interfere with scheduled flights of aircraft and with 
launches and reentries of spacecraft planned by other States – and international level, primarily 
in the regulatory sphere, for example, by the International Telecommunication Union in its 
activities to ensure interference-free use of radio frequencies. These activities, while achieving 
the goal of orderly and interference-free operation, are performed on an ad hoc basis and will 
continue to be effective, and also feasible, as long as space launches continue to be infrequent. A 
centralized and uniform system of space traffic regulation will become a necessity when space 
launches, including sub-orbital flights, become more regular. 
It should be recalled that in the period immediately preceding and following the launch of 
Sputnik I ICAO was often though of as the body most naturally qualified to undertake regulation 
of activities in space. Two factors, however, rapidly emerged asserting ICAO’s limitations and 
ultimately inability to comprehensively regulate outer space activities. First, activities in space 
involve a complex of political, military, economic, technical and legal considerations far 
exceeding the competence of either ICAO or any other specialized international organization, 
thus, pointing toward the United Nations with its general mandate as a more viable alternative. 
Second, at that time the Soviet Union was not a member of ICAO. “These factors, rather than 
                                                        
35 See, R. Abeyratne, Regulation of Commercial Space Transport: The Astrocizing of ICAO (2015); F. Lyall and 
P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009); Panel Discussion on Session 4: “Common Issues in Air and Space Law: 
Envisaging Future Air Space Applications – The Examples of Registration and Liability,” in S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-
Tedd, K.-U. Schrogl (eds.), ‘Project 2001 Plus’ – Global and European Challenges for Air and Space Law at the 
Edge of the 21st Century (2006); C. Contant, P. Lala, K.-U. Schrogl, “”Space Traffic Management” and Future 
Space Regulations,” in M. Benkö (ed.), Essential Air and Space Law (2005); R. Jakhu, T. Sgobba, P. Dempsey 
(eds.), The Need for an Integrated Regulatory Regime for Aviation and Space: ICAO for Space? (2011); M.J. 
Rycroft, The Space Transportation Market: Evolution or Revolution? (2000); G. Lafferranderie, “Basic Principles 
Governing the Use of Outer Space in Future Perspective,” in M. Benkö (ed.), Essential Air and Space Law (2005); 
R. Jakhu and R. Battacharya, “Legal Aspects of Space Tourism,” in Proceedings of the International Institute for 
Space Law (2002) 
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any evaluation of the relationship between the flight in the atmosphere and activities in space, 
have determined the allocation to the United Nations rather than to ICAO of the major 
responsibility for the international regulation of activities in space.”36 
In the early years of the space era authors were pointing out the continuing concern of 
States for the regime of airspace as it might be affected by outer space activities. Such an interest 
was “based upon two important considerations: first, airspace and outer space in fact represent a 
physical continuum, and the effective utilization of outer space will require a complimentary use 
of airspace; second, the conduct of activities in space may have important consequences for the 
internal value processes of the territorial communities on earth. In the more advanced 
exploitation of our spatial environment, the most obvious significance of the regime of airspace 
for all states derives from the fact that spacecraft in order to reach, or return from, outer space 
must pass through airspace.”37 Apparently, we have arrived at the stage of ‘more advanced 
exploitation’, and regulation of airspace-outer space transit has emerged as one of the prominent 
issues instigating broad academic, and to some extent practical, discussions. 
Authors have been pointing out that in the future a proper system of space traffic 
management would be desirable. This system has been envisioned as possessing three elements.  
First, air-traffic control should coordinate transit of a spacecraft through a national airspace on 
launch and reentry. Second, in addition to airspace control measures, a system ensuring safe 
launch and reentry through areas used by low orbit communications satellite systems should be 
established. Third, “various orbits are better suited for certain purposes than others: polar and 
near-polar orbits are useful for certain types of remote sensing, the geostationary orbit is 
excellent for telecommunications and direct broadcasting. It would make sense were the use of 
these orbits rationalized so that the best can be got from space.”38  
The International Astronautics Academy Cosmic Study of 2006 suggested the following 
definition of the space traffic management: “The set of technical and regulatory provisions for 
promoting safe access into outer space, operations in outer space and return from space to Earth 
free of physical of radio-frequency interference.”39 Therefore, space traffic management goes 
beyond control of routes taken by space objects and adequate coordination of routes with those 
                                                        
36 C.W. Jenks, Space Law (1965), at 70-71. 
37 M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 244. 
38 F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 300.  
39 C. Constant-Jorgenson, P. Lala, K.-U. Schrogl (eds.), Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management, International 
Academy of Astronautics (2006), at 10.  
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used by aviation, but also ensures that movements of space objects are free of radio frequency 
interference, an element considered negligible in the air traffic regime. Just as the air traffic 
management, the space traffic management regime should be grounded on physical 
characteristics of the regulated area, along with profound understanding of the physics of 
movement and operation in outer space. The review of these technical considerations,40 however, 
makes it abundantly clear that the space traffic management differs from that pertaining to civil 
aviation in a multitude of ways. To name just one example, which underlines the dramatically 
different nature of space flights compared to aviation, a spacecraft is significantly less 
maneuverable compared to an aircraft and is rarely manned, meaning that its operation requires 
going through a somewhat extended chain of commands.41 
An extensive system of space traffic control, as described above, further complicated by 
the precarious physics of space flights, obviously goes beyond the expertise of ICAO and would 
require major reshaping of the existing system. So the question is whether the ICAO mechanism 
as it has been established by the Chicago Convention, is a sound starting point for creation of the 
space traffic management system, and whether its mechanism can indeed be adapted to take over 
new functions. At this stage, some assert that the space conventions do not apply to suborbital 
flights.42 “Now this is something that has to be dealt with one way or the other. And some help 
may come from ICAO for the simple reason that after it has briefly been mentioned at the recent 
Legal Subcommittee meeting of COPUOS, ICAO has put ‘the regulation of suborbital flights’ on 
its agenda.”43 
Despite the seeming remoteness of space activities from the current ICAO mandate, 
ICAO has already dealt with space-related issues. In 1998 by Resolution A32-20 the ICAO 
Assembly instructed the ICAO Council and the Secretariat “to consider the elaboration of an 
                                                        
40 For an excellent review of physics underlying the activities, particularly operation, directing and monitoring of 
space objects on orbit, which must be thoroughly considered in the course of the space traffic management regime 
establishment see, J.D. Rendleman, B.D. Green, Space Traffic Management Regime Needs and Organizational 
Options, 58th IISL Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Technical Programme “Legal Issues of Space Traffic 
Management,” IAC-15.E7.4.3. Not yet published as of November 2015. 
41 See, F.G. von der Dunk, Space Traffic Management: A Challenge of Cosmic Proportions, 58th IISL Colloquium 
on the Law of Outer Space, Technical Programme “Legal Issues of Space Traffic Management,” IAC-15.E7.4.2. 
Not yet published as of November 2015. 
42 See, Panel Discussion on Session 4: “Common Issues in Air and Space Law: Envisaging Future Air Space 
Applications – The Examples of Registration and Liability”, in S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd, K.-U. Schrogl (eds.), 
‘Project 2001 Plus’ – Global and European Challenges for Air and Space Law at the Edge of the 21st Century 
(2006), at 251. 
43 Id. 
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appropriate long term framework to govern the operation of Global Navigation Satellite Systems, 
including consideration of an international convention for this purpose.”44 That could have been 
done using Annex 10 to the Chicago Convention, which is the vehicle for establishing navigation 
standards for both Global Navigation Satellite Systems.45 The Thirty-Second ICAO Assembly 
also adopted the Charter on Rights and Obligations of States Relating to Global Navigation 
Satellite Systems Services. “This Charter is not legally binding; it is not part of Annex 10 to the 
ICAO Convention. However, as the resolution of an Assembly with worldwide competence 
within its field, it may be considered to be significant.”46 
While ICAO has a certain degree of experience in regulating space-related matters, space 
traffic management constitutes a substantially different area, both in subject of regulation and in 
scope of the required regulation. In the early years of the space era, for example, a prominent 
scholar suggested that should launches take place from the territories with high density of air 
traffic – apparently, he was concerned with substantially similar issues as the contemporary 
scholars advocating the need for space traffic management – a regional arrangement akin to the 
Eurocontrol would become necessary.47 Hence, despite the affection of that period toward ICAO 
as a possible space regulator, it was not considered as a plausible candidate to take over the role 
of space and air traffic management; evidently, the task is indeed a far stretch from traditional 
ICAO functions. 
If the definition of the space traffic management proposed by the International Academy 
of Astronautics is accepted,48 creation of an effective space traffic management system heavily 
depends on delimitation of airspace and outer space. While absence of a statutory delimitation 
has not so far caused any practical problems in outer space activities, in case of suborbital flights 
this can become a problem when a reentry of reusable space vehicles is concerned.49  
                                                        
44 Resolution A32-20 adopted at the 32nd Session of the ICAO Assembly “Development and elaboration of an 
appropriate long-term legal framework to govern the implementation of GNSS,” available at 
http://www.icao.int/meetings/amc/ma/assembly%2032nd%20session/resolutions.pdf. 
45 Annex 10 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, “Aeronautical Communications”, 6th Ed., October 
2001, available at http://www.icao.int/Meetings/anconf12/Document%20Archive/AN10_V2_cons%5B1%5D.pdf. 
46 F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 407.  
47 See, C.W. Jenks, Space Law (1965), at 81. 
48 C. Constant-Jorgenson, P. Lala, K.-U. Schrogl (eds.), Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management, International 
Academy of Astronautics (2006), at 10. 
49 See, C. Contant, P. Lala, K.-U. Schrogl, “”Space Traffic Management” and Future Space Regulations,” in M. 
Benkö (ed.), Essential Air and Space Law (2005), at 247. 
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It is doubtful that ICAO is properly placed to elaborate the delimitation of airspace and 
outer space. Article 1 of the Chicago Convention states: “The contracting States recognize that 
every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.” Quite 
clearly, States find great value in comprehensive, continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over the 
airspace over their territories. It has been suggested that the competence accorded to States 
should be fashioned like the occasional exclusive competence only for the purposes of protecting 
“the unique vital interests of the state in the appropriate functioning of the community processes 
on its territory,”50 though there is no indication that States are, or will be in any foreseeable 
future, willing to give up even a fraction of their authority over territorial airspace. Practice is the 
most telling evidence of how jealously States have guarded their sovereign rights and how 
passionate States have been in application of these rights.51 Hence, there is little doubt that 
complete national sovereignty over territorial airspace will persist. 
This provision is clearly at odds with Article II of the Outer Space Treaty rejecting 
sovereign rights over outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. And although 
ICAO has experience of regulation in areas devoid of State sovereignty, namely of air traffic 
within international airspace over the high seas,52 the prominent function of ICAO is to regulate 
national civil aviation practices and coordinate them for international air traffic. In other words, 
every international flight takes off from a national territory, ends on a national territory, and over 
its course might cross dozens of national airspaces. And while part of the route might indeed lie 
in international airspace, international aviation has been shaped into its modern state due to 
compatibility of national air regimes and coordination of national activities – and dealing with 
States’ sovereignty over their airspaces is the most complicated task and the basis for the ICAO’s 
success. Against this background, regulation of civil air transportation in the airspace over the 
high seas does not seem to be the most challenging task ICAO is facing. 
Thereby, ICAO is used to working in the environment completely different from that of 
outer space, in an environment premised on the complete sovereignty of a State over its airspace. 
Regulation of outer space activities would require a different mindset. Moreover, the delimitation 
                                                        
50 M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 279. 
51 Cf., M. Lachs, The Law of Outer Space: An Experience in Contemporary Law-Making (2010), at 55. 
52 Cf., R. Jakhu, T. Sgobba, P. Dempsey (eds.), The Need for an Integrated Regulatory Regime for Aviation and 
Space: ICAO for Space? (2011), at 121 (“Thus ICAO is responsible to regulate safety and navigation over high seas, 
covering some 72% of the totality of the Earth’s surface.”). It seems that the percentage of the Earth’s surface 
covered by seas is somewhat irrelevant for characterization of the work being done by ICAO. 
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of airspace and outer space is a legislative kind of task, and as it has been determined earlier, 
ICAO only possesses quasi-legislative powers in the area of technical regulation. So while ICAO 
might be a good choice for the space traffic management regulation – whether it is indeed so or 
not will be discussed in details below – it is definitely inappropriate for dealing with the 
underlying definitional matters. 
 
6.3.2 ICAO as Space Traffic Management Organization: Alternatives 
Two recent scholarly works have tackled the issue of whether ICAO is an appropriate 
mechanism for the space traffic management regulation, and they have arrived at somewhat 
divergent results.53 Both works, however, acknowledge that though realistically commercial 
suborbital flights and intensifying space tourism are the interests for the second half of the 
century, space traffic issues are better to be addressed “proactively than retroactively before 
threats and hazards to public safety become intolerable; now is the appropriate time.”54  
On the one side, it has been suggested that ICAO should regulate space traffic due to the 
need to have harmonious coordination of air traffic and space traffic. Both means of 
transportation use airspace, therefore air routes should be established for both.55 So it has been 
concluded, “undoubtedly, the ideal solution to accommodate space traffic management and other 
space safety requirements would be to amend the Chicago Convention thereby expressly 
extending ICAO’s jurisdiction over space.”56 
But there is a legal obstacle to such a scenario, namely that ICAO does not have a 
mandate to involve itself in anything other than civil aviation.57 Nevertheless, some degree of 
ICAO involvement would be necessary because, as it has been remarked above, a spacecraft 
inevitably crosses airspace in the part of its journey, and thereby traffic management of aircraft 
and ‘transit’ spacecraft would be required. It has been correctly noted that “prior to any work of a 
                                                        
53 R. Abeyratne, Regulation of Commercial Space Transport: The Astrocizing of ICAO (2015); and R. Jakhu, T. 
Sgobba, P. Dempsey (eds.), The Need for an Integrated Regulatory Regime for Aviation and Space: ICAO for 
Space? (2011). 
54 R. Jakhu, T. Sgobba, P. Dempsey (eds.), The Need for an Integrated Regulatory Regime for Aviation and Space: 
ICAO for Space? (2011), at xiii. 
55 Cf., R. Jakhu and R. Battacharya, “Legal Aspects of Space Tourism,” in Proceedings of the International Institute 
for Space Law (2002), at 112. 
56 R. Jakhu, T. Sgobba, P. Dempsey (eds.), The Need for an Integrated Regulatory Regime for Aviation and Space: 
ICAO for Space? (2011), at xvii. 
57 Cf., R. Abeyratne, Regulation of Commercial Space Transport: The Astrocizing of ICAO (2015), at 7. 
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policy nature commencing on the subject of commercializing space travel, a sustainable and 
sustained regime that governs species of transportation has to be established.”58  
Not only the definition of outer (and correspondingly air) space should be established, but 
also the definition of an aerospace space object, the definition of a space tourist, and the 
definition of a suborbital flight should be elaborated; safety, licensing and other technical 
standards should also be agreed upon. An international organization with broad technical 
mandate can operate effectively only in a legally stable environment, meaning that the scope 
ratione materiae of its authority should be defined with precision. Lax definition of the subject 
matter of organization’s powers would inevitably lead to lax technical regulations – a clearly 
undesirable result. Thus, just as aviation-related definitions were included in the text of the 
Chicago Convention, space-related definitions should necessarily become a part of the 
Convention’s glossary should ICAO become responsible for the space traffic management.  
It has been earlier concluded that ICAO is not properly placed to deal with the 
legislative-regulatory tasks. Thus, at least this part of the space traffic management should be 
handed over to a more appropriate entity. At this point there seem to be more questions than 
answers. Basically, there are only two feasible options for the elaboration of the needed 
definitions: the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space or a specialized 
diplomatic conference. The first option appears to be an obvious choice, but the inability of the 
Committee to produce a single binding document in the last three decades makes one doubt if 
this case is any different. Furthermore, an agenda item “Matters relating to the definition and 
delimitation of outer space and the character and utilization of the geostationary orbit, including 
consideration of ways and means to ensure the rational and equitable use of the geostationary 
orbit without prejudice to the role of the International Telecommunication Union” has been on 
the Legal Subcommittee’s agenda for several years now without any visible results, at least with 
regard to the first part of the item. In the light of the continuing criticism of COPUOS for its 
overcomplicated and not especially effective methods of work, there is no evidence that the 
legislative standstill can be easily overcome for the sake of development of the space traffic 
management system. A diplomatic conference, therefore, might prove more effective, but again 
States’ reluctance to take on any more legal obligations pertinent to outer space activities would 
                                                        
58 Id. at 8. 
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likely halt this initiative as well. In the end, there is no definitive answer as to which organ and 
how is supposed to take on this task. 
Other alternatives that fall short of precise delimitation of airspace and outer space have 
been suggested. One is to amend the ICAO Annexes and redefine the term ‘aircraft’ to include 
aerospace vehicles, so that when they fly in the airspace used by civil aircrafts, the rules of safety 
and navigation are the same.59 Without getting into details, there is one major objection to this 
approach: if the goal is to draw the space traffic management system, equation of an aircraft and 
a spacecraft does not achieve the goal since it does not create any new system that would pertain 
to launches and reentries; it simply extends aviation rules to space flights, which are materially 
different. From a theoretical point of view, a new definition covering both aircraft and spacecraft 
within the ICAO legal framework without the definition of outer space would effectively extend 
airspace legal regime into outer space, at least in part pertaining to space objects. That would 
interfere with existing space law with respect to space objects as such and would jeopardize the 
principles of non-appropriation, of freedom of exploration and prohibition of placement of 
weapons of mass destruction. Obviously, that is not something States would be willing to do. 
The second option is for ICAO to promulgate a new Annex on “Space Standards” based 
on Article 37 precedent that now allows ICAO to adopt not only safety standards, but also 
security and environmental standards.60 In addition to the theoretical complications entailed in 
this approach as outlined above, the authors acknowledge that this path would also require “a 
certain international regulatory body” to provide uniform standards for national certification of 
space launch systems and vehicles, and their navigation through airspace. First, it is not clear 
which international regulatory body might undertake this task, and second, the breadth of 
standards that would have to be promulgated, including terms of registration, airworthiness 
certification, pilot licensing and operational requirements,61 is so great that adoption of the new 
Annex apparently would not get us closer to the creation of the space traffic management system.  
The third option is for ICAO to define the limits of airspace by amending an Annex. It is 
acknowledged that such a change would most likely require amendment of the Chicago 
Convention first, which, in accordance with Article 94, is a laborious process. Inclusion of the 
                                                        
59 See, R. Jakhu, T. Sgobba, P. Dempsey (eds.), The Need for an Integrated Regulatory Regime for Aviation and 
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60 Id. at 63. 
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airspace definition in the Chicago Convention does not support the case of transforming ICAO 
into a regulator of both civil aviation and suborbital space flights because it would only more 
firmly establish ICAO as a purely aviation-oriented organization, and extension of its mandate, 
which is by itself a contentious issue,62 would be all the more problematic. By and large, no 
feasible method to fill in the definitional vacuum has been proposed yet.  
Setting aside the question of airspace and outer space delimitation, there are basically two 
approaches to the role of ICAO in the space traffic management. They both are premised on the 
central role of ICAO in regulation of space flights, but envision different methods in adaptation 
of the existing regime to the new challenges. The first one suggests that ICAO will continue to 
work using the same methods and principles, its work will continue to be based on the Chicago 
Convention, albeit some structural adjustments along with addition of new Annexes would be 
required. This view explains that “instead of establishing a new international space flight 
organization, it is argued that the same ends could be achieved, as a starting point, simply by 
extending the mandate of ICAO to the region of space up to including the geosynchronous 
orbit.”63 Extension of the mandate would provide “an unequalled wealth of organizational 
experience in establishing an internationally encompassing and deeply rooted safety culture such 
as that which has been instrumental in making civil aviation the great success of which we are all 
aware.”64 Acknowledging the logic behind the argument, the question should be asked: why then 
the extension of the ICAO mandate should serve as ‘a starting point’? Is that supposed to be an 
intermediary solution for the time being, or should the transformation somehow continue in the 
future? Unfortunately, no answer is provided. 
The regulatory model for this proposal presupposes three elements: development of a 
safety oversight operating model, establishment of an organizational framework and constitution 
of a safety certification process. The first part includes design of a comprehensive permanent 
safety oversight regulatory regime, likely by way of its inclusion in Annex 6, that national space 
authorities would implement. The second element presupposes creation of ten new organs within 
the ICAO mechanism based on the Article 37 powers. The third element is aimed at vesting with 
ICAO the authority to monitor the space standards’ and recommended practices’ 
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implementation.65 That can be done by way of extending the ICAO’s jurisdiction over space, but 
that is not the best solution due to the lengthy amendment process of the Chicago Convention, 
which might last up to twenty-five years. 
 Instead, the authors suggest using ‘residual powers’ set forth in Article 37, but in this 
case it seems to be a stretch. Article 37 is entitled “Adoption of International Standards and 
Procedures”, but the contextual reading of the Convention does not reasonably allow making a 
conclusion that it mandates to regulate all “matters concerned with the safety, regularity, and 
efficiency of air navigation as may from time to time appear appropriate.” If an expansive 
interpretation is favored, then in principle ICAO might extend its jurisdiction to military conflicts 
– they undoubtedly jeopardize safety of aviation, prevention of terrorism – the tragedy of 
September 11, 2001 involved civil aircraft, even regulation of explosives trafficking since 
improper transportation might also endanger safety and security of civil aviation. But it is indeed 
unlikely that anyone would ever suggest any of these readings of Article 37 of the Chicago 
Convention. Therefore, amendment of the Convention remains the only legal opportunity for 
implementation of the envisioned plan. 
The other approach, despite being substantively similar to the one described above, is 
very critical of the idea of including space traffic management into the existing ICAO structure. 
The proposal to bring commercial space transportation in the Chicago Convention by amending 
the instrument is considered “similar to saying that rail transport can be brought into the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea by just amending the Convention. The 19 Annexes to 
the Chicago Convention are entirely on civil aviation and there is no practical way in which it 
can be amended, or added on to or revised, or new Annexes adopted under the Chicago 
Convention (which is entirely and exclusively on civil aviation) to cover such areas as licensing 
of spaceports, human space flight, space traffic management, safety of personnel and astronauts 
and security.”66 
In the following discussion, however, the author becomes more complimentary. It is 
suggested that ICAO does not have the structure to sustain the entirely different regime of 
transport. So if it is the intent to bring in the regulation of commercial space transportation 
within the ICAO structure, it should be done through a separate multilateral treaty. The 
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organization could be renamed into the International Aerospace Organization, and it should have 
separate funding for two means of transportation, and necessarily have the relevant expertise.67 
“It is not prudent to lump air transport and space transport together by amending an existing 
[Chicago] Convention, however attractive that might be as a quick fix. Both are very different 
fields of transport and should be covered by separate multilateral instruments. At the least, any 
involvement of ICAO should be separate from its responsibilities pertaining to civil aviation 
under the Chicago Convention.”68 
Overall, this approach is premised on a fairly unspecified notion of ICAO having to 
undergo a whole system change to justify its performance and values based structure. The 
bottom line is the “need for change in the mindset of the Organization, from its service role to a 
role of implementation and assistance. The human factor is an essential consideration in this 
metamorphosis. The key and the starting point, however, is to recognize the need for the 
transition, which ICAO has already done. The next step is to recognize that ICAO needs its 
peoples’ best efforts, both individually and collectively.”69 While throughout the book the author 
has explained the changes that have to be made to change the ‘mindset’ from service to 
implementation and assistance, nowadays it is not at all obvious that ICAO has already 
recognized ‘the need for transition’. Two Assembly resolutions adopted thirty years apart70 can 
hardly serve as a reliable indicator in such a delicate matter as recognition of the need for 
substantive changes. And the next step that is directed at the ICAO workers as “good stewards of 
ICAO’s business,” is a long way from the international legal realm.  
By and large, the last proposal is still based on the premise of the Chicago Convention 
serving as a starting point for all substantive changes that have to be introduced in order to make 
a separate treaty governing the space traffic management an appropriate instrument for its 
purposes. Outline of these changes requires a book-length document, so probably starting de 
novo should not be completely disregarded. At the same time, it is not to be doubted that “the 
technical Annexes to the Chicago Convention are one reason why ICAO has been so successful 
in international lawmaking. Through use of these Annexes, the organization has been able to 
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separate the political and technical facets of international civil aviation. To a large degree, 
uniformity in all technical and navigational aspects of international civil aviation has been 
achieved. This has, generally, made civil aviation safe, regular, efficient and economical.”71 
ICAO, like other successful United Nations organizations such as the International 
Telecommunication Union, has successfully managed to separate political from technical 
aspects.72  
It has been concluded that the ICAO standards and recommended practices under current 
international law cannot be directly applied to space vehicles, so “it has been proposed to use a 
regulatory mechanism similar to standards and recommended practices in space law, as in 
general space law no such arrangements exist and similar issues like certification of vehicles to 
guarantee minimum safety levels are likely to arise.”73 Hence, utilization of technical standards 
is a feature that should be translated onto the space traffic regime. The Working Paper of the 
ICAO Council, however, suggests that with respect to sub-orbital flights pertinent Annexes to 
the Chicago Convention might not come into force for many years or it may be found most 
practical not to extend application of Annexes at all.74 Deviation from the procedure of using 
technical standards that proved exceptionally successful in performance of ICAO functions, 
would be detrimental on many levels: generally, there is little value in handing over the sub-
orbital flights regulation to ICAO if its standards are not applicable to sub-orbital flights; more 
specifically, lax regulation of sub-orbital flights might well undermine the organization’s 
authority in regulation of airspace flights. Thus, the named way of regulation – if it can be called 
regulation at all – should be avoided. 
ICAO has significant experience and expertise in development of technical standards in 
international civil aviation that have been almost uniformly complied with. More so, the ICAO 
mechanism of regulation proved efficient for aviation, an area where States exercise sovereignty 
over their national airspaces. Regulation of space traffic, thus, can and should be based on the 
system that has proved effective for air transportation, borrowing the practices and methods 
highly praised by scholars and practitioners alike; but that does not mean that it should be copied 
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from it or be absentmindedly transplanted to a different type of transportation. Moreover, the 
Working Paper correctly noted that current commercial activities envisage sub-orbital flights 
departing from and landing at the same place, which may not entail crossing of foreign airspaces, 
thereby, making pertinent Annexes to the Chicago Convention not amenable to their regulation.75  
In addition to straightforward transferal of space traffic management to ICAO, other 
alternatives have been suggested. The US Federal Aviation Administration suggested creation of 
a dedicated international organization, the International Space Flight Organization. It is 
envisioned as an internationally sanctioned organization that is the focal point for collaboration 
and information exchange for orbital or hypersonic point-to-point flights requiring international 
planning and notification to mitigate contention for airspace.76 Scholars, however, considered 
this idea as premature. “There is no need to establish an organization which would address and 
regulate all aspects of air space activities and the use of air space. In the long run, however, it 
could be considered whether a new Convention would be required to establish the rules 
applicable to “space tourism” and other hybrid activities. Such a legal instrument indeed could 
learn from the experience gathered by ICAO while taking into account the specifics of the 
activities and the knowledge of UNCOPUOS and other institutions.”77  
There is another approach to the issue of space traffic management. An international 
intergovernmental agreement building on and eventually replacing parts of the existing treaties 
has been suggested as a viable option. This agreement should include provisions for liability, 
should be open only to sovereign States, but its provisions should be made applicable to private 
activities as well through national licensing regimes. “This international intergovernmental 
agreement could comprise a legal text, which cannot be changed easily, and technical annexes, 
which can be adapted more easily.”78 This ambitious project is envisioned to be completed by 
2020. After this date, however, the proposal becomes even grander: this agreement along with 
other existing space treaties could be replaced by a comprehensive Outer Space Convention, 
whereas COPUOS, the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs and ICAO apparently be 
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merged into the International Outer Space Organization.79 The need for the space traffic 
management regulation is an unusual justification for the suggestion to create a universal space 
organization akin to the International Maritime Organization, which have been advocated since 
the 1960s by both Soviet and American scholars,80 though without gaining broad support.  
While the first stage of the proposed approach might be justified in the light of the 
discussed issue, it is hard to see how the International Space Organization might be necessary for 
the development of the space traffic regime. Recalling the earlier discussed tendency of avoiding 
legally binding documents in the area of outer space activities, the so-called Washington 
Consensus, even the first part of the proposal does not present itself as a feasible one. While 
technical standards, or even better recommendations, are a realistic way to regulate space traffic, 
a legally binding agreement that covers issues beyond specific traffic management questions is 
unlikely to gain support among spacefaring nations. Some authors opined that due to States’ 
sensitivity with regard to the access to national airspace, a full ICAO for space, which would 
necessarily deal with matters of access to and usage of national airspace for outer space launches, 
is not likely,81 and thus a not-only-technical-oriented solution is even more impractical. 
Alternatives falling short of a government-centered space traffic management system 
have also been brought into discussion. One such approach is for commercial operators of 
satellites to provide their own space traffic management by way of contracting out the capability 
to one or more international concerns or nonprofit entities.82 The first downside of this option is 
the need for commercial entities providing space traffic management to heavily rely, at least 
initially, on government provided data due to insufficiency of their own data. The second 
shortcoming is the inadequacy of commercial mechanisms for addressing proprietary and 
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security concerns, which are at the higher level in the area of outer space activities.83 
Acknowledging benefits of this approach, it is suggested that as of now it is not a feasible option 
and is not likely to become one in the foreseeable future precisely due to traditionally high 
national security concerns. 
 
6.3.3 Space Traffic Management: A Proposal 
Judge Manfred Lachs eloquently illustrated that ‘mechanical transfer’ of institutions from 
one environment to another is of little value: “It may lead to distortions and even seriously stunt 
the development of the new branch of law. Yet despite Lord Mansfield’s warning (“There is 
nothing in law so misleading as a metaphor or an analogy”) or Einstein’s caveat that analogies 
have been “a source not only of the most fruitful theories, but also of the most misleading 
fallacies,” the analogical method cannot utterly be discarded. One has simply to beware of its 
pitfalls and seek to grasp reality as comprehensively as possible in proceeding from tried systems 
to the construction of new ones.”84 By and large, a separate, fairly idiosyncratic, regime of 
orbital and sub-orbital flights should be developed, albeit necessarily compatible with, and to 
some extent premised on, the international regime of civil aviation. 
A good starting point, thus, is the proposal made by Jasentuliyana: “In seeking to provide 
technical standards and practices for space activities, it does not seem practical to substantially 
revise the existing space treaties for this purpose. There are several reasons for this. First, 
technical solutions are better handled by technical experts in a technical body rather than by 
lawyers in diplomatic conferences. … Second, just as in the case of international civil aviation, 
space technology is rapidly and continuously changing. It would be highly impractical to 
convene diplomatic conferences every time regulations required updating. This could be 
achieved competently and quickly by way of space Annexes. The Annexes could update 
technical progress on a continual basis, as opposed to existing legal instruments or creation of 
new instruments, which could take years.”85 The idea of including space traffic regulation in the 
ICAO mandate by way of amending the Chicago Convention or development of a separate 
treaty, however, should be rejected. 
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The Conference on the Regulation of Emerging Modes of Aerospace Transportation held 
in 2013 discussed the possibility of ICAO involvement in regulation of space commercial 
transportation. The majority of attendees generally agreed that ICAO standards and 
recommended practices of the Annexes to the Chicago Convention might be extended to apply to 
commercial space travel.86 It is, however, unclear whether the existing legal framework should 
be applied only to ensure safety of suborbital flights during their airspace journey segment, or 
whether it can be applied to regulate all stages of suborbital flights, both in airspace and outer 
space. It seems that the former would be less complicated from a legal perspective, though the 
latter might be preferable should indeed suborbital flights become as frequent as currently 
airspace flights are. Finally, the applicability of these standards to orbital flights has not been 
even touched upon. 
Whatever route is preferred, and if ICAO is chosen to be the primary regulatory organ, 
amendments to the Chicago Convention are inevitable. Article 94 of the Chicago Convention 
established a complicated procedure for the Convention amendment, which requires, first, two 
thirds support in the Assembly, and second, ratification of the amendments by two thirds of 
member-States. While fulfillment of the first requirement seems practically achievable, 
implementation of the second might take years and years. In practice it means that consent of 
128 States is necessary, and that might take in the range of fifteen to twenty-five years. But that 
is not the main issue here. The main concern is that the Chicago Convention and ICAO have 
worked well for international community, they have ensured civil aviation safety and stability; 
but once the system is being redrawn, albeit by way of extending ICAO mandate and adopting 
rules for the new area of regulation, the old system of civil aviation regulation might be 
jeopardized.  
On the one hand, as described above, both orbital and suborbital flights have an airspace 
flight segment, thereby new rules would have to be tailored in a way to establish safety and 
security of space-bound flights and at the same time adapt it to the existing civil aviation rules. 
Hence, one way or the other, the existing rules would have to be touched upon and would have to 
be alternated, maybe specified to a certain extent. On the other, introduction of the new area of 
regulation would inevitably require adaptation of the ICAO structure, internal procedures, 
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including, most importantly budgeting and financing rules. Neither the ICAO Secretariat, nor its 
technical staff, possessing professional knowledge in civil aviation, but having virtually no 
knowledge of space flights’ particularities, is properly placed to take the plunge into commercial 
space transportation regulation. New structures and procedures would have to be incorporated in 
the existing ICAO system, thus requiring reassessment, again to a certain extent, of the structure 
that has worked effectively and efficiently for over seventy years.  
Against this background, amendment of the Chicago Convention should be undertaken 
only if wide support of States is secured, when there is a practically achievable compromise that 
can satisfy all parties. Otherwise, not many results would be achieved in the space traffic 
regulation, but a reliable system of the civil aviation regulation might be put in jeopardy. In other 
words, ICAO would have to undergo the whole system change if it is to take on the role of a 
space traffic regulator. In the current situation, wide, virtually uniform support would be hard to 
achieve, especially with regard to the contentious issue of outer space activities regulation.  
There is another reason prompting to reconsider the desirability of transforming ICAO 
into ‘ICAO for civil aviation and space’.The Chicago Convention was drafted over seventy years 
ago, and despite the great success of the created system in regulation of civil aviation, it is an 
international document from a ‘previous epoch’. In 1944 the world was going through horrors of 
the Second World War and the world economy was structured in a whole different way. From an 
international legal perspective, in 1944 the United Nations was non-existent, international 
organizations did not play the role in international relations they are playing now, and, of course, 
Sputnik I had not yet orbited the Earth for hundred-and-eight minutes on its elliptical path. That 
is not to say that the Chicago Convention has become archaic and obsolete, but as has been 
mentioned above, it took over hundred pages to describe changes that have to be made to make 
the Chicago Convention appropriate for this new area. New challenges require new approaches. 
The question of international intergovernmental organizations membership in ICAO has 
not been discussed in either of the analyzed works, despite their significant role in international 
space activities. The 2003 precedent of the European Community’s request to be admitted to 
ICAO membership evidences that international organizations are expressing will to participate 
more actively in international cooperation on all levels. With respect to outer space activities, 
where international organizations are major players, and where for many States cooperation 
through international organizations is the only way to explore and use outer space, that is even 
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more true. So membership of international organizations in the entity regulating space traffic 
would be only logical and beneficial. If ICAO were such an entity, as discussed above, inclusion 
of international organizations as its members would require amending the Chicago Convention. 
Initiation of the amendment procedure would postpone adoption of necessary provisions for 
decades, while it is generally agreed that the space traffic management system should be put in 
place as soon as possible.  
Another important issue to consider is the chances that a new legally binding agreement 
extending the mandate of ICAO to include the space traffic management would be adopted by a 
majority, or more accurately two-thirds of States. Separately, it has to be considered whether 
those States active in space would support the necessary document. The case of the Code of 
Conduct for Outer Space Activities, whose destiny is still uncertain,87 patently shows the 
challenges of arriving at accord when the document touches upon regulation of outer space 
activities notwithstanding its legally non-binding nature. A legally binding document regulating 
outer space activities has not been adopted for over three decades. Consequently, a probability of 
adoption of a legally binding document regulating space traffic in the short-term, and maybe 
mid-term perspective is very low, especially given the inextricable connection of the necessary 
regulation with sovereign rights over national airspace.  
And, of course, as it has been explained above, ‘hard law’ regulation of space traffic 
would inevitably require delimitation of airspace and outer space. The United States has 
repeatedly stipulated that delimiting outer space is not necessary because no legal or practical 
problems have arisen in the absence of such a definition. Moreover, whatever definition is 
ultimately agreed upon would be arbitrary at worst, or, at best, be constrained by the current state 
of technology.88 And in the absence of support from the major spacefaring nation any agreement 
can hardly be achieved.  
Another consideration that should be duly reflected on is the practical implications of 
addressing issues governed by one legal regime by an organization working within a legal 
regime governed by substantively different principles. In other words, what are the implications 
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of sovereignty-oriented ICAO dealing with matters, where the primary legal principle is rejection 
of sovereign rights? “Because of the autonomous operation principle, which indicates that ICAO 
should apply its constitutional framework – its procedures and rules – there exists a danger that 
ICAO will prioritize air law over space law. Or similarly … ICAO may grant priority to norms 
of space law, but it will do so according to its own administrative objectives and purposes, thus 
risking the subjugation of the object and purpose of space law regime to ICAO’s ethos.”89 That is 
clearly an undesirable outcome. 
Based on these considerations, it is suggested that regulation of space traffic would be 
best achieved using a legally non-binding mechanism of cooperation with broad State 
participation based on the ‘best-effort’ principle akin to the Committee on Earth Observation 
Satellites.90 This proposal, however, does not reject the great value that ICAO, being an 
unquestioned expert in airspace navigation, can bring to the table. Quite to the contrary, due to 
the inextricable connection of airspace navigation and space traffic management in the airspace 
segment of space flight, it is advocated that ICAO should be, first, closely involved in the 
establishment of the future mechanism, and, second, maintain constant contact and coordination 
throughout its work.  
As a first step, therefore, it could be considered to request ICAO to study the legal and 
technical issues related to the introduction of the space traffic management regime in close 
cooperation with other relevant institutions such as COPUOS and the International 
Telecommunication Union.91 ICAO could play a significant role in coordination of air and space 
traffic,92 provide valuable insight and ensure that the space traffic regime is fully compatible 
with the air traffic regime. It was noted over fifty years ago that while the Chicago Convention 
and its Annexes could not be directly applied to space instrumentalities, they were suggestive of 
the matters that should be covered by appropriate space regulations.93 ICAO is a highly 
specialized technical-oriented international organization that has been successfully regulating 
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civil aviation for many decades, and it is unreasonable to try to alternate its system and try to 
‘squeeze in’ the area it was not designed to deal with. By contrast, coordination and cooperation 
with the entity that is designed specifically to regulate space traffic, which possesses necessary 
resources, specialists and most importantly State support, is not an onerous burden.  
The issue of airspace and outer space delimitation can also be resolved using the legally 
non-binding mechanism of cooperation. It is suggested that “no fixed, arbitrary demarcation line, 
even if established, could eliminate all important anticipated problems,”94 so outer space should 
be defined solely for the purposes of this mechanism. An eminent scholar pronounced that 
adoption of “a purely conventional boundary which would only subsidiarily rely on specific 
environmental or functional criteria”95 is a feasible solution of the delimitation conundrum.96 
While there might be some tensions regarding the exact definition of outer space, the fact that the 
definition will be contained in a legally non-binding act is likely to smooth the controversy. 
Additionally, in the relevant part of the document it should be noted that this definition ‘is solely 
for purposes of this [entity]’, and ‘is without prejudice to national and international documents 
and obligations of participating States’.  
Overall, a legally non-binding mechanism of cooperation is a feasible option under 
several conditions. First, a new entity should be created in close contact with ICAO and 
COPUOS. Involvement of the International Telecommunication Union might also prove 
beneficial. Second, the underlying document of the new entity should be flexible enough and use 
only cautious wording akin to ‘to the greatest extent possible’, ‘whenever feasible’ and the like. 
But at the same time it should be precise enough in describing the entity’s mandate ratione 
materiae by way of defining the outer space and the aerospace object. 
Utilization of the legally non-binding document would allow, on the one hand, to have 
necessary definitions agreed upon, and on the other, preserve the opportunity to amend them as 
needed. Thereby, the main reason behind the US opposition to delimitation of outer space would 
be negated, and with the development of science and technology all necessary definitions can be 
easily revised.  
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Technical rules and standards pertaining particularly to space traffic should be enunciated 
in Annexes to the main underlying document following the ICAO example. Scholarly works 
advocate Annexes as a proper way to assert technical standards in case a legally binding 
document is utilized, thereby eliminating the need to amend the treaty every time the standards 
have to be changed.97 This scheme would still be preferable if a ‘soft law’ instrument is 
employed. There are two reasons for that. First, the main underlying document is intended to 
state objectives of the entity, participation rules, basic definitions, main organs of the entity and 
their responsibilities, voting procedure, financing and the like, and inclusion of technical 
standards in the main text would unduly complicate it. Second, as in case of ICAO, a separate 
Annex should be dealing with a separate topic or sub-topic, thus making navigation through 
standards easier, ensuring that no mutually controversial norms regulating one subject are 
introduced, and overall preserving strict specialization, which is important in technical issues. 
Generally, separate Annexes are easier to work with, to use and to amend. Drafting of Annexes 
should certainly be conducted in close collaboration with ICAO. 
From a structural point of view, a plenary organ, a multi-member executive organ, a sole 
executive organ, an administrative entity performing secretarial functions and working groups 
drafting and revising technical standards would be required. On the one hand, the mechanism is 
envisioned as adopting exclusively legally non-binding documents that States are not compelled 
to comply with, but on the other, an international organization-like internal structure would 
create a basis for productive work toward a widely acceptable solution. 
To maintain a spirit of cooperation a consensus-based decision-making should be 
favored, though as the International Organization for Standardization’s definition of consensus 
pronounces: “Consensus need not imply unanimity.”98 The mechanism should be open to States 
and international organizations, which have powers in the area of outer space activities, and 
international nongovernmental entities should be allowed as observers. The latter is an important 
characteristic, because technical standards developed by this entity would in part regulate 
activities in sovereign airspace, and complete confidence of States that no private ‘lobby’ is able 
to influence these regulations is important. 
                                                        
97 Cf., N. Jasentuliyana, International Space Law and the United Nations (1999), at 380. 
98 ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004, Standardization and Related Activities -- General Vocabulary, n. 1. 
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One might argue that a less formal mechanism of cooperation is not capable of 
developing rules and standards for space traffic that will be universally complied with. 
Throughout this book it has been noted more than once that a legally binding character does not 
presuppose (in)effectiveness of the document in question. The Moon Agreement and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights are just two examples. Therefore, not the legally binding 
character of the standards, but the quality of the standards and due consideration of States’ 
proposals in the spirit of cooperation will presuppose whether or not the proposed mechanism is 
successful. 
ICAO was created as an organization with a mostly technical mandate in the area, where 
a majority of States are sincerely interested in orderly regulation first and foremost for their own 
benefit. The legally non-binding solution advocated above, therefore, might well turn out to be 
an appropriate solution once States are persuaded that the orderly space traffic management 
would be more beneficial than it would be detrimental to their freedom. And the space traffic 
management regime does not need to go beyond technical regulation – just as the air traffic 
management regime – to be effective. Thereby, there is no reason, at least from the ‘purpose-
result’ perspective, to believe that a legally non-binding less formal approach to cooperation 
would not succeed in regulation of space traffic. The rest depends on the execution: whereas 
ICAO is believed to have been elevated to its current level of respect by its workers “as good 
stewards of ICAO’s business,” qualifications of the new entity’s members along with the usage 
of the most reliable and up-to-date data would anchor the new mechanism as an esteemed 
authority in its area.  




“The thought of living and working in outer space has captured the attention of numerous 
individuals. The intrigue associated with living in a new environment and of doing what few 
others have done before is fuel for this desire.” 1 And this desire, in turn, fueled international 
cooperation in creation and operation of the first multinational space station. Initially devised as 
an international project under the US leadership, bringing US allies as partners to the project, and 
designated the Space Station “Freedom”, it has evolved into a 15-nation project with significant 
participation of the former Cold War rival weighting almost four hundred tons and called simply 
the International Space Station. 
In the present chapter the mechanism of cooperation utilized in this grand project will be 
analyzed. The International Space Station (ISS) is unique in many ways, technical, scientific, 
political, economic, and not the least – legal. The ISS legal regime is comprised of a multi-
layered system of legal documents, both multilateral and bilateral, legally binding and ‘soft law’. 
And quite logically, the complex legal structure has spawned an intricate institutional system. 
The institutional component of the ISS project will be analyzed in close connection with the 
legal innovations included in the relevant legal texts; the basic six elements of the mechanism of 
cooperation will be identified and analyzed using the earlier proposed criteria. It has been 
suggested that the ISS legal regime provides an adequate legal framework for the project, being 
both precise and flexible enough.2 Thereby, the ISS experience might serve as a basis for future 
massive international space projects, especially those requiring combination of efforts, resources 
and knowledge to create a new object outside the Earth atmosphere. The ‘purpose-result’ 
analysis will focus on consideration of whether the ISS mechanism of cooperation can be copied 
for other projects, or whether that is a peculiar construction created for a one-time use only. 
The term ‘space station’ is not self-defining and is not self-evident, thus it is necessary to 
define it in a way that would be appropriate from both technical and legal points of view. The 
                                                        
1 D.D. Smith, Space Stations: International Law and Policy (1979), at 12. 
2 See, D. St-Arnaud, A. Farand et al, The Legal Framework for the International Space Station, UN Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Legal Subcommittee, April 17, 2013. 
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former National Aeronautics and Space Administration Administrator defined a space station as 
follows: “Properly conceived, a station could function as: (1) a laboratory in space, for the 
conduct of science and development of new technologies; (2) a permanent observatory, to look 
down upon the Earth and out at the universe; (3) a transportation node where payloads and 
vehicles are stationed, processed and propelled to their destinations; (4) a servicing facility, 
where these payloads and vehicles are maintained and if necessary repaired; (5) an assembly 
facility where, due to ample time on orbit and the presence of appropriate equipment, large 
structures are put together and checked out; (6) a manufacturing facility where human 
intelligence and the servicing capability of the station combine to enhance commercial 
opportunities in space; and (7) a storage depot where payloads and parts are kept on orbit for 
subsequent deployment.”3 This strikes as a technology- and utilization-oriented definition. 
Alternatively, a space station can be defined as a “large space structure” located in outer space 
appropriate for permanent inhabitation and discharge of a variety of scientific and technical 
tasks.4 The ISS and future more ambitious projects, including prospective outer space 
colonization,5 would be covered by this definition; hence, it should be considered an appropriate 
one.  
 
7.1.1 History of the ISS Project 
As early as 1979 it was prophesied that it was probable that involvement of several States 
through institutional entities would intensify, “and thus there will be pressure for multiple 
participation in the area of space station ownership and operation.”6 And indeed the International 
Space Station turned out to be one of the most significant examples of how the principle of 
international cooperation has been applied.7 The participating States “are realizing the 
advantages of sharing the risks and rewards of undertaking such a monumental effort in outer 
                                                        
3 Civil Space Station – Senate Hearing 98-523, before the Sub-Committee on Science, Technology and Space of the 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 98th Congress, 1st Sess. 15 November, 1983, serial No. 98-48 
(1984), at 43.  
4 Cf., D.D. Smith, Space Stations: International Law and Policy (1979), at 2-3. 
5 The term ‘colonization’ is not used in a meaning of occupation that is directly prohibited by Article II of the Outer 
Space Treaty. 
6 D.D. Smith, Space Stations: International Law and Policy (1979), at 65. 
7 See, C. Sharpe and F. Tronchetti, “Legal Aspects of Public Manned Spaceflight and Space Station Operations,” in 
F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 619. 
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space.”8 Unique advantages provided by the opportunity to work on the space station, including 
that of weightlessness, a perfect vacuum, the virtually unlimited light and energy source of the 
sun, and others, spurred unprecedented technological advances and breakthroughs to benefit the 
quality of life on earth.  
While other space-faring nations weighted their options, President Reagan in his State of 
the Union Address on January 25, 1984 gave a ringing endorsement to the space station program 
by declaring that one of the great goals was to develop a new frontier based in the pioneer spirit. 
“I am directing NASA to develop a permanently manned space station and to do it within a 
decade,” he enthused. “A space station will permit quantum leaps in our research in science, 
communications, in metals, and in life-saving medicines which could be manufactured only in 
space.”9  
The Space Station started out as a national US program to be executed by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the late 1970s and acquired an international 
dimension with the conclusion in 1985 of three Memoranda of Understanding for the conduct of 
parallel detailed definition and preliminary design studies on the Space Station. “These 
Memoranda of Understanding, dealing with what is commonly referred to as “Phase B” 
activities, were concluded between NASA and the European Space Agency, NASA and the 
government of Japan, and NASA and the Canadian Ministry of State for Science and 
Technology.”10 During negotiation of the initial Memoranda of Understanding in 1984-85 
several principles emerged, which have influenced the current structure of cooperation in the ISS 
project. “The first, termed “functional allocation” is a NASA concept whereby each partner 
develops a different component of the space station to avoid duplication of effort. … The second 
principle is corollary of the first and is described as “mutual” or “open access”. This implies that 
the entire space station should be a common facility allowing each partner to have access to all 
the others’ contributory elements.”11 
Due to the expected decades-long duration of the project and corresponding billion-
dollars costs, agency-level Memoranda were not considered sufficient. Involvement of the States 
                                                        
8 L.L. Manzione, Multinational Investment in the Space Station: An Outer Space Model for International 
Cooperation?, 18 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 507 (2002), at 509. 
9 P. Bond, The Continuing Story of the International Space Station (2002), at 106-07. 
10 A. Farand, “Space Station Cooperation: Legal Arrangements,” in G. Lafferranderie and D. Crowther (eds.), 
Outlook on Space Law over the Next 30 Years (1997), at 126. 
11 A.J. Young, Laws and Policy in the Space Stations’ Era (1989), at 100-01. 
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wishing to participate in such a project through the conclusion of an international agreement, 
what later became the Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement, setting out the general 
principles for carrying out this cooperative effort, including those governing the parties’ conduct 
in outer space, was deemed necessary to secure a long-term high-level commitment to 
international cooperation in development and construction of the space station.12 The initial 
Intergovernmental Agreement was signed on December 29, 1988.  
It provided several examples of implementing standard space law provisions in an 
international context, such as applying the quasi-territoriality of jurisdiction over registered space 
objects to the individual elements of the ISS and creating a separate liability regime amounting 
to a very broad cross-waiver of liability as opposed to the default general liability regime under 
the Liability Convention. The latter was the evidence of the need to work together in such a 
highly innovative but risky area as space station operations without a chance of lawsuits spoiling 
the spirit of cooperation.13 Another notable feature of the Agreement was a distinction made 
between the Partner States and Cooperating Partners. This distinction in addition to being the 
first of its kind in international space law practice, was of a particular importance for Europe: 
there were twelve original Partner States but they represented only four Cooperating Partners in 
the project, the nine European States being grouped for the purpose of conducting this 
cooperation under the umbrella designation of the “European Partner”.14 Despite changes 
introduced to the 1998 version of the Intergovernmental Agreement, this clause remained in 
force. The current mechanism used to incorporate the “European Partner” into the general 
scheme of cooperation intended primarily for States participation will be discussed later on. 
In 1993 the original “Freedom” Space Station due to budgetary constraints was 
redesigned into the more conservative “Alpha” Space Station.15 At that time, when it had finally 
become clear that the Soviet Union had dissolved and the communist regime had been repealed, 
the United States decided to involve Russia in the Space Station international program. This 
decision was taken for a number of reasons, ranging from the desire to benefit from Russia’s 
                                                        
12 See, A. Farand, “Space Station Cooperation: Legal Arrangements,” in G. Lafferranderie and D. Crowther (eds.), 
Outlook on Space Law over the Next 30 Years (1997), at 126. 
13 See, F. G. von der Dunk, “International Space Law,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), 
at 115. 
14 See, A. Farand, “Space Station Cooperation: Legal Arrangements,” in G. Lafferranderie and D. Crowther (eds.), 
Outlook on Space Law over the Next 30 Years (1997), at 126-27. 
15 For a detailed discussion of the events that led to the space station redesign see, R.M. Bonnet and V. Manno, 
International Cooperation in Space: The Example of the European Space Agency (1994), at 112-19. 
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wealth of experience in human spaceflight to foreign policy objectives.16 On September 5, 1993, 
the human space programs of the United States and Russia became inextricably linked – 
something that would have been regarded impossible during the height of the Cold War – by an 
agreement signed by Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. A 
November addendum to the Space Programme Implementation Plan detailed the three-phase 
plan for the US-Russian space cooperation. “Phase One comprised combined operations with the 
Shuttle and Mir. Up to 10 Shuttle dockings with Mir were anticipated, with Russia providing two 
years of astronaut flying time on Mir, opening the door to the first long-duration flight 
experience for U.S. astronauts in more than 20 years. Phase Two foresaw the construction of a 
joint interim space facility, based upon a second-generation Mir module mated with a U.S. 
laboratory. Successful implementation of this initial structure could then lead to construction of a 
truly international space station in Phase Three.”17 
As a result of this major change, the original Intergovernmental Agreement and 
Memoranda of Understanding had to be amended. The 1988 Intergovernmental Agreement 
stipulated the lead role of the United States due to the overwhelming importance of the 
contribution of that State in the program but mainly because of the need to provide for a clear 
line of command and control in this endeavor. Understandably, Russia being involved in the 
project to a large extent, exceeding that of the non-US partners in the project, pressed for the 
Agreement renegotiation, which would reflect the qualitative and quantitative importance of its 
contributions to the International Space Station program. The Intergovernmental Agreement, 
thus, had to establish a balance between the Partners without prejudice to the genuine partnership 
concept. As a result, the lead role of the United States, and almost all of its original 
responsibilities in the overall program management and coordination were confirmed, but a large 
number of changes were made to reflect the new technical reality brought about primarily by 
Russia’s contributions but also by Europe’s redesign of its original contributions to the project.18 
 
7.1.2 Modern ISS Legal Framework 
In order to bring the enormous ISS project to fruition, a consortium of as of now fifteen 
nations has come together to construct and launch various elements. More than forty launches of 
                                                        
16 Id. at 130. 
17 P. Bond, The Continuing Story of the International Space Station (2002), at 66-67. 
18 Id. at 132. 
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the Space Shuttle and Russian expendable rockets were required to deliver the different pieces, 
with at least 850 hours of spacewalks to assemble and maintain the station during its construction 
phase alone. The historic moment came on October 31, 2000 – sixteen years after President 
Ronald Reagan first proposed the construction of an international space station, when a Soyuz 
rocket blasted off from the Baykonur Cosmodrome carrying the first in a long line of crews to 
permanently inhabit the ISS. The ISS program is the first-ever space exploration project to 
accomplish unprecedented things: the first time a partnership of nations has owned and operated 
a space station; the first time western agencies have been given access to previously secret 
Russian facilities; the first time training and control centers in many countries have been linked; 
the first time traffic involving multiple spacecraft built by many countries has been coordinated; 
the first attempts at large-scale commercial ventures, including space tourism; the deployment of 
the largest solar arrays ever placed in orbit; the first time a robot has handed over to another 
robot in human space flight; and the list keeps on growing.19 
The following legal structure providing the legal framework for the ISS massive project 
has been created. The 1998 Intergovernmental Agreement is the cornerstone of the specific legal 
regime pertaining to the ISS and its related activities. In accordance with Article 25 of the 
Intergovernmental Agreement it is a legally binding treaty subject to the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties. All other legal documents relating to ISS activities, 
negotiated either on a multilateral or on a bilateral basis, refer to and are based on it. Underneath 
the Intergovernmental Agreement there is a series of Memoranda of Understanding concluded 
between the Cooperating Agencies of the States parties.20 “At a third level all further 
implementing arrangements between the same entities form part of the ISS legal framework. The 
next tier of the hierarchy consists of contracts and subcontracts needed to involve private 
industry. These contracts mostly deal with the commercial uses of the ISS and address issues 
such as intellectual property rights.”21 
“The legal rules and principles developed, sui generis, to govern the operation of the ISS 
constitute a particularly interesting sub-section of space law. They are based on and consistent 
with the five U[nited] N[ations] space treaties but significantly expand their provisions in order 
                                                        
19 Id. at 2. 
20 See, F.G. von der Dunk, “Space Law in the Age of the International Space Station,” in L. Codignola et al. (eds.), 
Humans in Outer Space – Interdisciplinary Odysseys (2009), at 150. 
21 C. Sharpe and F. Tronchetti, “Legal Aspects of Public Manned Spaceflight and Space Station Operations,” in F. 
G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 631. 
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to provide a legal framework capable of adequately addressing the specific issues resulting from 
human activities on board a manned station orbiting in low earth orbit.”22 
The Intergovernmental Agreement regulates the important issue of liability between the 
cooperating parties, establishing a broadly construed cross-waiver of liability aiming at 
encouragement of “participation in the exploration, exploitation, and use of outer space through 
the ISS.”23 Since from the very beginning the ISS was planned as “a permanently inhabited civil 
international space station” serving for decades, it became apparent that specific legal regimes in 
addition to space law strictu sensu would become applicable to activities performed on board the 
space station.24 Questions of criminal jurisdiction, intellectual property, customs and 
immigration, and exchange of data and goods are effectively regulated by the Intergovernmental 
Agreement. With the commencement of space tourism flights to the ISS, the Crew Code of 
Conduct was developed and adopted by the partners. It seeks to differentiate between astronauts 
and cosmonauts, and flight participants, and to establish ‘ground rules’ of appropriate behavior 
on board the Station.  
By and large, the ISS legal framework though by no means comprehensive, is aimed at 
regulating those questions that are most likely to arise during months-long expeditions of 
complete strangers coming from different countries, cultures, and with introduction of leisure 
flights to the ISS, from different backgrounds, confined in a limited space twenty-four hours a 
day. Although these considerations are not purely legal, law in general, after all, is aimed at 
orderly regulation of relations between people; and in this case psychology is a relevant factor to 
consider when choosing areas of absolutely necessary regulation, in addition to regulation of 
intellectual property since primary goals of the ISS lie in the area of science and technology. The 
regulation, even if in the most broad terms, of these questions is an important element of 
cooperation in implementation of the large-scale long-term project: proactive regulation is 
required for the issues that might possibly cause tensions during the operative part of 
cooperation. “Overall, the ISS offers an example of how to manage international cooperation 
with respect to long-duration manned missions in outer space.”25 
                                                        
22 Id. at 619. 
23 Id. at 638. 
24 See, F.G. von der Dunk, “Space Law in the Age of the International Space Station,” in L. Codignola et al. (eds.), 
Humans in Outer Space – Interdisciplinary Odysseys (2009), at 152. 
25 C. Sharpe and F. Tronchetti, “Legal Aspects of Public Manned Spaceflight and Space Station Operations,” in F. 
G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 660. 
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Despite the great legal value of the ISS legal framework, it can hardly be considered a 
model for future cooperative endeavors in outer space exploration and use, but it can certainly be 
“a potential point of reference for either future world space organizations or for other long-term 
space projects of massive size and complexity.”26 Some authors even suggested that the ISS 
framework might serve as a basis for legal and institutional regulation of joint ventures in 
asteroid mining, erection of solar panels on the moon and space tourism.27 While the basic 
features of the ISS legal regime has been briefly addressed, it has more peculiar legal and 
technical provisions ensuring that the project continues to be successful and manageable on a 
day-to-day basis after the major agreements have been concluded and the first elements launched 
and assembled. The work on the Station is still going on, and in 2015 launch of the multipurpose 
laboratory module with the European Robotic Arm is planned.28 It has been seventeen years 
since the International Agreement and Memoranda of Understanding were signed and entered 
into force, and throughout this period the ISS partners have been able not only to cooperate 
within the initially envisioned framework, but to continue developing and enhancing the project, 
adding new modules and equipment, and extending duration of man’s habitation on board the 
Station.  
All that would not have been possible without the elaborated and continuously adjusted 
barter agreements between the partners, which are based on Article 9 of the Intergovernmental 
Agreement. Neither would any of it have been possible without the continuous work of organs 
and entities created to support the ISS project, including the Human Exploration and Operations 
Division, which provides policy guidance and program support for human exploration 
capabilities, systems development and operations; the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance 
working on safety, health and other medical matters; and the Multilateral Coordination Board 
tasked with development and adoption of yearly plans of the Station utilization and 
maintenance.29 For the ISS project the Russian crew-training center is being utilized; until 2011 
                                                        
26 F.G. von der Dunk, “International Space Law,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 
114. 
27 Cf., L.L. Manzione, Multinational Investment in the Space Station: An Outer Space Model for International 
Cooperation?, 18 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 507 (2002), at 510-11. 
28 European Space Agency, Building the Space Station, available at 
http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Human_Spaceflight/International_Space_Station/Building_the_International_Spa
ce_Station3. 
29 See, NASA Human Exploration and Operation Mission, available at 
http://oiir.hq.nasa.gov/human_exploration.html; РИА Новости, Международная Космическая Станция 
[International Space Station], available at http://ria.ru/spravka/20150114/1042556349.html. 
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the US Shuttles and Russian expendable rockets were utilized, and nowadays due to the Shuttles’ 
retirement only Russian launchers are being used. These are not merely technical specifics; they 
directly affect relations between the partners. For example, the barter principle necessitated that 
partners’ allocations are renegotiated with the Shuttles’ retirement, whereas the United States has 
become another user of the Russian rockets that are now the only transport to the Station.  
Acknowledging that the preceding discussion goes deep into the particularities which do 
not substantively affect the major, overarching legal regime as established by the 
Intergovernmental Agreement and Memoranda of Understanding, they are still relevant parts of 
the legal framework supporting the ISS project. Thereby, the ISS legal regime cannot and should 
not be considered a model for future similar, or probably more ambitious projects. Future 
projects will definitely differ in many ways, like the list of participants, their respective roles, 
technological and financial capabilities, purposes and goals of the project, its duration and many 
more. But the ISS legal regime can and should be considered a basis, a starting point, a point of 
reference for draftsmen of legal documents for future outer space manned long-term projects.30 
Hence, the analysis based on the six criteria should be performed. 
 
7.2 Six-Criteria Analysis 
 
7.2.1 Membership/Participation 
The Intergovernmental Agreement has been accepted by fifteen Partner States31 as well 
as by five Cooperating Agencies.32 Subsequently another State – Brazil – had effectively become 
a formal part of the legal construction supporting the ISS venture, but as a special partner, 
namely through a bilateral agreement with the United States under the arrangements pertinent to 
planned utilization by Brazil of the US modules of the ISS. In this context, the United States had 
                                                        
30 The ISS is considered a useful structure that can be adapted for future, even very different projects. However, it is 
not advocated as a model to ensure that future projects have significant flexibility in drafting their institutional and 
legal structure. 
31 United States, Canada, Japan, Russian Federation and 11 members of ESA, namely Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
32 NASA, Government of Japan coordinating activities of relevant national agencies, Roscosmos, Canadian Space 
Agency, ESA. 
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to notify in advance and seek consensus from the other partners.33 However, due to financial 
issues Brazil eventually left the project. 
In accordance with the Preamble and Article 3 of the 1998 Intergovernmental Agreement, 
fifteen States are considered parties to the Agreement and Partners to the ISS project. Article 4 
introduces the term ‘Cooperating Agencies’, which are responsible for implementation of Space 
Station cooperation. Article 4 enumerates five Cooperating Agencies responsible for cooperation 
on behalf of fifteen nations. This complex approach to participation in the project and the reasons 
behind using one shall be further explored. 
“From a public international law point of view the Intergovernmental Agreement can be 
considered a ‘mixed agreement’. Mixed agreements are defined as: ‘Agreements with a third 
party to which an international organization and its members are parties, each in respect of its 
own competence’.”34 There, however, has never emerged a clear legal reasoning behind the 
phenomenon of a mixed agreement, because motivation for conclusion of a mixed agreement 
varies from case to case. “In many cases the decision to conclude a mixed agreement is due to 
some kind of expediency,”35 but in practice this type of agreements has been utilized for 
European Union (and earlier European Community) participation in various forms of 
international cooperation, for example, membership in the World Trade Organization and the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations alongside its members.36 In case of the 
ISS there seems to be more to it. This aspect should be discussed in the context of questions of 
registration and jurisdiction – two issues that make the ISS venture clearly stand out from the 
legal point of view. 
At the initial stages of the Space Station project evolution – at that point without the 
Russian participation – scholars pointed at the legal complexities with regard to registration of 
the future station. It was acknowledged that most likely the modular construction would be 
pursued, which turned out to be correct. The issue of registration, in addition to “myriad 
problems of aspiration, coordination and integration requiring solution to enable this venture to 
                                                        
33 See, F.G. von der Dunk, “Space Law in the Age of the International Space Station,” in L. Codignola et al. (eds.), 
Humans in Outer Space – Interdisciplinary Odysseys (2009), at 150. 
34 C. Sharpe and F. Tronchetti, “Legal Aspects of Public Manned Spaceflight and Space Station Operations,” in F. 
G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 631-32. 
35 N.A. Neuwahl, Joint Participation in International treaties and the Exercise of Power by the EEC and Its Member 
States: Mixed Agreements, 28 Common Market L. Rev. 717 (1991), at 717. 
36 See, J. Heliskoski, Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International Relations of the European 
Community and its Member States (2001), at 2. 
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proceed on its envisaged international basis”37 was among the most pressing. “Stated succinctly, 
the difficulty lies with according proper recognition to the considerable investment of money and 
expertise in the venture made by the several partners.”38 
The initial proposal was for the United States to become the launching State as per 
provisions of the Registration Convention and consequently to become the State of registry. 
Later on it was suggested that “territorial application of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, not 
through the territory from which the space station is launched but through perceiving in law the 
space station as a piece of territory of its own and all activities taking place on board to be 
national activities, would solve the [] problems concerning seeming inapplicability and 
illogicality of application of the liability-regime through the launching state-notion.”39 Precisely 
this approach was endorsed by Article 5 of the 1998 Intergovernmental Agreement.40 
A unique special regime was established for registration and jurisdiction of the European 
modules of the ISS. “Although the European states party to the Intergovernmental Agreement are 
sovereign states as they signed the Agreement, they have jointly appointed ESA not only as their 
collective Cooperating Agency, but also as representing the ‘European Partner’. Consequently, 
the European modules have been registered by ESA which [] has acquired the right to operate as 
the ‘State of registration’. As ESA, however, is not a sovereign state, the exercise of 
‘jurisdiction’, a prerogative usually exclusively of sovereign states, requires further 
arrangements.”41 Such arrangements were provided as a matter of internal ESA procedure. 
But there is another reason to consider designation of ESA as a partner in the ISS 
undertaking a unique scenario. “ESA, as an intergovernmental organization consisting of 
sovereign member states, does not and cannot exercise jurisdiction and legal control in the 
normal sense of the word”42 precisely because an international organization is a ‘secondary’, 
artificially created subject of international law possessing only those powers and functions that 
                                                        
37 A.J. Young, Laws and Policy in the Space Stations’ Era (1989), at 287. 
38 Id. 
39 F.G. von der Dunk, “Pandora’s Box? The Basic Legal Framework for Doing Business with a Space Station: An 
Inventory of Problems,” in K. Tatsuzawa (ed.), Legal Aspects of Space Commercialization (1992), at 124.  
40 Agreement Among the Government of Canada, Governments of Member States of the European Space Agency, 
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41 C. Sharpe and F. Tronchetti, “Legal Aspects of Public Manned Spaceflight and Space Station Operations,” in F. 
G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 633. 
42 F.G. von der Dunk, “Space Law in the Age of the International Space Station,” in L. Codignola et al. (eds.), 
Humans in Outer Space – Interdisciplinary Odysseys (2009), at 153. 
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have been conferred upon it by the founding States. Despite the limited scope of its functions, 
despite the somewhat synthetic construction that was required to designate ESA the Cooperating 
Agency alongside national agencies of other Partners, it was considered beneficial and desirable 
to have an international organization as a same-level partner within this massive international 
cooperative project.  
And this signifies the new role played by international organizations in contemporary 
international space law: although it has been long acknowledged that international organizations 
are the only opportunity for many States to participate in space exploitation, the legal structure 
chosen for the ISS project indicates that international organizations are not merely vehicles for 
States’ commute into the club of spacefaring nations, but that they are already operating on a par 
with States. Dedicated space organizations akin to the European Space Agency possess required 
expertise, resources and States’ support to effectively and efficiently discharge functions 
normally vested in a sovereign State on behalf of its members, whereas member-States relying 
on the created entity may effectively withdraw from operative activities.  
By and large, since the Intergovernmental Agreement has fifteen Partner-States that 
signed the Agreement, only sovereign States are eligible to participate in the International Space 
Station project. Notwithstanding the primary role of the respective Agencies in practical 
implementation of the project, only States are considered parties to the Intergovernmental 
Agreement and, therefore, participants of the ISS cooperative undertaking at the highest legal 
level.  
While nowadays such a construction is logical and appropriate due to the type of 
international organizations participating in outer space exploration and use, in future the 
participation structure might well be amended. With the growing involvement of the European 
Union in outer space activities,43 and considering its unique status of a ‘regional integration 
organization’,44 or a supranational entity performing certain sovereign powers of its member-
                                                        
43 See, e.g., A. Froehlich, “European Space Agency and European Commission: Recent Rules for the European 
Space Sector,” in Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 2013 (2014); J. Wouters and R. Hansen, 
“The Other Triangle in European Space Governance: The European Union, the European Space Agency and the 
United Nations,” in Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 2013 (2014). 
44 European Union, International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, version from March 31, 2014, Part 10, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/outer-space-activities/index_en.htm. 
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States,45 it is plausible that in the next ‘space station’ project the European Union would 
participate on behalf of its member-States, whereas practical implementation might or might not 
be handed over to the European Space Agency. Acknowledging that at present day this prospect 
is a mere extrapolation of the current trends onto a non-existent theoretical future outer space 
project, still States-only participation in projects of similar scale and complexity should not be 
presumed an everlasting reality. The international legal landscape is constantly changing and 
evolving, and whereas in 1967 it was considered inappropriate for international organizations to 
become parties to the Outer Space Treaty, today the European Space Agency has been 
successfully preforming functions of the Cooperating Agency for almost twenty years. 
 
7.2.2 Secretariat 
The ISS framework does not provide for an entity performing secretarial functions. 
Article 24 of the Intergovernmental Agreement states: “In the view of the long-term, complex, 
and evolving character of their cooperation under this Agreement, the Partners shall keep each 
other informed of developments which might affect this cooperation. Beginning in 1999, and 
every three years thereafter, the Partners shall meet to deal with matters involved in their 
cooperation and to review and promote Space Station cooperation.” There are no additional 
provisions as to an appropriate format, place or time of the meetings. In practice the meetings are 
held on the level of the heads of the Cooperating Agencies and are convened at the ESA 
headquarters in Paris or in other ESA facility.46 These meetings are generally aimed at discussion 
of technical details and plans of the Station utilization, and financial support of the planned 
missions. For example, during the 2004 meeting “the ISS Partnership unanimously endorsed the 
ISS technical configuration and reviewed the status of ISS on-orbit operations and plans.”47  
                                                        
45 See, e.g., K. Archick, The European Union: Questions and Answers, Congressional Research Service 7-5700 
(2015), available at www.crs.gov; European Parliament, Fact Sheets on the European Union, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.4.1.html. 











Therefore, these meetings are designed to develop a uniform strategy of the Station 
exploitation by way of clarification of the Memoranda obligations, introduction of new areas of 
joint actions, and coordination of activities of the partners’ contractors and responsible agencies. 
Since the Intergovernmental Agreement is silent about the organizational part of the meetings 
and in practice they are held at different locations, and not precisely once in three years as 
stipulated by Article 24, but apparently as often as it is deemed necessary by the partners, the 
conclusion can be drawn that the secretarial functions for these meetings are performed by the 
hosting organization, namely the European Space Agency, and necessary arrangements are being 
made on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, this scheme fits perfectly in the overall system of the ISS 
regulation. The project is already big enough; it requires tremendous volume of coordination, 
communication and, at the same time, flexibility and opportunity to adjust joint actions 
depending on the arising needs. Hence, creation of a rigid structure supporting the triennial 
meetings would have been an undue complication and an additional item of expenditure. While 
the latter might be a drop in the ocean, the former is an unnecessary obstacle toward flexible 
communication in the spirit of partnership. 
Maintenance of the ISS proper functioning requires holding additional meetings on a 
regular basis, including those of the Multilateral Coordination Board. They are summoned as 
often as might be required and are principally dedicated to discussion of technological issues 
within the mandate of the organ. For example, at the 2001 Board meeting the partners granted 
flight exemption to Dennis Tito.48 Meetings of the Board and other similarly specialized organs, 
however, do not shape or affect international legal rights and obligations of the partners. These 
organs work under the umbrella of the ISS legal regime establishing their legal rights and 
obligations and are not empowered to alter them; rather they specify particular actions to be 
taken by the entities acting on behalf of the partners within the already existing legal framework. 
Thus, these particular organs should neither be considered organs of the ISS mechanism of 
cooperation in the international legal sense, nor should their organization and procedure be 
reviewed as a part of the six-criteria analysis of the international legal mechanism of 
cooperation.   
                                                        
48 Originally Mr. Tito was supposed to be launched to the Russian space station Mir. However, in the course of 
preparations Mir had to be de-orbited, and in order to honor the commitment the Russians were forced to change Mr. 
Tito’s destination to the Russian module of the ISS. For more information see, See, F.G. von der Dunk, “Space Law 
in the Age of the International Space Station,” in L. Codignola et al. (eds.), Humans in Outer Space – 
Interdisciplinary Odysseys (2009), at 154. 
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7.2.3 International Legal Personality 
International legal personality is not present in the ISS mechanism of cooperation, which 
is a logical outcome given the history of the project development. Stated succinctly, it was a 
situation where a former rival, one of the two first ‘space superpowers’ was invited in the 
project, and despite all the changes that had occurred after the Soviet Union dissolution, the 
doubts about Russia’s reliability and loyalty to international cooperation in the spirit of 
partnership still persisted. Another important historical consideration is the fact that the ISS is 
the first international space station ever created, and understandably it has been a challenge to 
provide for a satisfactory but nevertheless sensible procedure of work. The first experience, as in 
most other areas, demands close supervision of all parties involved, and delegation to a third 
party, even if created or hired by the owners of the project, is premature.  
Article 14 of the Intergovernmental Agreement states: “The Partners intend that the 
Space Station shall evolve through the addition of capability and shall strive to maximize the 
likelihood that such evolution will be effected through contributions from all the Partners. To 
this end, it shall be the object of each Partner to provide, where appropriate, the opportunity to 
the other Partner to cooperate in its proposals for additions of evolutionary capability.” Although 
the primary objective of this Article is to oblige partners to make efforts to accommodate 
proposal of other partners to develop the Station, it also underscores that any developments and 
enhancements to the Station can only be done by the partners themselves and with appropriate 
coordination with other partners. 
Article 23 continues: “The Partners, acting through their Cooperating Agencies, may 
consult with each other on any matter arising out of Space Station cooperation.” By way of this 
provision any and all matters regarding the International Space Station are to be discussed and 
resolved by direct communication between the partners, thereby excluding possibility of any 
intermediary-separate-subject-of-international-law acting on behalf of the States or performing 
legally significant acts. Therefore, three out of four criteria characteristic for an entity possessing 
international legal personality are not fulfilled: while the ISS mechanism of cooperation is an 
association of States with lawful objectives, it does not have organs performing functions in the 
legal realm of cooperation; only the organs charged with technical responsibilities of the Station 
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maintenance have been created. Consequently, no international legal powers can be attributed to 
such non-legal organs. 
 
7.2.4 Term of Existence 
The term of existence criterion as applied to the ISS is comprised of two elements: the 
term of existence of the Intergovernmental Agreement as the legal basis for the project, and the 
term of existence of the Station as a physical object placed in orbit as a result of cooperation. The 
Intergovernmental Agreement has been created for an unlimited time. Part 5 of Article 28 
“Withdrawal” in principle envisions the possibility of termination of the partners’ rights and 
obligations, but does not explicitly state so or explain the exact procedure of such a termination. 
Therefore, the Agreement should be presumed as created for an indefinite period of time.  
The term of existence of the Space Station itself, however, cannot be indefinite due to 
laws of physics, including the regrettable feature of all real things to wear out and sooner or later 
to come to the end of its existence. Initially the Space Station was expected to work for twenty 
years, but now the plan has been revised to maintain the Station until at least 2024.49 There is a 
possibility that the Station’s de-orbiting deadline would be further postponed depending on the 
available funding and the Station’s overall condition.  
Therefore, from a legal perspective the ISS mechanism of cooperation has been created 
for an indefinite period of time. It logically correlates with the purpose of the Station, namely 
scientific and technical research: as long as the partners are interested in continuing the research, 
and correspondingly funding the Station’s operation, it would exist, with the caveat of the 
physical limitations on the term of its existence.50 
 
7.2.5 Binding Force of Documents Produced 
The legal characterizations of most elements of the ISS legal regime cause little 
controversy: the Intergovernmental Agreement is a legally binding treaty, whilst the legal nature 
                                                        
49 NASA: Obama Extends International Space Station Operation Until at least 2024, The Washington Post, January 
8, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/nasa-space-station-operation-
extended-by-obama-until-2024-at-least/2014/01/08/9819d5c8-788e-11e3-8963-b4b654bcc9b2_story.html. 
50 The representative of Roscosmos announced that Roscosmos and NASA will work together on the project of a 
new orbital station. But he added that both parties “do not rule out that the station’s flight could be extended”, and 
that “its term of existence will depend on the implementation of our joint projects. See, Russia Announces Plan to 
Build New Space Station with NASA, Phys.org, March 28, 2015, available at http://phys.org/news/2015-03-russia-
space-station-nasa.html. 
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of the implementing arrangements, and of contracts and subcontracts is primarily based on 
international private law. The legal nature of the Memoranda of Understanding, however, is a 
more controversial issue. The objective of the Memoranda - space agencies-level agreements - is 
to describe in detail the roles and responsibilities of the agencies in design, development 
operation and utilization of the Station. In addition, the agreements serve to establish the 
management structure and interfaces necessary to ensure effective utilization of the Station.51 
There is, however, no general agreed definition of what a memorandum of understanding is as a 
matter of law. “A Memorandum of Understanding is more formal that a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ 
but ‘less than a contract’. It may, but need not, precede a contract. It is certainly a record (not 
necessarily exhaustive) of what the parties intend. In a mutual enterprise it is what the parties set 
down as their respective commitments, which may include financial provisions, but the 
‘obligations’ enunciated are not to be founded on as a matter of law. In itself it can be a form of 
‘soft law’.”52 
Therefore, a memorandum of understanding seems to be a type of arrangement that 
registers a political and moral commitment of its parties to conduct itself in a certain way. But in 
the case of the ISS project, the Memoranda of Understanding initially preceded the 1988 
International Agreement, thereby suggesting that at first they had been considered a sufficient 
legal basis for the endeavor. Furthermore, after Russia’s accession to the project all underlying 
documents had to be renegotiated, and should the form of a memorandum be considered not 
stringent enough to record specific obligations of the partners, it could have been substituted for 
a different type of document. But it has not. It has been suggested that because of the 
Memoranda’s close links with the Intergovernmental Agreement, “it would appear that the Space 
Station M[emoranda] O[f] U[nderstanding] will have acquired the status of international 
agreement, as an exception to the general practice in this field. Canada confirmed, through an 
official communication dated 29 September 1988 from the Canadian Ambassador in Washington 
to the State Department, that it was the intention of Canada to consider the M[emorandum] O[f] 
                                                        
51 European Space Agency, International Space Station Legal Framework, available at 
http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Human_Spaceflight/International_Space_Station/International_Space_Station_le
gal_framework. 
52 F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 37. 
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U[nderstanding] as an international agreement from the date of entry into force of the 
Intergovernmental Agreement for Canada.”53 
By no means is there a clear-cut answer to the question of the Memoranda’s legal nature. 
The scope of their provisions and the overall thrust of establishing roles and responsibilities of 
the partners in contribution to the project suggest a conclusion that they are more than non-
binding documents. At the same time, they should not be considered ‘hard law’ because the very 
fact that the Canadian Ambassador considered it necessary and appropriate to opine on his 
country’s intent to treat the Memorandum as a binding agreement is suggestive of the uncertainty 
about the legal nature of the document. This ‘intermediate’ nature of the Memoranda should not 
be considered a weakness of the ISS legal regime, but an evidence of the complicated task its 
draftsmen were faced with: creation of a relatively sophisticated regulatory framework in outer 
space that was compatible with the rules of international law and would provide the code by 
which crews from different countries and cultures would be able to live and work together over 
long periods.54 
Some authors have described the ISS legal framework, including the Intergovernmental 
Agreement and the Memoranda of Understanding, as a “complex of legal and sub-legal 
arrangements,”55 whereas the latter characteristic obviously pertains to the Memoranda. 
Notwithstanding a somewhat ‘inferior’ characterization of the Memoranda from a purely 
legalistic treaty-law perspective, they are still an integral part of the legal regime, and should be 
treated as such. 
 
7.2.6 Existence of Opportunity to Modify Obligations 
Both the Intergovernmental Agreement and the Memoranda of Understanding allow 
amendments. Article 27 of the Agreement requires that all amendments, except for those made 
exclusively to the Annex, be “subject to ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession by those 
States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.” So while there are no limits 
to the scope of amendments, the respective States are required to incorporate all amendments 
into their national legal systems to ensure that no State would become unable to comply with its 
                                                        
53 A. Farand, “Space Station Cooperation: Legal Arrangements,” in G. Lafferranderie and D. Crowther (eds.), 
Outlook on Space Law over the Next 30 Years (1997), at 129. 
54 Id. at 133. 
55 F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), at 122.  
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obligations. It is reasonable to presume that this provision stems from the US foreign relations 
practice, because it was first included in the 1988 Intergovernmental Agreement, which was 
drafted under the United States leadership.  
In accordance with the Treaty Clause of the United States Constitution, the President has 
the power “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur.” Since the 1950s, however, the presidents have used their 
executive power more often to conclude international agreements in the form of executive 
agreements, which do not require advice and consent of the Senate. In case the Senate disagreed 
with the actions taken by the President, it used the most powerful tool at its disposal – budget 
appropriations, and cut off funding for implementation of an international agreement concluded 
in the form of a presidential executive agreement. So while the United States continued to be 
bound on the international plane, internally the president remained powerless to implement such 
an agreement.56  
Funding is crucial for the normal functioning of the Space Station. Article 15 provides 
that each partner bears the costs of fulfilling its respective responsibilities, and in the event that 
funding problems arise that may affect a partner’s ability to fulfill its responsibilities, that partner 
is required to notify and consult with other partners in a timely manner. Therefore, the 
‘incorporation clause’ of Article 27 excludes at least one scenario leading to funds insufficiency, 
namely an internal constitutional conflict between the executive and legislative branches. 
Maintenance of appropriate funding in other situations remains a responsibility of the partners. 
The Intergovernmental Agreement, being a legally binding document, however, does not 
contain provisions regulating reservations. Hence, formulation of reservations to the Agreement 
is regulated by Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties. 
Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention states that formulating a reservation is prohibited in case 
the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. The United Nations 
International Law Commission explained: “A reservation is incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the treaty if it affects an essential element of the treaty that is necessary to its general 
                                                        
56 For more information see, C.A. Bradley, J.L. Goldsmith (eds.), Foreign Relations: Cases and Materials (2014), at 
467-473; G.S. Krutz, J.S. Peake, Treaty Politics and the Rise of Executive Agreements: International Commitments 
in a System of Shared Powers (2009), at 24-50. 
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tenor, in such a way that reservation impairs the raison d’être of the treaty.”57 The object and 
purpose of the treaty should be determined taking into account terms of the treaty in their 
context, in particular the title and the preamble, preparatory work, circumstances of its 
conclusion and subsequent practice.58  
The preamble of the Intergovernmental Agreement pronounces: “Convinced that working 
together on the civil international Space Station will further expand cooperation through the 
establishment of a long-term and mutually beneficial relationship, and will further promote 
cooperation in the exploration and peaceful use of outer space.” The subsequent practice of the 
ISS exploitation proved that intensive cooperation and coordination have been the key to the 
project’s success. The ISS history and the Agreement’s preparatory work also evidence that 
search for a common ground for cooperation and development of the legal framework 
satisfactory to all parties concerned have been the project’s cornerstone. Taken together, it seems 
that formulation of reservations to the Intergovernmental Agreement is not permissible because 
they would have been detrimental to its object and purpose, namely development of a legal 
regime for an unprecedented space project requiring an unprecedented level of cooperation.  
In accordance with Article 39 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 
amendments to treaties are made “by agreement between the parties,” while a reservation is 
defined as a “unilateral statement” excluding or modifying the legal effect of a certain provision 
of a treaty.59 Therefore, while amendments to the Intergovernmental Agreement made by 
agreement between the ISS partners and governed by Articles 39, 40 and 41 of the Vienna 
Convention are permissible because they do not undermine the cooperative, or collective method 
of work, unilateral reservations are incompatible with the object and purpose of the Agreement. 
The Memoranda of Understanding also have amendments clauses. For example, Article 
20 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration of the United States of America and the Russian Space Agency Concerning 
Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station states that the Memorandum can be 
amended at any time by written agreement of the parties, and that any amendment must be 
consistent with the Intergovernmental Agreement. 
                                                        
57 United Nations International Law Commission, Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties 2011, Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission, Vol. II, Part Two (2011), at para. 3.1.5. 
58 Id. at para. 3.1.5.1. 
59 Id. at para. 1.1. 
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7.3 Evaluation and Conclusions 
 
Overall, the ISS mechanism of cooperation can be summarized as follows. It is a 
cooperative mechanism created for an indefinite period, open only to States’ participation,60 
utilizing the secretariat of the hosting organization during its meetings, not possessing 
international legal personality and created by a legally binding international agreement explicitly 
allowing amendments. The enumerated features are characteristic for a traditional international 
treaty.  
In Chapter 1 it has been noted that every international organization is created by an 
international treaty, but the mechanism of cooperation itself is the respective international 
organization and not the constituent treaty. That is so because States parties to the treaty and 
consequently members of the organization are cooperating by way of the organs and other 
mechanisms of the created international organization, and not by using the treaty provisions. In 
other words, operation of the organization is based on the treaty, and inter-State cooperation is 
based on the international organization.  
The Intergovernmental Agreement is the legal basis for the more specialized methods of 
cooperation necessary for the International Space Station maintenance and management. These 
methods, however, are not legal in the sense that they do not create, modify or terminate legal 
rights and obligations of their parties on the international plane. An international organization 
created by a treaty, by contrast, possesses international legal personality and is normally granted 
certain rights and obligations by its founding States, so becomes capable of performing actions 
that create, modify or terminate legal rights and obligations. Therefore, the Intergovernmental 
Agreement is itself an international legal mechanism of cooperation that created a basis for 
establishment of both non-legal (technical cooperation) and non-international (agreements 
regulated by private law) mechanisms of cooperation necessary to fulfill the project, which the 
international legal cooperation was instituted for.  
By and large, from the international legal perspective, the ISS project is founded on and 
administered by a single international treaty – the Intergovernmental Agreement. But the 
                                                        
60 As explained above, strictly speaking, the States are the ones to sign the agreement, so despite the fact that 
European States handed the management over to ESA, they remain parties to the Agreement, not ESA. Although the 
role of ESA is unique in many ways, it cannot be considered party to the ISA. 
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operational structure of the project is materially more complicated. There are two ‘branches’ of 
cooperation derived from the Agreement – legal and technical. The legal ‘branch’ is represented 
by the Memoranda of Understanding, additional technical arrangements between the 
Cooperating Agencies, and the contracts and subcontracts needed to involve private industry, and 
nowadays also the Crew Code of Conduct. This ‘branch’ using ‘soft law’ documents, inter-
agency agreements and contracts regulated by private law governs the roles and responsibilities 
of the Cooperating Agencies in the design, development, operation and utilization of the Station, 
substantiates technical side of cooperation, and establishes roles and functions of the respective 
Agencies and their contractors and subcontractors. None of these documents constitute 
international legally binding documents strictu sensu, but they all affect legal rights and 
obligations of the partners and are expected to be adhered to due to their close connection to the 
Intergovernmental Agreement.  
The technical ‘branch’ consists of standards pertaining to technical and scientific 
implementation of the project, including crews training, operation of control centers and 
standards of equipment compatibility. This ‘branch’ is distinguishable from the legal ‘branch’ by 
the non-legal character of regulation, but is based on the provisions of the latter; at the same 
time, the Intergovernmental Agreement is the foundation of both ‘branches’. In other words, 
while the Memoranda of Understanding and the agreements regulated by private law do not 
constitute a legal basis for this technical cooperation – precisely because, as it has been explained 
above, they are not strictly speaking binding on the international plane – they do shape the scope 
and the nature of technical cooperation. For example, the Memoranda of Understanding cannot 
be considered legally binding and they rather elaborate the Intergovernmental Agreement’s 
provisions. While the Memoranda, being the more specific documents containing respective 
rights and obligations of the partners, create the basis for technical cooperation, the 
Intergovernmental Agreement is the one to be considered the legal basis for such technical 
cooperation from a strictly legal perspective. The bottom line is that the Intergovernmental 
Agreement, legally speaking, is the sole legal source of cooperation in the ISS project, whereas 
in practice all layers of the ISS legal regime are interconnected and affect each other’s operation. 
Generally, the ISS mechanism of cooperation is created by and functions as the 
international treaty. A single treaty, supplemented by the legally non-binding Memoranda of 
Understanding between the Cooperating Agencies and several other tiers of documents, acts as a 
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legal basis for the largest international cooperative endeavor in outer space. It has been argued 
that in international law a distinction exists between ‘law-making’ treaties and ‘contract’ treaties, 
where only the former should be considered a source of international law because they impose 
the same obligations on all parties to the treaty and seek to regulate parties’ behavior over a long 
period of time.61 While this differentiation might be misleading in the context of the theory of 
sources of international law, it is quite helpful in the analysis of particular treaties, especially of 
their practical application.62 There are only a few treaties that can be firmly designated to one 
category or the other, since most treaties contain provisions that fall within both categories. 
Particularly, in the context of the International Space Station, an Intergovernmental Agreement 
also has elements of both ‘lawmaking’ and ‘contract’ treaty, but it is suggested that, judging 
primarily by the way the Agreement is structured and operates in practice, it should be 
tentatively labeled a ‘framework-contract-treaty’.  
Out of the Agreement’s twenty-eight articles only six do not refer to the Memoranda of 
Understanding as documents containing detailed procedures, obligations, responsibilities and the 
like. The Agreement undertakes to outline the overall structure, scheme of cooperation, where 
only the most important issues are to be regulated in detail, for example the cross-waiver of 
liability principle, criminal jurisdiction and intellectual property jurisdiction, general procedures 
of communication and management. The Intergovernmental Agreement, however, does not 
contain specifics as to the required level of funding, provision of the Space Station 
communications, launch and return transportation services, and suchlike. It is beyond question 
that inclusion of detailed provisions relating to the Station’s maintenance and exploitation would 
have been inappropriate and inconvenient. But at this point the conclusion should be drawn that 
the Agreement has been intentionally drafted to provide only a framework that has three 
elements: the overall scheme of cooperation, provisions regulating certain issues deemed 
substantively important for the whole project, and general obligations of the partners that are to 
be specified in the Memoranda of Understanding and implementing arrangements.  
The remainder myriad of questions are to be addressed using the more specialized either 
‘soft law’ instruments or technical agreements. Hence, while the Intergovernmental Agreement 
indeed has imposed certain obligations to regulate partners’ behavior over the term of the ISS 
                                                        
61 See, P. Malanczuk, Akehursts’s Modern Introduction to International Law (1997), at 37-38. 
62 Id. at 38.  
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project, on the whole it is concerned with creating a blueprint, a map for the States to use on the 
road toward the Space Station of their dreams. In other words, the Agreement has not attempted 
to micromanage legal and technical issues that might arise throughout the decades-long project. 
Instead, it focused on those areas that necessarily have to be regulated and those that have not 
ever been regulated before, leaving the rest to be decided ‘on the go’.  
Overall, the ISS project has provided a successful legal basis for prospective manned 
exploration and use of outer space. “It has shown that governments can collaborate on 
technological, financial, political and legal levels to produce successful projects that provide for 
the benefit of all with little dispute and operational difficulty.”63 It has shown that governments 
can successfully cooperate despite their political or economic differences, that mutual interest in 
cooperation helps overcoming any controversies and work toward an acceptable solution even if 
it means re-drawing the initial project. Moreover, the ISS project has underlined the importance 
of a structural approach to the legal regulation of complex long-term space endeavors. A multi-
layered legal framework has allowed distinguishing matters worthy of inter-State overarching 
agreement, matters that are better dealt with on a bilateral level thereby ensuring sufficient 
flexibility, and issues that should be left to self-regulation of the immediate agencies and entities 
involved.  
“Many challenges await the international community. However, if nations can maintain 
the same level of collaboration and willingness to cooperate that has characterized the ISS 
experience, it is likely that future outer space endeavors would be structured in a cohesive way 
leading to success.”64 The ISS endeavor is more than an example of successful cooperation, it is 
a precedent of a level of coordination unseen before, and certainly it is a precedent of a precisely-
tailored legal regulation that takes into consideration not only the envisioned goals of the project, 
but also the goals of its participants, the need to preserve flexibility to allow adaptation 
throughout the long-term functioning of the station along with the need to preserve a certain 
level of stability, mainly by assuring partners that their rights cannot be threatened by a unilateral 
action. The choice of a ‘framework-contract-treaty’ structure has played a significant part in the 
overall success of the project, from both practical and legal points of view. 
                                                        
63 C. Sharpe and F. Tronchetti, “Legal Aspects of Public Manned Spaceflight and Space Station Operations,” in F. 
G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 659. 
64 Id. at 661. 
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That is the approach that has to be adopted for future international cooperative projects of 
similar scale and complexity. The need to separate legal issues from technical, administrative, 
logistical and other similar issues is not the only lesson to be learned, albeit it is clearly an 
essential element in the ISS project’s success. Neither it is suggested that copying every single 
feature of the ISS mechanism of cooperation, including the participation open solely to States 
and the absent organ performing secretarial functions, would be justified for future projects. 
Rather, the overarching modus operandi is something to be propagated in future similar projects. 
Large-scale technically complex multi-national long-term outer space projects have one 
immutable characteristic – they are bound to be evolving over the years, and the ISS partners 
have acknowledged this feature when drafting the Intergovernmental Agreement.  
At the present state of outer space technology it is impossible to assemble a space station 
suitable for permanent inhabitation on earth and launch it into outer space in one piece. Thereby, 
construction of a similar or larger space station would necessarily have an assembly period, 
which in the case of the ISS lasted over 11 years. But even completion of the main body of the 
station does not mean that the evolution is over; to the contrary, incessant development of 
science and technology allows enhancing the station and its capabilities, introducing new 
elements and planning new missions and researches. The unceasing evolution is more than a 
technological process; it also means that legal rights and obligations would also be subject to 
adaptation. This is precisely the reason for choosing a flexible, a framework-contract-like legal 
basis for cooperation. On the one hand, it allows distinguishing between legal and all other 
matters, leaving lawyers to deal with the former and keeping them out of the latter. On the other, 
it creates a firm legal basis for cooperation and inter-partner relations, at the same time leaving 
particularities to be dealt with at the practical applications stage and not on an abstract, 
conceptual level.  
It has been suggested earlier that inclusion of international organizations in the list of 
eligible participants is one possible modification to the space station mechanism of cooperation. 
Opening up the mechanism to the international organizations would not substantively alter the 
cooperative approach advocated above, though, certain changes would have to be made; 
particularly questions of jurisdiction and ownership would have to be revisited.  
Another possible modification might be the creation of a separate dedicated international 
organization tasked with the project management and supervision. The scholarly work dating to 
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the late 1970s proposed utilizing a regional international intergovernmental organization as a 
possible mechanism of space station operation.65 Utilization of a regional organization might not 
be exactly justified if, as in the case of the ISS, participating States do not belong to the same 
region, but the idea of an international organization charged with project management should not 
be completely disregarded.  
Surrender of operating rights to a specially created international organization in principle 
remains a possibility, but that would require an unprecedented, even compared to that exhibited 
in the ISS project, level of cooperation and trust among cooperating States. Such an 
organization’s constitutive treaty would have to be meticulously drafted to provide it with 
powers sufficient to perform both legal and technical management and supervision of the project, 
on the one hand, and to preserve a satisfactory level of control of States-parties over the project, 
on the other. Undoubtedly, utilization of an international organization mechanism of cooperation 
for the project similar to the International Space Station would require substantial rework of the 
structure of the parties’ rights and obligations, ownership and jurisdiction, and the like. In the 
end, while theoretically this is a possibility, utilization of an international organization as a 
mechanism of cooperation for a large-scale international space project, remains a very distant 
possibility.66  
Substitution of the treaty mechanism of cooperation for an international organization, 
therefore, would be a major change. Nevertheless, even with an international organization 
charged with the project management, the advocated approach, namely a flexible, a framework-
contract-like legal basis for cooperation, still can and should be followed. 
An international organization is created by an international treaty; the constituent treaty 
might be very comprehensive, establishing the organization’s structure, competence and 
procedures in great detail, simultaneously creating substantive rules applicable to the issues 
subject to the organization’s mandate. Alternatively, it might be limited to creation of an 
international organization by way of framing its mandate and applicable methods of work, 
                                                        
65 See, D.D. Smith, Space Stations: International Law and Policy (1979), at 195. 
66 E.g., see A. Guzman, Doctor Frankenstein’s International Organizations, 24 Eur. J. Int’l L. 999 (2013), where the 
authors persuasively argues that States are very cautious in providing international organizations with any 
significant authority, especially mandating organizations to adopt legally binding decisions. In the same vein, it is 
plausible to suggest that entrusting an international organization with management of an extremely expensive outer 
space station would take a major reconsideration of States’ attitude toward creation of powerful international 
organizations. The author, however, suggests that States and the whole process of international cooperation would 
significantly benefit from a less cautious approach to the authority granted to international organizations. 
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leaving other details to be decided by the organization’s plenary or executive organs. If the latter 
scenario is used, then the organization preserves the ability to act when the time is ripe, when 
there is a need for action.  
The international organization mechanism of cooperation is not an obvious choice, at 
least currently. It is a whole new level of cooperation and trust compared to the international 
treaty mechanism, where each State retains complete control over its part of the Station. It seems 
that only if the member-States of the European Union were to create a European Space Station, 
could an organization have been a viable option; there is hardly any other combination of States 
that would have been a probable candidate for using the international organization as a 
mechanism of cooperation in the space station project. There are multiple other arguments 
against this option: the complicated and lengthy lawmaking procedure characteristic to 
international organizations; the high costs of the organization’s maintenance; the inability of an 
organization to become a ‘full’ party to the Outer Space Treaty and three elaborating 
conventions; the need to circumvent the organization’s inability to exercise jurisdiction and 
control in the normal sense of the word; and others.  
At this point, there is no need to insist on the international organization’s option; quite to 
the contrary, presently there is a need to advocate against this option. But the time may come 
when an international organization would be the best possible mechanism of cooperation for 
large-scale international outer space projects. Stephen Hawking has asserted that if the human 
species is to continue beyond the next hundred years, its future is in space. Elon Musk of SpaceX 
has posited the goal of establishing ourselves as a multi-planetary species.67 And if these 
projections were to become a new reality, intensive international cooperation in the 
technologically sophisticated area of space applications would play a crucial role. Nowadays, the 
ISS experience should be considered the most successful example of international cooperation in 
the realm of space applications, from both practical and institutional perspectives. 
                                                        
67 See, L. Brennan, Why China’s Space Program Stands Out, cnn.com, May 29, 2015. 
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In this chapter the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (“CEOS”) will be 
analyzed. In some parts of CEOS underlying documents the entity is designated as an 
“international organization” and its participants are named “Members and Associates”,1 while in 
others it is characterized as a “forum” for coordination. CEOS, thus, is an interesting subject for 
the institutional analysis, requiring a comprehensive review of the Committee’s structure and 
procedural elements to determine the legal nature of this mechanism of cooperation. First, the 
distinctive elements of the entity will be reviewed. Second, the analysis based on the proposed 
criteria will follow leading to the conclusion about the category of cooperation CEOS belongs to. 
Third, based on the analysis of the goals the founding States were aiming to achieve by way of 
establishing CEOS and the results that have been achieved so far, conclusions will be offered 
about the effectiveness of this mechanism. 
CEOS “was established in September 1984 in response to a recommendation from a 
Panel of Experts on Remote Sensing from Space that was set up under the aegis of the G7 
Economic Summit of Industrial Nations Working Group on Growth, Technology and 
Employment.”2 Since then the number of Earth-observing satellites has vastly increased, and 
CEOS reported in late 2013 that it was overseeing one-hundred and seven space satellite 
missions from over twenty States and several international organizations. In 2015 the total 
number of overseen satellites increased to one hundred and thirty-five from fifty-five 
participating Agencies.3 The mission of CEOS is to ensure “international coordination of civil 
space-based Earth observation programs and promote exchange of data to optimize societal 
benefit and inform decision making for securing a prosperous and sustainable future for 
humankind.”4 At the outset it should be observed that space satellite missions oversight and 
                                                        
1 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, Governance and Processes (November, 2013), at 3, www.ceos.org. 
2 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, Strategic Guidance (November, 2013), www.ceos.org. 
3 See, Y. Yamamoto, 2015 Activities of the CEOS, 2015 International Astronautical Congress, Technical Session 
“International Cooperation in Earth Observation Missions,” IAC-15.B1.1.1. Not yet published as of November 
2015. 
4 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, Terms of Reference (November, 2013), at 2, www.ceos.org. 
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operations enumerated in the CEOS mission are all of a long-term character, requiring 
continuous cooperation and management.  
The CEOS underlying documents state that Members and Associates, collectively 
referred to as the Agencies, have affirmed the value of cooperation in the development and 
management of remote sensing and associated data management systems, and the need for 
optimization of national programs to avoid redundancy among systems. And the Agencies “have 
agreed to continue to informally coordinate their current and planned systems for Earth 
observation from space through the organization of CEOS.”5 In other words, the agreement has 
been reached to informally coordinate national activities, and not to establish a supervisory 
mechanism charged with coordination of such activities in a formal, rigid manner, in spite of the 
continuous nature of CEOS operations. Achievement of long-term goals, thereby, is not made 
dependent on utilization of formalized methods of coordination. 
The work of CEOS is conducted through a number of permanent and temporary 
organizational mechanisms. The Secretariat, the Strategic Implementation Team, the CEOS 
Executive Officer, the CEOS Systems Engineering Office, the Working Groups and the Virtual 
Constellations are the main permanent organs of the Committee. CEOS also utilizes the Troika – 
prior year, current year and future year CEOS Chairs – to allow CEOS leaders to exchange ideas 
and discuss issues regarding current year achievements, and direction, strategy, plans and 
expectations for the following years. While it is not clear if the Troika is a permanently 
functioning mechanism, it is logical to infer that it is commenced after the annual Plenary 
meeting: it allows looking back at the year that passed taking into consideration information 
shared during the Plenary, and work on future plans and strategy again taking into consideration 
opinions voiced at the meeting. Additionally, capability exists for the Plenary to create Ad Hoc 
Teams in case of permanent mechanisms’ insufficiency or existing need to address specific, 
short-term activities.  
Two other permanent CEOS mechanisms are the Working Groups and Virtual 
Constellations, which are described as “permanent working-level mechanism[s] for coordinating 
CEOS Agency assets.”6 They are charged with fulfillment of technical tasks, such as calibration, 
validation, capacity building and coordination in development of a set of common requirements 
                                                        
5 Id.  
6 Id. at 7. 
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for space- and ground-based systems.7 The Working Groups’ activities are intimately connected 
with and complimentary to the work of the Virtual Constellations; so to ensure proper 
communication and avoid discrepancies in their activities both mechanisms report to the 
Strategic Implementation Team Chair, while the Working Groups also report directly to the 
CEOS Chair. This mechanism, on the one hand, establishes a single point of contact and 
supervision for organs working essentially on similar tasks, and on the other, makes the Working 
Groups a ‘cross-cutting’ mechanism within CEOS connecting working-level organs with 
governing-level organs.  
The CEOS Plenary meetings are held annually in October-November. They are hosted, 
organized and chaired by the CEOS Chair.8 The CEOS Chair is elected for a one-year term, as 
will be discussed in detail further, so every next Plenary meeting is convened in a new place 
depending on the location of the current Chair. The agenda of the Plenary sessions and voting 
procedures are of relevance to the present analysis. The underlying documents emphasize that 
flexibility in fixing meetings’ objectives is necessary, and that CEOS “should be viewed as a 
place where organizations can gather to accomplish specific goals that are relevant to them, with 
no pressure to participate in activities that are of less interest or for which they do not have 
resources.”9 Additionally, the CEOS underlying documents explain that past experience has 
demonstrated that the resources, fields of interest, competences, and strengths of the CEOS Chair 
team and the Strategic Implementation Team Chair team vary, and that both teams should 
complement each other, what can only be achieved through dialogue. Thus, flexibility in the 
definition of the objectives for both the Plenary and Strategic Implementation Team meetings 
allows adjusting their agendas to target CEOS needs, and consequently allows both teams to 
adjust their respective agendas by inclusion of the most relevant topics and, at the same time, 
avoiding repetitiveness and overlaps among these meetings.  
The voting procedure is similarly flexible. The consensus decision-making procedure has 
been chosen in order to optimize agreement of the CEOS Agencies and maximize their 
commitment to deliver their best effort. However, unlike the consensus procedure adopted within 
the United Nations system, here consensus signals only a presence of “a significant number” of 
Agencies supporting the decision. Absence of support for a particular activity by a specific 
                                                        
7 Id. at 7. 
8 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, Terms of Reference (November, 2013), at 4, www.ceos.org. 
9 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, Governance and Processes (November, 2013), at 17, www.ceos.org. 
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Agency does not prevent adoption of a decision “if sufficient support is available.” Hence, it can 
be concluded that only a majority support is required, whereas deference to the consensual 
method is rather a political move designed to circumvent voting and create an atmosphere of 
friendship, not competition, as it is common for organs utilizing a majority voting procedure. 
Overall, despite the elaborate institutional structure, CEOS is striving to preserve flexibility of 
the methods of work, providing for extensive opportunities for dialogue on different levels of 
cooperation, expeditious adjustment of subjects under consideration as might be necessary, and 
opting for a ‘relaxed’ version of the consensus voting procedure. The need for ‘informal 
coordination’ is put at the front and center of this entity, as will be confirmed by the following 
analysis.  
 
8.2 Six-Criteria Analysis 
 
8.2.1 Membership/Participation 
CEOS allows participation of different types of subjects. Participation in CEOS can be 
either in the form of a Member, or an Associate. International and national governmental 
organizations responsible for a civil space-based Earth observation program currently operating 
or at least in the detailed design phase are eligible for the status of a Member in CEOS. 
International and national governmental organizations that have a civil space-based activity in 
concept feasibility and definition phases, and satellite coordination groups and international 
scientific or governmental bodies that have significant programmatic activity that supports 
CEOS objectives are eligible for a status of an Associate.10  
While Associates may fully participate in the Plenary and Working Groups discussions, 
only the approval of Members is necessary to establish consensus in the decision-making 
process. This formula resembles the procedure used in the World Health Organization. The 
World Health Assembly may grant a status of observer to “any organization, international or 
national, governmental or non-governmental, which has responsibilities related to those of the 
Organization.”11 Observers are allowed to participate in meetings and committees of the 
                                                        
10 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, Terms of Reference (November, 2013), at 3, www.ceos.org. 
11 Art. 18 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, in World Health Organization Basic Documents, 
Forty-fifth Ed., Supp. (2006). 
 274 
Organization, but they are not granted the right to vote. In the absence of a general ‘law of 
international organizations’ there is no universal definition of the status of observer, there is no 
unified understanding of the rights and responsibilities of an observer to an international 
organization.12 Generally, the practice supports the formula endorsed in the World Health 
Organization: the status of observer may be granted to an entity with responsibilities similar to 
those of the organization, and it authorizes the entity to participate in organization’s meetings but 
does not grant the right to vote.13  
Thereby, it is plausible to suggest that a status of a CEOS Associate is quite similar to the 
status of observer, as it is generally understood in international law, and hence entities with the 
status of an Associate cannot be considered members of CEOS, just like observers of the 
International Maritime Organization cannot be considered members of the organization. The 
statuses of a CEOS Member and a CEOS Associate are different: while they both entail the right 
to participate in all meetings, only the former gives the right to vote. Then, it should be 
concluded that only States and international intergovernmental organizations are eligible for the 
status of a CEOS Member and so are eligible to vote, and non-governmental entities are merely 
non-voting participants, or observers in more common terms.  
 
8.2.2 Secretariat 
The CEOS Secretariat “provides a forum for coordination between Plenary sessions” and 
meets on a monthly basis.14 As provided by the CEOS underlying documents, the Secretariat is 
“maintained by” the European Space Agency, the European Organization for the Exploitation of 
Meteorological Satellites, two American and two Japanese CEOS Agencies. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY provides six definitions of the term ‘maintain’ and the most relevant one in the 
current context is the following: “To care for (property) for purposes of operational productivity 
or appearance; to engage in general repair and upkeep.”15 The contextual reading of the 
underlying documents leads to a conclusion that the Secretariat consists of the representatives of 
                                                        
12 For a discussion about the types of observers and rights granted to observers see, H.G. Schermers, “International 
Organizations, Observer Status,” in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 5: International Organizations in 
General, Universal International Organizations, and Cooperation (2014), at 151-52. 
13 This or a similar formula is adopted in International Maritime Organization, United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization, International Organization for Migration, United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, World Intellectual Property Organization, and others. 
14 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, Governance and Processes (November, 2013), at 5, www.ceos.org. 
15 Black’s Law Dictionary, “Maintain”, 10th ed. (2014), Westlaw Next. 
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these Agencies, and these six Agencies together are responsible for administrative management 
of the Secretariat.  
The Secretariat composition, however, is not limited to representatives of these six 
Agencies. The Chair presides over the Secretariat; former and future Chairs are also included to 
ensure expeditious and smooth conduct of business; the Chair of the Strategic Implementation 
Team, Working Groups Chairs, the CEOS Executive Officer and the CEOS Systems Engineering 
Office are invited to participate in the Secretariat; and upon the Chair’s invitation representatives 
of additional CEOS Agencies or other relevant organizations might participate in the Secretariat 
on a temporary basis. Such a representative Secretariat makeup apparently has been established 
not only to facilitate efficient fulfillment of its functions, but also to ensure that they are carried 
out in an unbiased, fair, evidence-based and verifiable manner.  
The latter reasoning is justified given the fact that the Secretariat is the one to formulate 
CEOS position statements and coordinate CEOS activities both internally and externally. In 
other words, the Secretariat is the organ that determines which decisions, opinions and actions of 
the CEOS Agencies are made public; the Secretariat has the power to emphasize certain actions 
and diminish importance of others; overall, effective execution of its functions is crucial for 
CEOS reputation externally and adequate communication internally. Keeping in mind that a 
majority of the Secretariat members are simultaneously the representatives of their respective 
Agencies and are not completely independent international civil servants, composition of the 
administrative organ has to be fair and respectable. The more representative the composition of 
the Secretariat, the more trustworthy it is. As any other secretariat, the CEOS Secretariat is in 
charge of meeting attendance coordination, reviewing meetings agendas, actions and minutes, 
maintaining an expeditious flow of documents and reporting on other relevant topics upon CEOS 
organs’ requests.  
The Chair heads the Secretariat and performs a number of other important functions 
within the CEOS framework. Particularly, the Chair hosts, organizes and chairs the Plenary 
meetings.16 He has the overarching responsibility “for ensuring that the guidance and direction 
from the annual CEOS Plenary are appropriately reflected in CEOS’s activities and collective 
strategic priorities.”17 The Chair is charged with a whole multitude of other responsibilities, 
                                                        
16 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, Governance and Processes (November, 2013), at 4, www.ceos.org. 
17 Id. at 4. 
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including chairmanship of the Troika, oversight of the activities of the Executive Officer and the 
Working Groups; overall, the Chair is described as “the primary interface for all external 
coordination.” The Chair serves a one-year term, and though he is elected from senior space 
agency officials, the CEOS underlying documents provide for an independency safeguard clause: 
The “CEOS Chair … receives guidance from, and reports to, the CEOS Plenary.”18 Additionally, 
in order to preserve fairness and promote leadership diversity the Chair responsibilities are 
rotated amongst major geographic regions.  
The CEOS Executive Officer is the additional mechanism created to assist the Secretariat 
and in relevant questions the Strategic Implementation Team; however, this organ seems to 
perform much more important functions in the long-term perspective. The Executive Officer is a 
full-time official appointed by the Chair for a two-year term and charged with development of a 
Work Plan, with advising CEOS leadership on prospects for continuation and expansion of 
cooperation, and tracking relevant actions.19 The Officer, thereby, is essentially charged with 
keeping an eye on the possible future Earth observation projects, identifying States and 
international organizations that plan or might begin planning Earth observation missions, 
locating other entities whose participation in CEOS would be desirable and beneficial. The 
CEOS underlying documents clearly state: “CEOS leadership shall maintain awareness of 
emerging international groups capable of qualifying for CEOS membership, and make an effort 
to engage them in CEOS activities.” And that is, apparently, the main responsibility of the 
Executive Officer.  
Additionally, the Officer is charged with development of a Work Plan – a document 
updated on an annual basis setting forth near-term objectives and deliverables. The current Work 
Plan was finalized in March 2015 and includes a description of CEOS activities to be executed in 
the 2015 calendar year, and summarizes anticipated activities for the subsequent two years. The 
Executive Officer is responsible for annual Plan review as current activities are completed, 
planned activities are executed, and new initiatives are projected.20 Overall, the nature of the 
activities performed by the Executive Officer indicates that CEOS as an entity is focused on 
long-term activities, providing its participants clear understanding of the strategy, at the same 
time actively monitoring ongoing changes and appropriately incorporating them in CEOS 
                                                        
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 6. 
20 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, CEOS 2015-2017 Work Plan (March 30 2015), www.ceos.org. 
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activities. In other words, CEOS strives to remain relevant, to continue incentivizing the 
Agencies to cooperate in achievement of its goals and to promote among its participants a 
prospective-oriented mindset and willingness to adapt to the changes.  
It has been earlier determined that an international organization’s secretariat possesses 
the following characteristics: (1) a separate organ within the structure of the organization; (2) 
working on a permanent basis and financed from the organization’s budget; (3) and acting 
independently from the will of member States and pursuing in its work goals of the international 
organization, thus possessing an international character of work. International treaties and 
conferences either have ad hoc secretariats or use administrative capacities of a hosting 
organization.  
The functions of a secretariat within CEOS are performed by the CEOS Chair, the 
Secretariat and the Executive Officer; basically, these three organs should be considered as 
‘departments’ of the CEOS secretariat. The CEOS underlying documents clearly stipulate that 
these three organs are permanent; the documents establish a detailed procedure of their 
members’ election or appointment and enumerate functions of each of these organs within the 
CEOS structure. So by no means can they be characterized as ad hoc entities or as belonging to a 
different organization. 
Whether the CEOS secretariat meets all three criteria of an international organization’s 
secretariat is not entirely clear. Undoubtedly, there are separate organs fulfilling secretarial 
functions within the CEOS structure, and undoubtedly they are working on a permanent basis, as 
it has been established earlier. But it is not clear whether they are financed from the 
organization’s budget since the CEOS underlying documents are silent on this matter. Relevant 
conclusions might be inferred from the following statements: “CEOS should be viewed as a 
place where organizations can gather to accomplish specific goals that are relevant to them, with 
no pressure to participate in activities that are of less interest or for which they do not have 
resources. As CEOS initiates and further implements activities, Members and Associates may 
choose to participate or not participate, depending on their interest in particular activities.”21 The 
document goes on to emphasize that it is important to “increase use of telecommunication 
                                                        
21 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, Governance and Processes (November, 2013), at 17, www.ceos.org. 
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technology and leverage other internal and external meetings to maximize the efficient use of 
resources”22 and suggests that more meetings should be held via teleconference. 
It seems that this flexibility in meetings’ attendance and participation in CEOS activities 
is a sound indication in favor of case-by-case funding of programs undertaken and limited 
resources allocated for the maintenance of permanent CEOS organs – if such resources are 
indeed being allocated. Introduction of a new activity undergoes a rigorous process of 
assessment and discussion,23 which in combination with the right of the Agencies to opt out of 
certain activities is a logical argument in favor of a conclusion that participating Agencies 
finance a certain activity on an ad hoc basis, where budget and payment shares allocations are 
settled when a particular project is launched. In other words, there is no comprehensive budget 
for all possible activities and needs of CEOS, but each new activity has to have its own budget 
and sources of financing. 
This structure, however, does not clarify how the permanent organs are being financed. 
Since this issue has not been addressed in clear terms, interpretation of the CEOS underlying 
documents serves as the most reliable source of information. It has been noted that the Plenary 
meetings are hosted, organized and chaired by the CEOS Chair.24 It is a sensible conclusion that 
‘organization’ entails not only administrative support, but also provision of an appropriate 
location, supporting staff, required technology and the like, thus putting the burden of a Plenary 
meeting funding on the hosting Agency.  
Further, all CEOS officers with the exception of the Executive Officer are elected among 
the CEOS Agencies representatives, and since they are not relieved from their responsibilities 
toward their respective Agencies, it is only logical that they are not being paid for the functions 
performed within CEOS.25 The Working Groups, the Virtual Constellations, the Strategic 
Implementation Team, Ad Hoc working groups – all these organs are comprised of 
representatives of the Agencies which expressed their will to participate in respective organs and 
activities, thus it is similarly cogent that they are financed by their participants, and their budgets 
are just another question for discussion during the initial meetings.  
                                                        
22 Id.  
23 Id. at 10. 
24 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, Terms of Reference (November, 2013), at 4, www.ceos.org. 
25 They are not paid by the CEOS; internal compensation packages of the respective Agencies are irrelevant here. 
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The CEOS Secretariat is being maintained by the six enumerated Agencies, which, it is 
logical to presume, have acquiesced to perform necessary functions and simultaneously have 
agreed to provide funding toward the Secretariat maintenance. Otherwise it would have lacked 
any logic to appoint these particular Agencies – which are not rotated, unlike the Chair office – 
without charging them with specific obligations in exchange for certain influence granted by way 
of performing important functions of the CEOS Secretariat.  
Overall, taking into consideration that CEOS is primarily a forum facilitating 
coordination for the benefit of all participating Agencies, where undertaken activities depend on 
their will and no obligation exists to participate in all or any, funding does not present itself as a 
contentious issue because when you have a choice, presumably you are choosing what is best for 
you, and if funding is something you cannot agree with, there is always an opportunity to walk 
away. Getting back to the pertinent characteristic of a secretariat, it would be a stretch to affirm 
that the CEOS secretariat is financed from the uniform budget. First, there is no firmly 
established budget – otherwise, presumably, this matter would have been addressed in the 
underlying documents. Second, the inferences made about certain organs financing processes 
also do not assert that should a CEOS budget have existed, all organs constituting the CEOS 
secretariat would have been financed from such a budget.  
Finally, whether the CEOS secretariat acts independently from the will of its participants 
and possesses an international character of work should be determined. The Secretariat 
formulates CEOS position statements and coordinates CEOS activities both internally and 
externally, the Chair is responsible for hosting and organizing the Plenary meetings, and the 
Executive Officer is charged with preparation of the Strategic Plan. These functions combined, 
the secretariat is charged with a broad scope of activities that are important for normal 
functioning of the Committee and its external perception. It has been noted earlier, however, that 
the precise breadth of functions of a secretariat is not indicative of the status of the organ 
performing such functions, though they might be helpful for the analysis.  
Another matter that should be considered in this regard is the status of the secretariat’s 
staff. With the exception of the Executive Officer, all other officials are also the officials of the 
relevant Agencies, but the CEOS underlying documents provide certain safeguards to preserve 
these officers’ independence. For example, the Secretariat composition is not limited to those six 
Agencies in charge of its maintenance and includes other CEOS officials and Agencies 
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representatives. For the Chair, the CEOS underlying documents provide for an independency 
safeguard clause: The “CEOS Chair … receives guidance from, and reports to, the CEOS 
Plenary.”26 Overall, while these provisions do not secure a true independent status of an 
international civil servant for the CEOS officers, they serve as an important tool in alleviating 
undue influence on officers. Thereby, while the CEOS secretariat is not staffed by independent 
civil servants, its composition provides a certain level of security against promotion of interests 
of a specific State or a group of States. Nevertheless, when secretariat members and 
representatives of CEOS participants are the same people, it is hard to see how the secretariat 
might act independently from the will of the entity’s participants.  
So the conclusion should be drawn that the CEOS secretariat, as comprised of the three 
analyzed organs, does not fully comply with the third characteristic of an international 
organization’s secretariat, though taking into consideration the additional measures provided to 
ensure the secretariat’s efficiency and representativeness, it comes very close to resemble 
features of an international organization’s secretariat. On a linear graph where on the one side is 
an organization’s secretariat and on the opposite is a conference’s (or treaty’s) secretariat, the 
CEOS secretariat would be just a few inches away from the organization and three full feet away 
from the conference’s side. 
 
8.2.3 International Legal Personality 
International legal personality is characteristic only to international organizations, and its 
determination requires that all four criteria of legal personality are met. First, CEOS is 
undoubtedly an association of States and international organizations with lawful objectives. The 
latter characteristic most likely does not need further elaboration. When analyzing CEOS 
participation rules it has been established that States and international intergovernmental 
organizations are eligible for the Member status, and non-governmental entities can only become 
Associates – a status equal to an observer status, thereby leading to a conclusion that the former 
characteristic is also met. 
                                                        
26 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, Terms of Reference (November, 2013), at 4, www.ceos.org. 
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The second criterion is also present in CEOS: the underlying documents enumerate seven 
permanent CEOS organs and there is no reason to doubt their allegiance solely to CEOS.27 But 
the legal powers and purposes of the organization as distinct from that of its members, which is 
the third criterion, are not present in CEOS. It seems that one can hardly make a sound 
distinction between the members’ goals of successful fulfillment of their Earth observation 
projects using as little resources as possible and the CEOS mission to ensure “international 
coordination of civil space-based Earth observation programs … to optimize societal benefit and 
inform decision making for securing a prosperous and sustainable future for humankind.”28  
More broadly, the main role of CEOS is to provide a primary forum for international 
coordination of space-based Earth observations. Throughout the CEOS review it has been noted 
multiple times that the CEOS structure is very flexible, that the Agencies are free to propose new 
activities or to opt out of the activities, and a dissent of a few States cannot bar the project 
important for other Agencies. What is important, in the end, is that CEOS is designed to meet the 
needs and wishes of its participants, and the Agencies are the ones to decide what is going to 
happen and what is destined to be forgotten. The CEOS structure is designed to put minimal 
pressure on its participants by way of giving an opportunity to move forward with the project 
valuable for one group of Agencies and not others, at the same time leaving uninterested 
Agencies free from financial, legal and organizational burdens in fulfilling such a project. 
CEOS also does not seem to have any separate legal powers. All CEOS officers, with the 
exception of the Executive Officer, are representatives of Committee’s participants and not 
CEOS employees, thereby there can be no legal power over the staff exercisable by the 
Committee, and not the members. In the absence of headquarters, CEOS cannot exercise legal 
powers over its premises. The inherently flexible structure of cooperation precludes a possibility 
of certain regulations’ enforcement, even to the extent enforcement is at all a possibility in 
international law regulating behavior of sovereign independent States. In other words, there is 
not a single power that can be exercised solely by CEOS, not its participants.  
Based on these considerations, a conclusion is drawn that CEOS does not have legal 
powers distinctive from its participants. Thereby, it should be inferred that CEOS does not 
possess legal personality because it does not meet the third necessary criteria. For the sake of the 
                                                        
27 These permanent organs are: The Secretariat, the Strategic Implementation Team, the CEOS Executive Officer, 
the CEOS Systems Engineering Office, the Troika, the Working Groups and the Virtual Constellations. See, p. 3-7. 
28 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, Terms of Reference (November, 2013), at 2, www.ceos.org. 
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argument it may be added that CEOS fails to comply with the forth criterion of legal personality 
as well: in the absence of legal powers specific to CEOS as an entity, there can be no powers 
exercisable on any plane, whether national or international. 
 
8.2.4 Term of Existence 
At this point a little doubt is left that CEOS is a permanently functioning entity with 
permanent organs, annual meetings and goals requiring continuous long-term cooperation. CEOS 
was created in 1984 and although it has been growing ever since and took its current shape only 
in 2011, it has been continuously working for over thirty years now. Moreover, a glance at a 
table summarizing CEOS major meetings assures that an entity that holds five major meetings 
annually,29 apart from monthly Secretariat meetings, cannot possibly work on any other than 
permanent basis. 
 
8.2.5 Binding Force of Documents Produced 
CEOS underlying documents stipulate: “Members of CEOS will use their best efforts to 
implement CEOS recommendations in their respective Earth observation programs,” and further 
clearly acknowledge that “participation in the activities of CEOS will not be construed as being 
binding upon space-based Earth observation system operators,” leaving their right to manage 
national programs unrestricted.30 While the produced documents are designated 
“recommendations” and thereby cannot be expected to be complied with at all times, it might be 
suggested that there is a good reason for utilization of legally non-binding documents.  
CEOS predominantly relies on coordination of the capabilities and assets of individual 
Agencies. CEOS recommendations might cover issues like coordination of infrastructure and 
crosscutting issues, and coordination of thematic and topical-based areas.31 While the main thrust 
of such recommendations is to promote solutions to reduce observational gaps and achieve better 
integration across the full range of Earth observations, the named goals cannot be achieved 
merely by means of cooperation and dialogue; technological compatibility is the required 
prerequisite. Satellite missions are technically complex, require rigorous management and 
                                                        
29 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, Governance and Processes (November, 2013), at 13, www.ceos.org. 
30 Id. at 2-3. 
31 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, Strategic Guidance (November, 2013), at 7, www.ceos.org. 
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control and an in-depth knowledge of the specifics of the particular project. Bottom line is that 
the security of operations cannot be jeopardized. Unconsidered and unquestioned compliance 
with each and every technical standard would essentially imperil safety and soundness of the 
project. Thereby ‘soft law’ obligations allow the Agencies to make thought-through decisions 
about compliance or non-compliance with a particular recommendation; at the same time, in case 
non-compliance is determined necessary and justified, the respective State or international 
organization is not considered in breach of international obligations.  
Also it has been noted that the goal of CEOS activities is to facilitate informal 
coordination “to optimize societal benefit and inform decision making for securing a prosperous 
and sustainable future for humankind.” By definition informal cooperation does not presuppose 
existence of strict, legally binding formalized obligations. More so, even formal cooperation 
through the mechanism of an international organization does not necessarily entail the power of 
such an organization to adopt any binding decisions. Hence, it should be concluded that a legally 
binding nature of produced documents does not per se predetermine (in)effectiveness of a 
particular mechanism of cooperation; rather, the choice between legally binding and ‘soft law’ 
obligations is completely at the discretion of cooperating States and is likely to depend on the 
distinct area of cooperation. In this particular case, obviously, the latter factor played its role in 
choosing non-binding recommendations as the type of documents produced within the 
Committee.  
The reasons behind choosing ‘soft law’ regulation together with the fact that the 
underlying documents unequivocally declare that CEOS decisions should not be considered as 
binding would point toward a conclusion that the legally non-binding nature of the produced 
documents is an intentional, conscious decision the founding States made when creating this 
entity. By contrast, documents produced by an international conference are legally non-binding 
by default, and participating States’ will cannot change the nature of the produced documents; if 
a document drafted during the conference becomes binding following the appropriate procedure, 
it moves to a treaty category. Although this distinction does not add anything to the legal 
characterization of the produced documents, it puts CEOS documents on a linear scale a bit 
closer to international organizations’ documents than to those of conferences. 
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8.2.6 Existence of Opportunity to Modify Obligations 
It has been concluded that the produced documents are legally non-binding, so it is 
simple logic that there is no need to provide for an opportunity to modify obligations. Just one 
detail should be mentioned: CEOS participants have the right to opt out of any activities, they 
have the right not to support any documents, and by doing so they are relieved from any, even 
moral or political obligation to use their best efforts in implementation of CEOS 
recommendations. Sir Jennings in 1980 when discussing United Nations General Assembly 
resolutions wrote that “recommendations may not make law, but you would hesitate to advise a 
government that it may, therefore, ignore them, even in a legal argument.”32 In this sense, the 
right to opt out from ‘soft law’ obligations does make a difference. 
 
8.3 Evaluation and Conclusions 
 
8.3.1 CEOS Institutional Structure: A Hybrid? 
A patchy and somewhat confusing result follows from the preceding analysis. CEOS 
membership is open to States and international organizations, and non-governmental entities 
might become Associates without a vote; it has a secretariat that comes close to resemble an 
international organization’s secretariat, which works on a permanent basis, but does not possess 
international legal personality; it is not entitled to produce legally binding documents, but gives 
the right to opt out of even these ‘soft law obligations’. Some criteria point toward CEOS 
designation as a conference, others signal its attribution to the international organizations 
category, and the CEOS secretariat does not fit into any category at all. This puts the analysis in 
a difficult situation since there are only two options to explain the identified variations. The first 
option is to admit that the preceding analysis was wrong, but obviously that is an unwanted 
outcome.  
The second option is to ascertain the existence of mechanisms of cooperation that do not 
fit into any of the categories. This route is flawed in at least one way: if such deviations do exist, 
it undermines the premise that the proposed set of criteria is indeed a reliable one. But in reality 
what should be said is that any one-and-for-all classification cannot fully grasp each and every 
                                                        
32 R.Y. Jennings, What is International Law and How Do We Tell It When We See It? (1980), at 14, quoted in R.S. 
Jakhu and S. Freeland, “The Sources of International Space Law,” in Proceedings of the International Institute of 
Space Law 2013 (2014), at 477. 
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possible variation. Famous precepts suggest: “For every rule there is an exception,” or “There are 
always exceptions to every generalization,” or “Nature provides exceptions to every rule.” 
Whatever phrase is preferred, the lesson to be learned is that a generalization, no matter how 
precise, will always remain a generalization requiring adaptation, flexibility and open-
mindedness to apply it in a meaningful and correct way to phenomena in the real world.  
Moreover, at the outset it has been made clear that the present book will use the proposed 
set of criteria only as a starting point for further in-depth analysis of existing mechanisms of 
cooperation. Obviously, now is the point where the criteria should be treated as such, and not as 
a dogma. It has to be acknowledged that one starting point of the analysis is a generalization, that 
analysis of a particular mechanism of cooperation is true and correct precisely for the analyzed 
mechanism, and that the conclusions made as a result of such an analysis will again be a 
generalization – true most times, but demanding cautious application exactly owing to the ever-
changing nature of the objects of these conclusions.  
International organizations researchers noted: “In recent decades several countries have 
often chosen to use ‘informal’ (or soft) international organizations rather than creating 
international organizations in the traditional sense. Soft international organizations, despite their 
informal structure, implement goals and values that are sometimes very important for their 
Member States and, in some cases, also for other States or groups of States of the international 
community.”33 Keeping in mind the authoritative view quoted, based on the preceding 
philosophical reflections and taking into consideration the complexity of the CEOS mechanism 
identified above, it is plausible to conclude that hybrids do exist, and that CEOS is one example 
of such. CEOS was created to be a permanent mechanism of cooperation and coordination that is 
characterized by substantial flexibility.  
There are three CEOS characteristics that are normally attainable to an international 
organization.34 The first is the membership rule allowing only States and international 
organizations to become participants with voting rights. Membership rules in international 
organizations vary widely according to a number of factors including  ‘political’ or ‘technical’ 
                                                        
33 A. Di Stasi, “About Soft International Organizations: An Open Question,” in R. Virzo and I. Ingravallo (eds.), 
Evolutions in the Law of International Organizations (2015), at 44. 
34 Although, as mentioned before, the CEOS secretariat does not fully comply with all characteristics of an 
international organization’s secretariat, it comes close enough to resemble an organization’s secretariat and 
affirmatively reject possibility of its resemblance of a conference’s or a treaty’s secretariat. Thereby, for the 
purposes of the ensuing analysis the CEOS secretariat would be treated as indicating its comparability with that of 
an international organization.  
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character and level of integration. So generally membership is conditional upon certain 
prerequisites being satisfied.35 In CEOS there are two layers of admission to membership: 
substantive and procedural. In order to meet the substantive requirement a national or 
international governmental organization must be responsible for a civil-based Earth observation 
program currently operational, or at least in the detailed design phase, and must have continuing 
activity in space-based Earth observation intended to operate and provide nondiscriminatory and 
full access to data that will be made available to the international community.36 At this point it 
should be mentioned that actually the governmental agencies responsible for the enumerated 
activities and not the States themselves are admitted to the CEOS membership, but following the 
theory of attribution of conduct of organs to a State on the international plane, this distinction is 
not crucial for the purposes of the present book because in the end actions of these agencies 
constitute actions of a particular State.37 
So the CEOS membership is open only to States and international organizations 
conducting Earth observation on a continuous basis, thereby restricting membership to subjects 
that are actively involved in the activities, which are the scope of the CEOS mandate. Subject 
matter or technical membership limitation is not unusual in international practice and basically 
aims at uniting those subjects that are meaningfully involved in regulated activities and, thus, can 
both benefit from the membership and contribute to the cause of such an entity. Overall, there are 
multiple variations of necessary substantive membership requirements ranging from the 
statehood criterion to membership in another international organization to fulfillment of 
conditions enunciated in a constituent instrument. There is no clear-cut distinction between 
‘open’ and ‘closed’ organizations because admittance of a new member even to a seemingly 
open organization aiming at universal membership – the United Nations and its specialized 
                                                        
35 See, P. Sands and P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (2009), at 537. 
36 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, Terms of Reference (November, 2013), at 2, www.ceos.org. 
37 United Nations International Law Commission, “Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”, in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. II (2001), art. 4 (“The conduct of any State organ shall be 
considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or 
any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an 
organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State.”). See also, I Brownlie, System of the Law of 
Nations: State Responsibility, Part I (1983), at 132-66 (The author ascertains that the general rule is that the only 
conduct attributable to the State in the context of international law is that of its governmental organs or of others 
who have acted under the direction, instigation or control of those organs, in effect acting as agents of State.).  
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agencies, for example – is always conditional upon one or the other requirement.38 In the end, 
founders of a particular international organization enunciate membership conditions, and there is 
no universal scheme to classify international organizations with regard to their ‘openness’, and 
there is no established inventory of the membership requirements for different types of 
international organizations. 
There is a procedural requirement as well: the addition of Members is possible with the 
consensus of current Members of CEOS. Although that does not seem to be a significant 
obstacle, in the United Nations requirement of the Security Council approval of new members 
admittance led to a significant controversy and eventually elicited two International Court of 
Justice Advisory Opinions.39 The procedural requirements are important tools in preserving an 
entity’s integrity. There is a distinction between ‘original’ and ‘admitted’ members, and the 
‘original’ members have a legitimate interest in ensuring that incoming subjects share the same 
interests as they were sharing when creating the international organization.40 
With regard to participation rules, CEOS obviously used the approach normally utilized 
in technical international organizations. The membership as well as an observer-like status can 
be granted only to those subjects that are active in the CEOS area of work, thereby guaranteeing 
that first, only those genuinely interested in coordination of Earth observation activities are a part 
of the Committee, and second, that CEOS members are capable of fulfilling its goals and 
contributing to its activities’ development. Acknowledging that founding States are the ones to 
judge and weigh whether such composition is beneficial for the created entity, it should be 
concluded that a cooperative entity dealing with technically complex and project-specific 
activities has to limit its membership to subjects specializing in such activities; unrestricted 
membership would only lead to unnecessary complication of communication and would not add 
any benefits either for ‘active’ or ‘passive’ members. This inference is supported by a continuing 
long-standing practice of ‘closed’ specialized international organizations; should the limitation 
have proved unjustified it would have been eliminated long ago.  
                                                        
38 See, P. Sands and P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (2009), at 538-45; C.F. Amerasinghe, 
Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (2005), at 106-10. 
39 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of Charter), International 
Court of Justice Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1948; and Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a 
State to the United Nations, International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion of 3 March 1950, available at www.icj-
cij.org. 
40 Cf., P. Sands and P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (2009), at 538. 
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CEOS has one noteworthy feature closely related to participation rules. Constituent 
instruments of international organizations normally provide for a procedure of membership 
termination and might also include provisions for suspension of membership privileges. While 
the latter provisions are dictated by the need to provide for disciplinary measures, the former is a 
standard clause enabling members to voluntary withdraw from organization, and providing the 
international organization with the right to expel a member.41 The CEOS underlying documents 
are silent on this matter, and there is a proper reason for that. CEOS has been created as a 
mechanism for informal coordination; it aims at making Earth observation programs more 
efficient and at ensuring public nondiscriminatory data availability. In this case, every eligible 
Agency is an asset in achieving the Committee’s goals.42 And in the absence of legally binding 
obligations disciplinary measures are unnecessary and even more so, counterproductive. The 
CEOS underlying document expressly asserts: “A best-effort organization like CEOS needs a 
mass of consistently active Members and Associates to ensure that key activities have sufficient 
human resources and that there is seamless transition of leadership at all levels.”43 Therefore, 
given the specifics of CEOS activities and its goals, elimination of rules for membership 
termination is not an unfortunate omission but a thought-through decision beneficial for the 
entity as a whole and its participants.  
It has been mentioned multiple times that CEOS is a mechanism for informal best-effort 
coordination. So it is perfectly logical that legal personality has not been bestowed onto this 
entity since no practical projects are being performed by CEOS itself and no legal documents are 
being adopted. CEOS is not supervising Earth observation projects of its Members; it merely 
coordinates their pursuits, synchronizes their efforts and ‘mediates’ in negotiation of 
recommended standards of performance. In handling these tasks international legal personality is 
an unnecessary luxury and maybe even an undesired complication.  
At the same time, the continuous long-term nature of activities performed within this 
mechanism made permanent organs an utter necessity. Regular Plenary meetings and unceasing 
work within the Working Groups and Virtual Constellations demand an administrative 
                                                        
41 For an overview of practice of international organizations in using procedures of suspension and termination see, 
C.F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (2005), at 114-125; J. 
Klabbers, An Introduction to International Organizations Law (2015), at 106-112. 
42 In this regard an analogy to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which prohibits expulsion, 
is relevant. Art. VIII(2) of the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1992 states: “All States parties to this Convention 
shall be members of the Organization. A State Party shall not be deprived of its membership in the Organization.” 
43 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, Governance and Processes (November, 2013), at 16, www.ceos.org. 
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apparatus’ support. At the crossroad of ‘no legal personality’ and ‘permanent administrative 
organs’ stands the hybrid nature of this mechanism of cooperation. While preserving the 
permanent institutional structure, a hybrid disposes of the legal personality, and substitutes the 
stability afforded by one with legal and institutional flexibility and informal methods of work. 
Despite the seeming diminished stability of such an arrangement, the presence of the permanent 
working organs supported by the will of participating States to achieve coordination, a hybrid 
manages to achieve a balance between institutionalization and flexibility. 
On the one hand, States need a permanently working institution to secure proper 
communication and coordination of their Earth observation missions, and on the other, flexibility 
and ‘soft law’ order are essential because very few States would have entrusted legal regulation 
and supervision of their national space-based projects to an international entity. Moreover, such 
regulation and supervision would have required a much more complex structure, which, in turn, 
would have been an additional financial burden for the participating Agencies. Through 
amalgamation of international organization’s features, including membership rules, presence of a 
separate organ performing secretarial functions and the permanent term of existence, with 
conference-like absent legal personality and legally non-binding documents a unique hybrid 
mechanism of cooperation has been created. The question is whether this hybrid structure has 
proved effective in achievement of the allocated goals, whether the gamble was worth it. 
CEOS has three primary objectives: (1) to optimize benefits of Earth observation through 
cooperation of CEOS Agencies in mission planning and the development of compatible data 
products; (2) to serve as the focal point of coordination of Earth observation activities; and (3) to 
exchange policy and technical information to encourage complementarity and compatibility 
among space-based Earth observation systems.44 The constituent documents identify three 
further goals of CEOS, which elaborate on the abovementioned primary objectives by way of 
adding technical details and procedures for their accomplishment.  
CEOS Agencies are operating or planning around two hundred and sixty satellites with 
an Earth observation mission over the next fifteen years. These satellites will carry around four 
hundred different instruments. “This sustained investment by the space agencies will ensure the 
provision of information of unique value in both public and commercial spheres, derived from 
                                                        
44 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, Strategic Guidance (November, 2013), at 4-5, www.ceos.org. 
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the measurements of a diverse range of geophysical parameters and phenomena.”45 As early as 
1997, CEOS was praised as “the premier world body for coordinating and planning civilian 
satellite missions for Earth observation.”46 Scholars have pointed out the undisputed 
achievements of the Committee in publication and network services, and in its efforts to include 
developing countries into enjoyment of obtained data and to adapt the technology utilized by 
developed countries to needs and capacities of developing countries.47 The active inclusion of 
commercial, technology-advanced and service-oriented Earth observation in the planning and 
operation of robust Earth observing systems, which can equitably meet diverse needs of 
developed and developing countries was seen as a major challenge for CEOS in the years to 
come.48 Scholars generally agree that “there is clearly an important role for the Committee on 
Earth Observation Satellites to play in the coordination of the various national [Earth 
Observation] programs into a truly integrated global observing system.”49 
Nowadays, an elaborate methodology for defining and measuring success has been 
outlined in the CEOS document “Strategic Guidance”. Success is defined as the achievement of 
the goal as indicated by measurable results for its stakeholders, or, in cases where results cannot 
be measured directly, CEOS success may be attained when the stakeholders involved perceive 
that desired results are obtained. Success measurement requires identification of three elements: 
initial project needs and requirements; milestones, schedule, deliverables, and success criteria 
specific to each individual project; and the appropriate level of project management and the 
channels by which to communicate project status.50 
For example, the success of the CEOS Working Group on Calibration and Validation was 
measured based on the results of its activities in three areas: coordination, communication and 
geophysical parameter validation. The fact that CEOS had begun to examine ways of extending 
international cooperation beyond consideration of the space component alone and had launched 
                                                        
45 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, The Earth Observation Handbook: Special Edition for Rio +20 
(Updated for 2014), www.ceos.org. 
46 B. J. J. Embleton and J. Kingwell, Coordination of Satellite and Data programs: The Committee on Earth 
Observation Satellites’ Approach, Acta Astronautica Vol. 40, No. 2-8 (1997), at 397. 
47 Id. at 402-404. 
48 Id. at 404-405. 
49 E. Chuvieco, Earth Observations of Global Change (2008), at 45. 
50 Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, Strategic Guidance (November, 2013), at 8, www.ceos.org. 
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an Integrated Global Observing Strategy was considered an additional evidence of success in this 
particular area of work.51 
The Working Group on Capacity Building and Data Democracy formed in 2011 has two 
objectives: establishing effective coordination and partnership among CEOS Agencies offering 
Earth observation education and training, and working with CEOS entities to address data 
accessibility. To these ends a variety of activities has been undertaken, including partnering with 
local and regional providers to increase effectiveness and decrease duplication of efforts, 
focusing on user needs for data and capabilities, conducting remote sensing workshops and 
seminars, publishing of training materials, and publicizing resources, datasets and software.52 All 
other currently functioning Working Groups are also conducting activities relevant to their 
proclaimed goals and objectives.  
It is reasonable to conclude, thus, that the results of CEOS actions present themselves as 
an almost complete fulfillment of the established purposes. The overview of the former and 
current CEOS Working Groups’ activities, the growing number of supervised projects, and more 
generally the increasing participation and the ongoing efforts to sustain effectiveness of the 
mechanism for the past thirty years, all signal that the work is being done. Without the inside 
information it is hard to assess with a certain level of confidence practically achieved results in 
some objective form, be it numerical or percentile. But what is clear from the presented overview 
is that States are willing to participate, States are willing to disclose their planned projects and to 
work toward their utmost effectiveness and elimination of redundancies among national space-
based Earth observation programs.  
 
8.3.2 Why Choosing a Hybrid 
Scholars have opined that “because of the recent and impressive growth of space 
activities with international cooperation elements in them, various forms of establishing such 
relations have flourished.”53 A more recent trend has emerged in addressing general-purpose 
issues with an obvious impact on mandates and political objectives; and CEOS is one such 
example of a somewhat informal common institution able to represent views of its participants, 
                                                        
51 See, A. S. Belward, International Cooperation in Satellite Sensor Calibration: The Role of the CEOS Working 
Group on Calibration and Validation, Adv. Space Res. Vol. 23, No. 8 (1999), at 1445-47. 
52 The Working Group on Capacity Building and Data Democracy, http://ceos.org/ourwork/workinggroups/wgcapd/ 
53 M. Ferrazzani, “Soft Law in Space Activities,” in G. Lafferranderie and D. Crowther (eds.), Outlook on Space 
Law over the Next 30 Years (1997), at 439. 
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which preserve their distinct identity, to act and to take decisions in practical areas of outer space 
exploration and use.54 These trends should be understood in the light of the so-called 
‘Washington consensus’ that led COPUOS and its Subcommittees to be grinding almost to a 
complete halt it recent years. Its principal aim was “to liberalize and deregulate national and 
international markets and as a consequence reduce the influence of states and governments in 
economic and social matters.”55 Liberalization and deregulation objectives combined with the 
need to continue cooperation logically result in informal legally non-binding mechanisms of 
cooperation.56 
The conclusion is offered that these contemporary trends were engendered by the 
growing exploitation of outer space and the need to use its resources in an efficient and 
sustainable way.57 A growing practical utilization of outer space, where space programs and 
projects become more intensive and regular, generated a need for a rational use of space 
capacities. Thirty-one CEOS Members and twenty-four Associates are operating or planning 
hundreds of space-based observation missions. These impressive numbers, which reflect only 
Earth observation missions, while there are many more other space-based missions – it was 
estimated that a total of approximately five-thousand and five-hundred launches were made since 
1957 – present a convincing evidence of how busy outer space has become.58 Outer space traffic 
regulation proposals that have been actively discussed during the last decade also serve as 
evidence that both scholars and practicing lawyers consider an increasing number of space 
launches worthy of a specialized traffic regime. “Space has started to host all sorts of human 
activities, or better, play a fundamental role in them: military, scientific, administrative, crime 
                                                        
54 Cf., M. Ferrazzani, “Soft Law in Space Activities,” in G. Lafferranderie and D. Crowther (eds.), Outlook on Space 
Law over the Next 30 Years (1997), at 439-41. 
55 P.  Jankowitsch, “The Background and History of Space Law,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space 
Law (2014), at 13. 
56 For an overview of different theories regarding proliferation of less-than-formal transgovernmental networks that 
nowadays are expanding rapidly and oftentimes substitute for more formal intergovernmental organizations and 
treaties see, K. Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the 
Future of International Law, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (2002); M.-C. Runavot, “The Intergovernmental Organization and 
the Institutionalization of International Relations,” in R. Virzo and I. Ingravallo (eds.), Evolutions in the Law of 
International Organizations (2015); A. Di Stasi, “About Soft International Organizations: An Open Question,” in R. 
Virzo and I. Ingravallo (eds.), Evolutions in the Law of International Organizations (2015). 
57 Cf., M. Hofmann, “Sustainability of Space Environment: Draft UNGA Resolution”, in Proceedings of the 
International Institute of Space Law (2012), at 639-40. 
58 It was estimated that since 1957 till December 31, 2014 a total number of 5438 launches were performed, 
including the unsuccessful ones. See, http://www.spacelaunchreport.com/logyear.html. 
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fighting and anti-terrorism, commercial, and humanitarian – and thus in regulating the behavior 
of all sorts of humans to go with them.”59 
A logical extension to the intrinsic connection between outer space and the world as we 
know it today is that “everyday life would be seriously degraded, if not impossible, without the 
utilization of space-based science and technology. This holds true for the present generations, but 
also for the ones to come. Accordingly, space has to be preserved for the future. Sustainability 
can be achieved through a fair and responsible use of space.”60 At least one of the CEOS primary 
objectives, namely the optimization of benefits of Earth observation through cooperation of 
CEOS Agencies in mission planning and the development of compatible data products, focuses 
precisely on promoting sustainability of outer space exploitation albeit through the prism of 
preventing redundancy in national space-based Earth observation programs.  
In the context of the space debris problem analysis authors have been pointing out that 
Earth orbits are a limited resource requiring efficient and responsible utilization. The fact that the 
space debris issue has become one of the major topics in international space law triggering 
intensive work on international and national levels alike, is by itself a vocal argument that 
contemporary outer space exploitation has to be sustainable; the need is already here.61  
Against this background cooperation becomes more relevant and rewarding for 
spacefaring States. It has been noted that in today’s world there is no longer room for ‘solitary 
adventures’ on the part of individual States, and creation of integrated entities seems to be the 
‘postmodern passport to globalization’.62 At the same time, while States are open to cooperation, 
there is much less longing for creation of formal mechanisms of cooperation. The last three 
decades showed that States have become more wary of legally binding mechanisms than they 
were in the beginning of the space era; all recent developments in international space law were in 
the form of ‘soft law’ and there is no evidence that States are ready to break this equilibrium 
between the need to cooperate and the reluctance to become bound by additional legal 
                                                        
59 F. G. von der Dunk, “International Space Law,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 
125. 
60 R. Wolfgang, K.-U. Schrogl (eds.),The Fair and Responsible Use of Space: An International Perspective (2010), 
at 12.  
61 Cf., H.R. Hertzfeld, “A Roadmap for a Sustainable Space Law Regime”, in Proceedings of the International 
Institute of Space Law (2012). 
62 See, P. Pennetta, “International Regional Organizations: Problems and Issues,” in R. Virzo and I. Ingravallo 
(eds.), Evolutions in the Law of International Organizations (2015), at 80-81. 
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obligations. With that perspective, the emergence of hybrid mechanisms of cooperation seems 
consequent and logical. 
The hybrid mechanism, as represented by the CEOS example, does not impose any 
legally binding obligations, which is both its advantage and to some extent a disadvantage. On 
the one hand, it incentivizes States to participate – because its activities are beneficial but with 
no strings attached, and on the other, it limits effectiveness, or more precisely enforceability, of 
the adopted decisions. In the end, the overall effectiveness of such a mechanism lies in the 
balance between the benefits its participants gain, restraints on freedom of action brought about 
by way of their participation, and their willingness to put an effort into cooperation and 
coordination.63 Continuous work of permanent organs comprised from participants’ 
representatives ensures that results are effective and practically feasible, at the same time 
providing an opportunity to introduce new activities as they emerge. And an informal, lacking 
international legal personality nature of the mechanism and its legally non-binding decisions, 
first, reduce the costs of the mechanism’s maintenance, and second, provide States with much-
treasured flexibility and freedom of action.  
These general considerations, however, are far from being a universal recipe for success. 
Each mechanism is unique in its history, sphere of activities, participation, methods of work and 
the like. Analysis of a particular mechanism can only give guidance regarding the necessary 
components of successful cooperation. But as always, balance and proportionality is what makes 
a set of fine features a masterpiece. It is argued that the topic the mechanism is working on is the 
most important element of all. Structure and methods of work can change depending on the will 
and needs of participants and changing circumstances; it is the core trait of a flexible hybrid 
mechanism of cooperation that it can be easily modified. But the subject matter is the 
cornerstone, the foundation of cooperation. It, of course, can be extended or modified throughout 
the mechanism’s existence, but the initial choice of the subject matter presupposes how the 
international community would react to this new entity. If the subject is relevant and timely, 
chances are that a majority of States and international organizations active in this area would join 
the new mechanism. That, in turn, would lead to adaptation of working procedures so that they 
                                                        
63 CEOS cooperation does not fall within the category of mere coordination, where cooperation through 
international law mechanisms comes naturally and without much resistance on any side. Hence, other incentives 
toward cooperation apart from mere convenience are at play here. For relevant discussion see, A.T. Guzman, How 
International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (2008), at 26-28. 
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are appropriate for all, which would lead to a prosperous work of the mechanism, which finally 
leads to its overall effectiveness. But if the subject matter turns out to be either too narrow or too 
broad, or include highly controversial issues, or is simply not propitious, the mechanism’s 
participation is destined to be scarce, which consequently would not allow it to develop into a 
well-respected influential institution. 
By way of conclusion it is suggested that a hybrid mechanism of cooperation, fusing 
together structural flexibility and continuous character work, is a distinctive feature of the 
modern state of space cooperation and would continue to be used to coordinate national space 
activities. On the one hand, the wariness of new legally binding documents necessitates 
utilization of informal arrangements and space activities. On the other, due to the increasing 
technical and organizational complexity of space projects, cooperation greatly benefits the 
projects (and in some cases cooperation is the only way to make the project at all possible). 
Simultaneously, the complexity of modern and future projects demands flexibility in their 
operation to ensure that an institutional mechanism can be easily adapted to the developments in 
the project implementation or operation. 
While details may vary, the main idea of such a mechanism is to perform long-term goals 
using informal methods. Utilization of a hybrid mechanism corresponds with the identified 
trends of contemporary international law, namely inclination toward ‘soft law’ regulation and the 
need to promote sustainability of the expanding outer space exploitation, at the same time 
addressing them both simultaneously. It is, furthermore, plausible to suggest that CEOS is one 
such occasion in the arena of space activities where ‘soft law’ regulation fulfills “an 
indispensable function in the development of a proper international space law framework for 
such activities.”64 
A hybrid mechanism of cooperation should not be equated to a compromise, neither 
should it be labeled a weaker version of an international organization. It is true that in the sphere 
of cooperation a hybrid mechanism, and CEOS more particularly, is capable of providing long-
term support of a specified activity similar to that of an international organization. But hybrid 
mechanism’s functions end right here, and an international organization’s functions just begin at 
this point. A hybrid mechanism focuses on coordination, eliminating any other functions that 
                                                        
64 F.G. von der Dunk, “Contradictio in terminis or Realpolitik? A Qualified Plea for a Role of ‘Soft Law’ in the 
Context of Space Activities,” in I. Marboe (ed.), Soft Law in Outer Space: The Function of Non-Binding Norms in 
International Space Law (2012), at 53. 
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most international organizations are dealing with, like control over the premises, employment 
relations, budget drafting and so on. By way of limiting the functions the mechanism is charged 
with, a de-formalization of its structure becomes possible. While the drawbacks of hybridity, 
such as non-enforceability of obligations and lack of legal precision, should be acknowledged, it 
should also be acknowledged that it is the answer and the result of the most recent trends in 
space activities. CEOS, being a prominent example of a hybrid mechanism, proves that 
efficiency and flexibility are not mutually exclusive in international legal cooperation.
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The International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities developed by the European 
Union (“Code”) is one of the most recent developments in international space law.1 It is intended 
to summarize ‘rules of the road’ for outer space activities in the form of a ‘soft law’ instrument. 
While a lot has been said about the nature of the proposed document and about the 
effectiveness of the suggested guidelines and principles,2 less attention has been paid to the 
mechanism of cooperation advanced by the Code. Although the Code provides a comparatively 
perfunctory outline of the proposed mechanism of cooperation, the fact that a ‘soft law’ 
instrument provides one is a notable development in international space cooperation.  
The present chapter is aimed at reviewing the mechanism of cooperation endorsed by the 
Code of Conduct, examining proposed ways and means of international cooperation, and 
analyzing how that affects its operation. Conclusions are offered about the nature of the 
envisioned mechanism of cooperation, its distinctive features are identified, and determination is 
made about the overall effectiveness of the established mechanism of cooperation.  
The Code of Conduct is one example of an arrangement underlying the correctness of a 
conclusion drawn by many authors that as a consequence of the codification process in space 
lawmaking there now appears a tendency to produce relevant international instruments 
containing non-binding principles, norms, standards or other statements of expected behavior in 
the form of recommendations, charters, terms of reference, guidelines, and codes of conduct.3 
Following two 2006 United Nations General Assembly Resolutions4 the European Union 
submitted a joint reply to the United Nations General Assembly in 2007, “in which it mooted the 
                                                        
1 Here the analysis is based on the latest version of the Code of Conduct. European Union, International Code of 
Conduct for Outer Space Activities, version from March 31, 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-
disarmament/outer-space-activities/index_en.htm, while conclusions arrived at by the scholars in regard to the 
previous versions and still relevant for the latest version will also be considered. 
2 For such analysis see, A. Lele (ed.), Decoding the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities 
(2012). 
3 See, P. Jankowitsch, “The Background and History of Space Law,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of 
Space Law (2014), at 25. 
4 UNGA Res. A/RES/61/58 “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”, 6 December 2006; and UNGA Res. 
A/RES/61/75 “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities”, 6 December 2006. 
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plan of a “code of conduct on space objects and space activities”, to complement the existing 
space legal framework.”5 By 2008 the European Union Council adopted the first draft of the 
Code; ensued bilateral consultations led to the second draft in 2010. When in 2012 the United 
States announced that it would not sign up to the prospective instrument and proposed to launch 
multilateral negotiation process to develop an acceptable text of the Code of Conduct,6 
international negotiations including States other than the European Union members were 
commenced.  
In 2013 the European Union tabled the new revised draft International Code of Conduct 
and launched an open-ended multilateral consultations process in order to get support from the 
international community for such a code. The consultations process consisted of three open-
ended multilateral meetings, the first one in Kiev, Ukraine in May 2013, the second one in 
Bangkok, Thailand in November 2013, and the third and final one in Luxembourg in May 2014. 
More than 80 States have participated overall in this consultations process. During the final 
meeting the most vocal opponents of the Code, Russia and China, had again expressed their 
reservations to the proposed document and confirmed their strong inclination toward the “Treaty 
on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat of Force against 
Outer Space Objects” they first presented at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in 
2008. Until now “it does not appear to be clear for anyone, including member states of the 
European Union themselves, what the next step for the code is.”7  
The Code of Conduct is a “non-legally binding and voluntary act of guidelines intended 
to highlight what the international community generally agrees to be responsible behavior in 
space.”8 The opening words of the Code “The Subscribing States” at the outset hint at the legally 
non-binding nature of the document. Paragraph 1.4 of the Code further declares: “Subscription to 
this Code in open to all States, on a voluntary basis. This Code is not legally binding, and is 
without prejudice to applicable international and national law.” Thus, the Code of Conduct is a 
                                                        
5 J. Wouters and R. Hansen, “The Other Triangle in European Space Governance: The European Union, the 
European Space Agency and the United Nations,” in Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 2013 
(2014), at 666. 
6 Id.  
7 G. Irsten, Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities ends, Reaching Critical Will (May, 2014) 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/news/latest-news/8907-the-consultation-process-for-the-international-code-of-
conduct-for-outer-space-activities-ends. 
8 V. Samson, “ICoC: Need of the Hour”, in A. Lele (ed.), Decoding the International Code of Conduct for Outer 
Space Activities (2012), at 136. 
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legally non-binding document having a purpose “to enhance the safety, security, and 
sustainability of all outer space activities pertaining to space objects, as well as the space 
environment.”9 Leaving aside analysis of the proposed legal regime of “safety, security and 
sustainability,” the institutional mechanism of cooperation established by the Code in order to 
achieve the proclaimed purposes will be reviewed. 
Section III of the Code entitled “Cooperation Mechanisms” is meant to address in detail 
means of cooperation between the Subscribing States that include: notification of outer space 
activities, exchange of information, and consultations. Notification of outer space activities and 
exchange of information are the two least formalized means of cooperation that should be 
conducted through the channels and by methods determined by the Subscribing States, and only 
to the “greatest extent possible,”10 leaving States under no obligation to notify of each and every 
event related to outer space activities. Similarly, States should share information on an annual 
basis, but only “where available and appropriate.”11 Consultations, in accordance with Part 7 of 
the Code, are supposed to be commenced in cases where a Subscribing State or States have 
reason to believe that activities of another State are or may be contrary to the provisions of the 
Code. Consultations should be held in any way or manner satisfactory for the interested States, 
and are supposed to conclude with a “mutually acceptable solution in accordance with 
international law.”12  
In Chapter 1 it has been proposed that a mechanism of cooperation should be understood 
as an established process defining legal measures and methods for coordinated activities in 
achievement of a specific objective, and that mere utilization of diplomatic and other ordinary 
means of inter-State communication does not amount to creation of a separate mechanism of 
cooperation.13 With this definition in mind, the “cooperation mechanisms” set up in Section III 
of the Code do not constitute separate mechanisms at all. Consultations and exchange of 
information should be conducted through diplomatic channels or other methods mutually 
determined by the Subscribing States, and only notifications may be transferred through the 
Central Point of Contact unless States determine that other method is more convenient. In the 
end, the Section requires that States engage in certain contacts to extend the Code’s objectives, 
                                                        
9 International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, at 1.1. 
10 Id. para. 5.1. 
11 Id. para. 6.1. 
12 Id. para. 7.1. 
13 Supra, at 1.3. 
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but it does not create a specialized process for doing so. Rather, the Code summarizes ways and 
means the Subscribing States might wish to use in different situations, but it does not establish a 
single mechanism of cooperation – contrary to the name of the Section these three Parts are put 
into. Weakly worded language used throughout the Section that “States may also consider,” “on 
a voluntary basis,” “to the extent feasible and practicable,” “when consistent with national law,” 
and the like only underlines such a conclusion.  
While that might be a weakly and too broadly worded Section, it does not stand there for 
no reason. The Code of Conduct is a legally non-binding document that has an ambitious goal of 
summarizing ‘rules of the road’ in outer space exploitation. The Section enumerates events that 
are deemed worthy of taking steps to inform about, for example, the launch of space objects, the 
presence of malfunctioning space objects, and collisions. It encourages States to share 
information about their space strategies and major space programs, and to organize activities to 
familiarize other Subscribing States with their programs and policies. Finally, it recommends that 
consultations should ensue to resolve situations where a State has allegedly acted contrary to the 
provisions of the Code.  
Overall, the Section emphasizes that extensive communication is a necessary prerequisite 
for effective cooperation; it highlights the areas and questions that should be taken seriously by 
the Subscribing States, and appropriate steps should be considered. The legally non-binding 
nature of the Code, of course, aggravated by weak and somewhat hollow phrases quoted above 
does not make it possible to demand this kind of behavior from States. But it can undoubtedly 
attract attention to the desirability of proper communication, and only practice will prove 
whether the effort has paid off. At this point it is suggested that most likely States would provide 
information about a fraction of planned strategies and projects, that the consultations mechanism 
would be stillborn and States would instead use their customary means of communication, and 
that notifications would be a precious rarity, as it turned out to be in the case of the Hague Code 
of Conduct Against Ballistic Missiles Proliferation.14 Hopefully, practice will prove otherwise. 
Section IV entitled “Organizational Aspects”, by contrast to Section III, is the one to set 
up the mechanism of cooperation endorsed by the Code of Conduct. It calls for convening of 
                                                        
14 Although the Code was signed by 134 States, in 2009 only 13% of launches subject to the Code regulations were 
reported, and neither Russia nor the United States has notified of their launches. See, L. Marta, “The Hague Code of 
Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: ‘Lessons Learned’ for the European Union Code of Conduct for 
Outer Space Activities”, 34 ESPI Perspectives (2010). 
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annual meetings of the Subscribing States, establishment of the Central Point of Contact, and 
development of an electronic database and communication system. The Code also allows calling 
for additional meetings of the Subscribing States “if decided by consensus of the Subscribing 
States at previous meetings or as communicated through the Central Point of Contact.”15 
Annual meetings are envisioned as a mechanism “to define, review and further develop 
this Code and facilitate its implementation.”16 The Code lists four topics that ‘could’ be included 
in the annual meetings’ agenda: review of the implementation of the Code, modification of the 
Code, discussion of additional measures that can be necessary, and establishing procedures 
regarding the exchange of notifications and other information. Usage of the verb ‘could’ in the 
relevant provision suggests that the list of topics is not exhaustive. The absence of a clear 
indication that an agenda might include other issues should the Subscribing States decide so 
probably is not intended to signal that the Code’s cooperative mechanism is a rigid and formal 
one. But comparison to the formulations used in, for example, the Committee on Earth 
Observation Satellites (CEOS) underlying documents – which are also legally non-binding – 
forces one to wonder whether this mechanism of cooperation is actually an informal one.  
The structure, organization, phrasing of the Code of Conduct are all significantly more 
formal than those of the CEOS documents. The Code covers general principles endorsed by the 
Code, it reaffirms commitment to the “Charter of the United Nations and existing treaties, 
principles and guidelines relating to outer space activities;”17 it emphasizes twice that the 
endorsed measures and norms are without prejudice to the existing legal framework and should 
be considered as complementary.18 Taking into consideration that the Code of Conduct has been 
re-drafted and amended multiple times in the course it its 7-year history, mindful of the strong 
oppositions of the United States to the 2012 version of the Code and ensuing multilateral 
consultations, it is logical to infer that the Code is indeed aiming at legal precision and 
unambiguity. The meticulous choice of words necessary to achieve the desired clarity could have 
been the reason for a cautious usage of open-ended formulations akin to “and others as decided 
by the Subscribing States” throughout the text of the Code; in fact, such formulations are only 
used three times, and two of them when describing means of inter-State communication that can 
                                                        
15 International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, para. 8.1. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. para. 3.1. 
18 Id. para. 15 of the Preamble, 1.3. 
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be used for information exchange and notifications. Overall, the Code of Conduct seems to be 
using relatively less flexible formulations in establishing the structure of cooperation.  
Decisions at the meetings, both substantive and procedural, are to be adopted by 
consensus. The Code does not provide additional details about the exact procedure for consensus 
establishment, and presumably it should be understood in a conventional way. The International 
Organization for Standardization describes consensus as follows: “General agreement, 
characterized by the absence of sustained opposition to substantial issues by any important party 
of the concerned interests and by a process that involves seeking to take into account the views 
of all parties concerned and to reconcile any conflicting arguments. Consensus need not imply 
unanimity.”19 
Decisions with regards to amendment of the Code, by contrast, literally require 
unanimity. The Code pronounces that any modifications “are only to apply after written consent 
is received by the Central Point of Contact via diplomatic note from all Subscribing States.” This 
is a good example supporting the earlier inference that the Code itself and by extension its 
mechanism of cooperation are not intended to be especially flexible. Unanimity is rarely required 
in international practice.20 The most obvious example is the voting procedure in the United 
Nations Security Council requiring unanimity among the permanent members for decisions on 
all matters, except procedural.21 But over time even this strict procedure was relaxed,22 and 
nowadays abstention of a permanent member is not considered an obstacle for adoption of the 
resolution.23   
But the Code of Conduct, being a legally non-binding document, includes such an 
unusually strict voting procedure to amend its ‘soft law’ provisions. Origins of and reasons for 
the Security Council voting procedure have been discussed at great lengths, but whether 
                                                        
19 ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004, Standardization and Related Activities -- General Vocabulary, n. 1. 
20 Hirschman explained that unanimity was rarely used in both firms and international organizations because an 
effective oversight with a possibility to introduce necessary changes to an organization requires unanimous support 
of all States, making the mechanism of control relatively weak from the standpoint of an individual State. See, A.O. 
Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (1970). From the 
collective standpoint, the organization whose modification is subjected to unanimous agreement of all parties is in 
effect the most stable, since even active majority would be incapable to push for changes. 
21 Art. 27 of the United Nations Charter. 
22 For detailed overview see, R. Sonnenfeld, Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (1988), at 46-49. 
23 Some suggest that a veto right – presumably an inevitable consequence of unanimity voting procedure – “is a left-
over from the power-oriented doctrine of international law of past centuries,” and is not compatible with democratic 
principles. See, H. Köchler, “The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council,” in Studies in 
International Relations, XVII (1991).  
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criticized or praised, there is little doubt that wide support and agreement are mandatory 
prerequisites for the decision-making in the Security Council due to its exceptional powers. 
Similar line of reasoning, quite clearly, cannot be used to explain the unanimity requirement with 
regard to the Code of Conduct. One possible explanation for such an extravagant choice of 
voting procedure is that States, which participated in the lengthy drafting and negotiation 
process, just do not want this Code to be amended, and establishment of the unanimity 
requirement would effectively prevent any modifications. The other reason might be that it is a 
concession: a State or a group of States made their support conditional to inclusion of this 
provision that in effect gives this particularly interested State or a group of States confidence that 
no additional obligations would ever be introduced without their express consent.24 It has to be 
kept in mind, though, since the Code is intended to codify ‘rules of the road’ and evolve along 
with evolution of best practices, the willingness to preserve the Code’s changelessness, if that is 
the reason behind the unanimity requirement, is contrary to the overarching goal of the Code. 
As per paragraph 8.3, “at the end of each regular meeting the Subscribing States are to 
elect by consensus their Chair for the period until the end of the next regular meeting.” This 
procedure guarantees that, first, the Chair is a rotatable short-term position, and second, that 
election of the Chair necessitates a wide support for the proposed candidacy and in principle 
strong opposition of just one Subscribing State might be enough to effectively veto election of an 
unwelcome candidate. The cautious approach to the Chair election procedure is somewhat 
surprising in the absence of any indication of the scope of the Chair’s responsibilities. In 
principle, Subscribing States are free to endow the Chair with broad rights and responsibilities 
common for presiding officers in international organizations,25 or to limit his mandate to 
symbolical actions of opening and closing the meetings, giving the word to the next speaker, and 
the like. Moreover, it is not clear whether the Chair is envisioned merely as the meetings’ 
presiding officer, or more broadly as the head of the secretariat-like organ and thus has a status 
akin to a Secretary-General-like officer of an international organization.  
 
                                                        
24 Although the Code of Conduct, whether with or without any changes to it, is legally non-binding, ‘soft law’ 
documents still bear certain obligations, though of mostly political and reputational character. While binding 
documents are the main perceived threat to States’ freedom of action (e.g. see, A. Guzman, Doctor Frankenstein’s 
International Organizations, 24 Eur. J. Int’l L. 999 (2013), at 1023), the more active use of non-binding documents 
makes States wary of taking upon additional commitments even as established by ‘soft law’ documents. 
25 For more information see, J. Kaufmann, Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis (1988). 
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9.2 Six-Criteria Analysis 
 
9.2.1 Membership/Participation 
Subscription, or participation, according to the express provisions of the Code of 
Conduct, is open to any State, regional integration organization which has competences over the 
matters covered by the Code – which is presumably a longer definition of the European Union, 
and international intergovernmental organizations which conduct outer space activities if a 
majority of its members are Subscribing States to the Code. Non-governmental entities are 
excluded from participation due to the specifics of the substantive part of the Code. First, the 
Code of Conduct reiterates general principles of international space law, including an obligation 
to refrain from threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state. Second, it reaffirms commitment of the Subscribing States to existing international 
legal instruments relevant to outer space activities. Finally, the Code in Section II commits 
Subscribing States to “establish and implement policies and procedures to minimize risk of 
accidents in space,” to limit any activities in outer space operations, which may generate long-
lived space debris, and “to adopt and implement, in accordance with their own internal 
processes, the appropriate policies and procedures or other effective measures in order to 
implement the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the United Nations Committee for the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.”26 Implementation of these policies can be achieved on a national 
governmental level by way of appropriate legal incorporation of relevant standards of space 
operations. Taken together, all these substantive obligations provided for in the Code are directed 
at sovereign States, can be complied with by international organizations as well,27 but cannot be 
fulfilled by non-governmental entities.  
Furthermore, in accordance with Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, a State on whose 
registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over 
such object. Along the same lines, in accordance with Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and 
Articles I(c), II-V of the Liability Convention, States are to be held squarely liable for damage 
                                                        
26 International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, para. 4.1, 4.4. 
27 Not all enumerated obligations can be complied with by international organizations, for example, an international 
organization cannot adopt and become a party to the Outer Space Treaty. But international organizations are capable 
of complying with most principles and obligations enumerated in the Code. Imposition of relevant obligations by the 
organization on its members if a particular member has not yet implemented these obligations or implemented to a 
different extent is an additional legal issue that should be resolved separately and does not immediately affect 
possibility of international organizations’ compliance with the principles and obligations of the Code of Conduct. 
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caused by space objects launched into outer space, even if such objects were built, launched and 
operated by private entities. International space law strictu sensu is State-centered,28 and 
international organizations possess a ‘secondary’ status,29 while non-governmental entities are 
excluded from international regulation altogether. The Code of Conduct, continuing the tradition 
of space law ‘State-centricity’ addresses its recommendations to subjects of international law – 
States and international intergovernmental organizations – and literally eliminates possibility of 
private entities’ participation in the Code of Conduct. 
 
9.2.2 Secretariat 
The Central Point of Contact plays a cohesive throughout the mechanism of cooperation 
established by the Code of Conduct. On the one hand, it serves as a secretariat at the annual 
meetings, and on the other, it is responsible for creation and management of the electronic 
database and communications system. Overall, the whole part outlining functions of the Central 
Point of Contact is rather indeterminate: it is unclear how it will be comprised, where it will be 
located, how it will be funded. Authors point to the two possible options for its establishment: 
either one of the Subscribing States could voluntarily take on the role of the Central Point of 
Contact following the example of Austria in the Hague Code against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation, or, since the Code is the initiative of the European Union, it could reside with a 
European Union institution.30 Paragraph 9.4 calling for the best use of existing facilities does not 
resolve this dilemma, since both potential Subscribing States and the European Union might 
have resources available to locate, staff and manage the Central Point of Contact.  
The Central Point of Contact, in addition to secretarial functions and database-related 
responsibilities, is tasked with: receiving and communicating notifications that a State subscribes 
to the Code; serving as a mechanism to facilitate communication of exchanged information; 
exercising organizational functions in connection to preparation and implementation of 
familiarization activities in the course of information exchange as provided by the Section III; 
and carrying out other tasks as decided by the Subscribing States. It has been noted that “the 
smooth running of the administration of the Code depends greatly on the mandate of the [Central 
                                                        
28 Cf., P. Jankowitsch, “The Background and History of Space Law,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of 
Space Law (2014), at 45-46. 
29 See, W.F. Foster, “The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,” in C.B. 
Bourne (ed.), The Canadian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 10 (1972), at 180. 
30 See, C. Brünner, A. Soucek, Outer Space in Society, Politics and Law (2012), at 543. 
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Point of Contact]. In this context, the [Immediate Central Contact] of the [Hague Code of 
Conduct against Ballistic Missiles Proliferation] can serve as an example. While it can remind 
states of their obligations, it cannot pressure them on their declarations on [Transcontinental 
Ballistic Missiles].”31  
While the comparison is to the point, the Code of Conduct does not entitle the Central 
Point of Contact to remind States of their obligations; a close reading of the paragraph 9.1 
enumerating its responsibilities does not envisage direct contacts of the Central Point of Contact 
with the Subscribing States on its own behalf, but only as an intermediary to “facilitate 
communication” between the States. The Subscribing States are free to task the Central Point of 
Contact with other functions, including communicating reminders of States’ responsibilities, but 
somehow formal inclusion of such a function seems unlikely.  
Relations between the Chair and the Central Point of Contact are of interest. The logical 
question is whether the Central Point of Contact acting as an annual meetings’ secretariat and the 
Chair presiding over these annual meetings are in some way interrelated or subordinated. The 
Code does not give an answer to that, there is no practice of implementation of the Code, read 
‘State practice’, and hence at this point the only available source to base the conclusions on is the 
scarce information provided in the text. Since the Central Point of Contact is tasked with serving 
as a secretariat at the annual meetings and the Chair presides over the annual meetings, it is safe 
to presume that their activities should be coordinated for obvious reasons of facilitating 
meetings’ proper organization and work. But there is no indication that the Chair leads the 
Central Point of Contact or is a part of it from a structural perspective. Simultaneously, there is 
no indication rejecting such an option. Adequate administrative support is necessary for effective 
work of any mechanism, and in this case the Code has outlined organs that should suffice to meet 
the needs of the annual meetings, but the Subscribing States are left with an option to structure 
these organs as they see fit. 
The Central Point of Contact is envisioned as performing secretarial functions for the 
annual meetings, indicating that neither is it an ad hoc entity, nor is it a secretariat of a hosting 
organization, which are the typical entities performing secretarial functions for an international 
conference or a treaty meeting. The Central Point of Contact, however, also does not amount to 
an international organization’s secretariat based on the three characteristics of such a secretariat 
                                                        
31 Id.  
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as they have been established in Chapter 1. First, the Central Point of Contact tasked with 
performing secretarial functions is a separate organ created within the analyzed mechanism. 
Second, it might be concluded that the Central Point of Contact works on a permanent basis: its 
functions as a communications intermediary and database manager require permanent 
functioning. Funding, as it has been discussed above, is not a settled issue, but it is plausible to 
suggest that it would be funded by the State or the entity taking on the role of the Central Point 
of Contact; but the option of funding allocation from the ‘Code of Conduct budget’ – should 
anything like that ever be created – remains a possibility until determined otherwise.  
Third, an international character of work or its absence is not established by the Code, but 
based on the functions bestowed on the Central Point of Contact it is unlikely that it would be 
acting independently from the will of the Subscribing States. Quite to the contrary, the Central 
Point of Contact seems to have been provided for the convenience of the Subscribing States, to 
ensure that all and any information shared by a State is properly transmitted to the recipient, that 
an electronic database and communications system is maintained for States’ benefit and 
expediency, and that meetings are properly served and organized by a professional secretariat 
again for the benefit of participating States. The Central Point of Contact is not responsible for 
external contacts, it does not prepare development strategy, and it does not undertake any steps 
toward new Subscribing States’ solicitation. The consensual voting procedure for most questions 
is also indicative of the Subscribing States desire to preserve control over matters related to the 
Code implementation; in such a situation a secretariat possessing even a limited autonomy, and 
more so capable of performing functions on the international plane distorts the States’ complete 
control.  
Overall, while the organ performing secretarial functions is a separate organ working on a 
permanent basis and possibly funded from the sources allocated for the mechanism financing, it 
does not possess an international character of work. Recalling the analogy to the linear scale, 
where an international organization’s secretariat is on the one side and an international 
conference’s (or a treaty’s) secretariat is on the other, the Central Point of Contact will be closer 
to the international organization side than to the conference side. This linear scale now looks as 
follows: an international organization’s secretariat, then the CEOS secretariat, then the Code of 
Conduct Central Point of Contact – then we reach the midpoint, and on the other side is an 
international conference’s secretariat. 
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9.2.3 International Legal Personality 
Evaluation of the measure of legal personality is a complicated issue with respect to the 
Code of Conduct. The text of the Code does not cover this question; it has not yet come into 
force and, thereby, no practice is available to rely on.  In such a situation any argument, whether 
in favor or opposing existence of a legal personality, is bound to be refutable. Nevertheless, this 
criterion is an important one and should be addressed, even if in an inconclusive way.   
Scholars tend to describe the Code of Conduct as a non-institutional mechanism of self-
regulation.32 But it has already been established that the Central Point of Contact – a clearly 
institutionalized entity – works, or better, is envisaged to work on a permanent basis. Moreover, 
the Code provides for annual, read regular, meetings of the Subscribing States, which also 
evidence institutionalization. Therefore, the mechanism of cooperation established by the Code 
of Conduct cannot justly be characterized as a ‘non-institutional’ one. But it might be agreed that 
it is indeed a mechanism of self-regulation: a legally non-binding document outlining principles 
and guidelines of behavior in outer space activities can only be complied with conditional to 
States’ willingness to act accordingly. In this sense the Code is indeed a mechanism of self-
regulation, where each State is responsible for its own decisions and cannot be compelled to act 
in a certain way. 
Having agreed that an institutional system is present in this mechanism of cooperation, 
there is a need to determine whether this mechanism is provided with a legal personality. After 
the preceding analysis, little doubt is left that this mechanism does not possess a legal personality 
characteristic for an international organization. While it is an association of States and 
international organizations with lawful objectives and it possesses at least one organ not subject 
to the authority of any of the organized communities, no distinction can be made between the 
legal powers of participating States and the entity. On several occasions it has been pointed out 
that the Central Point of Contact is created to support activities of the Subscribing States and not 
to perform functions on the international plane, and that overall mechanism aims at self-
regulation, not the regulation with a possibility of control and enforcement – to the extent that is 
a possibility at all in international public law regulating relations of sovereign subjects.  
                                                        
32 Cf., L.E. Martinez, “The ITU’s Evolving Regulatory Role for Space Debris ‘Rules of the Road’: Implications for 
Space Communications Regulation,” in Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 2013 (2014), at 277. 
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Two factors acting in concert suggest that the Subscribing States are not willing to give 
up a shred of their freedom in outer space activities: first, the fact that the Code does not provide 
for any independently performed powers of the Central Point of Contact evidenced by a rather 
perfunctory, sketchy outline of the mechanism of cooperation by the Code; and second, the 
overall thrust and tenor of the Code, as exemplified by the consensus voting procedure and the 
unanimity requirement for the Code amendment. The history of the Code of Conduct negotiation 
and drafting, where even after the multilateral consultations completion no steps have been taken 
to initiate a process of subscription to the Code, speak in favor of such a conclusion. Cautious 
scholarly assumptions about the value and possible impact of the Code on outer space activities33 
just add ground to the conclusion that States are indeed reluctant to join even this legally non-
binding document, which is carefully crafted to preserve the ‘self-regulation ambience’. The 
conclusion should be drawn that this mechanism of cooperation does not possess international 
legal personality.  
 
9.2.4 Term of Existence 
The Code of Conduct mechanism of cooperation has been established to exist and, 
therefore, to work for an indefinite period of time. The necessarily permanent work of the 
Central Point of Contact and annual repetition of the Subscribing States meetings are not limited 
by a certain time limit or achievement of a goal. To the contrary, the Code is viewed as a 
codification of the modern ‘rules of the road’ that therefore has to be amended and developed 
due to advances in space technologies and their applications. Interestingly, previous versions of 
the Code required only biannual meetings, but in the current version the choice in favor of more 
frequent meetings was made. Hence, the mechanism of cooperation in accordance with the Code 
of Conduct has always been seen as requiring regular recurring meetings, and not the occasional 
ad hoc gatherings. Additionally, there is a possibility that was duly noted by the scholars of the 
Code’s provisions transformation into customary norms subject to their widespread support and 
                                                        
33 For example, see, A. Lele, “Space Code of Conduct: Inadequate Mechanism”, in A. Lele (ed.), Decoding the 
International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (2012), at 5-8; W. Rathgeber, N.-L. Remuss and K.-U. 
Schrogl, “Space Security and the European Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities,” in Disarmament Forum: A 
Safer Space Environment?, 10, 4 (2009), at 38 (“The content of the final Code of Conduct, its forum of negotiation, 
as well as the mode of adoption all need further clarification.”). 
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compliance.34 Without getting into the discussion about the necessary prerequisites for such a 
transformation, suffice it to say it would not be possible without continuous and consistent 
practice, thus underlying a presumably indefinite need for the Code’s, and consequently its 
mechanism’s, existence.35 
 
9.2.5 Binding Force of Documents Produced 
According to paragraphs 1.3 and 1.4, the Code is not only legally non-binding, but is also 
“complementary to the international legal framework regulating outer space activities.” If the 
Code itself is non-binding, there is no reason to suggest that documents adopted during the 
annual meetings could be of any other legal nature, precisely because the annual meetings should 
be convened to review and develop the Code itself. Hence, only legally non-binding documents 
can be produced using this mechanism of cooperation.  
The Code of Conduct has not yet been adopted and therefore has not yet been put up to 
practice. Therefore, the analysis has to rely on the text of the Code itself. There is a possibility, 
however, that once (and if) the Code is adopted and begins to be enforced, including by way of 
commencing annual meetings and adopting appropriate documents, the nature of such adopted 
documents might well change. While such documents would most likely continue to be legally 
non-binding, they might become authoritative and eventually become a basis for identification of 
customary international law, if they would be widely complied with. At this point, however, 
these are purely theoretical reflections, and only the practice would prove them right or wrong.  
 
                                                        
34 Cf., J. L. Banos, “EU Code of Conduct on Activities in Outer Space: Issues that Matter,” in A. Lele (ed.), 
Decoding the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (2012), at 100. 
35 For an overview of the elements of the international custom and the process of its identification see, T. Treves, 
“Customary International Law,” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2012); A.A. D’Amato, 
The Concept of Custom in International Law (1971); A.A. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of 
Treaties, 21 Vand. J. Transat’l L. 1 (1988). In addition to the traditional approach to the identification of 
international customary norms, requiring identification of both objective and subjective elements, some authors have 
claimed that only one element might be sufficient. For an overview of the modern approach see, Lepard, Brian D. 
Customary International Law: a new theory with practical applications (2010); M.P. Scharf, Customary 
International Law in Times of Fundamental Change (2013).  For an opinion attempting to reconcile the two 
approaches see, A.E. Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
Reconciliation, 95 A.J.I.L. 757 (2001). 
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9.2.6 Existence of Opportunity to Modify Obligations 
Neither the consensus voting procedure nor the unanimity requirement for the Code of 
Conduct modification per se constitutes an opportunity for States to modify their obligations. 
The established consensus voting procedure is supposed to guarantee the continuing significant 
support for the decisions of the annual meetings, both substantive and procedural. By way of 
consensus procedure a State cannot opt out of a particular decision, but every Subscribing State 
is thereby guaranteed to be satisfied by the adopted decision. The unanimity requirement for the 
modification of the Code, as discussed above, effectively gives any opposing State an 
opportunity to veto undesirable changes, but it does not provide much of an opportunity to 
modify its obligations. The unanimity requirement goes back to the Code’s origins. As early as 
2008, when France took over the European Council Presidency, it made the development of the 
Code of Conduct a priority and sought to make it acceptable to as many States as possible.36 In 
the same vein, scholars have pointed out that “while the Draft Code of Conduct is not legally 
binding, it could become customary law, but it depends on how many states agree to abide by 
it.”37 Hence, a unanimous consent requirement of all Subscribing States is a safeguard 
requirement for the maintenance of a wide support of participating States, and not a constraint on 
the right of States to abide by the Code on a voluntary basis as provided by paragraph 1.4 of the 
Code of Conduct.   
 
9.3 Evaluation and Conclusions 
 
9.3.1 Comparison between CEOS and Code of Conduct Hybrid Mechanisms 
The Code of Conduct established a permanently working mechanism of cooperation open 
to States and international organizations empowered to adopt legally non-binding documents, 
which has an organ performing secretarial functions not amounting to an international 
organization’s secretariat. Essentially, this mechanism is similar to that of CEOS, namely should 
be characterized as a hybrid mechanism possessing features of an international organization and 
international conference. There is, however, a major substantial difference between the two 
mechanisms: CEOS aims at coordination of individual space programs, and the Code of Conduct 
                                                        
36 Cf., W. Rathgeber, N.-L. Remuss and K.-U. Schrogl, “Space Security and the European Code of Conduct for 
Outer Space Activities,” in Disarmament Forum: A Safer Space Environment?, 10, 4 (2009), at 36. 
37 Id. at 37.  
 312 
has the goal of ‘regulating’, albeit in a legally non-binding manner, States’ outer space activities. 
Thereby, while the first one focuses on practical outer space exploitation, the Code of Conduct 
exists in the realm of ‘legal regulation’.  
With respect to CEOS it has been noted that scholars are generally favorable to the 
chosen structure of cooperation due to its ability to accommodate Washington consensus-
inspired reluctance to adopt legally binding documents and at the same time provide a solid basis 
for necessary cooperation and coordination. With respect to the Code of Conduct, however, there 
is no concurrence as to its effectiveness.38 And this divergence in opinions is likely to be caused 
precisely by the goals pursued by these two hybrid mechanisms of cooperation. Effectiveness of 
the CEOS hybrid mechanism was seen to lie in the balance between the benefits its participants 
gain, restraints on their freedom of action, and their willingness to put an effort in cooperation 
and coordination. The same line of argument, however, cannot be applied to the Code of 
Conduct mechanism of cooperation.  
In the realm of practical space applications, cooperative efforts have tangible results that 
can be experienced in a short-term perspective. For example, coordination makes valuable data 
publicly available and it promotes technical compatibility to avoid redundant experiments, 
thereby minimizing costs and preventing costly changes of ground equipment. Normative 
regulation, by contrast, cannot bring immediate practical results. On the one hand, it ensures that 
all parties are behaving within the framework of relevant regulation promoting stability and 
security of the regulated activities. On the other hand, it restraints parties’ freedom of action 
through subordination of their activities to a mandatory set of rules. But that is only true for a 
legally binding regulation. In case of a ‘soft law’ regulation neither the stability of regulated 
activities can be guaranteed, nor are the parties restrained by a mandatory set of rules. This 
distinction is essential to understanding why hybrid mechanisms are most effective in 
coordination of activities in practical applications. 
Drawing comparison with CEOS, where amalgamation of an organization-like secretariat 
and a conference-like absent legal personality was necessitated by the demand to provide a 
flexible and informal mechanism of coordination beneficial for all participants, the Code of 
                                                        
38 Compare A. Lele, “Space Code of Conduct: Inadequate Mechanism,” in A. Lele (ed.), Decoding the International 
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (2012); and M. Krepon, “Space Code of Conduct: Inadequate 
Mechanism – A Response,” in A. Lele (ed.), Decoding the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities 
(2012).  
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Conduct’s hybridity is of a different nature. In CEOS all permanent organs, even the Chair, are 
involved in design of those practical measures that will lead to the CEOS purposes achievement: 
the Working Groups report directly to the Chair, the Executive Officer is charged with the 
Strategic Plan development, and the Secretariat coordinates CEOS activities internally and 
externally. The Central Point of Contact, by contrast, in entrusted only with administrative tasks.  
CEOS absent legal personality is mostly the result of the need to utilize a flexible 
mechanism of cooperation and minimize expenses for such cooperation. The Code of Conduct 
mechanism of cooperation does not have legal personality, first, because it simply would not 
need one since the Central Point of Contact does not have any functions exercisable beyond the 
annual meetings and Subscribing States’ communication, and second, because international legal 
personality equals a certain degree of independence – something the Subscribing States are 
determined to prevent from happening, predominantly because the issue of peaceful uses of outer 
space has been brought up in the Code.  
Moreover, the Code’s focus on ‘regulation’ as opposed to the CEOS’s focus on practical 
applications, put these two mechanisms in different ‘boxes’: practical applications and focus on 
technical issues of cooperation require a different approach and mindset than politico-regulatory 
activities. The practice-oriented cooperation focuses on such matters as economy, expediency, 
effectiveness rate, equipment compatibility and the like, which demand primarily technical 
expertise and adequate application of scientific knowledge to the current circumstances. The 
politico-regulatory cooperation, by contrast, concerns matters of political feasibility, 
adequateness to the existing political climate, compatibility with other numerous political and 
legal regulations, which cannot be evaluated objectively and always demand making a judgment 
call – an approach substantially different from the ‘hard science’. The change of the objective of 
cooperation might well affect effectiveness of the mechanism of cooperation, even if the 
mechanism itself proved successful in different circumstances. 
 
9.3.2 Code of Conduct Hybrid Mechanism: Expected Results 
While the Code has not been put up for work yet and no practice is thus available, 
inferences can be made about the anticipated mechanism’s effectiveness. The choice of a legally 
non-binding document ipso facto does not predetermine (in)effectiveness of a particular 
mechanism of cooperation. A lot has been said about the weaknesses or outright inadequacy of 
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the form of code of conduct for regulation of outer space activities, especially of the question of 
peaceful uses of outer space. While such criticism might be well grounded or, to the contrary, be 
proved unwarranted by practice, it should not become the focal point of the mechanism’s 
analysis. This criticism pertains to the substantive provisions of the Code, but current analysis 
focuses on the institutional element of the Code.  
Acknowledging that non-compliance with substantive provisions would inevitably lead to 
uselessness of any mechanism, no matter how effective it is on its own, for the purposes of the 
present analysis it will be presumed that the substantive provisions of the Code are being 
implemented to some degree, and that overall States are being supportive.  
The goal of the Code is “to enhance the safety, security, and sustainability of all outer 
space activities pertaining to space objects, as well as the safe environment.”39 In furtherance of 
the substantive provisions, including general principles, a commitment to comply with the 
existing legal framework and an agreement to introduce and implement measures regarding outer 
space activities, the Code requires that the Subscribing States (1) notify of outer space activities, 
(2) exchange information, (3) engage in consultation in case of Code provisions violations, and 
(4) meet on an annual basis to review and develop the Code, presumably its substantive 
provisions. To facilitate compliance with these requirements the Central Point of Contact is 
established. It has been earlier suggested that efficient compliance with the first three 
requirements is unlikely; but it is plausible that annual meetings might see extensive attendance. 
Again, in the absence of practice to support or refute these inferences, these presumptions should 
be accepted as hypotheses based on the limited data currently available. 
Hence, only the annual meetings are capable of effectively working toward greater 
understanding between the Subscribing States, serve as a forum for information exchange and 
serve as a forum for development and enhancement of the Code’s substantive provisions. 
Collective discussion at most times is a crucial prerequisite for gathering comprehensive 
information, while consultations and similar methods are capable of supplying sporadic, 
patchwork-like pieces of data.40 And with this perspective a hybrid mechanism created by the 
Code is justified.  
                                                        
39 International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, para. 1.1. 
40 See e.g. International Law Commission, Preliminary Report on the protection of the environment in relation to 
armed conflicts, Sixty-sixth session, 5 May-6 June and 7 July-8 August 2014, A/CN.4/674, at 6-8. (The International 
Law Commission filed a request for information from States about their practice, international and domestic law 
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First, the annual meetings have to be properly organized. Otherwise, even those States 
willing to cooperate might be deterred by poor administration, unskillful management of papers 
and overall nonprofessional atmosphere. Second, the Chair being elected among States’ 
representatives is a long-standing practice for most international gatherings, and the Code of 
Conduct annual meetings are not an exception. Third, powers and functions of the organ 
performing secretarial functions – the Central Point of Contact – focus on internal matters. With 
external communication taken away from the secretarial organ, a figure of a Secretary-General 
representing the mechanism in relations with other international entities becomes unnecessary. 
Fourth, information exchanged during the meetings should be properly recorded; decisions 
arrived at should be formalized, and progress in their implementation should be duly tracked and 
passed out to all Subscribing States. Fifth, communications beyond annual meetings, which 
inevitably would take place even if merely in regard of procedural matters, should be properly 
transmitted and recorded. In the absence of such an intermediary the possibility of complying 
with the requirements regarding notifications, information exchange and consultations vanish. 
A permanently working organ with secretarial functions, thus, is a necessity in 
achievement of the ambitious goals of the Code. The Central Point of Contact, however, has not 
been created as an entity capable of influencing or catalyzing achievement of these goals. There 
is a good reason for this, though. The Code of Conduct is supposed to regulate outer space 
activities; the non-binding form has been chosen intentionally to accommodate States’ reluctance 
to sign for any obligations,41 and the whole scheme of cooperation is concentrated on 
guaranteeing that every State feels confident that nothing contrary to its will is ‘slipped into’ the 
Code. In such an almost paranoid atmosphere of distrust and rejection of anything that has not 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
interpretations pertaining to the theme of the Report, and only 5 States have responded to the request within a year, 
while 3 out of these responses were very concise and did not provide all requested information. The Special 
Rapporteur expressed hope that other States will provide further information to the questions posed by the 
Commission.); M. Benkö and K.-U. Schrogl (eds.), International Space Law in the Making: Current Issues in the 
UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (1993), at 199. (In 1988 and 1989 two notes verbales from the 
UN Secretary General asked the States to provide information about their national legal frameworks relating to the 
development of the application of the principle contained in Art. 1 of the Outer Space Treaty. 30 countries, out of 
more than 170 Member States of the UN and 53 Member States of COPUOS responded to these two notes verbales. 
While the response rate was sufficient, it does not come close to even a majority of nations, whose responses were 
requested.) 
41 For an argument about unlikelihood of the majority of spacefaring nations agreeing to a fundamental outer space 
treaty, see F.G. von der Dunk, “International Space Law,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law 
(2014), at 43. 
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been scrutinized by a State itself, a secretariat possessing even a limited autonomy and entrusted 
with substantive, as opposed to administrative functions would have been unthinkable. 
By extension, it is equally logical that no new subject of international law has been 
created. The formality of the Code mentioned above coupled with the need to ensure that any 
and all changes to the Code are properly agreed upon by the States led to the need of establishing 
a permanently working organ with secretarial functions, at the same time rejecting the possibility 
of such an organization’s  independence and any measure of legal personality of the entity. 
Getting back to the Code’s goal, it can now be understood that the hybrid mechanism of 
cooperation has not been triggered by it. There are multiple options to achieve the proclaimed 
goals: an agreement providing for regular review meetings, a mechanism with a secretariat-like 
organ tasked with continuing monitoring of its participants activities, or a practice-oriented 
mechanism akin to CEOS aimed at coordination of space debris mitigation practices. The current 
option seems to have been chosen because the Code is not only about ‘safety, security and 
sustainability’ measures, but it also covers the principles pertaining to peaceful uses of outer 
space. This issue has always been controversial for outer space regulation,42 it is being discussed 
within the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, and has been a part of the Code since its 
inception. Although multiple redrafts have watered-down relevant provisions, which can now be 
found only in the General Principles Section, the approach has been preserved: if the issue of 
peaceful uses of outer space is touched upon, no intermediaries are allowed.43 
The hybrid mechanism exemplified by the Code of Conduct is not a result of the need to 
combine flexibility with a continuous character of work. It is a product of the need to regulate 
complex controversial matters, which in turn require a high level of formality and legal 
precision, and the unwillingness to accept any legally binding obligations. The mechanism itself, 
while not substantially different from CEOS, has not been altered in a specific way, which made 
                                                        
42 F. Tronchetti, “Legal Aspects of the Military Uses of Outer Space,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of 
Space Law (2014), at 331-32 (“The controversy over military uses of outer space has been largely related to four 
factors: (1) the use of outer space for military reasons is a highly sensitive issue and states are often reluctant to 
accept legal restrictions or prohibitions to such a use; (2) a unitary legal framework governing military operations in 
space is missing – instead, the applicable rules are distributed among various sources of law, including general 
public international law, international humanitarian law and international space law; (3) these rules fail, at times, to 
provide a clear understanding of key terms and concepts; and (4) space technologies (especially as for launch 
vehicles) and space objects (notably satellites) are usually of a dual-use character, as they have the potential to be 
used for civil and military applications.”). 
43 It was suggested that “Arms are not only a symptom of mistrust, they may also be a cause of it.” S.D. Bailey and 
S. Daws, The United Nations: A Concise Political Guide (1995), at 79. 
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it less effective in achievement of the proclaimed goals. The bottom line is the goals are too 
grand for a hybrid mechanism.  
Despite the outlined drawbacks on the institutional side of the established cooperation, or 
as of now just proposed cooperation, nowadays it seems that a majority of authors agree that the 
success of the Code depends mostly on the number of States supporting the Code, and here the 
Code might face significant difficulties.44 A panel of experts’ symposium entitled “International 
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities – The International Perspective” specifically 
mentioned that “for the Code to succeed, as many countries should participate as possible via a 
flexible forum, one that includes civil and military aspects of using outer space, and there should 
be clear implementation mechanisms.”45 Currently, neither broad support nor clear 
implementation mechanisms have been secured.  
Nevertheless, it is likely that further regulation of outer space activities will continue to 
utilize hybrid mechanisms of cooperation. States are not willing to take on any more obligations 
than they already have; simultaneously, the contemporary issues of outer space exploration and 
use, including the one emphasized by the Code of Conduct – space debris, demand coordination 
on some level, and hybrid, read flexible, mechanisms of cooperation are one possible solution. In 
the previous chapter it has been suggested that usage of the hybrid mechanisms of cooperation 
was necessitated by the growing exploitation of outer space and the need to use its resources in 
an efficient and sustainable way.46 The same motivation is true for the case of the Code of 
Conduct. 
 Space debris is obviously a pressing issue.47 The Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines 
were drafted in 2007. But even complete abidance by the Guidelines’ provisions for every future 
launch would not solve the problem because the debris that is already there would not disappear. 
Additionally, space technology is in constant development, and there is a chance that ten years 
from now these Guidelines become outdated and ineffective.48 These two considerations point 
                                                        
44 See, M. Krepon, ”Origins of and Rationale for a Space Code of Conduct,” in A. Lele (ed.), Decoding the 
International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (2012), at 34. 
45 Secure World Foundation, Experts Confer on “Rules of the Road” for Outer Space Activities (2012), 
http://newswise.com/articles/view/586738/. 
46 Cf., M. Hofmann, “Sustainability of Space Environment: Draft UNGA Resolution,” in Proceedings of the 
International Institute of Space Law (2012), at 639-40. 
47 For a general overview see, N. Jasentuliyana, International Law and the United Nations (1999), 321-49. 
48 Cf., H.R. Hertzfeld, “A Roadmap for a Sustainable Space Law Regime,” in Proceedings of the International 
Institute of Space Law (2012), at 299. 
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toward a dynamic mechanism of cooperation, receptive to the latest developments and able to 
promote best practices. The hybrid mechanism ensuring flexibility and adaptability, but capable 
of constant monitoring of the recent trends, their analyses and introduction to all interested States 
and international organizations would prove helpful. The more subjects engage in outer space 
exploitation, the more pressing the issue would become.  
The Code of Conduct was largely stimulated by the troubling display of non-transparency 
and insensitivity to the space environment shown by China in its 2007 anti-satellite test.49 
Certainly, by way of introducing the Code of Conduct – a ‘soft law’ document – the European 
Union supported the notion that voluntary rules of the road, founded in ‘best practices’ among 
space actors, offered the most promising approach to achieving space behavioral norms. “The 
EU emphasized that the Code of Conduct represents a pragmatic and incremental process which 
can assist in achieving enhanced safety and security in space. The Code has a preventive focus, 
emphasizing that activities undertaken in space should involve a high degree of care, due 
diligence, and transparency with the aim of building confidence and trust among space actors.”50 
The goals of the Code as stated in paragraph 1.1 of its text, the reasoning behind initiating 
the Code of Conduct development, and the rationale for choosing the legally non-binding 
instrument support the earlier suggested conclusion that a hybrid mechanism of cooperation 
created by way of a legally non-binding document is a contemporary trend in outer space 
regulation. On the one hand, the more intensive outer space exploitation requires greater 
coordination and transparency of such activities, and on the other, it necessitates that measures 
are taken to attain sustainability, ensuring that outer space is preserved for future space 
endeavors. Viewed from a different, legally-political perspective, ‘soft law’ regulation has 
become a trend since the 1980s, and the last decade has only strengthened the tendency. 
Consequently, there is nothing surprising in utilization of a legally non-binding document, but 
there is a novelty here, namely the establishment of the hybrid mechanism of cooperation to 
support formal, to the extent they can be characterized as such given their non-binding nature, 
relations and measures promoted by the Code of Conduct.
                                                        
49 See, J. Robinson, “Europe’s Space Diplomacy Initiative: The International Code of Conduct,” in A. Lele (ed.), 
Decoding the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (2012), at 27. 
50 Id. at 28. 
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“Achieving sustainability is one of the great policy objectives of our time. It is a global 
concept and it comprises a huge set of policy areas.”1 Although the term ‘sustainability’ is 
usually used to refer to environment protection studies, in reality it is much broader. “Its main 
idea is to maintain the longevity of the global ecosystem safeguarding humanity’s further 
development or even survival,”2 and in this sense concerns a wide array of issues from 
environment and energy to mobility and security.3 Safety of life is the nucleus of the 
sustainability studies. Therefore, application of the latest technology in rescue operations is an 
indispensable part of the sustainability discussion. 
Although it is true that space technology has acquired an important place in the 
sustainability and safety apparatus just recently, as early as 1979 the international COSPAS-
SARSAT Programme was founded to provide help to persons in distress, particularly to maritime 
and aviation users. In the present chapter this Programme will be reviewed and analyzed. In 
scholarly works there is no unity with regard to proper designation of the Programme: some 
argue that it is an international organization, others are not so categorical in their evaluations. 
Hence, the analysis based on the six criteria will allow classifying COSPAS-SARSAT in a 
decisive way, leading to a conclusion about the form of cooperation that was deemed appropriate 
to fulfill the Programme’s humanitarian objectives.  
In 1982 the rescue of two men stranded in a remote area of British Columbia, Canada 
made the headlines. Communication received by the Ottawa ground station from the Soviet 
COSPAS I sputnik, which detected the emergency aircraft’s beacon – a cooperative endeavor 
that was the prototype of the modern COSPAS-SARSAT Programme – allowed determining the 
crash site and rescuing the passengers of the crashed plane.4 The satellite system was initially 
                                                        
1 K.-U. Schrogl, C. Mathieu and A. Lukaszczyk, “Space and Sustainability,” in K.-U. Schrogl et al. (eds.), Threats, 
Risks and Sustainability – Answers by Space (2009), at 3. 
2 Id. at 4. 
3 See, The European Space Policy Institute’s conference “Threats, Risks and Sustainability – Answers by Space,” 
10-11 December 2007, Vienna, Austria.  
4 Cf., National Aeronautics and Space Administration, COSPAS/SARSAT (1986), at 3. 
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created based on the Memorandum of Understanding of 1979 between the agencies of the Soviet 
Union, United States, Canada and France. This Memorandum united the Western program 
SARSAT and the Soviet maritime navigation satellite system abbreviated COSPAS “calling for 
interoperability between the two systems, thus allowing participants in both programs to use both 
space segments to detect and locate distress beacons.”5 Upon successful completion of the 
evaluation phase in 1982, the next Memorandum of Understanding of 1984 among the same 
parties followed. The system was declared fully operational in 1985. 
“Since several other countries had also participated in the experiment and used the 
system to save lives, finding a way to transform it into an operational system was highly 
desirable.”6 On July 1, 1988 the four States providing the space segment of the Programme 
signed the International COSPAS-SARSAT Programme Agreement,7 which ensured the 
continuity of the System and its availability to all States on a non-discriminatory basis. That was 
the de jure beginning of the successful story of cooperation that by 2014 saved over thirty-seven 
thousand lives.8 Technologically, the COSPAS-SARSAT system can be described as follows: “A 
constellation of satellites is circling the globe monitoring for distress signals, while tracking 
stations on six continents receive the satellite signals, compute the location of the emergency, 
and quickly forward the distress alert information to the appropriate rescue authorities.”9 
An independent Programme, however, was not the first and only choice for the 
cooperating States; operation by an existing international organization was another option. The 
International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) had the right institutional 
structure.10 “Search and rescue was compatible with the Inmarsat’s mission, and the organization 
had in fact studied the possibility of adding a search and rescue capability to future generations 
of its geostationary satellites.”11 
                                                        
5 R.J.H. Barnes and J. Clapp, Cospas-Sarsat: A Quiet Success Story, 11 Space Policy 261 (1995), at 262. 
6 J.V. King, Overview of the Cospas-Sarsat Satellite System for Search and Rescue, Online J. of Space Comm. 4 
(2003), at 6. 
7 International COSPAS-SARSAT Programme Agreement, July 1, 1988. 1518 U.N.T.S. 209. 
8 COSPAS-SARSAT System Data, No. 40, 15 December 2014, available at www.cospas-sarsat.int. 
9 J.V. King, “Cospas-Sarsat Satellite System for Search and Rescue,” in P. Olla (ed.), Commerce in Space: 
Infrastructures, Technologies, and Applications (2008), at 69. 
10 O. Lundberg, “Mobile Communications via satellite in the 1990s,” in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London. Series A, Mathematical and Physical Sciences, Vol. 312, No. 1519, Technology in the 1990s: 
The Industrialization of Space (Jul. 26, 1984), at 51. 
11 R.J.H. Barnes and J. Clapp, Cospas-Sarsat: A Quiet Success Story, 11 Space Policy 261 (1995), at 265. 
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By 1983 the Council of INMARSAT was fully engaged in examination of possible ways 
to fund provision of satellite-based rescue services.12 The Soviet Union, playing a significant role 
in INMARSAT, strongly favored the option of handing administrative functions to the 
organization, suggesting that it was well equipped to undertake the task, while the Western 
partners needed assurances that all participating States possessed a similar level of control over 
the Programme and therefore were wary of accepting the institutional solution where the Soviet 
Union had an upper hand. At the same time, all countries, and particularly the United States in 
the light of the Reagan era budget cuts, were looking for an option to maintain the rescue service 
without committing to higher expenditures. In the end, a compromise was struck by way of 
preserving the Programme’s independence but establishing a small secretariat at the 
INMARSAT Headquarters in London in 1987.13  
Somewhere at this point begins the confusion about the legal nature of the COSPAS-
SARSAT Programme. The COSPAS-SARSAT Programme International Agreement and 
relevant international practice will be analyzed in order to identify the category of cooperation 
the Programme belongs to. Simultaneously, the analysis will allow identifying institutional 
specifics of this mechanism of cooperation, which will be further used in the course of the 
‘purpose-result’ analysis.  
Article 2 establishes purposes of the 1988 Agreement: assurance of the long-term 
operation of the system of search and rescue, provision of distress alert and location data, support 
of the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization 
objectives in search and rescue, and coordination of the management of the system. The 
COSPAS-SARSAT system, in accordance with Article 1 of the Agreement, is comprised of a 
space segment, a ground segment and radiobeacons.  
The way the objectives of the Agreement are formulated is noteworthy. The exact 
wording focuses on the operation of the system, namely three types of equipment, not the 
Programme itself. Should the Agreement have been focused on the establishment of a separate 
entity, one might expect that the objectives would concern activities of the entity, but it rather 
sets the goals of proper functioning of the necessary equipment. Acquiescing that a practice-
                                                        
12 Cf., G.P. Zhukov, “Search and Rescue Satellite Aided System (COSPAS-SARSAT System),” in International 
Institute of Space Law of International Astronautical Federation, Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Colloquium on the 
Law of Outer Space (1983), at 267-69. 
13 W.-H. Park, Satellite Application for Aviation Requirements, 14 Air L. 17 (1989), at 27. 
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oriented cooperation is impossible in the absence of properly functioning equipment, the 
emphasis on the technical component suggests that the institutional side of cooperation is 
somewhat secondary. Notably, Article 1 defines the term ‘Programme’ as “activities carried out 
by the Parties to provide, operate and coordinate the COSPAS-SARSAT system.” Therefore, the 
COSPAS-SARSAT Programme – the official name of this mechanism of cooperation – can be 
translated using the Agreement’s glossary as ‘the COSPAS-SARSAT activities carried out by the 
Parties to provide, operate and coordinate a space segment, a ground segment and radiobeacons’. 
In this sense, the Programme can hardly be equated to an international intergovernmental 
organization. Further analysis is necessary, however, to draw a persuasive conclusion in this 
regard. 
To facilitate functioning of the COSPAS-SARSAT system, the 1988 Agreement 
established two permanent organs: the Council and the Secretariat. The exact wording of the 
Agreement suggests that the organs are created for implementation of the Agreement, which in 
turn, as it has been noted earlier, was adopted for performance of the activities carried out by the 
Parties to provide, operate and coordinate the COSPAS-SARSAT system. In other words, the 
organs were created to facilitate operation of the technical equipment, not per se coordination of 
actions of the Parties. This suggests that functions of the organs have technical focus, albeit 
administrative tasks are also necessarily a part of their mandate. 
In accordance with Article 8, the Council is composed of one representative of each Party 
– that is four representatives altogether, which may be accompanied by deputies and advisers. 
The Council is a permanent organ: though the precise frequency of the Council meetings is not 
established, it is mandated that the Council meet at least once a year. The Agreement sets up the 
most important of the rules of the procedure – the voting rules, requiring that decisions be made 
unanimously, leaving other procedural rules to be drafted at the Council’s discretion. 
From the inception, the Programme’s financial arrangements have been premised on the 
principle of independency. “From the very beginning an important feature of this cooperation 
was that no funds passed among the national participants; each party paid for its own hardware 
and services.”14 The same system was preserved after the formal institutionalization of the 
system. Article 6 of the 1988 Agreement states: “Each Party, in conformity with its domestic 
funding procedures, and subject to the availability of appropriated funds, shall be fully 
                                                        
14 R.J.H. Barnes and J. Clapp, Cospas-Sarsat: A Quiet Success Story, 11 Space Policy 261 (1995), at 263. 
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responsible for financing costs associated with its contribution to the Space Segment … and the 
common costs arising from the obligations of this Agreement.” This provision effectively means 
that no common Programme’s budget exists apart from the allowance necessary for financing of 
the Programme’s organs, which by all means is not the greatest item of expenditure in a system 
involved in space-related activities.  
The autonomous principle of funding of each Party’s activities seems to be a logical 
extension of the overall thrust of the Programme, where all decisions are to be made 
unanimously. Russian scholars, however, have claimed that the utilized financing system 
threatens the Programme’s stability and uninterrupted functioning. COSPAS-SARSAT is 
performing important humanitarian functions, the argument goes, hence its continuous work 
should be preserved using all available means, and advance financial planning and funding is 
crucial. Therefore, it has been suggested that a uniform budget that is filled up on a mandatory 
basis should be created, and liability provisions for failure to comply with monetary obligations 
should be drawn and enforced.15  
There are at least two counter-arguments to the outlined proposal. First, an example of 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) where 
insufficient funding caused by the United States’ refusal to pay its contribution showed that even 
thorough budgeting is not a panacea from organizations’ financial crises. The United States, 
along with Israel, has lost its vote in the Organization after missing the deadline to repay its 
debt.16 While the liability mechanism is in place and has been enforced against the non-paying 
States, the results have been more devastating for the Organization than for the United States or 
Israel. The US share in UNESCO contributions amounts to twenty-two percent of the 
Organization’s budget, and missing eighty million US dollars a year put UNESCO on the brink 
of financial crisis and prompted to impose drastic financial cuts.17 Thereby, an extensive 
financial planning and budgeting, as it is the case with UNESCO, coupled with enforceable 
                                                        
15 See, Ганюшкина Е.Б., Правовая природа международной программы КОСПАС-САРСАТ [Legal Nature of 
the International Programme COSPAS-SARSAT] // Ежегодник морского права 2008. Юбилейное издание к 40-
летию Ассоциации международного морского права. – М., 2009. С. 117. 
16 See, US loses UNESCO Voting Rights after Stopping Funds over Palestine Decision, The Guardian, 8 November 
2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/08/us-unesco-voting-funds-palestine-decision. 
17 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Facts and Figures: UNSECO’s Response to the 




liability provisions for non-fulfillment of financial obligations is not capable of completely 
halting a problem of insufficient funding, nor it is capable of ensuring an uninterrupted 
functioning of an entity. 
Second, creation of a unified COSPAS-SARSAT treasury does not fit within the 
Programme’s structure as established by the 1988 Agreement. In accordance with Article 5, each 
Party contributes space segment units and remains fully responsible for their operation and 
maintenance, whereas the Council is only responsible for development and adoption of technical 
standards that are to be followed in appropriate equipment management. So the Parties do not 
transfer to the Programme either full ownership of the equipment, or even operation and 
maintenance rights. And if the Programme does not manage the equipment, there is no need for a 
funding of operational activities – since they are performed separately by the States and not 
within the COSPAS-SARSAT framework. Thus, creation of a uniform budget for administration 
and operation of space segment equipment is only justified if the whole system of management is 
changed by way of transferring space segment units to the Programme and leaving the Parties 
responsible only for financing, not operation. It is suggested that such transformation is highly 
unlikely, and so alteration of the financing system is also unlikely and unnecessary.  
The Programme, nevertheless, possesses separate capital used to cover administrative 
costs of operations, primarily funding of the Council and Secretariat. These expenses are borne 
by all Programme participants, including Parties, space and ground segment providers and users, 
in equal shares that are being revised from time to time by the Council in accordance with 
Articles 6 and 9 of the 1988 Agreement. In accordance with the COSPAS-SARSAT Guidelines 
for Participation, all associated States pay a flat fee of forty-two thousand Canadian Dollars as 
their contribution to the common costs of the Programme.18  
 
10.2 Six-Criteria Analysis 
 
10.2.1 Membership/Participation 
The COSPAS-SARSAT Programme mechanism of cooperation provides for several 
levels of participation. The first and, in practice, closed level of participation consists of Parties 
                                                        
18 Guidelines for Participating in the COSPAS-SARSAT System, C/S P.007 (E), October 2009, Issue 5, available at 
www.cospas-sarsat.int. 
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to the 1988 Agreement, namely Canada, France, Russia and the United States. Formally, 
however, in accordance with Article 16 any State “that agrees to contribute a minimum of one 
basic unit of the Space Segment, and is prepared to assume the responsibilities of a Party 
pursuant to this Agreement” can become a Party. An Understanding between the States Parties to 
the International COSPAS-SARSAT Programme Agreement and the Republic of India 
concluded in 2007 effectively requires India to provide space segment equipment – a search and 
rescue geostationary satellite,19 but that has not led to India becoming a Party to the Agreement. 
In accordance with the official COSPAS-SARSAT List of States and Organizations associated 
with or contributing to the Programme, India is designated to Group II – Ground Segment 
Providers, and to Group V – Contributors to the Space Segment through Special Arrangement. It 
is noteworthy, that Group V has only two other providers: the European Organization for the 
Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) and the European Commission on 
behalf of the European Union.  
So notwithstanding the existing provision about the accession to the 1988 Agreement, 
India has not acquired a status of a Party to the Agreement despite the fact that it provides space 
segment. It has acquired a ‘transitory’ status that has been granted only to two other entities – 
international organizations, which by way of Article 16 provisions are excluded from accession 
to the Agreement altogether. It is a perplexing outcome that can be explained in one of two ways: 
either India rejected to assume the responsibilities of a Party, or the initial Parties to the 
Agreement rejected to accept another State into ‘the club’. The former is quite unlikely in the 
light of responsibilities assumed by India in accordance with the 2007 Understanding, which 
include, among others, operation of the provided geostationary satellite in accordance with the 
procedures agreed with the Programme’s Council, timely distribution of alert data through Indian 
Control Center, complete financing of all costs associated with India’s contribution and 
participation in common costs associated with the Programme. At the same time, representatives 
of India are allowed to attend only open (often annual) meetings of the Council and are excluded 
from the Parties-only regular meetings of the Council.  
Moreover, to accommodate India’s specific status, the 2007 Understanding introduced 
the fourth element in the COSPAS-SARSAT system – ‘the geostationary Earth-orbiting satellites 
                                                        
19 Understanding between the States Parties to the International COSPAS-SARSAT Programme Agreement and the 
Republic of India Concerning the Association of the Republic of India with the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme as a 
Provider of Geostationary Satellite Services for Search and Rescue (GEOSAR), signed on 23 February 2007. 
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of the GEOSAR Space Segment’ – without introduction of respective changes in the 1988 
Agreement. In accordance with the 1988 Agreement, then, India should be expected to have 
acquired the status of a Party, but in fact it is treated as an ‘associate pursuant to special 
arrangement’ in spite of the absence in the 1988 Agreement provisions of establishment of such 
a status. Apparently, the Roman dogma lex specialis derogat lex generalis was deemed sufficient 
to resolve this legal ambiguity, meaning that the 2007 Understanding having been concluded at a 
later date supersedes (amends) provisions of the 1988 Agreement.  
Participation in the status of a ground segment provider and of a user, in accordance with 
Articles 11 and 12, is also formally permitted solely to States, but in practice two other types of 
entities have the status of a ground segment provider, and two more have the status of a space 
segment provider pursuant to special arrangement. While the latter two, EUMETSAT and the 
European Union represented by the European Commission are indeed international organizations 
– which of course does not change the fact that, strictly speaking, only States are allowed to 
participate in the Programme – whereas the former two have an unclear international legal status. 
One is the Hong Kong Marine Department, and the other is the International Telecommunication 
Development Company of Chinese Taipei. Different States depending on their foreign policy 
considerations treat the territorial entities, to which these two organizations belong, differently 
from an international legal perspective. But it would be a sound exaggeration to designate these 
entities international organizations; and such a designation for the purposes of the COSPAS-
SARSAT Programme should be considered a diplomatic move aimed at curtailing possible 
controversies about their statuses.  
The 1988 Agreement, at the same time, is not silent about the Programme’s relations with 
international organizations. Article 13 provides that to promote implementation of the 
Agreement, the Parties shall cooperate with international organizations on matters of common 
interest, and that such cooperation may be formalized between these organizations and the 
Parties. In principle, the wording is broad enough to encompass almost anything, but reading of 
the Agreement as a whole makes a clear distinction between the possible methods of cooperation 
with States, and those with international organizations. One cannot fail to assume that a separate 
article covering relations with international organizations was introduced for a reason, namely to 
reserve participation only to States, but at the same time to leave room for cooperation with 
international organizations. Recalling that the Soviet Union had always been a vocal opponent of 
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providing international organizations with the international status similar to that of States, such a 
conclusion seems all the more justified. The practice, however, went a different way, and the 
broad and ambiguous wording of Article 13 turned out to be convenient.  
The association agreement with EUMETSAT is a useful example to explore the 
COSPAS-SARSAT practice of relations with international organizations. The Arrangement on 
Cooperation between the Cooperating Agencies of the Parties to the International COSPAS-
SARSAT Programme Agreement and the European Organization for the Exploitation of 
Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) on the EUMETSAT Contribution to the COSPAS-
SARSAT GEOSAT System was signed on October 25, 2010.20 As it is clear from the title of the 
document, this arrangement was concluded by the Parties to the 1988 Agreement, just as 
provided in Article 13, and is aimed at cooperative utilization of geostationary satellites operated 
by EUMETSAT for the purposes and benefits of the Programme by way of their integration. 
Article 3 stipulates that the Arrangement “is not binding under international law and does not 
require the exchange of resources or technology among the Signatories.”  
It should be recalled that EUMETSAT and India are both designated to the same category 
of participants of the Programme, namely Contributors to the Space Segment through Special 
Arrangement. The Understanding with India, however, does not have the ‘legally non-binding 
clause’ and provides for specific rights and obligations of the parties, hence falls within the 
category of legally binding intergovernmental international treaties. By and large, these two 
agreements furnish similar sets of obligations, both aim at enhancement of COSPAR-SARSAT 
capacities through addition of geostationary space segments, and are concluded on behalf of the 
Parties to the 1988 Agreement, while they obviously differ in their international legal nature, 
whereas one is binding and the other one is not. This essential difference can, therefore, be only 
explained by and attributed to the type of the counter-party: within the COSPAS-SARSAT 
framework only an agreement with a State can be set forth in the form of a legally binding 
treaty.21  
                                                        
20 The Arrangement on Cooperation between the Cooperating Agencies of the Parties to the International COSPAS-
SARSAT Programme Agreement and the European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites 
(EUMETSAT) on the EUMETSAT Contribution to the COSPAS-SARSAT GEOSAT System of October 25, 2010, 
available at the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme official website www.cospas-sarsat.int. 
21 The Declaration of Intent for Co-operation on the Development and Evaluation of the Medium Earth Orbit Search 
and Rescue (MEOSAR) Satellite System between the Co-operating Agencies of the International COSPAS-
SARSAT Programme and the Galileo Joint Undertaking concluded in December 2006 and reassigned to the 
European GNSS Supervisory Authority represented by the European Commission in 2007 does not have the ‘legally 
 328 
Overall, provisions of Article 13 of the 1988 Agreement have been used to cooperate 
with international organizations in providing space segment units, but due to the abovementioned 
legal differentiation of the statuses of States and international organizations, cooperation with the 
latter is being framed in a ‘soft law’ manner. The conclusion can be drawn that participation in 
the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme is only legally conceivable for States, and collaboration with 
international organizations is framed in an informal legally non-binding way.  
 
10.2.2 Secretariat 
The Programme has two permanent organs, as has been noted above: the Council and the 
Secretariat. Their functions are extremely intermingled, where functioning of the Secretariat is 
fully guided by the Council’s instructions.  
The Council has the broad functions of a plenary organ, including, among others, 
oversight of the implementation of the Agreement, development of necessary plans for the 
implementation of the Agreement, agreement on the common costs of the Programme to be 
borne by the Parties and other participants, preparation and adaptation of technical standards, and 
communication with the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International 
Telecommunication Union, the International Maritime Organization and other international 
organizations. 
The Secretariat is a permanent administrative organ headed by the Head of Secretariat 
performing functions as directed by the Council. Basically, the Secretariat is charged solely with 
administrative clerical-like functions: provision of conference services, correspondence services, 
documental support, liaison between Programme’s participants and other similar functions as 
required by the Council.22 As it has been noted above, initially the COSPAS-SARSAT 
Secretariat was located at the INMARSAT Headquarters in London and had only five 
employees. In 2005, the Programme’s Headquarters were transferred to Montreal in accordance 
with the Arrangement between Canada, the Republic of France, the Russian Federation and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
non-binding clause’, but the designation of the document along with the nature of the contained provisions also 
suggest the legally non-binding nature of the document. 
22 Para. 3 of Article 10 of the 1988 International COSPAS-SARSAT Agreement states: “The Secretariat shall take 
direction from the Council in the performance of its functions, which include: (a) conference services for the 
meetings of the Council and of its subsidiary organs; (b) administrative services concerning general correspondence, 
system documentation and promotional materials; (c) technical services including the preparation of reports as 
instructed by the Council; (d) liaison with Ground Segment Providers, User States and international organizations; 
and (e) such other services as may be required by the Council for the implementation of this Agreement.” 
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United States of America Regarding the Headquarters of the International COSPAS-SARSAT 
Programme (Headquarters Arrangement). 
At the outset, Article 1 of the Headquarters Arrangement establishes a completely new 
understanding of the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme. For the purposes of this Arrangement it is 
designated an “organization” and is defined as “comprising the Council and the Secretariat,” by 
comparison to the first article of the 1988 Agreement, which defines the Programme as 
“activities carried out by the Parties to provide, operate and coordinate the COSPAS-SARSAT 
system.” Undoubtedly, ‘activities’ and ‘organization’ are fundamentally different terms, and 
fundamentally different characterizations, which one would hardly apply to the same 
phenomenon, at least in the international legal sense.  
The second part of the Headquarters Arrangement is entitled “Status of Organization” 
and opens with an Article, which reads: “The Organization will have the legal capacities of a 
body corporate under Canadian domestic law, without prejudice to privileges and immunities 
provided in this Arrangement, and the Head of Secretariat will be its legal representative with 
respect to the functions described in the Programme Agreement.” The meaning of this provision 
in the international legal sense, however, should not be exaggerated. It should be read in 
conjunction with Articles 25 and 26 of the Headquarters Arrangement that stipulate the legally 
non-binding nature of the document, and affirm that privileges and immunities granted pursuant 
to this document are granted only by the Government of Canada, not the governments of other 
three State-Parties to the 1988 Agreement. Taken together, these articles suggest that the 
designation of the Programme as the ‘organization’ was literally made only for the purposes of 
this document.  
Moreover, the Headquarters Arrangement, being a ‘soft law’ document, is incapable of 
altering the legal nature of the object of the document; hence, by way of the provisions of this 
document the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme cannot and was not transformed into an 
organization. The agreement deals with a specific issue – establishment of the Headquarters on 
the sovereign territory of the State; it provides for privileges and immunities of the Programme 
as represented by the Council and the Secretariat on the territory of Canada, it provides for 
privileges and immunities of the officials of the Programme – read employees of the 
Programme’s organs, and representatives of States and experts attending meetings and 
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conferences commenced in connection with the Programme, but again only on the territory of the 
sovereign State.  
Overall, the Headquarters Arrangement has a noteworthy legal composition. On the one 
hand, it is an international agreement concluded by four sovereign States regarding the matter 
that is normally addressed on the international level. On the other, the Headquarters 
Arrangement unequivocally stipulates that the agreement shall not be considered binding on the 
international plane. Thus, the Headquarters Arrangement suggests that it has binding force solely 
on the national plane, or more precisely, within the territory of Canada;23 the substantive 
provisions of the Headquarters Arrangement confirm their strictly national applicability. The net 
result is that four sovereign States by way of an internationally legally non-binding agreement 
created rights and obligations enforceable on the territory of one of the contracting States; in 
effect, the Headquarters Arrangement attempts to substitute national Canadian legislature in this 
regard. While the internal procedures have been properly complied with, as it will be discussed 
below, to ensure that rights and obligations enforceable on the territory of Canada have proper 
legal source, the overall approach to establishing the Programme’s headquarters and providing 
functional privileges and immunities strikes as unconventional, to say the least, and as legally 
convoluted and somewhat confusing. Quite likely, this approach was chosen for political 
reasons, leaving plenty of room for adjustment or straightforward withdrawal. 
In furtherance of the Headquarters Arrangement, the International Cospas-Sarsat 
Programme Privileges and Immunities Order has been appended to the Canadian Foreign 
Missions and International Organizations Act.24 In this national law COSPAS-SARSAT is 
defined as an ‘international organization’, but given the municipal nature of the act and its legal 
force solely on the sovereign territory of Canada, the named designation does not bear 
international legal significance. Due to the federative structure of Canada, it was deemed 
necessary to conclude an additional, regional agreement with the hosting province of Canada. On 
May 17, 2005 the Understanding between the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme and the 
                                                        
23 Article 25 of the Agreement expressly states that it is legally non-binding on the international plane. Therefore, 
other parties to COPSAS-SARSAT cannot enforce Canada’s legally non-binding promise to provide headquarters 
using international legal methods. That, however, does not undermine the fact that legally non-binding agreement 
should be complied with in good faith. 
24 International Cospas-Sarsat Programme Privileges and Immunities Order (SOR/2005-112), annexed to the 
Foreign Mission and International Organizations Act, S.C. 1991, c. 41. 
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Gouvernement Du Québec was concluded.25 The Preamble pronounces that the Understanding is 
concluded because “the Gouvernement du Québec wishes to enable the COSPAS-SARSAT 
Programme to adequately carry out its mandate and to facilitate its performance.” In general, the 
document repeats privileges and immunities granted pursuant to the Headquarters Arrangement, 
and only specifies the exemptions in accordance with the laws of Québec. Overall, the 
Headquarters Arrangement, even as strengthened and elaborated by the two national Canadian 
laws, does not provide privileges and immunities on the international plane, but only on the 
national plane as detailed in the two municipal laws. 
An international organization’s secretariat has to possess three characteristics defined in 
Chapter 1. The COSPAS-SARSAT Secretariat is undoubtedly a separate organ within the 
Programme’s structure as per Article 7 of the 1988 Agreement. Article 10 unequivocally states 
that the Secretariat works on a permanent basis; and Article 6 as detailed in the Guidelines for 
Participation26 confirms that functioning of the Secretariat is funded from the Programme 
participants’ contributions to the common costs of the system. While none of the COSPAS-
SARSAT underlying documents uses the term ‘budget’, creation of an allowance funded by 
participating States’ flat-fee contributions to finance the functioning of the Council and the 
Secretariat and Programme’s meetings can hardly be treated as anything different than the 
entity’s budget. That puts the COSPAS-SARSAT Secretariat in compliance with the first two 
characteristics of an international organization’s secretariat. 
The third characteristic, however, is barely met by the COSPAS-SARSAT Secretariat. 
There are two arguments in favor of such a conclusion. First, Article 10 of the 1988 Agreement 
explicitly states that the Secretariat “shall assist the Council in the implementation of its 
functions.” Since the Council is the plenary organ comprised of representatives of the Parties to 
the Agreement, where the decisions are adopted by a unanimous vote, any decision of the 
Council is effectively a decision, maybe a compromise, of all four State-Parties. Unlike plenary 
organs in most international organizations, where, as a general rule, decisions are adopted by a 
majority vote, the Council uses the principle of unanimity for all decisions, thereby making it 
impossible to claim that the document, in fact, was adopted by the organ, which is different from 
                                                        
25 Understanding between the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme and the Government Du Québec Concerning 
Exemptions, Fiscal Advantages and Courtesies Accorded to the Programme, Representatives of Member States and 
Officials of the Secretariat, C/S P.006 (2005), available at www.cospas-sarsat.int. 
26 Guidelines for Participating in the COSPAS-SARSAT System, C/S P.007 (E), October 2009, Issue 5, available at 
www.cospas-sarsat.int. 
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a mere sum of opinions of its members. In case of the COSPAS-SARSAT Council, any decision 
at all times equals a sum of opinions of the four Parties. Hence, the Secretariat, which is by way 
of the Agreement provisions charged with supporting the Council, cannot have any tasks that 
have not been directly adopted and promulgated by all four Parties.  
Although one might say that this distinction is not essential and does not have a drastic 
practical effect, a strictly legal analysis prompts a different conclusion. The voting rules, whether 
in a national or international setting, have a significant effect on the results. When a stringent 
two-thirds majority vote is required, the proposed document would more likely be a true 
compromise, which satisfies both the majority and the minority – otherwise a required two-thirds 
vote would not be satisfied. In case a simple majority vote is required, the text might be less of a 
compromise and rather a document that satisfies only the majority – since the votes of the 
minority are no longer essential for the document adoption. The bottom line is that the voting 
rules significantly affect the contents of the adopted document.  
In the international legal practice the requirement of the permanent members’ of the 
United Nations Security Council unanimous vote has been contentious from its inception, and 
obviously there is a reason for that: the unanimity rule is substantively different, in both practical 
and legal realms, from the majority rule. Therefore, it is suggested that in the closed system 
comprised of four COSPAS-SARSAT Parties, the unanimity rule makes a great difference; and 
not in the least with regard to the functions performed by the Secretariat. 
Second, an international character of work is generally understood to mean independence 
of an entity’s employees from the influence of States of their nationality or location. The 1988 
Agreement is silent on that matter. The Headquarters Agreement, while providing functional 
privileges and immunities on the territory of Canada, including immunity from legal process, 
taxation, national service obligations, immigration restrictions and alien registration, is silent on 
the matter of personnel independence and freedom from influence from the States of their 
nationality and, strictly speaking, from influence of the State of their location in discharge of 
their functions. 
These two considerations taken together with the Secretariat’s mandate strictly limited to 
performance of purely administrative tasks, lead to the conclusion of a non-existent international 
character of work of the COSPAS-SARSAT Secretariat. A similar situation has been 
encountered in the course of the analysis of the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites 
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mechanism of cooperation and the institutional mechanism of cooperation created by the Code of 
Conduct for Outer Space Activities. The COSPAS-SARSAT Secretariat is closer to that of the 
Code of Conduct mechanism, because just as the latter it is not responsible for external contacts, 
it does not prepare a development strategy, and it does not undertake any steps toward 
solicitation of new associated States. The goals of the Programme, however, are closer to those 
of the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites: it is aiming at practical applications of space 
technologies, not regulation of certain outer space activities as the Code does. This issue will be 
discussed in greater detail later on, and at this point it is only suggested that a choice of a 
particular institutional approach might be dictated by a multitude of factors, and the success of 
the mechanism of cooperation in performing declared goals is the only relevant measure of 
correctness of the choices made.   
 
10.2.3 International Legal Personality 
To provide sufficient material for conclusions based on the six criteria analysis, it should 
be decided whether the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme is an entity possessing international 
legal personality. A Russian scholar suggested that the 1988 Agreement unequivocally provided 
international legal personality to the created mechanism, and that this conclusion was further 
supported by practice.27 Earlier in the chapter it has been suggested that the 1988 Agreement is at 
best ambiguous regarding the definition and, consequently, the nature of the Programme; hence, 
the Agreement’s claimed clarity on the matter of international legal personality cannot be 
accepted. Four practice-related arguments were proposed in support of the existing international 
legal personality of the Programme. 
The first argument in favor of an existing international legal personality of the COSPAS-
SARSAT Programme mechanism of cooperation is an establishment of two independent organs 
– the Council and the Secretariat.28 Acquiescing that presence of independent organs is generally 
characteristic for an entity with an international legal personality, the author did not elaborate on 
the features of these organs that would allow identifying them as working independently and 
possessing an international character of work. An international organization, based on the criteria 
                                                        
27 See, А.В. Лукьянова, Международно-правовые проблемы использования космоса в целях мореплавания 
[International Legal Problems of Using Outer Space for the Purposes of Seafaring] // Автореферат дисс. на 
соискание ученой степени к.ю.н. – М., 2005. 
28 Id. at 30. 
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identified in Chapter 1, must, one, have an international organization’s secretariat, and two, must 
have an international legal personality, which is defined using four characteristics. Earlier it has 
been concluded that the Programme’s Secretariat does not amount to an international 
organization’s secretariat, although it goes beyond a typical conference’s secretariat (or 
secretariat of a meeting commenced with connection to an international treaty). While strictly 
speaking one of the elements necessary for an international organization is not present in the 
COSPAS-SARSAT Programme, the ‘transitory’ status of the Secretariat should not be viewed as 
barring possible identification of international legal personality and, thus, qualification as an 
international organization. 29 
Usually, for existence of an international organization’s legal personality four criteria 
should be fulfilled: (1) it is an association of States or international organizations or both with 
lawful objectives; (2) it has one or more organs, which are not subject to the authority of any 
other organized communities; (3) legal powers and purposes are distinct between the 
organization and its member States; and (4) it possesses legal powers exercisable on the 
international plane and not solely within the national systems of one or more States. 
The COSPAS-SARSAT Programme is unquestionably an association of States with 
lawful objectives. The conclusion that the Programme has two organs, which are not subject to 
the authority of any other organized communities, puts it in compliance with two out of four 
criteria of an existing international legal personality. The opinion of the Russian scholar earlier 
referred to claimed the last two criteria to be fulfilled based on three pieces of evidence: 
existence of functional privileges and immunities of the personnel as established by the 2005 
Headquarters Arrangement; ability to conclude international treaties regulated by the 1986 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or 
between International Organizations; and participation in the International Maritime 
Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization in the status of observer.30 These 
three arguments will now be addressed. 
                                                        
29 In the light of the absence of the ‘law of international organizations’, as it has been discussed in Chapter 1, and 
considering the correct assertion made by many scholars that it is difficult to reduce a variety of forms of association 
of States to a one-and-for-all model of an international organization, we suggest that a comprehensive review of the 
institutional model adopted within an entity should be completed in order to make persuasive conclusions.  
30 See, А.В. Лукьянова, Международно-правовые проблемы использования космоса в целях мореплавания 
[International Legal Problems of Using Outer Space for the Purposes of Seafaring] // Автореферат дисс. на 
соискание ученой степени к.ю.н. – М., 2005. C.30. 
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First, as has been shown earlier, functional privileges and immunities of the Programme, 
its officials and representatives of States as set out in the 2005 Arrangement are established 
solely on the national plane and are applied only on the territory of Canada. As per provisions of 
Articles 25 and 26 of the Headquarters Arrangement, this agreement is not legally binding in the 
international legal sense and does not convey similar privileges and immunities on territories of 
other Parties to the 1988 Agreement. Thereby, the conclusion is drawn that no functional 
privileges and immunities of the Programme and its officials are existent on the international 
plane.  
Second, the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations in Article 2 defines the term 
‘treaty’ as “an international agreement governed by international law and concluded in written 
form.”31 Basically, this definition is a shortened version of the definition used in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in 
turn, applies only to legally binding treaties governed by international law irrespective of their 
form or designation.32 By extension, the 1986 Vienna Convention similarly applies only to 
legally binding treaties between States and international organizations or between international 
organizations.33  
Currently, there are five international agreements concluded within the COSPAS-
SARSAT system, and four of them are concluded on behalf of the States-Parties to the 
International COSPAS-SARSAT Programme Agreement.34 The only document concluded on 
behalf of the Programme itself is the Understanding Between the COSPAS-SARSAT 
                                                        
31 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between 
International Organizations, Vienna, 21 March 1986, Doc. A/CONF.129/15. The Convention is not yet in force. 
32 Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, entered into force January 27, 
1980. 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
33 United Nations Treaty Collection, Definition of Key Terms Used in the UN Treaty Collection, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/overview.aspx?path=overview/definition/page1_en.xml#treaties. 
34 Arrangement between Canada, The Republic of France, the Russian Federation and the United States of America 
regarding the Headquarters of the International COSPAS-SARSAT Programme, April 2005; Arrangement on 
Cooperation between the Cooperating Agencies of the Parties to the International COSPAS-SARSAT Programme 
Agreement and the European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) on the 
EUMETSAT Contribution to the COSPAS-SARSAT GEOSAR System, October 2010; Understanding Between the 
States Parties to the International COSPAS-SARSAT Programme Agreement and The Republic of India Concerning 
The Association of The Republic of India with the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme as a Provider of Geostationary 
Satellite Service, February 2007; Declaration of Intent for Co-operation on the Development and Evaluation of the 
Medium Earth Orbit Search and Rescue (MEOSAR) Satellite System between the Co-operating Agencies of the 
International COSPAS-SARSAT Programme and the Galileo Joint Undertaking, December 2006. All available at 
www.cospas-sarsat.int. 
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Programme and the Gouvernement du Québec concerning Exemptions, Fiscal Advantages and 
Courtesies accorded to the Programme, Representatives of Member States and Officials of the 
Secretariat. The Understanding, however, as it has been explained above, is not governed by 
international law since it regulates relations between a part of a sovereign State and an entity 
designated an ‘organization’ solely for the purposes of this document. Moreover, three out of 
four agreements concluded on behalf of the Parties to the 1988 Agreement are also not binding 
under international law. 
In the end, there is only one legally binding international cooperative agreement 
governed by international law within the COSPAS-SARSAT system, and even this one is 
concluded on behalf of the State-Parties, not the Programme itself. The conclusion should be 
drawn that the Programme is not capable of concluding international treaties governed by the 
rules of the 1986 Vienna Convention: neither is it capable of entering into international 
agreements with States or international organizations, nor is it capable of concluding legally 
binding agreements governed by international law.  
Third, participation in the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil 
Aviation Organization in the status of observer similarly does not add anything to the case of 
identifying the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme as an international organization. The 
International Maritime Organization allows for participation of international intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organizations in the status of observer. Acknowledging that COSPAS-
SARSAT is put on the list of ‘IGO observers’ in the International Maritime Organization,35 it is 
still argued that such a designation is irrelevant for the purposes of international legal analysis. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross36 and the Memorandum of Understanding on Port 
State Control in the Black Sea Region,37 for example, are not international intergovernmental 
                                                        
35 See, Intergovernmental Organizations, which have Concluded Agreements of Co-operation with IMO, 
http://www.imo.org/About/Membership/Pages/IGOsWithObserverStatus.aspx. 
36 See, W.A. Sturges, Legal Status of the Red Cross, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 1(1957), at 3. (“In Red Cross circles there is 
the all-embracing “The International Red Cross.” It is composed of three Red Cross Organizations as follows: (1) 
“National Societies,” (2) the “League of Red Cross Societies,” and (3) the “International Committee of the Red 
Cross.” … The “International Committee of the Red Cross” is a membership corporation under the Swiss Code. … 
Its headquarters are at Geneva; its membership is limited to twenty-five Swiss citizens; members are elected for 
three year terms.”) For more information see, the official website of the Committee of the Red Cross, 
https://www.icrc.org/en. 
37 For more information see, the official website of the Port State Control in the Black Sea Region, 
http://www.bsmou.org/about/. 
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organizations in the strict international legal sense, but still have the status of an 
‘intergovernmental organization observer’ in the International Maritime Organization.  
The International Civil Aviation Organization, which is open exclusively to sovereign 
States and in accordance with the Standing Rules of Procedure of the Assembly allows invitation 
of non-Contracting States and international organizations in the status of observer,38 has recently 
invited the representative of Taiwan – whose international legal status is controversial, to say the 
least, and which hardly falls into either the category of a non-Contracting State or an 
international organization – to participate in the status of a guest,39 the status, which is absent not 
only from the International Civil Aviation Convention, but also from the Standing Rules of 
Procedure. Accordingly, the status of observer in the International Civil Aviation Organization or 
International Maritime Organization ipso facto does not confer the status of subject of 
international law onto an entity with such a status. Hence, the grant of particular statuses in these 
two organizations is irrelevant in the course of the legal analysis aiming at determination of the 
legal nature of the entity in question. 
Based on the preceding discussion, the conclusion should be drawn that the COSPAS-
SARSAT Programme does not have legal powers and purposes distinct from its participants, and 
does not possess legal powers exercisable on the international plane and not solely within the 
national systems of one or more States. Moreover, the very definition of the Programme as set 
forth in the 1988 Agreement – “the COSPAS-SARSAT activities carried out by the Parties to 
provide, operate and coordinate a space segment, a ground segment and radiobeacons,” focusing 
on activities and not mentioning anywhere characterization of the Programme as, for example, an 
‘entity’, or ‘organization’, or ‘arrangement’- shifts the emphasis toward coordination of activities 
by the States from the performance of necessary activities within the created institutional 
framework. In other words, institutional arrangements are seen as secondary, incidental to the 
centerpiece of the system created by the 1988 Agreement, namely the provision of alert and 
location services in support of search and rescue through utilization of compatible space and 
ground segment equipment contributed by the Parties and associated States. Therefore, the 
conclusion is drawn that the Programme does not possess international legal personality. 
 
                                                        
38 See, M. Milde, International Air Law and ICAO (2008), at 132. 
39 See, J. Yeh, Taiwan to Attend ICAO Assembly as ‘Invited Guest’, The China Post, September 14, 2013, available 
at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/intl-community/2013/09/14/388889/Taiwan-to.htm. 
 338 
10.2.4 Term of Existence 
Article 20 contains a not so common duration clause.40 It states: “This Agreement shall 
remain in force for a period of fifteen years from the date on which it enters into force and shall 
be extended automatically for successive period of five years.” Literal reading suggests that the 
mechanism has been created for a limited period, but the ‘automatic extension’ clause suggests a 
presumably unlimited duration of the Programme. At the same time, it might be suggested that 
such a duration clause has been chosen intentionally to leave room for easier termination of the 
Programme, though no clear indication toward this option is provided in the text. Article 17 
allows withdrawal of any Party at any time subject to notification and a one-year grace period, so 
the complicated duration clause could not have been chosen merely to provide a ‘way out’.  
In the political science doctrine it has been suggested that States are “most likely to seek 
time limitations when uncertainty over future gains is high, when expected costs from periodic 
renegotiation are low relative to anticipated gain from cooperation,” so duration clauses “offer 
parties a form of insurance against unfavorable changes in the distribution of future gains from 
international cooperation.”41 In the international legal doctrine it has been argued that “when the 
parties are not sure how long they envisage the treaty lasting, they will often include a clause that 
provides for an initial term that can be extended, either expressly or tacitly, as well as for 
withdrawal. Such flexible provisions enable the parties to keep their options open.”42 
The latter view comes closest to explaining the intricate COSPAS-SARSAT duration 
clause. Authors pointed out that the initial cooperative undertaking and later on the 1988 
Agreement survived in a very tense, cooperation-unfriendly environment of the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan, where the Reagan Administration gave serious consideration to 
allowing the umbrella bilateral US-Soviet civil space agreement to lapse in May 1982, and 
European open complaints of the United States domineering and unreliability in their other 
cooperative projects.43 In the concluding part of the chapter the reasons behind COSPAS-
SARSAT’s success will be discussed in greater detail, but at this point it would suffice to grasp 
                                                        
40 Cf., United Nations. Treaty Section, Final Clauses of Multilateral Treaties: Handbook (2003), at 106. 
41 B. Koremenos, Contracting Around Uncertainty, 99, 4 Am. P. Science Rev. 549-565 (2005), cited in M.S. 
Copelovitch and T.L. Putnam, Context Matters: International Institutions and the Limits of Rational Design, Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference 
(2009), available at <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p361335_index.html. See also, L.R. Helfer, “Flexibility in 
International Agreements,” in J. Dunoff and M.A. Pollack (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International 
Law and International Relations (2013), at 190.  
42 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law Practice (2013), at 251.  
43 Cf., R.J.H. Barnes and J. Clapp, Cospas-Sarsat: A Quiet Success Story, 11 Space Policy 261 (1995), at 266-67. 
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the understanding of a persisting state of instability and uncertainty hanging over the Programme 
that led to introduction of a complex duration clause. By and large, it should be concluded that 
the COSPAS-SARSAT mechanism of cooperation has been created for an indefinite period of 
time, and provisions of Article 20 played the role of ‘insurance’ for the scenario where 
controversies became critically incompatible with continuance of cooperation. 
In this context it should also be noted that while the 1988 Agreement allows voluntary 
withdrawal, it does not provide for expulsion. Given the compact participation in the Agreement 
and, more generally, the overall aim toward unimpeded control of each State over its equipment, 
such a provision would have been incompatible with the chosen approach to cooperation. 
Independent financing and vesting the responsibility for proper operation of the equipment used 
within the Programme presuppose a certain level of self-regulation along with a limited 
Programme’s (understood as an entity or as other participating States) leverage in forcing a 
deviating State into compliance. Moreover, the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme’s effectiveness 
depends on the equipment provided by the participating States; hence, expulsion of a State would 
impose greater detriment on the Programme compared to a relatively small damage that the 
expelled State would experience. Rational choice theory requiring weighting of benefit and harm 
entailed in any action suggests that the procedure of expulsion in this case is counterproductive 
and unnecessary.   
 
10.2.5 Binding Force of Documents Produced 
An overview of the functions of the COSPAS-SARSAT Council and Secretariat leads to 
the conclusion that no legally binding documents are being produced within this mechanism of 
cooperation. The Secretariat, as discussed earlier, has basic administrative functions and does not 
have policy-related powers. The Council, being the plenary organ and charged with a broad 
range of tasks, however, also does not have the right to adopt legally binding documents. The 
functions of the Council revolve around proper technical performance of the units comprising the 
system, and necessary communication with international organizations and associated States on 
matters of technical compatibility and performance. The only type of Council decisions that 
might be considered legally binding concerns the determination of participants’ contributions to 
the common costs of the Programme.  
 340 
Article 11, for example, describing obligations of ground segment providers, uses the 
verb ‘shall’ that is generally regarded as conveying legal obligations. On the one hand, usage of 
this verb may often be triggered by mere grammatical considerations and not the desire to 
impose legally enforceable obligations;44 on the other, the precise wording used in formulation of 
ground segment providers obligations later on in the Article suggests an intention to formulate 
legal obligations. More to the point, all these obligations, including adherence to technical 
specifications, delivery of distress alert and location information, provision of appropriate data, 
participation in appropriate meetings and payment of share of commons costs, are enumerated 
and described in greater detail in the internal document Guidelines for Participation.45  
The Guidelines play the role of the ‘preliminary questionnaire’ for States considering 
accession to the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme: if they agree to the terms and conditions of 
such participation, they formally announce their association with the Programme. This set of 
terms and conditions remains unchangeable for the duration of the State’s participation in the 
Programme since the Council is only entitled to change technical characteristics and the 
contribution amount, but is not empowered to impose additional obligations. Consequently, 
participating States agree to the ‘rules of the game’, which remain the same throughout the game, 
though new techniques, like video-recording of the goal, can be added along the way. And 
neither the referee (the Council in this metaphor), nor the players (participating States) can 
substantively change the rules for everyone or just for one player.   
 
10.2.6 Existence of Opportunity to Modify Obligations 
Having concluded that legally binding documents are not produced by the organs of the 
Programme and are not being concluded on behalf of the Programme, the procedure for 
modification of obligations is redundant and has not been provided for in the 1988 Agreement or 
any other internal COSPAS-SARSAT document. Moreover, the unanimity voting procedure in 
the Council effectively precludes a possibility of adoption of a decision contrary to the wishes of 
the State-Parties to the 1988 Agreement.  
                                                        
44 Cf., F.G. von der Dunk, “Contradictio in terminis or Realpolitik? A Qualified Plea for a Role of ‘Soft Law’ in the 
Context of Space Activities,” in I. Marboe (ed.), Soft Law in Outer Space: The Function of Non-Binding Norms in 
International Space Law (2012), at 49. 
45 Guidelines for Participating in the COSPAS-SARSAT System, C/S P.007 (E), October 2009, Issue 5, available at 
www.cospas-sarsat.int. 
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The 1988 Agreement does provide for an amendment procedure. Article 18 stipulates that 
any Party may propose amendments. The Council should consider the proposal and make 
recommendation to the Parties concerning such proposed amendment. Amendments enter into 
force sixty days after the Depositary, whose functions are performed by the Secretary General of 
the International Civil Aviation Organization and the Secretary-General of the International 
Maritime Organization,46 has received notification of the amendment acceptance from all the 
Parties; hence, a unanimity requirement is preserved with respect to adoption of amendments. 
The other internationally legally binding agreement concluded within the COSPAS-
SARSAT framework, the Understanding with India, provides only for an opportunity to 
terminate the agreement, but does not include an amendment procedure. In accordance with 
Article 39 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, thereby, amendment of the 
Understanding with India is regulated by provisions of Articles 40 and 41 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.47 
 
10.3 Evaluation and Conclusions 
 
Based on the preceding analysis the conclusion is offered that the COSPAS-SARSAT 
Programme is a cooperative undertaking created for an indefinite period formally allowing 
participation only of States, but in practice allowing international organizations’ involvement, 
that established separate organs, which, however, do not amount to an international 
organization’s secretariat, and are not empowered to adopt legally binding decisions. By and 
large, COSPAS-SARSAT is a hybrid mechanism of cooperation combining features of a 
conference and an international organization. Two hybrid mechanisms of cooperation have 
already been encountered in the course of this book; despite their similarities in combining 
features of different categories of cooperation, each of them has unique features. The COSPAS-
SARSAT Programme has peculiar rules of participation, a duration clause with an ‘insurance’ 
provision, and provides for maintenance of a common fund to finance the Secretariat and other 
necessary meetings. In addition to complex participation rules, the practice of COSPAS-
SARSAT cooperation both with States and international organizations has made the matter even 
                                                        
46 Art. 19 of the 1988 International COSPAS-SARSAT Agreement. 
47 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, entered into force January 27, 1980. 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
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more puzzling. This suggests there are different kinds of hybrids combining different elements of 
the three paradigms, but also maybe different elements of the six factors. 
It is suggested that these specifics have been first and foremost triggered by the 
circumstances of the Programme’s creation. The duration clause and funding scheme are the 
direct products of the chaotic political situation of the late 1980s. While the need for the space-
based search and rescue system was obvious, States were reluctant to bind themselves by a set of 
rigid obligations; more so, they were reluctant to hand over operation of their national satellites 
to an international entity with limited participation. Nor were they prepared to hand over 
operation of satellites to an entity where their vote might have been overridden by the majority 
vote. And this is where the unanimous voting procedure originated.  
The COSPAS-SARSAT practice of cooperation with both States and international 
organizations is a logical consequence of the outlined politico-ideological reflections. Indeed, it 
is quite surprising that not a single State has been granted the status of a Party to the Agreement 
later on, although India clearly complied with all required criteria. It is suggested that India was 
admitted to the Programme in a specially created status due to Parties’ unwillingness to re-draw 
the routine of their cooperation that had been settled for over twenty years. Continuous 
collaboration of four States – even though clearly their representatives had not been the same 
throughout these years – led to establishment of mutual understanding, customary procedures 
and gentlemen’s agreements on how to handle different matters; introduction of a fifth Party, 
possibly, would have disturbed well-settled habits within the four-member Council.  
The practice of cooperation with international organizations seems to be a logical 
development of the system that was created by States with dramatically different approaches to 
international law, but which over time have become closer in their legal and political views, 
allowing for greater understanding and compromise. While cooperation with international 
organizations on a par with States was ideologically intolerable for the Soviet Union, a 
compromise was reached that now allows including international organizations in the 
cooperative system of the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme. At this stage introduction of 
amendments to the 1988 Agreement to furnish organizations’ presence in the international life of 
the Programme appears to be unnecessary: first, in practice the ambiguous wording of the 
Agreement has not hindered necessary cooperation, and second, the Agreement focuses on 
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technical aspects of cooperation and, hence, its legal precision might be viewed as secondary to 
the system’s success.  
Generally, scholars identified four reasons behind the Programme’s success. “First, costs 
were kept low, both in the demonstration phase and by deciding to stay with a form of 
organization focused on cooperation among national technical agencies and utilizing a piggyback 
payload. Second, the project was designed to demonstrate clear practical – and in some cases 
dramatic – benefits which could be quantified in terms of money and lives saved. Third, the 
program’s low political visibility and multilateral character allowed it to avoid some potential 
political obstacles. Fourth, the program benefited from strong supporters in key positions of 
influence.”48 To this list one more reason should be added – putting technical aspects in the 
center of the Programme.  
Political and legal disagreements are capable of halting the best of the cooperative efforts, 
and the late 1980s was the time when such risks were on the higher side. By way of preservation 
of complete national control over space segments of the system the Parties excluded the most 
contentious issue from the agenda, concentrating on ways and means to bring forth technical 
compatibility. An unusual duration clause, peculiar participation rules, limitation of international 
organizations’ participation and utilization of allowance-based funding of the Programme’s 
organs coupled with financial independence in other areas, all these, especially taken together, 
create an extraordinary structure of cooperation. Crucially important in the light of the 
geopolitical situation the Programme had been created in, it turned out to be “a productive 
venture without political undertones or technology transfer adversely affecting US national 
security.”49 No matter how unconventional the chosen formulas might be from a legal 
perspective, they lose their significance in the light of the outstanding results achieved using this 
mechanism of cooperation. If saving thirty-seven thousand lives requires a bold approach to 
international legal cooperation, where the word ‘legal’ is put in the far corner as being of lesser 
importance, only the most ferocious positivists might voice opposition.  
By way of conclusion, the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme is a hybrid mechanism of 
cooperation based on a legally binding treaty, uniting States, providing an institutional 
mechanism to facilitate performance of the Programme’s goals, but excluding the most 
                                                        
48 R.J.H. Barnes and J. Clapp, Cospas-Sarsat: A Quiet Success Story, 11 Space Policy 261 (1995), at 268. 
49 N. Jamgoth, J. Knappert and R.C. Carpio, Perceptions and Confidence Building in US-Soviet Relations, 41 Int’l J. 
on World Peace Vol. 5, No. 2 (Apr-Jun 1988), at 45-46. 
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monumental elements of an international organization from the structure, making the mechanism 
more flexible, light-weight and capable of concentrating on substantive issues, abandoning the 
need to deal with bureaucratic procedural matters. 
The hybrid mechanism of cooperation of the COSPAS-SARSAT system resembles the 
Committee on Earth Observation Satellites mechanism in its goals, but from an institutional 
perspective comes closer to the one created by the Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. 
The goals of both the Programme and the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites focus on 
practical applications of space technologies, not regulation of certain outer space activities as the 
Code does. The institutional mechanism, at the same time, is closer to that of the Code in its 
simplicity. The Programme has two organs: the Council – the plenary organ, and the Secretariat 
– an administrative organ not amounting to an international organization’s secretariat. The Code 
of Conduct similarly has a plenary organ – the annual meetings of Subscribing States, and an 
administrative organ not amounting to an international organization’s secretariat – the Central 
Point of Contact.  
The Programme mechanism of cooperation, as noted above, has a number of peculiar 
features and particularly differs from the other two analyzed hybrid mechanisms in terms of 
participation, which might well be attributed to specific circumstances of the Programme 
creation. But nowadays it has evolved into an entity uniting forty-two participants, which is 
potentially open to universal participation. 
One more feature distinguishes the COSPAS-SARSAT hybrid mechanism of cooperation 
from those two encountered earlier: the Programme is based on a legally binding international 
treaty. Presumably, founding an institutional mechanism on a legally binding treaty signals 
greater stability compared to mechanisms based on ‘soft law’ documents and a greater legal 
precision. Practice, however, disavows these presumptions. The Committee on Earth 
Observation Satellites, despite having legally non-binding underlying documents, has been 
effectively working for approximately the same period as the Programme. The Code of Conduct, 
as it has been shown in Chapter 9, strives for legal precision in enunciation of substantive 
provisions of the Code; the 1988 Agreement, by contrast, adopted rather broad formulations, 
some of which, namely the introduction of the fourth category of association with the 
Programme, were amended later by way of additional documents without introduction of 
relevant changes to the text of the Agreement, suggesting lessened concerns for legal precision. 
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Therefore, it should be concluded that creation of a hybrid mechanism of cooperation using a 
legally binding treaty per se does not add anything to institutional or substantive characteristics 
of the mechanism of cooperation in question. 
The mission of the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme is to provide accurate, timely and 
reliable distress alert and location data to help search and rescue authorities assist persons in 
distress. As of August 2015 more than one million and six hundred distress beacons were 
operational worldwide supported by a network of eleven satellites and thirty-one mission control 
centers. The Programme has proved to be an important element in ensuring sustainability by way 
of saving people’s lives.  
These are the impressive results; from the standpoint of the present analysis, however, the 
most notable feature is the level of coordination achieved using the COSPAS-SARSAT 
mechanism of cooperation. Efforts of over forty participants are being coordinated in order to 
provide timely information about location of persons in distress based on a comparatively short 
and not overly detailed treaty. It is remarkable that in 1994 the director of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization’s Air Navigation Bureau cited the Programme as “an interesting and 
potentially useful precedent for international cooperation with respect to funding, ownership, 
management and operation of space systems.”50 
While the COSPAS-SARSAT mechanism might not be a model, it indeed can be used as 
a useful precedent. Some of the Programme’s characteristics, for example, the duration clause, 
the voting procedure and the ‘closed’ membership, are reflections of the unique circumstances of 
the system’s creation and, thus, their adoption might not be desirable in future endeavors. There 
are three Programme characteristics that can be useful in design of future space systems: the 
preservation of national ownership over space equipment, the imposition of operation 
responsibilities onto participating States, and the focus on technical coordination through 
cooperation of national agencies. All these characteristics have been identified in the Committee 
on Earth Observation Satellites analysis. 
It can, thereby, be suggested that hybrid mechanisms of cooperation are effective tools in 
international space cooperation aiming at practical space applications in a narrow field, which 
have modest institutional structures, and are premised on financial and operational independence 
of participating States. Although it is yet to be seen whether the Code of Conduct mechanism of 
                                                        
50 R.J.H. Barnes and J. Clapp, Cospas-Sarsat: A Quiet Success Story, 11 Space Policy 261 (1995), at 268. 
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cooperation proves to be effective in achieving regulatory purposes, it is suggested that the 
hybrid mechanisms of cooperation are most useful in cooperative projects functioning in a well-
established legal regime but requiring meticulous technical coordination. The Outer Space Treaty 
along with the three elaborating conventions has established the framework of international outer 
space legal regime, and currently space law is being developed either using ‘soft law’ 
instruments or on national levels, thereby, making the prospect of a new international outer space 
treaty adoption in the near future illusive.  
Space technology, however, has become an indispensible part of modern life, and the 
hybrid mechanisms of cooperation might prove to be the most helpful instruments for 
international space cooperation benefitting both States and mankind in general. While the 
Committee on Earth Observation Satellites mechanism of cooperation is the example of 
cooperation providing visible benefits to cooperating States, the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme 
is unquestionably an example of cooperation benefiting the whole mankind in providing 
important search and rescue services, continuing to be an outstanding precedent of international 
space cooperation saving thousands of lives every year.
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The United Nations General Assembly in its 2011 resolution emphasized “that regional 
and interregional cooperation in the field of space activities is essential to strengthen the peaceful 
uses of outer space, assist States in the development of their space capabilities and contribute to 
the achievement of the goals of the United Nations Millennium Declaration.”1 In the same vein, 
scholars have acknowledged that the role of international organizations in the space field 
continues to be essential in promoting space activities at the national, regional, and interregional 
levels. Regional cooperative mechanisms also “have a specific role in providing platforms to 
enhance cooperation and coordination between spacefaring nations and emerging space nations, 
and also to establish partnership between users and providers of space-based services.”2 
In this chapter one such mechanism will be scrutinized. The European Space Agency 
(ESA) is a prominent example of a prosperous regional arrangement delivering excellent results 
and proving to the whole international community that a regional mechanism of cooperation 
might be effective in both regulatory and practical areas, which can be entrusted with 
performance of a wide array of functions, including daily management of space projects of a 
significant complexity, as the International Space Station project has proved. First, history and 
structure of the Agency will be reviewed, followed by the six criteria analysis. Second, 
distinctive features of the mechanism will be reviewed, also paying attention to the place of ESA 
within the European-region integration. Finally, the analysis will focus on the reasons behind the 
undisputed success of the European Space Agency mechanism of cooperation in order to 
distinguish traits and features that made it an example and a role model for other regions striving 
for cooperation-based space activities. 
“Following some initial attempts of in particular the United Kingdom (in cooperation 
with the United States) and France to undertake national space activities within a few years after 
Sputnik-1’s flight, it soon became clear that Europe’s leading nations, still recovering from the 
                                                        
1 UNGA Res. A/RES/66/71, para. 16, 9 December 2011. 
2 T.C. Brisibe, “A Normative System for Outer Space Activities in the Next Half Century,” in Proceedings of the 
International Institute of Space Law 2013 (2014), at 23. 
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Second World War at that time, were essentially a size too small to develop a comprehensive and 
successful space program on their own.”3 The ESA’s first Director General Mr. Gibson rightfully 
noted in 1984: “The countries in Europe are all too small to be able separately to give economic 
battle to the giants – both those fully grown and those, like China, who are still developing. The 
concept of European cooperation was born of realistic economic necessity rather than sentiment, 
but it needs constant fostering in all fields – and space is no exception.”4 By and large, 
institutional consolidation of the European space sector was driven by the need for an 
autonomous and self-defined European role in international space cooperation, and by a growing 
desire to halt European dependencies and the lack of independent access to space.5 
The establishment of the European Space Agency was based on a decision made by the 
Ministerial Meeting of the European Space Conference on December 20, 1972 to form a new 
entity by merging the European Launchers Development Organization and the European Space 
Research Organization. Participating European governments were conscious of the need to 
redefine Europe’s space policy and the European space programs in science, applications and 
launcher fields.6 This decision, in turn, was spurred by the initial agreement on space 
applications programs, including METEOSAT, TELECOM and AEROSAT, reached at the 44th 
meeting of the European Space Research Organization Council, marking the shift of the main 
direction of European space cooperation from space science toward space applications 
programs.7 At that point the journey toward a unified, uniformly structured space cooperation in 
the European region has begun. 
De facto the new organization came into existence on the day after the signature of the 
European Space Agency Convention, that is on May 31, 1975, since on this very day the 
organizational structures of the two previous organizations were merged. De jure, however, the 
Agency was formed only after the Convention’s ratification by all members of the former 
European Launchers Development Organization and the European Space Research Organization, 
which happened on October 30, 1980. “Within the legal structure obviously the Convention is 
                                                        
3 F.G. von der Dunk, “European Space Law,” in F.G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 208. 
4 R. Gibson, “By the Way,” in N. Longdon and D. Guyenne (eds.), Europe, Two Decades in Space, 1964-1984 
(1984), at 51. 
5 See, B. Schmidt-Tedd, “The Geographical Return Principle and its Future within the European Space Policy,” in 
L.J. Smith and I. Baumann (eds.), Contracting for Space: Contract Practice in the European Space Sector (2011), at 
85-86. 
6 See, H. Kaltenecker, The New European Space Agency, 5 J. Space L. 37 (1977), at 37. 
7 See, R.F. von Preuschen, The European Space Agency, 27 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 46 (1978), at 46. 
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the highest document hierarchically speaking, with five Annexes integrally part of the 
Convention.”8 The Convention with the appended Annexes defines the Agency’s objectives and 
scope of powers, and provides for a comprehensive regulation of the Agency’s activities to the 
extent, of course, that the manifold practical endeavors ESA is and may be charged with, can be 
comprehensively regulated.9 
Article II of the Convention establishes the ESA purpose: “The purpose of the Agency 
shall be to provide for and to promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, cooperation among 
European States in space research and technology and their space applications, with a view to 
their being used for scientific purposes and for operational space applications systems.” It has 
been suggested that the Agency’s identity emerging from Article II is multidimensional, like the 
different faces of a cube. On the one side is the face of the executive instrument the European 
Launchers Development Organization used to be, and ESA continues to be. Other faces of the 
cube, namely the ESA’s policy and integrative role, its space competence, its civilian role, its 
research and development role, are what make the Agency a cooperative regional mechanism 
with the comprehensive mandate in the European space sector competent to complement and at 
times substitute for national space programs of its members.10  
“The Agency therefore effectively has a threefold mission: (1) to stimulate the 
development of material and technical resources of the member states through a distinct and 
innovative framework for international cooperation amongst them; (2) to integrate national space 
programs as much as possible at a European level, establishing greater economies of scope and 
scale and allowing for a certain level of specialization; and (3) to strengthen European space 
efforts for exclusively peaceful purposes at a global level, aiming for international cooperation 
with the other space powers whilst establishing and maintaining Europe’s own position within 
the global space arena.”11  
Assignment of these broad responsibilities to the Agency obviously could not have been 
attempted without the proper institutional mechanism. The ESA Convention provides for two 
                                                        
8 F.G. von der Dunk, “European Space Law,” in F.G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 213. 
9 It was correctly noted that the ESA Convention is the living document, and its provisions are being clarified and 
detailed by the subsequent practice. See, K. Madders, A New Force at a New Frontier: Europe’s Development in the 
Space Field in the Light of Its Main Actors, Policies, Law and Activities from Its Beginnings Up to the Present 
(2006), at 180. 
10 Cf., K. Madders, A New Force at a New Frontier: Europe’s Development in the Space Field in the Light of Its 
Main Actors, Policies, Law and Activities from Its Beginnings Up to the Present (2006), at 181. 
11 F.G. von der Dunk, “European Space Law,” in F.G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 214. 
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permanent organs of the Agency: the Council and the Director General supported by the staff. 
Article I specifies that the Headquarters of the Agency are situated in the Paris area, where 
presumably main organs are to be located. ESA has several additional facilities, including the 
Space Technology Center located in the Netherlands, the Space Operations Center in Germany, 
the Space Research Institute in Italy, several telemetry stations and its launching base in French 
Guyana.  
Article XI establishes the Council, a permanent plenary organ composed of 
representatives of all member-States. Structurally, the Chairman, who is assisted by the Bureau, 
heads the Council. Each member of the Council has one vote with regard to all issues, but shall 
not vote on questions pertaining to the programs in which the particular State does not 
participate. The Council, being the plenary organ of the Agency, is tasked with addressing the 
most important issues pertinent to the overall functioning of the organization and development of 
its activities. Specifically, the Council approves the activities and programs, determines the level 
of resources to be made available to the Agency for the coming five-year period, adopts 
recommendations addressed to member-States regarding optimization of States’ resources used 
in mandatory activities, accepts optional programs, adopts annual work plans, adopts the general 
budget of the Agency and of each program, keeps under review expenditures and publishes 
annual audit results, authorizes transfer of technology to non-members, decides on admission of 
new members, and takes all other measures necessary for fulfillment of the purposes of the 
Agency. The Council is considered superior to other organs in the ESA organizational hierarchy, 
therefore allowing directing all arising issues and conflicts to the Council for arbitration and 
resolution in a timely and uncomplicated manner.12  
Article XI does not provide for specific intervals between the Council meetings, stating 
that the meetings are to take place as and when required. Furthermore, the Council might meet 
on either delegate or ministerial level, thus providing a significant level of flexibility for States in 
deciding when and on what level the meetings are to take place. Normally, the Council meetings 
on ministerial level occur once in three years in order to address major issues and, if possible, 
make consolidated policy decisions, whereas the delegate-level Council handles ordinary overall 
policy over the course of each year based on the reports provided by its standing plenary 
                                                        
12 See, K. Madders, A New Force at a New Frontier: Europe’s Development in the Space Field in the Light of Its 
Main Actors, Policies, Law and Activities from Its Beginnings Up to the Present (2006), at 198. 
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committees. It has been explained that periodical Council meetings on ministerial level are 
sufficient for the ESA structure, which embodies a unified European space policy. That is in 
contrast to its predecessors, whereas the European Launchers Development Organization and the 
European Space Research Organization were separate international organizations, and whose 
activities had to be coordinated by a high level body working on a permanent, or at least regular, 
basis.13 At the same time, in the light of the new structure of cooperation there was a need to 
substitute former European Space Conferences, and the Council meetings on ministerial level 
were seen as a viable alternative.14  
In order to facilitate performance of the Council’s broad functions, the Convention calls 
for establishment of the Council’s Science Program Committee and other necessary subordinate 
bodies. The system of subordinate bodies was established in 1975 and since has been amended to 
a certain extent, though the overall scheme has been preserved. In addition to the Science 
Program Committee such other organs as the Administrative and Finance Committee, the 
Industrial Policy Committee, the International Relations Committee, the Programme Boards and 
several others have been created.15  
The Council and its subordinate bodies adopt decisions by voting. The voting system 
within ESA can be characterized as follows. Annex III provides for a weighted voting on 
optional programs’ decisions, where only their participants can normally vote. Since the cases 
where such a procedure is utilized are rather sporadic – that is starting or halting a new program, 
it does not disrupt otherwise simple voting rules: majority is the rule,16 the two-thirds majority 
the exception, and unanimity the rarity.17 
The ESA institutional system is financed from the Agency common costs budget. States’ 
contributions to common costs of the Agency are calculated based on average national income of 
the State. Effectively a ‘weighted’ financing system has been established; and it co-exists with 
the ‘one member – one vote’ principle. A similar system is used in most international 
organizations, and has been often criticized, especially as applied to the United Nations.18 It has 
                                                        
13 See, R.F. von Preuschen, The European Space Agency, 27 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 46 (1978), at 57. 
14 See, H. Kaltenecker, The New European Space Agency, 5 J. Space L. 37 (1977), at 38. 
15 See, K. Madders, A New Force at a New Frontier: Europe’s Development in the Space Field in the Light of Its 
Main Actors, Policies, Law and Activities from Its Beginnings Up to the Present (2006), at 200-02. 
16 Article XI (6)(d) of the European Space Agency Convention. 
17 See, K. Madders, A New Force at a New Frontier: Europe’s Development in the Space Field in the Light of Its 
Main Actors, Policies, Law and Activities from Its Beginnings Up to the Present (2006), at 198. 
18 See, W.G. Vitzthum et al., Völkerrecht [International Law] (2007), at 467-68. 
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been suggested that having the same number of votes notwithstanding the financial contribution 
effectively diminishes value of the vote of those members with highest contributions, and 
amounts to plain inequality despite the motives underpinning the ‘one member – one vote’ 
principle. This inequality in the ESA context is being mitigated by the established financing cap, 
guaranteeing that no member shall be required to pay contributions is excess of twenty-five 
percent of the total amount of contributions.   
 
11.2 Six-Criteria Analysis 
 
11.2.1 Membership/Participation 
ESA only allows membership of sovereign States. In accordance with Article XXI, the 
Convention entered into force after member-States of the European Space Research Organization 
and the European Launch Development Organization signed the Convention and deposited their 
instruments of acceptance. Therefore, the Article effectively enumerates ten founding member-
States. All other States may accede to the Convention as per Article XXII subject to approval of 
the Council by the unanimous vote of all members. The Convention does not provide for an 
observer status, but does mention ‘associate membership’. This status can be granted to a non-
member State, which wishes to participate in a future project, and it is granted pursuant to an 
international agreement concluded between the Agency and the respective State in accordance 
with provisions of Article XIV (3). Therefore, even the ‘associated’ membership is restricted 
solely to States, and no other subjects of international law can legally become integrated with the 
Agency.  
Thus, in accordance with the ESA Convention membership of, for example, the European 
Union in ESA is legally impossible. This is a noteworthy feature of the Agency particularly in 
the light of the growing inclusion of the European Union in the space sector, necessitating 
discussion as to proper ways and means of cooperation between the European Union and ESA. 
This question will be briefly addressed below. 
 
11.2.2 Secretariat 
The Director General is the second permanent organ of ESA, functioning as the chief 
executive officer of the Agency and its legal representative. The Director General is appointed 
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by the two-thirds majority vote in the Council for any period as defined by the Council. He has 
broad administrative functions, including overall management of the Agency, execution of its 
programs, and implementation of its policy. The Director General works in close cooperation 
with the Council by way of submitting proposals concerning activities, programs and other 
measures necessary to fulfill the Agency’s purpose. In the furtherance of concerted and 
coordinated actions of the two organs, the Director General is required to make annual reports to 
the Council and ensure their timely publication.  
The Director General is assisted by any necessary scientific, technical, administrative and 
clerical staff. Article XII declares the ‘exclusively international’ character of the responsibilities 
of the Director General and staff, and requires that member-States respect the international 
character of their work and shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties. 
Additionally, to ensure an independent and objective discharge of functions by the Agency’s 
employees, ESA has established its own internal legal system governing employment contracts 
of ESA staff. There is a good reason for creating such internal regulations. Since officials are 
recruited from any of the member-States and can be assigned for service in any respective 
country, the choice of a particular national jurisdiction would be arbitrary. Moreover, designation 
of a particular national law as governing employment relations could result in a dependency to a 
certain extent, and leave a possibility for national pressure. 
In accordance with Article XV and Annex I of the ESA Convention, the Director General 
and staff are “to ensure in all circumstances the unimpeded functioning of the Agency and the 
complete independence of the persons”19 to whom the privileges and immunities are accorded. 
The Director General and his staff are granted personal privileges and immunities, including 
immunity from arrest and detention, jurisdiction, alien registration formalities and the like, and 
are provided with limited privileges and immunities upon leaving the Agency’s service. 
It can, therefore, be concluded that the Director General assisted by the staff performs 
functions of the secretariat. It is a separate organ obviously working on a permanent basis, 
considering the Director General’s task of the overall management of the Agency and his status 
of the ESA legal representative, and financed from the ESA common costs budget. In addition to 
broad functions of the Director General, provisions of Articles XII and XV unequivocally assert 
the international character of work, putting the ESA secretariat as represented by the Director 
                                                        
19 Art. XXII of Annex I to the Convention for the Establishment of the European Space Agency. 
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General and necessary staff in compliance with all three criteria of an international 
organization’s secretariat. 
 
11.2.3 International Legal Personality 
ESA’s structure is regarded as an example of the generally introduced model of a 
classical international organization.20 First and foremost, a classical international organization is 
characterized by a legal personality. Just as other international organizations, ESA possesses 
both international and national legal personality. “The Convention confers in general terms legal 
capacity, which has undoubtedly an international character as it may transmit recommendations, 
impose rules on the Member States, conclude agreements with third parties and decide on the 
financial contributions of States. ESA is also bound by other multilateral space agreements 
provided their applicability is relevant to international organizations.”21  
Article XV and Annex I spell out privileges and immunities of the Agency. Particularly, 
the Agency has the capacity to contract, acquire and dispose property, be a party to legal 
proceedings; it enjoys inviolability of its premises and archives, and has immunity from 
jurisdiction and execution, taxes, import-export duties and the like. Further, the Convention 
stipulates that representatives of member-States while exercising their functions and in the 
course of their journeys to and from the meetings are entitled to immunity from arrest and 
detention, from seizure of their personal luggage; they enjoy immunity from jurisdiction, 
inviolability for all their official documents and suchlike. 
ESA also has legal capacity in accordance with national law: it can acquire property and 
fulfill any necessary legal acts. At the same time, it possesses immunities from jurisdiction, taxes 
and other duties imposed by national laws. “Those rules mean that ESA has a classical legal 
personality which is usually provided for international organizations. There is a personality of 
international public law, which confers the legal competence to act in accordance with the 
framework of the law of nations and it also possesses the legal competence to act in accordance 
with the national legal systems of its Member States when it is acting on their territory.”22 
                                                        
20 See, H. Kaltenecker, “The European Space Agency (ESA),” in N. Jasentuliyana and R.S.K. Lee (eds.), Manual of 
Space Law (1979), at 427. 
21 E.R.C. van Bogaert, Aspects of Space Law (1986), at 270. 
22 Id. at 271. 
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While the ESA Convention affirms legal personality of the Agency in Article XV, it was 
deemed necessary to specify that the Agency be empowered to “cooperate with other 
international organizations and institutions and with Governments, organizations and institutions 
of non-member States, and conclude agreements with them to that effect.” “While it remains 
debatable whether the wide and fragmented body of agreements and legal obligations regulating 
the relations between ESA and its member countries, as well as the host of agreements concluded 
between ESA and many governments and governmental space agencies, can be characterized as 
‘space law’, they must certainly be considered as an important contribution to creating a stable 
and transparent legal framework for many types of space operations.”23  
Overall, there is no doubt that ESA possesses all four criteria characteristic for an entity 
with international legal personality, as defined in Chapter 1: it is an association of States with 
lawful objectives that has two permanent organs performing functions on behalf of and in the 
interest of ESA, it has distinct purposes enumerated in Article II of the ESA Convention, and it 
has legal powers exercisable on the international plane, for example, the right to conclude 
international agreements in the course of international cooperation. 
 
11.2.4 Term of Existence 
ESA has been created for an indefinite period of time. Article XXV of the Convention, 
however, provides for conditions of the Agency’s dissolution: if the number of members 
becomes less than five or upon agreement between members, and sets out the procedure of 
dissolution. That by no means signals a temporary character of work, but rather indicates 
forethought of the Convention’s draftsmen and prudent care of the founding States in 
establishing a procedure allowing meeting financial obligations of the Agency in case of 
dissolution, which given its area of work might be quite substantial. The ESA’s predecessors 
were also created for an indefinite period, but their failures in delivering results prompted 
member-States to terminate them after merely a decade. So the dissolution scenario was not all 
that unrealistic at the time of Convention’s drafting. 
 
                                                        
23 P. Jankowitsch, “The Background and History of Space Law,” in F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space 
Law (2014), at 22. 
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11.2.5 Binding Force of Documents Produced 
ESA is mandated to adopt both legally binding and non-binding decisions. Article I, for 
example, states that members shall participate in mandatory programs and shall contribute to the 
fixed common costs of the Agency. Article II, by contrast, clearly stipulates that ESA is entitled 
to merely recommend a coherent industrial policy to its members.  
It should be noted that decisions adopted regarding implementation of optional programs, 
which will be explored in detail below, are legally binding, but only on States participating in 
these programs. In order to enjoy an exemption from these decisions, a State has to formally 
register its disinterest in an optional program. 
Article XVIII affirms that non-fulfillment of obligations under the Convention will lead 
to termination of the violator’s membership upon approval of the two-thirds of the Council, 
thereby providing a mechanism for enforcement of its decisions. By and large, obligations set out 
in the Convention and under the Convention are to be complied with under the penalty of 
expulsion from the organization, confirming existence of certain legal obligations binding ESA 
member-States.  
 
11.2.6 Existence of Opportunity to Modify Obligations 
In the absence of specific provisions in the Convention, it can be concluded that 
apparently members cannot modify obligations stemming from decisions adopted by the 
Council, with the noted above exception regarding optional programs. 
As for modification of the Convention itself, Article XV establishes two separate 
amendment procedures: one for the Convention and Annex I, and the other for all other Annexes. 
Amendments to the Convention and Annex I may be recommended by the Council or proposed 
by any Member State by way of notification of the Director General. All amendments, whether 
recommended by the Council or proposed by a Member State, are discussed and approved by the 
Council. These amendments enter into force, however, only once the Government of France 
receives the notification of acceptance from all Member States. This procedure effectively 
precludes a possibility of existence of different sets of obligations for different groups of States: 
either each member is bound by the amended Convention, or no member is bound by the 
amended Convention. 
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The second amendment procedure set forth by Article XV allows amendment of any 
Annex, except for Annex I, by a unanimous vote of the Council, provided that such amendments 
do not conflict with the Convention. For such amendments to come into force, there is no 
requirement for the deposition of the notice of acceptance with the Government of France. The 
unanimous vote required in the Council to adopt the amendment, though, already serves as an 
adequate indication of the concurring will of all Member States. 
Finally, the Convention is silent on the matter of reservations, so provisions of Article 20 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties apply. As discussed in Chapter 1, however, 
these provisions are vague and indeterminate, and heavily rely on the notion of ‘object and 
purpose’, which also can hardly be explained in definite terms. No reservations have been filed 
so far, and it might be presumed that no reservations are permitted to the Convention and the 
Annexes. That is so for two reasons: first, probably the ‘object and purpose’ of close regional 
cooperation do not presuppose the possibility of unilateral digressions from the provisions of the 
Convention, and second, the fact that every amendment requires unanimity contrary to the 
general rule of a majority support serves as additional evidence of the intent to prevent 
modification of the Convention absent a unanimous support. 
 
11.3 Evaluation and Conclusions 
 
To summarize, ESA is a permanently functioning international organization open to 
States, possessing international legal personality and an internationally operating secretariat, 
mandated to adopt both legally binding and non-binding decisions. Shortly after the 
establishment, ESA was regarded as a new road for Europe’s space policy.24 It was created as a 
European intergovernmental organization, founded to provide a forum for European cooperation 
in space.  
Authors have opined that the Agency is probably one of the most open space 
organizations, one in which the users and the members are continuously informed, “one they can 
check carefully, if they wish, to make sure their desires are properly implemented, the missions 
                                                        
24 E.R.C. van Bogaert, Aspects of Space Law (1986), at 267. 
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properly managed, and their financial contributions properly used.”25 In line with the 
organizational transparency and accountability, ESA is mandated to perform broad, strategically 
important functions, including elaboration and implementation of a long-term European space 
policy, recommendation of space objectives to the member States, elaboration and 
implementation of the industrial policy, and recommendation of a coherent industrial policy to its 
member States.26  
Three additional features enhance the institutional structure of a classic international 
organization in the case of ESA: the mandatory-optional programs dichotomy, the principle of 
geographic return and the principle of internationalization of new space programs. Although 
these features first and foremost affect the Agency’s internal relations and policies, they 
necessarily affect the institutional structure of cooperation and should be properly addressed.  
 
11.3.1 Distinctive Features 
Having covered basic institutional characteristics of ESA, there are three additional 
features that have to be reviewed in the course of the present analysis. These characteristics are 
unique to the Agency; they constitute the foundation of its operations and of its relations with 
member-States. At the same time, these features significantly affect the institutional structure of 
ESA. The mandatory-optional programs dichotomy, the principle of geographic return and 
internationalization of new space programs will be analyzed in the light of their importance for 
the institutional structure and operation of the European Space Agency. 
The ESA industrial policy is the cornerstone of both the mandatory-optional programs 
dichotomy and the unique principle of geographic return, also called fair return. ESA has a 
flexible and effective industrial policy based on cost-efficiency, competitiveness, fair distribution 
of activities and competitive bidding, which secures adequate industrial capacities, global 
competitiveness and a high degree of inner-European competition for efficient European 
cooperation in joint space projects, thus providing the basis for the successful development of 
                                                        
25 R.M. Bonnet and V. Manno, International Cooperation in Space: The Example of the European Space Agency 
(1994), at 24. 
26 See, K. Kunzman, J. Neumann and T. Reuter, “Session 3: Current and Future Relationship of ESA and EU. 
Introduction by Rapporteurs,” in S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd, K.-U. Schrogl (eds.), ‘Project 2001 Plus’ – Global and 
European Challenges for Air and Space Law at the Edge of the 21st Century (2006), at 167. 
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space in Europe.27 It has been noted that the place of the industrial policy as a uniting element 
between the geographic return principle and the mandatory-optional programs dichotomy, and its 
importance for international cooperative endeavors of ESA allowed Europe to gain a forty 
percent share of the global heavy lift launcher and satellite market, proving that the European 
space industry is highly competitive and efficient.28 
 
1.3.1.1 Mandatory-Optional Programs Dichotomy 
Strictly speaking, the ESA Convention established not two, but three types of programs: 
mandatory, optional and operational. Operational activities basically concern services on behalf 
of others: placing ESA facilities at a user’s disposal, ensuring the launching, placing in orbit and 
controlling of operational satellites of a user, or carrying out any other activities as requested by 
a user.29 They are to be carried out in accordance with conditions as defined by the Council. 
Upon acceptance by the Council, the Agency shall place at the disposal of the operating agencies 
its own facilities as far as they may be of use, and the costs shall be borne by the users.30 These 
activities are rather specific and are carried out under special circumstances upon request of the 
interested user; in effect, they are concerned with providing space-related services to 
‘customers’. In this regard, operational activities are substantially different from the first two 
categories of ESA activities, and therefore should not be analyzed on the same footing as the first 
two. Whereas the first two types of activities include programs fulfilled by members of the 
Agency for their own benefit and on their own behalf, the last one includes a third party as an 
activity’s beneficiary. Therefore, acknowledging existence of the third type of activities, the 
analysis will focus on the first two types. 
Historically, the concept of mandatory-optional programs dichotomy originates from a 
similar concept employed in the European Space Research Organization.31 That, however, has 
                                                        
27 Resolution of the 4th Space Council accompanying the adoption of the European Space Policy, Brussels, 22 May 
2007. 
28 See, B. Schmidt-Tedd, “The Geographical Return Principle and its Future within the European Space Policy,” in 
L.J. Smith and I. Baumann (eds.), Contracting for Space: Contract Practice in the European Space Sector (2011), at 
87-88. 
29 See, F. von der Dunk, “Perspectives for a Harmonized Industrial Policy of ESA and the EU,” in S. Hobe, B. 
Schmidt-Tedd, K.-U. Schrogl (eds.), ‘Project 2001 Plus’ – Global and European Challenges for Air and Space Law 
at the Edge of the 21st Century (2006), at 182-83. 
30 See, E.R.C. van Bogaert, Aspects of Space Law (1986), at 269-70. 
31 See, F.G. von der Dunk, “European Space Law,” in F.G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 
210. 
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not prevented the first endeavor toward European space cooperation from failure. The 
unsuccessful attempt to divide the responsibilities of scientific research and establishment of 
launching capacities between the European Launchers Development Organization and the 
European Space Research Organization, in the end, led to significant difficulties in 
implementation of applications satellite projects, the Ariane launcher and the Spacelab 
development programs. The decision was made to amalgamate the two organizations. The two, 
notably, had different memberships; the former, for example, included Australia as its member. 
The mandatory-optional programs dichotomy was applied to the new organization as a whole, 
since it had become even more relevant now that States with varying interests were members of a 
single organization created to manage both scientific research and launch programs.32  
In the ESA Convention account has been taken of the complexity of space activities and 
the different interests of States in space matters, and so the mandatory-optional programs 
distinction in its modern version came to life.33 “In Resolution No. 4 of the Final Act,34 the 
member States recommended that it should be ensured that the Agency undertakes enough 
optional programs to guarantee its viability, and that each of these programs is financed by the 
greatest possible number of member States.”35 The ESA Council at its session in May 1976 
underlined that it was essential that research and development efforts by governments should be 
followed by the setting-up of operational applications systems.36 As practice has shown, ESA 
proved itself to be a highly qualified entity to manage and operate highly complex projects. 
Mandatory activities in which all member-States must participate include education, 
documentation, studies of projects and technological research. They also cover collection of 
relevant information and its dissemination to member-States, assistance and advice for 
harmonizing national and international programs and elaboration and execution of scientific 
programs including satellites and other space systems. The Council approves these programs 
with a simple majority, and determines by a unanimous decision the level of resources to be 
made available. All member-States then contribute in accordance with the scale adopted by the 
Council, which is based on the average national income of each member calculated within a 
three-year period. The compulsory nature of funding coupled with the objective evidence-based 
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allocation of contributions shield mandatory programs from unwarranted national pressures, and 
no individual nation can use the leverage of its financial contribution or of its membership in the 
program to further its own preferences.37  
Optional activities include design, development, construction, launching, placing in orbit 
and control of satellites and all similar activities for launching facilities or space transport 
systems. “Here, a major portion of the actual work (in particular for the earth-based design, 
development and construction stages) is contracted out to the industries of (mainly) the member 
states.”38 Member-States may agree to execute such optional programs and they have to submit a 
completely detailed survey for the approval of the Council.39 For the State to register its 
unwillingness to participate in the optional program, it has to formally declare itself not 
interested. In other words, the Convention adopts the ‘opt-out’ principle, not the ‘opt-in’ 
approach requiring each interested State to sign up. So the default rule is the unanimous 
participation in both types of activities, whereas deviation is permitted only as applied to the 
optional programs, which should be formally communicated.  
“This “á la carte” concept on which the optional activities are based makes possible the 
execution of programs also in cases where there are only a small number of interested member 
States.”40 Therefore, in principle as few as two or three States may still be capable of jointly 
developing and implementing a project, and should they consider it desirable, it would have been 
only illogical and counterproductive to prevent them from pursuing the project. In the end, in the 
light of Article III provisions requiring States to exchange scientific and technical information, 
such a project would prove beneficial for all ESA members and the European space industry in 
general.  
At this point it is worthwhile to briefly address the financial side of ESA operations. 
Article XIII and Annex II set forth financial provisions and fix the structure of members’ 
financial contributions. Overall, three sets of budgets should be prepared by the Director General 
and submitted to the Council for approval: a general budget for mandatory activities, a general 
budget for common costs of the Agency and budgets for optional programs. Hence, mandatory 
activities are all covered by a single budget, whereas each optional program has its own budget. 
                                                        
37 See, R.M. Bonnet and V. Manno, International Cooperation in Space: The Example of the European Space 
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This scheme provides for fair allocation of financial contributions among member-States 
depending on their participation in optional programs, and ensures that financial burden of 
optional programs is not redistributed using blanket leveling. 
It has been noted that the optional activities are the reason why the industrial policy of 
ESA achieves its major impact.41 Overall, “the combination of mandatory and optional programs 
within one international intergovernmental institution makes for uniquely flexible framework 
accommodating the interests of individual states while maintaining a coherent and efficient 
manageable program, in short balancing the sovereign discretion of member states to spend 
resources on space programs and the fundamental need to cooperate in that respect.”42 
 
1.3.1.2 Principle of Geographic Return 
The principle of geographic return is inextricably connected with ESA optional programs, 
providing an additional incentive for States to participate in them. It has been shown above that 
from the first days optional programs were deemed highly important for the Agency’s success, 
so the principle of geographic return is correspondingly an essential element of ESA functioning. 
But the principle is also a foundation of the whole system of European space cooperation, which 
created a favorable atmosphere for participation in space activities; more so, it created a 
favorable atmosphere for active participation, for an increasing number and complexity of 
programs developed and fulfilled by ESA with a stable support of its member-States. Despite the 
justified critique of the principle as incompatible with the European Union competition rules,43 it 
has been in place for four decades and has demonstrated its effectiveness. There is hardly a 
competition-rules-compatible alternative of comparable effectiveness; hence, it is likely to stay 
for the years to come. 
Development of the European space sector, beginning with the establishment of national 
space policies and culminating in the creation of ESA, was driven by science: “The creation of 
an industrial base for European engagement in space played an important role in this context. As 
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a consequence, industrial policy for space – epitomized in the famous ‘juste retour’ – became 
one of the key elements in the founding document of ESA in 1974.”44 
Annex V elaborates the principles of ESA’s industrial policy established in Article VII of 
the Convention. By and large, the principle of fair return, or geographic distribution, is based on 
the requirement to give preference to industry and organizations of member-States and 
organizations of participating member-States in the context of optional programs when placing 
all contracts. “This principle is considered so important that derogation of it is only allowed by 
decision of the ESA Council, the highest organ of the organization.”45 While the ideal return 
coefficient is set at 1, the Convention leaves a certain degree of discretion to the Council, which 
can apply weighting factors to the value of contracts when calculating the return.46 The principle 
of juste retour, therefore, should not be viewed as only a purely financial incentive toward active 
participation in ESA programs, but it also turns on industrial policy. Industrial policy aims to 
‘return’ technological advances to participating nations. Under the policy, as implemented, 
advanced technology will carry more ‘weight’ than less advanced ones, thus affecting the actual 
return coefficient to member-States as reviewed by the Council once in three years.47 
Despite the quite ambitious target of one-to-one return coefficient established in the 
Convention, the target coefficient of 0,8 has been set as the lowest threshold. Under the 2004 
‘procurement and return rules’ a flexible, and more importantly easily adaptable, system was 
adopted. It allows member-States to agree on the average target coefficient, which is normally 
about 0,9, and allows designating programs where the lowest coefficient of 0,8 should be 
applied.48 Considering the extensive planning and constant monitoring required by the 
Convention, the fluctuating target coefficient ensures that, on the one hand, the States are not 
deprived of the promised reinvestment in their economy, but on the other, the actual percentage 
of return can be adjusted depending on the program’s performance or overall economic situation. 
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“The “fair return” principle was hailed by all concerned as a very intelligent device to 
entice ESA member states to implement whatever industrial policies they might develop as much 
as possible through the common framework offered by ESA, rather then acting alone, or taking a 
multilateral but ad hoc approach.”49 The predictability of the way the return will be calculated 
prompts States to assess prospects of such a return before signing up for a new optional activity 
and before agreeing on the corresponding financial contribution. The ability to compute the 
program’s ‘business case’ probably is another feature motivating member-States to participate in 
optional programs, which in 2011 represented sixty percent of the total costs.50  
Despite the notable benefits of the geographic return principle as applied in ESA and the 
prominent role it has been playing in advancement of the European space sector, there is a 
substantial amount of criticism as well. On the one hand, it is suggested that exaggerated 
expectations of a hundred percent return per program thwart the positive effect of the principle 
by way of inducing unrealistic financial assumptions of national industries and overshadowing 
the paramount goal of creating a valid technical and scientific basis.51 Authors further noted that 
the ESA industrial policy, including the principle of geographic return, serves the frequently 
divergent industrial, technological and often political interests of member-States, but at the same 
time attempts to comply with traditional procurement objectives such as competition and cost-
effectiveness.52 In other words, “the Agency constantly has to maintain a proper balance between 
industrial policy objectives and more traditional procurement goals, which, in combination might 
well prove to be the correct approach in line with the mandate given to it by its member states.”53 
Thus, the political influence is one source of inadequacies stemming for the principle, 
and it should be reduced to an adequate level.54 At the same time, it is almost undisputable that 
the principle of fair return reduces competition, increases costs, amounts to inflexibility in 
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procurement and impedes the obtainment of best value.55 Nevertheless, this “may well be a price 
worth paying to allow Europe to undertake missions of a unique scope and character, with a 
prominent place among all the space projects undertaken around the world.”56 What is more, this 
principle spurs active involvement and cooperation of scientists, and promotes integration of a 
large number of industrial companies in the development of space projects, becoming an 
important element in the overall effort of European integration, making the space industry one of 
the sectors where a true ‘European spirit’ prevails.57 
 
1.3.1.3 Principle of Internationalization 
The third feature crafting the institutional structure of ESA is the principles of 
internalization of new space programs. The ESA Convention has been characterized as having an 
overarching integrationist and rationalizing mission at the levels of European space policy-
making, programs and infrastructure.58 With this characteristic in mind, the internationalization 
as established by Article V and elaborated in Annex IV seems a logical addition to the ESA 
mechanism of cooperation. The Agency was created as a vehicle capable of developing and 
implementing a united European space strategy, thereby, at the outset programming member-
States for an in-depth cooperation on several levels, from strategic planning to projects 
fulfillment. But most importantly, ESA was created as an organization that would allow Europe 
to work on a par with main spacefaring nations, and that would unite efforts of European nations 
in delivering a world-class leading space industry to the region. So the principle of 
internationalization of new space projects within the region was at the genesis of the Agency, 
and not surprisingly it found its way to the Convention. 
“In general, either individual member states ‘offer’ programs to ESA for 
‘Europeanization’ thereof, meaning they invite other ESA members through the ESA 
mechanisms to join such a program, or the Director General as supported by his staff can 
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propose programs to be adopted as such by the Council.”59 Annex IV designated 
‘Internationalization of National Programs’ requires national programs of member-States to be 
made available for participation of other members within the framework of the Agency, if the 
program is intended to be undertaken either alone or in collaboration with another member-
States. In principle, this obligation also extends to such bilateral and multilateral space projects, 
which members may undertake with non-member States.60 Collaboration within this framework 
should be commenced at a relatively early stage, when modifications of the project necessary to 
accommodate a larger number of participants are still possible, so should be made before the 
project definition stage. 
The principle of internationalization effectively obliges member-States to make certain 
cooperative efforts, but does not go as far as to mandate international cooperation by way of 
imposing the ‘obligation of result’, notwithstanding its establishment within the tight framework 
of international regional cooperation. Particularly, Article I (c) of the Annex states that the 
initiating member shall explain the arrangements proposed for technical management, and 
Article I (d) stipulates that the initiating member shall use its best efforts to accommodate all 
reasonable responses and, subject to agreement being reached, within the time scale demanded 
by project decisions, and within the appropriate level of cost. In the end, the initiating State 
retains significant flexibility and control over its project and is apparently entitled to reject 
proposals of cooperation within the described framework should the proposed agreement not 
meet the objectives, timeframe, spending caps, technical requirements or presumably other 
relevant requirements – as per wording of the ‘best effort’ consideration – it envisioned for the 
project.  
Overall, the ‘obligation of result’ dimension of the principle of cooperation is non-
existent even within the ESA framework, the system that boasts an unprecedented level of 
intergovernmental cooperation in exploration and use of outer space. Nevertheless, the principle 
of internationalization is a notable feature of ESA ensuring that intra-region cooperation is given 
the utmost priority, and securing close relations between ESA member-States in their pursuit of 
common European space strategy.  
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11.3.2 Relations with the European Union  
It should be reminded that ESA is not a part of and is not subordinate to the European 
Union. Furthermore, not all members of ESA are members of the European Union, just as not all 
members of the European Union are members of ESA, but they all belong to one geographical 
region of Europe. ESA, at the same time, has proclaimed “itself proudly to be and regarded as a 
participant in the political efforts to forge a united Europe.”61 Recalling the ESA Convention 
preamble manifesting the desire “to establish a single European space organization,” and noting 
the internationalization principle, cooperation between the European Union as the regional 
integration, partly supranational organization and ESA as the regional international organization 
striving to develop and implement a united European space program, cannot be avoided.  
Only the recent developments, however, have prompted intensifying discussions as to 
proper and effective ways and means of cooperation between the two organizations. “The 
European Space Policy made substantive progress during the last decade with ESA and the EU 
as independent actors – and by involving new partners. On the implementing side, there are still 
a number of open issues, a result of the different characters of those institutions. ESA represents 
a form of intergovernmental cooperation and a specific industrial policy.”62 The greater the 
involvement of the European Union in space activities will be, the more acute the issue will 
become.  
ESA and the European Union have been in close collaboration for at least a decade now, 
since the conclusion of the Framework Agreement between ESA and the European Commission, 
which entered into force on May 28, 2004.63 The Agreement formalized cooperation committing 
the parties to working together and enumerated five institutional models to facilitate the 
cooperation, which are without prejudice to other models agreed upon by the parties. 
Cooperating efforts can address any field of space activities – science, technology, earth 
observation, navigation, satellite communications and the like, and joint initiatives can be 
structured in various manners: ESA managing a project for the Union, the Union participating in 
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ESA optional programs, by way of jointly coordinated and funded activities or even by way of 
creation of joint subsidiary bodies. In the end, ad hoc arrangements are required for every joint 
cooperative program.64  
The Agreement also created the European Space Council charged with development of 
the European space policy. “The Space Council should consist of regular joint and concomitant 
meetings of the ESA and EU Council and provide guidelines and orientations for the cooperation 
between the two organizations. The first Space Council was held on 25 November 2004, and 
paved the way for the adoption of a European Space Programme in late 2005.”65 Outlining 
institutional relationship between ESA and the European Union, the European Space Policy 
conferred upon ESA the role of the European Commission’s technical expert and the 
procurement agent for its projects; and such functional division was confirmed in the 2007 
prolongation of the Framework Agreement. So despite the ongoing discussions about further 
integration of the two organizations, the decisions of 2007 confirmed the model of two 
independent international organizations with their specific tasks.66  
The 2009 Lisbon Treaty, being a watershed agreement for the European Union, has not 
substantially affected relations between the European Union and ESA. Article 189 of the Lisbon 
Treaty recognizes ESA as an organization with its own mandate in the sphere of 
intergovernmental cooperation. Therefore, despite the partly supranational character of the Union 
and its expanded powers as per the Lisbon Treaty provisions, there is still no hierarchy between 
the two organizations.67 And the Framework Agreement continues to be the legal basis for 
cooperation, preserving an unmistakable distinction between them.  
Scholars have opined that four sectors are particularly promising as potential markets of 
the global, read combining the European Union and ESA, European space strategy. These are 
satellite navigation, telecommunication applications, earth observation and space launchers.68 
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The most prominent examples of these areas are: Galileo and GMES; development of satellite 
communications, particularly to provide communications services in rural areas by way of 
issuing a 18-year license to Inmarsat and Solaris Mobile; creation of a competitive launcher 
family composed of three complimentary launch systems; and finally creation of prizes and 
networks to foster innovation primarily in the private sector.69 This group of activities signifies 
that, first, space activities have already become a major commercial market in Europe, second, 
that space technology is essential for further economic development of the region, and third, that 
encouraging private sector’s initiatives in the space area is beneficial for the technology 
development, which in turn benefits both private sector and the economy in general.  
“As outer space and space activities also in the European context increasingly became a 
key area for technological development, as well as for strategic geopolitical positioning, the 
European Union became more and more concerned that clear space policies and a clear 
overarching legal framework for all space activities were necessary, and should be realized at 
least partially at a European, read EU level.”70 This, however, has not been done yet. More so, it 
is not at all obvious how such merger, or acquisition, should the European Union overtake the 
ESA’s functions, be done from a legal point of view due to significant discrepancies of the 
policies utilized in the two organizations. “One crucial point for the sometimes difficult 
cooperation and interaction between the EU and ESA is the partly divergent industrial policy 
between ESA, as a primary research and technology organization, and the EU as a regional 
integration organization with major economic goals. This leads to concrete questions of 
governance, project-financing and procurement.”71 For example, the Commission has repeatedly 
made it clear that the principle of geographic return should not be applied to projects financed at 
least in part by the Commission, such as Galileo or GMES.72 
Recalling that the fair return principle is at the core of the ESA industrial policy and has a 
sweeping effect on the institutional mechanism of cooperation as well, nowadays the possibility 
of an all-European space policy is subject to further debate. The principle of geographic return, 
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as has been discussed above, is more than a plain financial incentive; it also stimulates 
technological and technical innovations; and more broadly, it supports the important role played 
by the optional programs in ESA and the European space sector in general. Add to this policy 
incongruity between the membership in the two organizations and the prohibition of international 
organizations’ membership in ESA, and a legal conundrum of modern days arises.  
Despite the impressive success and development of European space commerce, currently 
there are four major obstacles to amalgamation of ESA and European Union activities: the need 
to find an adequate institutional framework for cooperation between the main actors of the 
European Space Policy – ESA and the European Commission; the need to reconcile commercial 
and societal aspects of space; the need for harmonization of legislation concerning liability for 
commercial space activities at the European level to guarantee a level playing field; and the need 
to ensure that space industry and space applications markets benefit all European countries and 
not only those, as Germany and France, that have a long-lasting tradition in space and therefore 
have a dense network of large and smaller space companies.73 None of these four obstacles can 
be overcome unilaterally by either the European Union, or ESA. The analysis of the possible 
ways of reconciling EU-ESA differences and merging their efforts toward a uniform European 
space policy – should that eventually be deemed advantageous for the region – should however, 
be left to further elaboration at a more appropriate time and place. 
 
11.3.3 ESA Example: A One-Time Success or a Model? 
Scholars are fairly unanimous in the opinion that institutionalization of the European 
space sector was driven by the understanding that European countries taken separately were a 
size too small to secure an autonomous and self-defined European role in international space 
cooperation. The ESA Convention explains that efficiency of European space efforts can be 
increased through a European space organization; and the main purpose of the new organization 
was defined as promotion of cooperation among the European States in space research and 
technology and their space applications. Hence, increasing efficiency of the European space 
efforts through international cooperation is the overarching purpose of ESA. This purpose is 
envisioned as being achieved by elaborating and implementing a long-term European space 
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policy and by concerting policies of the members, by elaborating and implementing activities in 
space field, by coordinating the European and national space programs through progressive 
integration, and by elaborating and implementing the industrial policy for collective and national 
space programs. 
Undoubtedly, ESA has achieved noteworthy results in fostering space cooperation in 
Europe, creating a European space market and elevating Europe to become one of the major and 
most influential players in exploration and use of outer space. Not all proclaimed goals, however, 
have been achieved in full. Although the Agency’s membership has grown from ten member-
States in 1975 to twenty-two members after the most recent Hungary’s accession to ESA on 
February 24, 2015, it is still eight members shy to include all members of the European Union, 
and twenty-five members74 shy of including all European countries. This, however, should not be 
considered an Agency weakness: blanket inclusion of all European States based only on the 
principle of regional affiliation would not have enhanced the quality of ESA performance since 
space activities require a certain level of technological and economic sophistication. This 
observation leads to a discussion of the type of ESA regionalism, and its role in the Agency’s 
success. 
There is little doubt that “regional organizations fulfill a significant role in the present 
international community.”75 And though some authors have expressed concerns about possible 
substitution of general international law by regional international law as a result of a growing 
number and influence of regional cooperative endeavors,76 the business of regional cooperation 
is tricky and somewhat confusing. Not every region possessing geographical, cultural and 
economic proximity is capable of creating and maintaining a successful international regional 
organization. And not every international regional organization created in the furtherance of 
regional similarities or homogeneity proves to be a successful tool of regional cooperation.  
International regional cooperation in general, and of course regionalism in exploration 
and use of outer space is a rather recent phenomenon in the evolution of the community of 
States. Regionalism may be defined as cooperation among States of a specific area or a group of 
States with the same political identity.77 A more comprehensive list of reasons behind 
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regionalism may be suggested: in addition to geographical and political closeness, social and 
cultural homogeneity, similar attitudes or external behavior, political and economic 
interdependence may be an impetus for regional cooperation.78 Integration based principally on 
geographical proximity is the most obvious, but not always the most advantageous way to 
promote cooperation. The territory-based regionalism can be described as a compromise: it is 
that single space which has been judged suitable for the attainment of a range of tasks, and it 
may be more or less appropriate for any one of them.79 Performance of individual or highly 
specialized tasks, the category space cooperation falls into, may not necessarily be best achieved 
through regionalism based on geographical proximity. Nowadays, thus, regionalism is still 
premised on territorial closeness, but there is more to it, so the term should not be understood 
literally.  
Historically, regionalism in the sense of seeking a single space in order to facilitate the 
performance of a range of interrelated functions has been encouraged by three categories of 
motives. The first motive is the appearance of a regional sentiment without more. The second 
option is the belief that a union would be desirable in fulfillment of a grand, often politics-related 
enterprise, as was the case with the Founding Fathers in the United States. Finally, 
regionalization may also result from continuous demonstration of specific benefits resulting from 
intensification, and at the same time demonstration of increasing costs of working individually or 
in cooperation with a few economically close partners.80 
The first motivation is hardly a viable basis for cooperation in the modern interconnected 
world, though regional sentiments are unquestionably a part of most regional organizations. The 
second motive is both a heritage of the long gone days, and is probably one of the subsidiary 
motivations behind the European Union, a contemporary grand political (and surely legal) 
enterprise. The third motive is the one underpinning creation of the European Space Agency. In 
the words of a Soviet scholar, “results of international cooperation [within the ESA predecessors] 
turned out to be utterly disappointing. Antagonistic differences characteristic for imperialistic 
integration, showed up with all clarity in efforts to develop a unified policy of West-European 
                                                        
78 See, Russet B.M. International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology, (1967), at 11, 
cited in C. Archer, International Organizations (1992), at 47. 
79 Cf., P. Taylor, International Organization in the Modern World (1993), at 7. 
80 Id. at 33. 
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states in exploration and use of outer space.”81 ‘Antagonistic differences’, in reality of course, 
were not the result of ‘imperialistic integration’, but still required decisive actions. And ESA was 
precisely that action, which allowed extracting most benefits from cooperation and 
simultaneously reducing individual costs. 
This outcome, however, would not have been possible should the Agency been founded 
solely on the basis of geographic proximity. Nor would cultural, religious, political or 
economical closeness taken separately suffice. A more complicated blend of all these factors 
combined with industrial policy considerations and zeal of each participant in advancing space 
activities is the recipe of ESA regionalism. Compared to global organizations, regional ones 
differ in three major ways: they tend to have a strong integrative dynamic deriving from 
functional linkage between issue areas; estrangement is seen as a major threat to cooperative 
undertakings; and the reconciliation of collective and national interests strongly favors the 
former.82  
ESA as the regional mechanism of cooperation is, therefore, premised on two elements: 
(1) regionalism combining geographical proximity and economic, or more precisely sectoral, 
closeness; and (2) amplified adherence to characteristics specific for regional organizations. The 
first element signifies the fact that ESA is not a regional organization in the literal sense of the 
word, but a regional organization based on territorial closeness coupled with meticulous 
calculation of costs and benefits of addition of a new member to the organization. The second 
element suggests that ESA regionalism has magnified three characteristics distinguishing global 
organizations from regional ones, namely a deepened functions-based integrative dynamic, a 
strive for overall equality of members and a favoritism of collective interests. These general 
considerations, however, are not enough to explain the great success of the ESA mechanism of 
cooperation. The general tendency of the European integration originating from the European 
Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community necessarily played its role 
in bringing members of ESA closer and fostering their collaboration.  
Three features of the ESA mechanism of cooperation discussed earlier, namely the 
mandatory-optional programs dichotomy, the principle of geographic return and that of 
internationalization, are also pivotal elements of the regionalism exemplified by the Agency. It is 
                                                        
81 Верещетин В.С. Международное сотрудничество в космосе [International Cooperation in Outer Space]. М.: 
Наука. 1974. C. 70. 
82 Cf., P. Taylor, International Organization in the Modern World (1993), at 114. 
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suggested that it is impossible to single out the one leading element in the structure of ESA that 
has predetermined its effectiveness. More so, all these elements are so closely interconnected 
that it might also be impossible to discern the one that constitutes the foundation of the system. 
In other words, the character of ESA regionalism, the high level of European integration in 
general and the three specific features of ESA cooperation are all links of a single chain, where 
one cannot tell, which is the first and which is the last one. A high level of integration, for 
example, is the basis of the internationalization principle, but the existing level of integration, in 
turn, has become possible only due to a precisely tailored approach to regionalism.  
The preceding discussion leads to the conclusion that the ESA institutional structure, 
created as a classic international organization, has evolved into the unparalleled mechanism of 
cooperation in exploration and use of outer space as we know it thanks to the multitude of 
interconnected factors and elements, some of which are unique to the dynamics of the European 
region development, and others that can in principle be duplicated in different circumstances. 
The ESA institutional framework “tries to combine different requirements: flexibility in the 
elaboration of new programs; efficiency in their execution; respect of different interests Member 
States have in the space field; acceptance of industrial return; sound equilibrium between 
legislative and executive tasks; and appropriate long term planning.”83  
All these different requirements can be copied and adapted to a different region, but the 
outcome would inevitably be a peculiar application of these features to the other region’s specific 
conditions, including the degree of homogeneity and interconnectedness, the degree of economic 
and technological development, the number of States interested in participation, and many more. 
It has been suggested that the uniquely flexible framework created by way of the mandatory-
optional programs dichotomy has already been copied by EUMETSAT, and “for such reasons is 
viewed as possibly the most likely trait of the Agency which prospective international space 
cooperation organizations in other parts of the world would like to copy.” 84 But it is quite 
obvious that replicating only this feature is either plainly impossible, or would prove ineffective. 
After all, how one can guarantee that in the absence of the geographic return principle States 
would be willing to participate in optional programs twice as actively as in mandatory 
                                                        
83 H. Kaltenecker, The New European Space Agency, 5 J. Space L. 37 (1977), at 43. 
84 F.G. von der Dunk, “European Space Law,” in F.G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 311. 
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programs?85 Hence, additional incentivizing mechanisms would have to be introduced, and that, 
in turn, would make this theoretical mechanism of cooperation unique in its own right. 
Overall, the European Space Agency exemplifies how international regional cooperation 
in exploration and use of outer space should be structured to achieve outstanding results and be 
capable of adaptation and enhancement in response to the ever-changing landscape of space 
activities. “While built on the basic respect for the legal framework existing in space, in 
particular for the peaceful uses of outer space, it certainly became one of the most influential and 
most powerful among the new actors, not only in the implementation, but also in the progressive 
development of new norms governing the cooperation of states as well as non-state actors in 
space matters.”86 
Regional cooperation is not a substitute for universal cooperation, but neither is universal 
cooperation a substitute for regional. These two levels of cooperation perform quite distinct 
functions, with universal cooperation focusing on higher-level regulation and coordination 
among the majority of States, and regional cooperation capable of achieving more specified 
goals in a compact region among a limited number of members. One advantage of regional 
cooperation is that it unites States that are close to each other geographically and often 
politically, economically and socially, and therefore have a lot in common. This creates a firm 
foundation success in cooperative practical along with regulatory areas, and ESA is the 
prominent example of practical success on a regional level. An eloquent and relevant conclusion 
was made by two European scientists: “As imperfect as it may be, ESA is the only organization 
that has proven that it is possible for many nations to work and plant together in space activities. 
It is offered here as an example on which to reflect. ESA managed and succeeded. The proof is 
there to be seen. The model exists.”87
                                                        
85 M. Cogen, An Introduction to European Intergovernmental Organizations (2015), at 222. (“In 2011, ESA’s 
mandatory programme activities represented 25 per cent (or €1 billion) of the total cost, 60 per cent was used in 
optional programmes (or €2,5 billion) and 15 per cent on programmes financed by third parties (or €627 million.”) 
86 P. Jankowitsch, “The Background and History of Space Law,” F. G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law 
(2014), at 22. 
87 R.M. Bonnet and V. Manno, International Cooperation in Space: The Example of the European Space Agency 
(1994), at 138. 
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The Commonwealth of Independent States is famously known as a postnuptial result of 
the former Soviet Union. Quite interestingly, the history of its creation is well known, while only 
few connoisseurs bear knowledge of what the Commonwealth has achieved during twenty-five 
years of its existence. Alben W. Barkley, the thirty-fifth Vice President of the United States, a 
storyteller of great repute, was especially fond of telling about the mother who had two sons. 
One went to sea; the other became vice president; and neither was heard from again.1 The 
Commonwealth seems to be the second son in this story: it had a grandiose beginning, but 
unfortunately no one ever heard from it ever again.  
Despite limited international influence of the Commonwealth from a worldwide 
perspective, it has achieved certain positive results within the region. It has played a role in 
smothering several conflicts in the region, eased transition from one State to fifteen independent 
States, proved to be somewhat useful in dealing with social issues, and allowed mitigating 
problems of intra-region migration. The space complex was one of many former Soviet Union 
industries that ended up divided among territories of several sovereign States. Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Ukraine all inherited parts of the once mammoth Soviet space complex: the Baykonur 
Cosmodrome is now located in Kazakhstan, the Energiya Company producing engines for space 
launch vehicles is now under the jurisdiction of Ukraine, while Russia received the rest of space 
capabilities.2 
In this chapter the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) mechanism of 
cooperation in outer space activities will be reviewed. Since the CIS is not a space-specialized 
entity, first,  the overall structure of cooperation within the CIS has to be addressed. The CIS 
Inter-State Outer Space Council is one of the sixty-nine specialized CIS organs; hence it is 
necessary to understand the processes, dynamics and institutional issues of the Commonwealth 
                                                        
1 United States Senate, Alben W. Barkley, 35th Vice President (1949-1953), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/VP_Alben_Barkley.htm. 
2 For an excellent overview of former Soviet space complex assets allocation between the three countries see, 
Молдабеков Е.М., Винокуров Е.Г. Перспективы сотрудничества стран СНГ в космической отрасли 
[Perspectives of Cooperation of the CIS States in Space Area]. Отраслевой обзор ЕАБР №8, 2010. С. 15-20. 
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as a whole. Next, the reasons behind the standstill in CIS cooperation will be briefly reviewed 
and the issues in the space sector caused by the cooperative stagnation will be touched upon. 
Finally, the chapter will be concluded by remarks about the nature of cooperation within the CIS, 
about the strengths this union used to have at its inception, and about the ways the issues 
frustrating CIS cooperation can (or maybe cannot) be mitigated. 
On December 8, 1991 in Minsk leaders of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine signed the 
Declaration by the Heads of States of the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic and Ukraine that effectively declared independence of these States and 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of 
Independent States.3 “In part because of the immediate need to manage the complexities of this 
vast political divorce process, the leaders of these new states quickly, and with almost no 
controversy, agreed to the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States.”4 These 
documents were followed by a number of additional documents, including the Alma-Ata 
Declaration of December 21, 1991, which incorporated the five Central Asian countries, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Moldova, who had not participated in the meeting in Minsk, into the 
CIS as members of equal standing with the three Slavic countries.  
Excerpts from the newspaper articles of that time underline how dramatically different 
the disagreements on the future of the CIS were. While one article suggested that the CIS “is the 
final attempt to switch to normal life and join the civilized world,” the other insisted that the 
“relationships taking shape within the Commonwealth have been the source of frustration, rather 
than inspiration, for people in Europe and worldwide.”5 But that was even before the 
Commonwealth actually took shape. Ahead were the drafting of the CIS Charter, establishment 
of CIS organs and procedures and organization of a meaningful dialogue between leaders of 
States, most of which had never before been independent.  
“Despite the five months of contentious negotiation that had gone into drafting the CIS 
Charter, its presentation to the of States Summit in Minsk on January 22, 1993, led to further 
disagreement. Only Kazakhstan and Russia fully supported the draft, while Belarus had 
                                                        
3 Full English texts are available in, Z. Brzezinski, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: 
Documents, Data, and Analysis (1997). 
4 M.B. Olcott, A. Åslund, S.W. Garnett, Getting it Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (1999), at 2. 
5 G. Shipitko, “Commentary: ‘Final Attempt’ and ‘Normal Life’,” Izvestiya, 31 December 1991; M. Mayorov, 
“’Commonwealth of Uncivilized States’ Observed,” Interfax, 3 January 1992, in Z. Brzezinski, Russia and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States: Documents, Data, and Analysis (1997), at 53-55. 
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reservations about the collective security provisions, and Uzbekistan objected to inclusion of 
human rights issues, which it considered to be the internal affair of member states. Ukraine, 
Moldova, and Turkmenistan refused to sign the charter, while Azerbaijan and Georgia did not 
even come to the meeting.”6 The CIS Charter, as it is widely acknowledged even by the 
advocates of the CIS, is far from perfect due to its vague wording leading to ambiguousness and 
diminished effectiveness.7 Thus, the more troubling was the discord displayed by the leaders of 
the new States, who used to be colleagues a little over a year earlier.  
Not surprisingly, a troublesome process of Charter ratification had followed. “Member 
states were given a year to ratify the charter, after which it would come into effect in January 
1994. Only nine nations did so, including Georgia, which did not ratify the charter until March 
1994.”8 Russian scholars characterized creation of the CIS as a “necessary reality of historical 
process of collaboration and cooperation of nations of a former totalitarian state, consummated 
by an attempt to preserve political, economic, cultural and other connections in new 
organizational and economic-legal realities.”9 If so, these were harsh realities and not a 
particularly successful attempt, at least at the initial stages. 
The CIS Charter in Article 2 enumerates a long list of the Commonwealth’s purposes, 
including cooperation in various spheres, balanced economic development, guarantee of human 
rights and liberties, maintenance of international peace and security and others. Article 3 
enumerates spheres of cooperative activities, which are to be undertaken on an equitable basis 
through common coordinating institutions: coordination of foreign policy activities, cooperation 
in establishment and development of a common economic market, cooperation with regard to 
customs policy, cooperation in protection of the environment, migration policy cooperation and 
cooperation in prevention of organized crime. The ambitious purposes and the broad spectrum of 
cooperative activities required an all-embracing institutional structure. 
                                                        
6 M.B. Olcott, A. Åslund, S.W. Garnett, Getting it Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (1999), at 9. 
7 Cf., Косов Ю.В., Торопыгин А.В. Содружество Независимых Государств. Институты, интеграционные 
процессы, конфликты и парламентская дипломатия [The Commonwealth of Independent States: Institutions, 
Intergational Processes, Conflicts and Parliamentary Diplomacy]. М.: 2009. 
8 M.B. Olcott, A. Åslund, S.W. Garnett, Getting it Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (1999), at 9-10. 
9 Косов Ю.В., Торопыгин А.В. Содружество Независимых Государств. Институты, интеграционные 
процессы, конфликты и парламентская дипломатия [The Commonwealth of Independent States: Institutions, 
Intergational Processes, Conflicts and Parliamentary Diplomacy]. М.: 2009. С. 21. 
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Within the CIS structure there are at least five Councils uniting representatives of 
member States on the ministerial level. The Council of Heads of States hierarchically is the 
highest organ in the CIS institutional structure and is empowered to adopt decisions on 
prominent issues of cooperative activities of the members. Article 14 of the CIS Charter 
designates the Council of Heads of States as “the supreme body of the Commonwealth for 
questions concerning defense and protection of external borders of the member states.” In 
accordance with Article 21, the Council shall be comprised of representatives of all member 
States and shall be convened at least two times a year, permitting convention of extraordinary 
sessions at the initiative of one of the member States.  
The latter provision strikes as the one appropriate for international mechanisms uniting a 
small number of States and requiring intensive cooperation. For example, consultations within 
the International Space Station framework can be commenced upon the request of any Partner.10 
The International Convention on Civil Aviation, by contrast, in Article 48 requires a call of the 
Council or a request of not less than one-fifth of the total number of contracting States for 
convening an extraordinary meeting of the Assembly. While the CIS membership is not close to 
that of the International Civil Aviation Organization, the nature of the CIS cooperation and 
coordination is undoubtedly closer to that of the International Civil Aviation Organization – 
concerned primarily with coordination of national regulations – than to that between the 
International Space Station Partners, which is centered around management of a particular 
project. Hence, the conclusion is drawn that initially a profoundly deep level of cooperation 
between the CIS States was envisioned; it was presumed that the call for an extraordinary session 
on the highest level by just one State would be enough to prompt other partners to take the call 
seriously and convene the meeting with full attendance. The history of the CIS meetings, 
however, even of those dealing with issues of great importance, like adoption of the CIS Charter, 
and of those called for and organized in advance proved that not all members shared the same 
sentiment. And so it went.  
The Council of Heads of Governments coordinates activities of executive organs of 
member States in economic, social and other spheres of cooperation. The Council shall hold 
sessions four times a year, as per provisions of Article 22 of the CIS Charter, and extraordinary 
                                                        
10 Article 23 of the Agreement Among the Government of Canada, Governments of Member States of the European 
Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the Government of the 
United States of America Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station (1998). 
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sessions can also be convened upon request of just one member. The decision of the Council of 
Heads of States of April 2, 1999 delimitated the scope of powers of the two Councils, 
empowering the Council of Heads of States to adopt decisions on any matters of CIS activities, 
and tasking the Council of Heads of Governments with coordination of all activities undertaken 
by executive organs of the member States.11 In other words, no precise delimitation exists, and 
both Councils have carte blanche in choosing matters to be discussed during their meetings. 
This, however, has not been the reason for the hurdles in achievement of the CIS goals. Even the 
most vehement supporters of the CIS acknowledge complete absence of a legal regime allowing 
to control implementation of the adopted decisions and to enforce them.  
Several other organs uniting the highest-ranking officials of the member States have been 
created within the CIS institutional structure: the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the 
Council of Ministers of Defense, the Council of Commanding Border Troops, the Inter-
Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee on Human Rights. The Economic Court was 
established in July 1992 to ensure fulfillment of economic commitments made within the CIS 
framework and to settle economic disputes among member States, but its powers were 
exclusively consultative and member States generally preferred not to avail themselves of its 
services.12 All decisions throughout the CIS structure are to be adopted by consensus. 
The CIS established a formal Executive Secretariat in September 1993, with headquarters 
in Minsk, Belarus. The Committee for Consultation and Coordination was also established in 
1993, but was effectively replaced by the Inter-State Economic Committee of the Economic 
Union in October 1994. In accordance with Article 28 of the CIS Charter, the Committee is a 
permanently functioning executive and coordinating body charged with execution of decisions of 
the Council of Heads of States and the Council of Heads of Governments. It is comprised of two 
representatives of each member and is headed by the Coordinator of the Committee appointed by 
the Council of Heads of States.  
In addition, about seventy specialized organs were set up, most with coordinating 
functions dealing with particular areas of economic, security, social and cultural cooperation, 
                                                        
11 These and other CIS documents are available on the CIS official website at www.cis.minsk.by. 
12 For example, in 2014 the Court adjudicated 4 cases, three of which were decided in the form of a Consultative 
Opinion, meaning that these cases in the US doctrine would have been dismissed as moot due to absence of a 
conflict between the parties. Consultative Opinions concern interpretation of provisions of legal acts and contracts. 
In 2013 the Court adjudicated 2 cases and both were concluded by Consultative Opinions. As of May 2014, there are 
no pending cases. For more information see the official website of the CIS Economic Court at http://sudsng.org. 
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including the Inter-State Outer Space Council. Overall, eighty-four organs have been created to 
support CIS functioning. Not surprisingly, the CIS is a large employer, providing the payroll for 
over two thousand employees.  
Initially, the large institutional structure of the CIS was not supported by the unified 
financing system. The Charter does not provide for ‘the Budget of the Commonwealth’. Article 
38 explains that each body of the Commonwealth has a separate budget, which shall be approved 
by the Council of Heads of States upon a submission from the Council of Heads of 
Governments. Members’ contributions are to be determined “on the basis of the participatory 
share” and shall be established “in accordance with special agreements on budgets.” This 
ambiguous wording effectively means that no pre-determined methodology for contributions 
calculation exists, leaving open a possibility for re-negotiation of the State’s share every year, in 
turn meaning that Russia is almost the sole sponsor of the grand CIS institutional machine.  
The decision of the Council of Heads of States of June 20, 2000 established the uniform 
budget of the CIS organs, which is financed from budgets of CIS member States.13 This, 
however, has not altered the mechanism of financial contributions’ allocation or changed the 
preeminent role of Russia in the CIS financing. For example, in the period of 2012-2015 the 
Republic of Belarus share in the CIS uniform budget was established at the level of 3,1 percent.14 
Ukraine has ceased to pay its contributions to the CIS budget since 2014. Contributions of the 
two largest, apart from Russia, CIS countries amounting to merely 3,1 percent of the overall 
budget, however, has not led to disruption of the CIS functioning, and has been used by Russian 
officials only to chide Ukraine’s irresponsibility with regard to its international obligations.15  
Thus, the CIS boasts an extensive institutional structure, but that has not prevented 
scholars from concluding that “the institutional design of the CIS was in conflict with the goals 
                                                        
13 Решение о Положении о едином бюджете органов СНГ, финансируемых за счет бюджетных средств 
государств – участников Содружества Независимых Государств [Decision of Regulation of a uniform budget of 
CIS organs, which are financed from the budgets of member-States of the Commonwealth of Independent States], 20 
июня 2000, доступно http://e-cis.info/page.php?id=21345. 
14 Министерство Финансов Республики Беларусь, О финансовых аспектах сотрудничества в рамках 
Содружества Независимых Государств [Of Financial Aspects of Cooperation within the Framework of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States], available at 
http://www.minfin.gov.by/upload/ministerstvo/cooperation/sng.pdf. 
15 See, Informational Letter of the CIS Executive Committee stating that “the Ukrainian party in 2014 has not 
transferred to the CIS budget any financial assents – neither one hrivna, nor one ruble. At the same time last year 
representatives of Ukraine worked in the CIS Executive Committee, receiving wages at the expense of contributions 
of other CIS member-States. Therefore, claims of certain Ukrainian politicians about the allegedly costly for 
Ukraine participation in financing of CIS organs are baseless.” Available at 
http://www.cis.minsk.by/page.php?id=19175. 
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of many of its members from the beginning. Many of the goals set out in the Minsk Agreement 
and the CIS Charter were explicitly integrative, but the institutional structures meant to 
implement them were either exclusively consultative or were not empowered to impose legally 
binding decisions.”16 The last conclusion, interestingly, cannot be directly derived from the text 
of the CIS Charter because it is suspiciously silent on this matter. The question of the legal force 
of the produced documents will be discussed in detail later in the analysis. 
 
12.2 Six-Criteria Analysis 
 
12.2.1 Membership/Participation 
Articles 7 and 8 of the CIS Charter effectively created four types of CIS membership, 
which, however, is open only to States. Founding States are those that had adopted the Minsk 
agreement and the Alma-Ata protocols by the time the Charter was opened for ratification, and 
then adopted the Charter. One might think that the three Slavic nations are the founding 
members. In reality, only Armenia and Uzbekistan fully met the criteria for founding 
membership that the Charter set forth, by endorsing the Minsk agreement and the Alma-Ata 
protocols prior to ratifying the Charter.  
The second category comprises those States that share “the purposes and principles of the 
Commonwealth” and accept the obligations contained in the Charter subject to approval of all 
member States. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan ratified the Charter and the 
Alma-Ata protocols but never ratified the Minsk agreement; due to Minsk agreement’s close 
resemblance of the Charter Preamble, failure to ratify it was not considered an obstacle toward 
‘full membership’.  
The third category is the associate membership status that by far has been granted only to 
one State. Moldova has never ratified the Charter itself, but ratified the Minsk agreement and the 
Alma-Ata protocols in April 1994. At signing it also specified that it would participate in 
economic questions only, and so accepted the associate member status. The fourth category of 
membership is the observer status that has not been granted to any of the former Soviet States 
and so far has remained dormant.  
                                                        
16 M.B. Olcott, A. Åslund, S.W. Garnett, Getting it Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (1999), at 10. 
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The infighting, which turned out to be deep-rooted in the CIS framework, had also 
resulted in creation of the fifth category of membership. Three most vociferous advocates of the 
strong Commonwealth, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia comprise the group of ‘members-type-
two’. These States had not ratified the Alma-Ata protocols, which then necessitated creation of a 
new category of participating States to parallel that of member States. Recalling that the Alma-
Ata protocols incorporated the five Central Asian countries, which had not attended the meeting 
in Minsk, into the CIS as members of equal standing, the fifth group of CIS member States 
apparently rejected the notion of equality between the Slavic nations17 and the Central Asian 
countries.  
Moldova, Turkmenistan and Ukraine have never ratified the CIS Charter. Ukraine and 
Turkmenistan participate in the CIS by way of their acceptance of the Minsk agreement and the 
Alma-Ata protocols. By and large, existence of five categories of membership within an 
organization uniting twelve States18 cannot be characterized as anything other than unique. These 
nations are uniquely interconnected in their histories as parts of the Soviet Union; cultural and 
social ties are uniquely strong between these nations; their political traditions are uniquely alike; 




The CIS established a formal Executive Secretariat in September 1993, with headquarters 
in Minsk, Belarus. In 1999 the Executive Secretariat along with eleven other organs was 
reorganized into a “permanently working executive, administrative and coordinating organ – the 
Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States.”19 
The Decree on the Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
establishes the Committee’s composition, areas of work, functions, procedures and financial 
arrangements.20 The Committee is headed by the Chairman of the Executive Committee, who 
                                                        
17 Although Kazakhstan is not a Slavic nation, for the majority of its population Russian is the mother tongue, and 
until today Russian is officially used on a par with Kazakh. 
18 Following Georgia withdrawal in 2009, currently the CIS has 11 member States. 
19 Information on the Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States available at the official CIS 
website, cis.minsk.by. 
20 Decree on the Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, June 21, 2000, available at the 
CIS official website, http://www.cis.minsk.by/page.php?id=376. 
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also has the title of the Executive Secretary of the CIS. The Chairman is elected by the Council 
of Heads of States for a three-year term. In his work he is assisted by deputies, departments and 
other organs as might be necessary.21 The Chairman has very broad functions, ranging from 
management of the Committee and support of the Committee personnel, to organization of 
sessions of CIS ministerial-level organs, to coordination of activities of specialized organs in 
intensification of economic cooperation, to maintenance and development of communications 
with international organizations.22  
The Executive Committee, in the same vein, is entrusted with broad functions, including 
administrative support of the vast CIS machine, legal expertise of incoming and outgoing 
documents, communication of various types of information to CIS organs and relevant member-
States, and performance of functions of the press secretary.23 The Committee is located in Minsk, 
Belarus, and, as per explicit provisions of the Decree, is financed from the uniform budget of 
CIS organs. The Executive Committee and its personnel are enjoying functional privileges and 
immunities in order to “provide all opportunities necessary for performance of their functions,” 
presumably ensuring the international character of work.24 
It should be concluded, therefore, that the CIS Executive Committee complies with all 
three criteria of a secretariat of an international organization: it is a separate organ within the 
structure of the CIS, which is financed from its budget and is empowered to perform diverse 
functions on behalf of the CIS, ranging from purely administrative tasks to full-fledged political 
roles. Finally, functional privileges and immunities provide a legal basis for an independent 
international character of work of the secretariat. 
 
12.2.3 International Legal Personality 
“Currently the majority of experts and scholars agree that the CIS is an international 
regional organization as per Article 52 of the United Nations Charter.” 25 The ambiguity of the 
wording of the basic constituent documents, however, spurred the discussion about the status of 
                                                        
21 Id. at para. 8. 
22 Id. at para. 9. 
23 Id. at para. 6,7. 
24 Id. at para. 4. 
25 Косов Ю.В., Торопыгин А.В. Содружество Независимых Государств. Институты, интеграционные 
процессы, конфликты и парламентская дипломатия [The Commonwealth of Independent States: Institutions, 
Intergational Processes, Conflicts and Parliamentary Diplomacy]. М.: 2009. С. 44. 
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the Commonwealth, or, more precisely, whether it was a subject of international law, and if so, 
what was the scope of its legal powers.26 
Russian authors suggested that the CIS should be considered an international 
intergovernmental organization because it was created based on an international treaty, its 
activities were governed by international law, but most importantly because it was comprised of 
sovereign independent States de jure recognized by the overwhelming majority of nations.27 The 
last argument, obviously, cannot serve as sufficient evidence in favor of identifying an entity as 
an international organization. Multiple forums, conferences, informal gatherings, committees, 
councils and the like have been created or are being convened from time to time; participation in 
such meetings of independent sovereign States recognized by other nations, while is a necessary 
condition, does not on its own transform them into international intergovernmental 
organizations.  
Further, Russian international law doctrine tends to believe that the status of observer in 
international organizations belonging to the United Nations system is a firm indicator of 
international legal personality of an entity in question.28 Just as in case of the COSPAS-SARSAT 
Programme,29 however, the status of observer in the United Nations or the United Nations 
Education, Social and Cultural Organization does not ipso facto confer any particular 
international status onto the CIS.  
Ambiguous wording of the CIS Charter left the question of international legal personality 
of the CIS unresolved, despite the best efforts of Russian scholars to employ all possible 
arguments to persuade everyone of CIS’s international competence. In 1998 the CIS Executive 
Secretariat requested the CIS Economic Court to clarify whether the CIS was a subject of 
international law, and if so, what competence did it have. Leaving aside an array of acrimonious 
                                                        
26 See, e.g., Каженов А.Б., Международная правосубъектность Содружества Независимых Государств 
[International Legal Personality of the Commonwealth of Independent States] // Белорусский Журнал 
Международного Права и Международных Отношений, 2002 - №1.  
27 Косов Ю.В., Торопыгин А.В. Содружество Независимых Государств. Институты, интеграционные 
процессы, конфликты и парламентская дипломатия [The Commonwealth of Independent States: Institutions, 
Intergational Processes, Conflicts and Parliamentary Diplomacy]. М.: 2009. С. 45. 
28 Id. 
29 For an argument regarding the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme see, А.В. Лукьянова, Международно-правовые 
проблемы использования космоса в целях мореплавания [International Legal Problems of Using Outer Space 
for the Purposes of Seafaring] // Автореферат дисс. на соискание ученой степени к.ю.н. – М., 2005. For an 
argument that status of observer does not confer any international legal status see supra, para. 10.2.3. 
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remarks about a clear conflict between the mandate of the Court and the object of the inquiry,30 
about the credibility of the Economic Court’s decision on matters of international public law, and 
about international legal value of the adopted decision, the findings of this high court will be 
summarized, at the same time reminding the reader that decisions of the CIS Economic Court are 
legally non-binding.  
The Consultative Opinion explained: “If the subject of international law is defined as a 
participant in international relations possessing international rights and obligations and 
performing them based on international law, the Commonwealth has to be regarded a subject of 
international law. Moreover, international legal personality of the Commonwealth is its 
immutable characteristic, an attribute of existence. It does not require additional (official) 
recognition as such by States, including member-States, or by other international organizations. 
The Commonwealth acts as a subject of international law merely because it really exists and is 
active in international relations.”31 
The Court went on to state that the CIS had the following rights on the international 
plane: the right to participate in international relations through establishment of relations with 
States and international organizations; the right to enter into international agreements with States 
and international organizations; the right to employ international sanctions in case of violation of 
international obligations; and the right of the Commonwealth organs to adopt decisions on their 
behalf.  
In Chapter 1 it has been suggested that the right to conclude international treaties on its 
own behalf is indicative of an existent international legal personality, although taken separately it 
cannot be used as a conclusive argument. The treaty-making practice of the CIS is not extensive, 
but is not non-existent. For example, on its own behalf the CIS concluded the Agreement 
between the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Republic of Belarus about the terms 
                                                        
30 Article 32 of the CIS Charter states: “The Economic Court shall operate for the purposes of fulfilling economic 
obligations under the framework of the Commonwealth. The mandate of the Economic Court includes the resolution 
of disputes arising during the implementation of economic obligations. The Court may also resolve other disputes 
classified as within its mandate by agreements of member states. The Economic Court shall have the right to 
interpret provisions of agreements and other acts of the Commonwealth for economic issues.” 
31 The Consultative Opinion No. 01-1/2-98 of the Economic Court of the CIS of June 23, 1998, on the interpretation 
of the CIS Charter [Консультативное заключение Экономического Суда СНГ от 23 июня 1998 г. № 01-1/2-98 
о толковании Устава Содружества Независимых Государствот 22 января 1993 г. [Konsul’tativnoe 
zaklyuchenie Ekonomicheskogo Suda SNG ot 23 iyunya 1998 g. No. 01-1/2-98 o tolkovanii Ustava Sodruzhestva 
Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv ot 22 yanvarya 1993 g.]]. See also, H. Flavier, Russia’s Normative Influence over Post-
Soviet States: The Examples of Belarus and Ukraine, Russian L. J., Vol. III, Issue 1 (2005), at 19-22. 
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of stationing of the Executive Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Independent States on the 
territory of the Republic of Belarus of June 13, 1994.32 
In the end, it should be concluded that the CIS is a subject of international law and, thus, 
possesses international legal personality. It is an association of States with lawful objectives 
supported by specially created organs of the organization. In accordance with Article 2 of the 
CIS Charter, the overarching purpose of the Commonwealth is promotion of cooperation among 
its member States in various areas; hence, it is only logical to conclude that purposes of the CIS 
and its members are distinct. Finally, the CIS possesses legal powers exercisable on the 
international plane, for example, the right to conclude international agreements, the right to adopt 
decisions on the collective use of armed forces as per provisions of Article 12 of the Charter, the 
right to recommend an appropriate procedure for resolution of a dispute, the continuation of 
which might threaten the maintenance of peace or security in the Commonwealth as per 
provisions of Article 18 of the Charter, and some others. 
 
12.2.4 Term of Existence 
The CIS Charter is silent on this matter; neither does it specify the procedure for 
withdrawal from the Commonwealth or its dissolution. The broad, almost all-encompassing 
sphere of cooperation envisioned by the CIS Charter is suggestive of an unlimited term of 
existence. The Charter, furthermore, does not anywhere suggest that the CIS has been primarily 
created to facilitate divorce of the former Soviet republics. Thus, only long-term goals are legally 
a part of the CIS framework, providing additional evidence in favor of the conclusion of the 
envisioned indefinite term of CIS existence.  
 
12.2.5 Binding Force of Documents Produced 
As it has been noted above, the CIS Charter does not explicitly address the question of 
legal force of the documents produced within the CIS framework. At the same time, the Charter 
uses the verb ‘shall’ in every provision outlining cooperative activities to be undertaken by 
member States. This, however, is not at all indicative of the intentions of the draftsmen. The 
Charter was drafted in Russian, and both verbs ‘shall’ and ‘should’ correspond to one verb 
                                                        
32 Full text available on the official website of the Executive Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, http://cis.minsk.by. 
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‘dolzhen’ in Russian. In Russian legal doctrine usage of this verb itself is not considered an 
indicator of a legal force of the document, and is traditionally used in all legal documents 
regardless of their legal force.  
Based on the contextual reading of the CIS Charter, it is suggested that the CIS organs 
are not empowered to adopt legally binding decisions. Article 34 “Organs of Specialized 
Cooperation” establishes the procedure for establishment of specialized organs – the Inter-State 
Outer Space Council is one such organ – and stipulates that the organs within their competence 
are entitled to “adopt recommendations, and if necessary might also make proposals for the 
Council of Heads of States consideration.” Thereby, the logical conclusion is that organs of 
specialized cooperation are not authorized to adopt any legally binding documents.  
Next, the ministerial-level organs of the CIS should be addressed. The Charter explicitly 
empowers only the Council of Heads of States and the Council of Heads of Governments to 
adopt decisions using the consensus voting procedure, leaving determination of working 
procedure of other organs to be decided by the Council of Heads of States.33 Separate articles are 
dedicated to setting forth the procedure of chairmanship rotation, the right to invite experts to 
relevant sessions, the right to create permanent and temporary working groups, but noting is said 
about the legal force of the Councils’ decisions.  
In order to resolve the ambiguity, the analysis is moved one level higher to reviewing the 
goals and spheres of cooperation within the CIS structure. Article 20 describes legal cooperation 
as follows: “Member-States perform cooperation in the area of law, in particular, by way of 
concluding multilateral and bilateral agreements on legal assistance and by way of facilitating 
convergence of national laws.” If legal cooperation within the CIS framework does not 
presuppose adoption of legally binding decisions within the CIS, nor does it direct legally 
binding cooperation outside the CIS, it is logical to conclude that cooperation premised on 
legally binding documents, except for the Charter itself, is not a feature of the CIS. 
Statistically, no more than ten percent of the signed agreements and substantive decisions 
of the CIS organs have been implemented.34 These statistics are suggestive of the political value 
                                                        
33 In practice, all CIS organs formally work using the consensus voting procedure. 
34 Cf., R. Sakwa, “Senseless Dreams and Small Steps: The CIS and CSTO between Integration and Cooperation,” in 
M.R. Freire and R.E. Kanet (eds.), Key Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia: The Return of the ‘Great Game’ 
(2010), at 199. 
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attached to CIS decisions, or at least of the political value that the CIS members attach to the 
relevant decisions. 
 
12.2.6 Existence of Opportunity to Modify Obligations 
Decisions in the CIS organs are to be adopted by consensus, but at the same time Article 
23 of the Charter establishes the right of any State to “declare its non-interest in a given question, 
which must not be considered to be a hindrance for the adoption of a decision.” It has been 
accurately concluded that “nothing in the CIS Charter encourages consensus; in addition to 
signing a given agreement, members also have the options of abstention, of signing with 
reservations, or of refusing to sign. Instead of encouraging members to seek compromises or to 
modify their positions, this procedure allows all of the contradictory stances on a given question 
to be brought to the conference table.”35 
Essentially, States preserve an unlimited right to modify any and all adopted decisions. 
Taking into consideration that presumably CIS organs are empowered to adopt only legally non-
binding recommendations, which in practice do not contain clearly formulated recommended 
actions and do not bear significant political value, the right to modify obligations is rarely used.  
Article 42 of the CIS Charter sets forth the procedure for the Charter amendment. 
Amendments may be introduced by any member and have to be considered and adopted by the 
Council of Heads of States. The amendments enter into force upon the receipt by the 
Government of Belarus of ratification notifications from all members. This procedure resembles 
the one employed in the European Space Agency: the hierarchically highest organ has to approve 
the amendment, but the amendment’s entry into force is subjected to its unanimous acceptance 
by member-States in accordance with their national procedures.  
The goal of unanimity and the ratification requirement in the amendment procedure are 
aimed at ensuring that all members of the organization are bound by the same set of legal 
obligations. The more puzzling then is the provision of Article 43 of the CIS Charter allowing 
reservations to certain parts and articles of the Charter. The reservations are permitted to 
provisions regulating military and political cooperation, procedures for conflicts prevention and 
resolution, inter-parliamentary cooperation and to articles establishing several major CIS organs, 
                                                        
35 M.B. Olcott, A. Åslund, S.W. Garnett, Getting it Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (1999), at 11. 
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including the Economic Court and the Human Rights Commission. In effect, the reservations are 
permitted in almost all areas of cooperation, from economic to military. It is notable that the 
reservations are not limited by their content: Article 43 does not limit the reservations to such 
that ‘are compatible with the object and purpose of cooperation’. Therefore, any member is free 
to refrain from cooperation in any of the enumerated areas. That is the type of reservation filed 
by Moldova: it notified that it would refrain from political and military cooperation. Belarus is 
the second State that filed reservations; but its reservations are of not such a sweeping nature and 
rather amount to the declarations of how certain terms are understood and would be treated. 
Overall, Articles 42 and 43 are exemplary of the inconsistencies the CIS is based upon. 
On the one hand, the Charter strives to preserve uniformity of obligations requiring ratification 
of any amendment by all members, and on the other, allows for sweeping reservations that might 
thwart cooperation in areas of major importance.  
 
12.3 Evaluation and Conclusions 
 
The six-criteria analysis unequivocally puts the CIS into the international organizations 
category. It is an organization with membership open solely to States, possessing international 
legal personality, created for an indefinite period of time that boasts an extensive institutional 
structure, including an international organization’s secretariat, but not authorized to adopt legally 
binding decisions. 
 
12.3.1 CIS: A Regional Organization? 
It has been earlier noted that Russian scholars consider the CIS an international regional 
organization. This characterization was often used, especially in public discussions, to compare 
the CIS and the European Union. Following the adoption of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty such 
comparisons were dropped, but the perception of the CIS as a regional organization persists. In 
the previous chapter in the course of the analysis of the European Space Agency, it has been 
suggested that regionalism is a complex concept that, if properly used, might prove an important 
factor in promotion of cooperation. Moreover, it has been suggested that the European 
regionalism, characterized by a unique level of integration as well as geographical, cultural and 
historical closeness, has been one of the prominent factors in the European Space Agency’s 
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success. The bottom line is that regional cooperation is significantly different from multilateral 
cooperation because it opens an opportunity for cooperation premised on features that can be 
found exclusively within the region in question; and hence the question of how the region is 
defined also becomes of paramount importance. 
Therefore, it is necessary to decide whether the CIS is indeed a regional international 
organization. Generally, it would allow hinting at problematic points of the CIS membership 
structure that have led to an overall lower level of cooperation and partnership between its 
members. More broadly, a parallel to the European Union can be drawn, but exclusively on the 
most abstract level, since there can be no doubt that the CIS cannot match the European Union in 
the level of integration. In the context of the international space law analysis, evaluation of the 
CIS regionalism would allow identifying whether the regionalism-based features are present 
within the CIS structure of cooperation, whether they may be used to enhance and deepen 
cooperation, and whether benefits enjoyed by ESA as a result of successful approach to 
regionalism may be mirrored by the CIS. 
Russian scholars accept characterization of the CIS as a regional organization without 
reservations: “There are no doubts about the regional character of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States from the purely geographical point of view: out of twelve member States of 
the Commonwealth seven belong to the European part of the continent, and five to the Asian 
part, while the bigger part of the largest CIS State – the Russian Federation – is situated in Asia. 
Nevertheless, taking into consideration historical traditions and the fact that in the recent past all 
CIS States were a part of a unified geopolitical entity with its center in Moscow, which 
undoubtedly must be considered one of European capitals, and also taking into consideration 
decisions adopted in this regard by the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe and 
the settled practice of designating States to regions in universal international organizations, the 
Commonwealth of Independent States can be viewed as a European regional intergovernmental 
organization.”36  
The cited view leads to two observations. First, it is unclear how an organization 
comprised of States both from Europe and Asia can be designated to a single region from a 
‘purely’ geographical perspective. Second, an organization comprised of States from different 
                                                        
36 Косов Ю.В., Торопыгин А.В. Содружество Независимых Государств. Институты, интеграционные 
процессы, конфликты и парламентская дипломатия [The Commonwealth of Independent States: Institutions, 
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geographical regions can hardly be characterized as a European one just because territories of all 
these now-independent States used to be governed from a city located in the European part of the 
country, which, as it was rightfully noted, has its largest part situated in Asia.  
At the same time, regionalism is not only about geographical proximity. Russet’s 
comprehensive study of the phenomenon suggests several prerequisites for successful regional 
integration: a degree of cultural similarity or at least compatibility for the major politically 
relevant values, economic interdependence, and the existence of formal institutions with 
substantial ‘consensus-building effects’ alongside a geographical proximity.37 Another author 
has explained that territory is not necessarily the best unifying factor for performance of 
individual tasks, “but rather it reflects a compromise: it is that single space which has been 
judged suitable for the attainment of a range of tasks, and it may be more or less appropriate for 
any one of them. In some sense, therefore, there is a general competence within the region as a 
whole. This means that regionalism is seen as being necessarily multidimensional.”38 Thereby, 
geographical proximity is not the cornerstone of a successful regionalism, rather a beneficial 
addition to a union, where member States are largely identical, or at least compatible in cultural, 
economic and political respects.  
The purely geographical approach to regionalism in international legal relations should, 
thereby, be rejected. The better question as applied to the CIS is: “To what degree do the former 
Soviet states comprise a recognizable region, and therefore can a single regional order apply to 
them?”39 So the question is whether the CIS States consider themselves close enough to 
acquiesce to a uniform intra-region legal order and its worldwide perception as a substantially 
homogenous unit with common values and goals. The answer to this question depends heavily 
on the type of cooperation pursued within the region. As explained above, regionalism is 
multidimensional, meaning that a particular choice of a region might work well enough for one 
set of purposes and be inadequate for another. In case of the CIS, where as per provisions of the 
CIS Charter members should strive to cooperate in virtually all areas of international relations, 
but most importantly in economic and military areas, which require an in-depth cooperation, the 
                                                        
37 B.M. Russet, International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology (1967), at 10, cited 
in T.V. Paul (ed.), International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation (2012), at 184. 
38 P. Taylor, International Organization in the Modern World (1993), at 7. 
39 R. Sakwa, “Senseless Dreams and Small Steps: The CIS and CSTO between Integration and Cooperation,” in 
M.R. Freire and R.E. Kanet (eds.), Key Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia: The Return of the ‘Great Game’ 
(2010), at 213. 
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answer should be in the negative. And here lies the reason behind the mediocre CIS performance 
as a cooperative and integrative entity.  
The road to the unsatisfactory level of cooperation was laid down by the wrangling over 
the CIS Charter. Although all of the Soviet successor States except the three Baltic nations 
eventually joined the organization, “most members have opted out of one or more of the key 
political, economic, and security agreements that were intended to be the main instruments of 
integration. The heads of the CIS states have all met regularly, but the agreements drawn up at 
their meetings have had no real force; indeed, the only reason that such sessions continue to be 
held seems to be that most of the leaders find some other utility in regular summit meetings.”40 
Another author has correctly noted that “the pursuit of integration in the post-Soviet 
Eurasia concerns institutions, but it is also about ideas: the vision that the region at some level 
remains some sort of political community. While the dream of unity remains an active project, 
the object remains as elusive as ever. Initiative is piled upon declaration, yet there appears to be 
little substantive progress.”41 The ideas have always been the centerpiece element in any more or 
less sizable undertaking in the former Soviet nations simply because the whole Soviet Union was 
based on one immaterial but very powerful premise – ideology. But when the idea lacks 
overwhelming obtrusiveness it loses its immense power; and that is where the differences stand 
out. Obviously, the idea of a new union right after dissolution of the other did not possess the 
storm-like power of communist values.  
There are, of course, objective reasons that preclude characterizing the CIS States as a 
union governed by a single regional order. Mark Webber argued that the absence of 
federalization within the CIS derived from inter-state competition, under-institutionalization and 
a weakness of unifying values, alongside incongruities arising from national elite perceptions, 
state viability, regime type and levels of economic convergence.42 The main reason, of course, 
lies in the sphere of economy: while Russia, despite all its economic hurdles, remains the most 
prosperous member of the CIS, a majority of the Central Asian republics’ citizens live below the 
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poverty line, and the more or less solid economies of Belarus and Ukraine remain unstable and 
often require outside help.43 In such a situation, one should have a very creative imagination to 
envision an equitable union of States premised on the notion of partnership. “The combination of 
passive resistance by most member states and enthusiasm without resources by others has 
prevented the CIS from developing into an effective organization. In fact, Russia’s continued 
determination to make the CIS work is the only thing that has kept the organization from dying 
entirely.”44 
Against this background, it is argued that the CIS is an international intergovernmental 
organization with a limited membership, not a regional organization. It was created to achieve a 
very concrete result, and “without question its pacific mediation of the breakup of the USSR was 
the greatest service that the CIS could have performed.”45 The fact that neither the Russian 
doctrine, nor Western scholars have arrived at a uniform view on whether the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union was a breakup of a single country or that of an empire, signifies the fact that 
internal ties among the former Soviet republics are being questioned on many levels. Nowadays, 
twenty-five years after the Soviet Union’s dismemberment, strong ties between the formerly 
united nations seem to be an anecdote from the long gone days. In the words of the former 
president of Ukraine, the CIS at the outset was created to facilitate the divorce of the newly 
independent States.46 Hence, having been created with one particular task in mind, and having all 
other goals as residual to the overarching one, it could not have been premised on any other 
criterion than being a part of the former Soviet Union; the geographic or any other regionalism 
had nothing to do with the choice of States allowed for participation in the Commonwealth. In 
the concluding part of the chapter it will be discussed whether an organization with a 
membership limited by non-space-related factors might be at all an effective mechanism of 
international cooperation in exploration and use of outer space. 
By the beginning of the new century, with resignation of the Russian president Eltsin, a 
vociferous CIS supporter, the Commonwealth lost that little influence it used to have. One 
scholar eloquently summarized the popular CIS perception: “News stories coming out of the CIS 
                                                        
43 Cf., Михайленко А.Н. СНГ: Быть или не быть? [CIS: To Be or Not to Be?]. М., 2007. С. 35-39. 
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46 See, Косов Ю.В., Торопыгин А.В. Содружество Независимых Государств. Институты, интеграционные 
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these days sound like reports from the frontline: Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan are 
lost; Adzharia has fallen; Transdniestria is under siege. … This is a less menacing continuation 
of the Cold War that was waged by the West and the Soviet Union for almost half a century, and 
now entails a smaller space and a different alignment of forces. Obviously the struggle between 
Russia and the West for Ukraine and Belarus is a direct extension of the struggle between the 
Soviet Union and the West for Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.”47  
In 2007 the Council of the Heads of States adopted the Strategy of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States Development in an attempt to revive the fading cooperation. The Strategy 
opens with a proclamation that the CIS is a regional intergovernmental organization, a form of 
cooperation of equal independent States in almost all areas of intergovernmental relations. It 
goes on to acknowledge that participation of certain CIS members is limited to specific areas, 
while suggesting that multi-level and multi-format cooperation necessitated by the different 
levels of States’ participation enhances the overall level of cooperation allowing to take into 
consideration specifics of each CIS member State.  
The Strategy enumerates objectives that will allow achieving a greater level of 
interconnectedness and will overall help developing the organization. It is worth listing them all: 
promotion of socio-economic stability and international security; strengthening of good-neighbor 
relations among member States; increase of States’ competitiveness and ensuring their inclusion 
in the world-wide market in order to achieve progress and prosperity; achievement of the 
maximized effectiveness in solving common problems caused by globalization; enhancement of 
the level of life and wealth of citizens of member States; facilitation of accession of each 
member State to the World Trade Organization; prevention of traditional and new threats; 
development of cooperation in the humanitarian sphere; realization of the main international 
principles and standards in the areas of democracy and human rights; further convergence of 
national laws of member States in different areas of cooperation based on the general principles 
and norms of international law; and provision of an effective dialogue on all levels in order to 
implement the above enumerated goals and prepare the Commonwealth for new stages of 
enhanced cooperation.  
One cannot fail to notice that only three goals actually touch upon issues concerning the 
organization and its development as a separate entity; the majority of these goals focus on 
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changes that have to take place on national levels. While without a doubt prosperity of members 
of an organization directly affects success of the organization, the international organization, 
after all, is a separate subject and it has its own ‘laws of physics’. It is suggested that an 
international organization can shift the focus from its own development to that of its member 
States in one of the two cases: it is either a highly de-formalized organization that effectively 
resembles a confederation, or it has become an organization with supranational authority. Since 
the CIS cannot neither legally, as per provisions of Article 1 of the CIS Charter, nor practically 
be rendered the latter, the former description is apparently the correct one.   
 
12.3.2 CIS Space Cooperation 
Despite the challenges the CIS was facing in promoting integration and cooperation in 
areas of economic development and security, outer space cooperation has always been the one 
area where cooperation was necessary for objective reasons. The formerly united Soviet space 
complex now was scattered along the territories of Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. The Inter-
State Outer Space Council was created on December 30, 1991 pursuant to the Agreement 
between the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States about Cooperation in 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space.48  
The Agreement in Article 1 states that cooperation in outer space should be based on 
Inter-State Programs. The Inter-State Programs, in accordance with Article 4 of the Agreement, 
are created based on agreements between member States on “utilization of existing and newly 
created space complexes and objects of space infrastructure,” which include two launch facilities 
Baikonur and Plesetsk, the Center for cosmonauts training, space flights centers, research centers 
and some other objects, all of which are located on the territories of the three States.  
The Agreement targets only cooperation in performance of space applications projects, 
but is silent regarding matters of ‘down-to-Earth’ space cooperation, particularly in areas of 
space research, technology and education. Articles 8 through 10 levy obligations in these areas 
onto cooperating States obligating them to “preserve and develop existing scientific, technical 
and manufacturing potential in design, creation, testing and processing of rocket-space 
technology.” Hence, potential cooperating States have one of two options in terms of technology: 
either to use the already existing equipment, which is only few years away from becoming 
                                                        
48 The full text of the Agreement is available at the CIS official website, http://www.e-cis.info/index.php?id=182. 
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obsolete, or to develop and manufacture necessary equipment ‘from scratch’, and, most 
importantly, outside the cooperative framework.  
The Inter-State Outer Space Council, in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the 
Agreement, has only a coordination role in implementation of the Inter-State Programs. The 
Protocol appended to the Agreement, establishing the Inter-State Outer Space Council structure, 
clearly stipulates that the Council has only consultative functions and is only mandated to make 
recommendations to the representatives of the CIS members.   
The possibility of inter-State cooperation only through the Inter-State Programs that are 
to be agreed upon by way of unspecified agreements between participating States, most likely 
bilateral agreements, limited in areas of cooperation, and coupled with a limited mandate of the 
Council allow the suggestion that the Agreement was never intended to become a solid basis for 
multilateral space cooperation of all CIS States. In other words, the Agreement encourages 
bilateral relations to be the basis for cooperation, not the multilateral coordination using the CIS 
mechanisms. Bilateral cooperation has been indeed the basis for space cooperation over the past 
twenty-five years. The main asset located on the territory of Kazakhstan is the Cosmodrome 
Baykonur, and terms of cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan regarding this launching 
facility were established by a set of bilateral agreements, the latest of 2009 introducing 
amendments to the Lease Agreement of the Baykonur Complex between the Government of the 
Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan of December 10, 1994.49  
Manufacturing of engines for the launch vehicles is now conducted on the territory of 
Ukraine. It comes as no surprise that space launch vehicles’ engines are classified as sensitive 
technology, and therefore are subject to heightened scrutiny when crossing State borders. To 
facilitate transportation of the engines, Russia and Ukraine concluded the bilateral Agreement on 
Movement of Goods within the Framework of Cooperation in Exploitation of Outer Space and 
Construction and Operation of Rocket-Space and Rocket Technology.50 At the same time, the 
                                                        
49 Федеральный закон от 28 апреля 2009 года N 64-ФЗ О ратификации Протокола между Правительством 
Российской Федерации и Правительством Республики Казахстан о внесении изменения в Договор аренды 
комплекса "Байконур" между Правительством Российской Федерации и Правительством Республики 
Казахстан от 10 декабря 1994 года [Federalniy Zakon ot 28 Aprelya 2009 goda N 64-FZ O Ratificazii Protocola 
mejhdu Pravitelstvom Rossiyskoi Federazii i Pravitelstvom Respubliki Kazakhstan o Vnesenii Izmeneniy v Dogovor 
Arendi Kompleksa “Baykonur” mezhdu Pravitelstvom Rossiyskoi Federazii i Pravitelstvom Respubliki Kazakhstan 
ot 10 Decabrya 1994 goda], text of this Federal Law has not been officially published. Full text is available at the 
Russian Space Agency official website http://www.federalspace.ru/2368/. 
50 Федеральный закон от 28 июня 2002 года N 74-ФЗ О ратификации Соглашения между Правительством 
Российской Федерации и Кабинетом Министров Украины о перемещении товаров в рамках сотрудничества 
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Agreement on the Terms of Maintenance and Operation of Objects of Space Infrastructure for 
the Benefit of Development of Space Programs of May 15, 1992 concluded within the CIS 
framework51 provides that coordination of utilization of space infrastructure for both 
intergovernmental and national programs in exploration and use of outer space shall be 
conducted through the Inter-State Outer Space Council.  
It has been noted that parts of the formerly united space complex, which are now split up 
between the three States, have uniform technological standards that are different from the 
European and American technological standards, making proper coordination absolutely 
essential: launch of Russian and Ukrainian space vehicles is impossible from European and 
American launch facilities, and vice versa.52 Initially, the Inter-State Outer Space Council was 
envisioned as an organ allowing Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine to coordinate their national 
space programs through open dialogue; it was also seen as a basis for continuous cooperation of 
national space industries in maintenance and utilization of a united space complex. Nevertheless, 
due to almost prohibitive governmental control over space industry and traditional wariness of 
allowing the private sector in space activities,53 all three States have been reluctant to coordinate 
their space programs on a multilateral level within the CIS. For example, the Decision of the 
Council of Heads of States on Optimization of Organs of Sector Cooperation of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States of November 14, 2008 noted that the Inter-State Outer 
Space Council had not been convened since the late 1990s.54 
In 2011 an effort was made to revive multilateral space cooperation between member 
States of the CIS. Under aegis of the Russian Government an international conference themed 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
в освоении космического пространства и создании и эксплуатации ракетно-космической и ракетной техники 
[Federalniy Zakon on 28 iynuya 2002 goda N 74-FZ O Ratifikazii Soglasheniya mezhdu Pravitelstvom Rossiyskoi 
Federazii I Kabinetom Ministrov Urkaini o Peremeschenii Tovarov v Ramkah Sotrudnichestva v Osvoenii 
Kosmicheskogo Prostranstva i Sozdanii I Ekspluatazii Raketno-Kosmicheskoi i Raketnoi Tekhniki], text of this 
Federal Law has not been officially published. Full text is available at the Russian Space Agency official website 
http://www.federalspace.ru/2369/. 
51 Соглашение о порядке содержания и использования объектов космической инфраструктуры в интересах 
выполнения космических программ [Soglashenie o Poryadke Soderzhaniya i Ispolzovaniya Ob’ektov 
Kosmicheskoi Infrastrukturi v Interesah Vipolneniya Kosmicheskih Programm]. Full text is available the CIS 
official website http://cis.minsk.by/reestr/ru/index.html#reestr/view/text?doc=168. 
52 See, Молдабеков Е.М., Винокуров Е.Г. Перспективы сотрудничества стран СНГ в космической отрасли 
[Perspectives of Cooperation of the CIS States in Space Area]. Отраслевой обзор ЕАБР №8, 2010. С. 37. 
53 Id.  
54 Решение об оптимизации деятельности органов отраслевого сотрудничества Содружества Независимых 
Государств [Reshenie ob Optimizazii Deyatelnosti Organov Otraslevogo Sotrudnichestva Sodruzhestva 
Nezavisimih Gosudarstv]. Full text is available on the official CIS website http://www.e-
cis.info/page.php?id=20827. 
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“Space Research in the CIS member States: integration, potential development and legal aspects” 
was held in Moscow. It was attended by high-ranking Russian officials, and the Chairman of the 
second chamber of the Russian Parliament made a statement emphasizing the need to promote 
and strengthen multilateral cooperation within the CIS region. The conference’s concluding act 
contained four recommendations: to promote effective governmental policies in supporting space 
researches; to take steps toward deepening of integration in space activities; to provide for 
separate national funding of fundamental space researches; and to prepare recommendations on 
development of international legal documents regulating different aspects of outer space 
exploration and use. Finally, the conference requested national science academies to consider 
creation of an international scientific organization “The United Institute of Space Research”.55  
Sessions of the Inter-State Outer Space Council in 2012, 2013 and 2014 did not, 
however, reveal any substantive changes in the format or the nature of cooperation. All sessions 
lasted no more than two days and were concluded with documents filled with phrases that 
something ‘was considered’, ‘taken into account’, ‘reviewed’ and the like. The idea of “The 
United Institute of Space Research” is moving slowly, and during the last session of the Inter-
State Outer Space Council held on October 23 and 24, 2014 the amended draft of the Agreement 
on the Creation of an International Scientific Organization “The United Institute of Space 
Research” was presented to the delegates. A decision was made that the drafters of the 
Agreement – the Russian Academy of Sciences – present the draft to the CIS Executive 
Committee “for consideration in accordance with the rules of procedure.”56 As always, during 
the session the parties proclaimed that an in-depth coordination and unification of efforts of 
States in outer space sphere was necessary. The events of 2014, however, and particularly 
Russian annexation of Crimea and the ongoing armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, shattered the 
chances of successful multilateral cooperation of the CIS States in outer space activities.  
In the end, cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space has been effectively 
absent from the CIS framework despite the objective need for such cooperation and already 
existing institutional structure. A Russian scholar acknowledging the primary role of bilateral 
cooperation between the former Soviet States in outer space activities noted that effective 
                                                        
55 Final Resolution of the International Scientific Conference “Space Research in the CIS member States: 
integration, potential development and legal aspects,” October 4, 2011. Full texts of all conference documents are 
available on the Federal Council of the Russian Federation http://council.gov.ru/activity/analytics/publications/574. 
56 Reports of the Inter-State Outer Space Council 2010-2014 sessions are available at the CIS official website, 
http://www.e-cis.info/index.php?id=312. 
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multilateral cooperation would not have been possible without bilateral cooperation.57 That 
might well be true, but unfortunately, until now no multilateral cooperation of the CIS States in 
exploration and use of outer space has taken place, let alone been effective.  
 
12.3.3 Results and Perspectives 
Overall, it has been suggested that “the CIS has not become an attractive proposition for 
its members, and even Russia has feared being constrained by its multilateral obligations.”58 
Keeping in mind that Russia was the most active, passionate supporter of the CIS, one cannot fail 
but notice that the CIS’s nonfulfillment explanation suffers from a circular reasoning fallacy. On 
the one hand, the CIS has not become attractive to its members because it is essentially toothless 
and not able to provide something the weaker States have been longing for, namely security and 
support. On the other, Russia, fearing for its own independence, particularly in determining its 
foreign policy objectives, but at the same time striving to unite and to some extent subordinate 
other CIS States, has chosen the path of economic bilateral pressure instead of working on a 
multilateral level through CIS cooperative mechanisms. Hence, a lack of uniform regional order 
has led other CIS members to realize that they can only expect to obtain Russia’s support and 
protection through individual negotiation, and not by using the CIS mechanism. And so they 
move in a perfect circle.  
Undoubtedly, by now the CIS States do not exclusively rely on Russia; the geopolitical 
situation has changed dramatically; but the detachment of the CIS members further away from 
each other initially was spurred, essentially, by Russia’s indecisiveness in choosing its foreign 
policy objectives. “Indeed, soon after his inauguration on 7 May 2008 Dmitry Medvedev stated 
that strengthening Russia’s ties with other former Soviet republics would be the priority for his 
presidency, and his first foreign visit as president was to Kazakhstan. This was in contrast with 
Vladimir Putin, who began his presidency by stressing the importance of ties with the EU.”59 
Now it is long too late to re-think and re-orient.  
                                                        
57 See, Моисеев Е.Г. Международно-правовые основы сотрудничества стран СНГ [International Legal Basis 
for Cooperation of CIS States]. М., 1997. С.9. 
58 R. Sakwa, “Senseless Dreams and Small Steps: The CIS and CSTO between Integration and Cooperation,” in 
M.R. Freire and R.E. Kanet (eds.), Key Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia: The Return of the ‘Great Game’ 
(2010), at 203. 
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Russian scholars, by contrast, pronounced: “By now the Commonwealth has become an 
integral element of the Eurasian political system, a reality that exists despite one or the other 
subjective attitude toward it. The CIS provides institutional, organizational and to some degree 
legal commonality of the majority of States in the post-Soviet region.”60 An opinion has been 
expressed that the CIS “remains under-institutionalized, and thus ineffective; although there is 
little evidence to suggest that greater institutionalization would render the organization more 
viable.”61  It is suggested that the CIS is institutionalized enough, and indeed further growth of 
the already large institutional machine of the CIS would not add any value to the organization’s 
effectiveness; what it is lacking is proper management.  
The CIS has a total of eighty-four organs, each with its own peculiar mandate and zone of 
responsibility; it is a number that will make some universal international organizations jealous. 
But, just as it has been shown in the case of the Inter-State Outer Space Council, some of them 
have not been convened for decades. The staff continues to be employed, salaries continue to be 
paid, and procedural documents continue to be adopted. In such a situation, when resources are 
being spent literally for nothing, and States do not feel any need or pressure to attend the 
meetings, the right thing to do would have been termination of non-working organs. That would 
achieve the main goal, freeing up time and attention of States representatives to focus on the 
questions that they feel the need to focus on. Over-bureaucratization leads to ‘routinization’ of 
meetings that in the end seem to become a never-ending line of meaningless reports, 
interventions and notes. Apparently, that is what has happened to the CIS. It took up more tasks 
than the member States were willing, or maybe simply capable, of meaningfully dealing with. 
Participation in eighty-four organs requires a whole platoon of diplomats, an unaffordable luxury 
for States that have never before had any inter-State relations, have never had a ministry of 
foreign affairs or any diplomats. In the end, the CIS diffused its attention across too many topics; 
it took Europe almost half a century to achieve the level of cooperation allowing the European 
Union to involve itself in questions of economy, social and cultural policies, security and 
development; the CIS attempted to do it essentially overnight.  
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Some fifteen years ago a scholar opined: “The CIS was most effective at its birth; it has 
steadily declined in effectiveness ever since. This suggests that it will probably prove to be a 
transitory phenomenon, which will either disappear or be radically restructured well before the 
last ties that held the Soviet states together are dissolved.”62 Several initiatives of the last decade 
ventured to add momentum to cooperation have been fruitless in most areas of cooperation. The 
Customs Union seemed to be a promising exception, but with Russia’s turn toward aggressive 
foreign policy even its most faithful ally Belarus has begun distancing itself from Russia,63 
thereby marking the demise of the Customs Union. Space cooperation, however, has not been 
damaged in the course of the recent events. As it has been explained above, multilateral space 
cooperation in the CIS has never been born; bilateral case-by-case cooperation has completely 
filled in the gap. Although geopolitical events might have a negative effect on bilateral 
cooperation, it would be a result of political, not legal changes. It has to be admitted that the CIS 
has not become a mechanism for multilateral space cooperation, and nowadays there is not a 
single indication, either from a legal or political perspective, that the situation might turn around. 
“The demise of the CIS has long been predicted, but it appeared finally to have arrived 
with the Russo-Georgian war of August 2008 and Georgia’s decision that it would leave the 
organization. The procedure was activated, and a year later Georgia left the grouping, reducing 
membership to eleven states.”64 From a legal perspective, withdrawal of one member has not 
altered the institutional structure of the organization, or jeopardized its activities, or had a 
degrading effect on the effectiveness of its decisions. But it had a degrading effect on a political 
level. Fear of Russia had always been a factor dissuading smaller States from deeper integration 
within the CIS, and Russia’s actions during the Russo-Georgian war, which led to resolution of 
the internal Georgian conflict in the most conclusive way possible,65 only further strengthened 
and added credibility to this fear. A legally stable international organization was deprived of its 
political foundation. 
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“The failure of the CIS to become an effective body has left many of the issues that the 
group attempted to address unresolved. To the extent that it allows the leaders and senior 
officials of the member states to meet on a regular basis in a controlled environment, the CIS has 
been the effective political forum. Judged by the policies it has actually been able to put into 
place, however, the CIS has been a political failure.”66 Indeed, it has been a legal failure too.  
If one agrees that the primary purpose of the CIS was to facilitate the divorce of the 
former Soviet nations, the CIS still has not been able to deal with all questions that arose the 
moment the Soviet Union ceased to exist. To name a few, the absence of a coordinated monetary 
policy led to hyperinflation in most States causing devastating financial crises throughout the 
region; the inability to compromise prevented States from settling allocation of the Soviet debt 
eventually worsening the Russian economic crisis of 1998 that affected all neighboring States; 
self-centered and cunning migration policies primarily in Russia and Ukraine led to tremendous 
flows of intra-region migration causing social and legal problems up until now; and, of course, a 
complete absence of coordination in questions of security immediately ignited vicious armed 
conflicts, particularly the one between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorny Karabakh 
region. There are objective as well as personal reasons behind these failures that has been 
extensively analyzed in historical and political scholarly works.  
From the perspective of the present analysis it should be decided whether the mechanism 
of cooperation created within the CIS is a viable option for cooperation in the exploration and 
use of outer space. First, the CIS is a traditional international organization, uniting sovereign 
States, possessing an international organization’s secretariat and international legal personality, 
created for an indefinite period and empowered to adopt legally non-binding decisions. Second, 
the CIS is not a regional organization in the modern sense because it unites States not based on 
the geographical proximity and economic, political and social closeness, but based on their 
former inclusion in one State. The CIS has never been an ‘open’ international organization, 
allowing as its members only States that have a certain historical background. The organization 
is not based on commonality of anything else but the past, making the structure inherently 
unstable: while the past always remains the same, States move on, change and evolve, thus 
making their common past more and more irrelevant with every passing year. In turn, such an 
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organization can remain viable only subject to continuous cooperation of its members based on 
their immediate needs. In this sense, analogy to the Commonwealth of Nations is relevant: 
Cameroon and Canada are members of the Commonwealth of Nations, but no one expects them 
to be the closest allies and cooperate on a broad range of questions. 
Third, by way of extension, membership in the CIS is not subjected to an impartial, 
objective set of requirements. Most other international organizations have a more or less 
formalized set of prerequisites for admittance to membership that in principle can be met by any 
State. Even international organizations allowing admittance only of States within a particular 
geographical region have a set of membership prerequisites that should be met by those States 
within the region; in other words, not every single State within a region is automatically admitted 
in the organization, but only when necessary requirements are met. The European Space Agency 
is a good example of a regional organization that has not admitted all countries in the region at 
once, but stipulated certain conditions and has been expanding over the past forty years at a 
steady pace. In the CIS, by contrast, all former Soviet Union republics, except for the Baltic 
States that declared that they had never been a part of the Soviet Union and so would not 
participate in the CIS, were invited in the CIS; at the same time, there is no set of requirements 
that any other State might possibly fulfill to get admitted to the Commonwealth. Neither peace-
loving intentions, nor willingness to cooperate with all members of the CIS might grant such a 
hypothetical State keys to the Commonwealth’s front door. And this fact dramatically changes 
the climate of CIS cooperation. 
Fourth, the CIS had only one clear goal – to assist newly independent States in the 
transition from the status of a Soviet republic to the status of a sovereign State. Other goals as 
stated in the CIS Charter are declaratory at best, and, at least at the time of drafting, had no 
particular context or meaning. In the absence of independent economies it is pointless to declare 
the need for economic cooperation. Industries, roads, system of education, social services, legal 
system, military – all were united, each was a single system that now had to operate as fifteen 
separate ones. It is hard to see how these States might have cooperated in providing peace and 
security when military officers could not even understand who was their new commander, which 
State they served, whose citizens they protected.67 Consequently, the CIS Charter declared 
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cooperation in all possible areas of inter-State cooperation without any practical basis for its 
implementation, leaving the CIS institutional mechanism almost hanging in the air.  
This work is premised on an understanding of a distinctive nature of outer space activities 
and consequently on an understanding of a distinctive nature of international legal cooperation in 
outer space. The European Union, an organization with supranational authority primarily in 
economic area, has not been actively included in regulation and coordination of outer space 
activities. Only in the recent years has it moved toward greater involvement in space area, but 
again to a limited extent. If one wishes to compare the CIS and the European Union, it should be 
agreed that not everything can be regulated on an international level, at least not everything at 
once. That is undoubtedly true as applied to space cooperation.  
Not every member of the European Union is actively involved in exploration and use of 
outer space; that is the primary reason why not all members of the Union are members of the 
European Space Agency. And that is the reason why a specialized space-oriented organization 
was deemed necessary instead of trying to fit it in the framework of the European Communities. 
Similarly, not every CIS State has space ambitions. But every CIS State participated in the Inter-
State Outer Space Council in the first years of its existence. How, for example, would 
participation of Tajikistan be beneficial for development of outer space exploration and use? 
How would its participation be beneficial for Tajikistan itself? Bearing in mind that the Inter-
State Outer Space Council focuses on coordination of space activities within the formerly united 
Soviet space complex, participation of non-spacefaring nations is simply unnecessary.  
By and large, Russian and Western scholars have opposite views on the significance of 
the CIS in promoting cooperation between the former Soviet republics and on the future of the 
organization. Doubtlessly, the CIS has been an important tool in building sovereign States from 
the rubble of the Soviet Union. But in the area of international space cooperation the CIS has not 
added much value.  
In addition to the abovementioned flawed ‘all-inclusive’ approach to space cooperation, 
subjecting membership in the Inter-State Outer Space Council only to the membership in the 
organization and nothing more, the legal foundation has not been created to promote 
cooperation, but to merely declare it. The Agreement between the Member States of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States about Cooperation in Exploration and Use of Outer Space 
in Article 1 states that cooperation in outer space should be based on the Inter-State Programs, 
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thus, limiting meaningful multilateral space cooperation, as has been noted above, in two ways. 
First, it effectively suggests bilateral cooperation in fulfillment of space programs. Second, the 
Agreement limits cooperation to practical applications and eliminates preparatory stage from the 
scope of cooperation, thus making space cooperation grotesquely one-sided. By contrast, the 
main purpose of the European Space Agency as pronounced in Article II of the Convention for 
the Establishment of a European Space Agency is “cooperation among European States in space 
research and technology and their space applications.” In a technologically sophisticated 
environment of space exploration every project is preceded by a painstaking process of 
development, testing, fine-tuning and more testing; exclusion of these stages from a cooperative 
process and shift of the focus toward the final stage, questions feasibility of successful 
completion of a cooperative project comprised of possibly incompatible elements. 
This, however, is not the main drawback of the chosen cooperative framework; after all, 
in every space project human and financial stakes are too high to neglect the compatibility and 
safety checks. The chosen approach limits the scope of cooperation and precludes further 
development. On the one hand, there are parts of the former Soviet space complex that by 
definition are fully compatible and can be operated with minimal preparatory activities. On the 
other, cooperation is limited only to the implementation stage, excluding an opportunity for 
participating States to develop new technologies in close cooperation with one another to ensure 
the continuing compatibility both with the already existing elements and those developed and 
employed in other cooperating States. It has been noted above that the Soviet space infrastructure 
and European and American space technologies are unfitting; that, however, does not mean that 
over time now-independent space industries of the CIS States cannot re-orient toward 
compatibility with the Western equipment. In the end, there is no guarantee that space 
technologies of the CIS States will always remain compatible, and the currently existing 
mechanism of cooperation does not stimulate a multi-faceted cooperation, effectively ‘freezing’ 
utilized types of technology at the level of year 1991, thereby limiting the scope of CIS space 
cooperation. 
Against this background it is not surprising that the Inter-State Outer Council has been 
convened sporadically, sometimes with years-long intermissions, has had almost no influence on 
national space strategies, and has not been able to introduce a single Inter-State Program that 
would have been implemented using the CIS mechanism of cooperation. Currently the Council 
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has ceased to work; instead, space-related matters are discussed within the permanently working 
meeting of representatives of national space agencies of the CIS members. The last session of the 
Council was attended by representatives of five States, while two States – Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine, were present in the status of observers. Nine States signed the 1991 Agreement and 
three other States attended sessions in the status of observers; so, over the period of twenty-five 
years the Council membership has significantly decreased. Since 2010, the sessions have been 
regular, although lasting no more than two days and convened only once a year, which is a 
significant improvement compared to the first decade of the twentieth century, but still can 
hardly bring about drastic changes in the level and intensity of CIS space cooperation.  
By way of conclusion, it should be noted that space cooperation is, of course, not the 
cornerstone of the Commonwealth, and the minimal results achieved are not a unique feature of 
the space area. In some spheres the CIS has been more successful than in others, but overall the 
net result is unimpressive. In this situation official statements praising the CIS as an 
indispensable instrument in coordination, dialogue and fruitful cooperation seem a baseless 
bravado, or an attempt to save the terminally ill by applying chamomile decoction.68 
Nonperformance of the CIS has been caused by different reasons in different areas of attempted 
cooperation. Creation of a unified system of national security has failed due to persisting fear of 
Russia among other members, especially the fear that it can use, and indeed has already used, its 
military power not to the benefit of its neighbors.  
Economic cooperation has not resulted in the projected Economic Union, and the modest 
successes of the Customs Union establishment and the Eurasian Union formation have been 
negated by the geopolitical events of the previous year. More generally, it was noted that 
economic insufficiency of the Commonwealth was caused by the unbalanced environment of the 
organization with only one leading State, where the other eleven members combined could not 
compete with Russia in terms of the size of the economy. Moreover, the CIS members are 
economically dependent upon Russia;69 while it can cut off supplies to the CIS countries, they 
hardly can do that to Russia. The European Union, for example, similarly does not unite 
economically equal States – there are hardly any economically equal States at all, each is 
different in its subtle way – but it has more than one leading State; Germany, France, the United 
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Kingdom and Italy are all believed to be leaders in their respective sub-regions, but at the same 
time none of them is overwhelmingly more powerful than the rest.70 
“Although a Russian presidential decree of 14 September 1995 recognized the principle 
of multi-speed integration in the CIS, even the most imaginative variable geometry could not 
disguise the fact that the CIS has not moved close to its original ambition of becoming an EU-
type common market.”71 
Political issues have had much lesser impact on space cooperation within the CIS, but 
even so it is not a success story. From the beginning space cooperation was lacking dynamics 
and could not boast a firm legal basis. Despite the expediency in establishing the Inter-State 
Outer Space Council days after the Commonwealth itself came into being, this drive very soon 
wore out and Council’s meetings occurred less and less often, by now having transformed into 
annual brief meetings of heads of national space agencies proclaiming goals that can never be 
achieved. Favoring bilateral cooperation over multilateral cooperation and focusing on practical 
applications with complete abandonment of cooperation in technological and scientific areas, 
coupled with blanket membership in the Council of all CIS members and powerless institutions, 
contributed to the demise of CIS space cooperation. Doubtlessly, political controversies, 
economic hurdles and traditional Soviet secretiveness in matters related to national security, of 
which the space industry is a major element, all played part in the perfect recipe of imperfect 
cooperation.  
Specialists in political science, economics, history, socio-cultural sciences would argue 
the importance of one factor over the other in the CIS failure. As mentioned above, different 
factors played predominant roles in halting economic, security and cultural integration; similarly, 
peculiar reasons have contributed to failed space cooperation. It is suggested, however, there is 
one overarching reason that, in turn, aggravated other anti-integration components of the 
Commonwealth. The CIS is a union of indisputably unequal States, of States with varying 
cultures, values and even languages; the predominant uniting factor is the former inclusion in the 
Soviet Union, which itself resembled an empire, not a single State. Subjecting membership in the 
                                                        
70 Cf., M.B. Olcott, A. Åslund, S.W. Garnett, Getting it Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (1999), at 37-72. 
71 E. Vinokurov, “Russian Approaches to Integration in the Post-Soviet Space in the 2000’s,” in K. Malfliet et al. 
(eds.), The CIS, The EU and Russia (2007), at 40.  
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CIS to the status of a former Soviet republic is not a problem by itself; the problem here lies in 
the goals the CIS was created to achieve.  
The need for an intermediary on the way from the Soviet Union to fifteen independent 
States can hardly be questioned. But maybe out of fear of unknown, or fear of responsibility, or 
quite prosaic financial considerations, the heads of the newly independent States attempted to 
create a confederation that hopefully would shift the burden of transition to sovereignty onto the 
institution, providing young governments a safety net in case independence proved to bring too 
many turbulences. In an environment where sovereign States plainly do not yet exist, economic 
cooperation rhetoric is redundant.  
Imagine the CIS was created only to facilitate the divorce; then, over the first years of 
independence, the States, which would have by then elected their new officials, created a system 
of government and set up economic system, would come together for a genuine inter-State 
conference. This conference would have been comprised of heads of States that were elected by 
their citizens instead of those inherited from the Soviet republics governments, and it would have 
had an actual subject for discussion. Now that at least first steps had been done to demolish the 
Soviet legacy and to create national institutions, negotiation of ways and means to use the 
common past to the benefit of all interested States would have been very timely. And this time 
the negotiation should not have been limited to the former Soviet States; this time the CIS 
Charter could have created a truly regional organization open to all willing States subject to 
certain conditions. This time the Charter might have actually been drafted to cover the areas 
where meaningful cooperation was possible; it could have created institutions that were capable 
of facilitating cooperation; it could have created an organization whose members were not afraid 
of cooperation that might well turn into the hegemony of the stronger, but were willing to 
cooperate and knew exactly cooperation in which areas would have been beneficial to their 
States.  
Instead, an all-encompassing Charter was adopted that covered everything and nothing. 
On the one hand, the States longed for preservation of some level of union for the sake of their 
own security; but on the other, these were newborn States that just as passionately wanted to be 
independent, to go their own way and to become recognized members of the international 
community. This ambivalence culminated in the CIS as we know it today.  
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A closed organization based on just one subjective criterion cannot become a viable 
platform for successful international cooperation. And a committee created within such an 
organization uniting all members no matter their space capabilities cannot become a firm 
foundation for international space cooperation. All other flaws just keep adding up to this 
primary structural chasm in the CIS mechanism of cooperation. 
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Bilateral treaties used to be the main source of international law until the end of the 
nineteenth century. Oftentimes different States concluded almost identical treaties on the subjects 
of commerce and navigation, thereby, incidentally establishing general rules of international 
law.1 From this perspective, concurrent bilateral treaties can create general international law, 
while preserving their role as a legal basis for relations between its parties. International space 
law, having been established as an area of international law only in the middle of the twentieth 
century, was originally created in most part by multilateral treaties, not the bilateral practice of 
States. This, however, did not preclude bilateral treaties from becoming an important source of 
international space law later on. Indeed, nowadays bilateral treaties constitute a significant part 
of the corpus juris spatialis; States have concluded hundreds of bilateral agreements of varying 
degree of specificity and terms of application. These treaties, in spite of their limited influence 
on the establishment of the general legal regime of outer space, have played an important role in 
promotion and development of international space cooperation. Hence, a book aiming at a 
review of contemporary forms of international cooperation in outer space cannot omit the 
analysis of particularities of bilateral treaties.  
In the present chapter the bilateral level of space cooperation will be examined using the 
example of bilateral treaties concluded by the United States and Russia, both among each other 
and with other States. Appreciating that the choice of any particular treaties – or treaties 
concluded by particular States – will always bear a mark of arbitrariness, the practice of these 
two States is suggested for two reasons: first, historically they were the first ones to enter the 
realm of outer space activities, where they became the two main rivals in the space exploration 
race, and, second, until today they preserve their statuses of space powers, albeit their dominance 
has been brought to an end years ago.   
The chapter is structured as follows. First, general remarks regarding the bilateral treaties 
as a way of inter-State cooperation will be provided, paying attention to their role in the 
                                                        
1 Cf., L.B. Sohn, Sources of International Law, 25 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 399 (1995-1996), at 401. 
 412 
formation and development of international space law. Second, a representative selection of US 
and Russian space cooperation bilateral treaties will be analyzed, putting emphasis, first, on the 
legalistic characteristics of a treaty in question, and, second, on the ways and means of 
cooperation enumerated in the document. Such an analysis will allow determining preferred legal 
characteristics in attainment of different goals – because, obviously, despite different treaties’ 
similarities, rarely a State is pursuing exactly the same set of goals in cooperation with different 
counterparts. Third, bilateral space treaties between the United States and Russia will be 
analyzed, starting from the early US-Soviet treaties all the way through to the documents 
currently in force. Although designation of bilateral treaties to one of the three categories of 
cooperation is straightforward, the six-criteria analysis will be completed to provide the most 
comprehensive review of these mechanisms of cooperation. The chapter will close by offering 
general conclusions regarding distinctive features of contemporary bilateral space cooperation 
and the benefits such cooperation provides for cooperating States. 
 
13.1.1 Specifics of Bilateral Treaties 
Manfred Lachs pronounced: “Treaties have been, still are and will remain the most 
effective instruments by which States acquire rights and enter into obligations in their mutual 
relations.”2 Today’s wariness of new legally binding outer space treaties does not change the 
relevance of this statement since international – and to a certain extent national – space activities 
rely on the regime established by the treaties: universal, regional and bilateral. For centuries now 
international law scholars have been studying the theory of international treaties, arriving at 
conclusions of varying breadth, quality and relevance; but a majority of researches have 
acknowledged differences between multilateral and bilateral treaties both in questions of form 
and substance. Although ‘rules of international treaties physics’ – namely, definition, parties, 
entry into force, withdrawal and the like – apply to bilateral treaties in full, certain variations are 
present. 
At the end of the nineteenth century Heinrich Triepel established the distinction between 
law-making treaties and treaties as contracts,3 which firstly was considered essential, but soon 
                                                        
2 M. Lachs, The Law of Outer Space: An Experience in Contemporary Law-Making (2010), at 129. 
3 Supra, para. 7.3. 
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became strongly criticized and eventually rejected.4 A modern legal argument instead of 
advocating a rigid distinction between the two types of treaties would lead to a more reasonable 
conclusion that actual treaties in their pure content rarely represent one or the other type of 
treaties, and that this rather arbitrary division – in the end, the interpreter is the one to judge 
whether the treaty in front of him belongs to a law-making or a contract type – is not so useful 
from the standpoint of modern international law. Different treaties cannot under the general 
principles of international law, and particularly the pacta sunt servanda principle, be structured 
hierarchically, giving preference to one type of obligations over the others. Nevertheless, authors 
suggest that there still exists intrinsic difference between the law-making and contractual 
provisions stipulated in the texts of the treaties, which might have especial importance in the 
context of codification conventions.5 Bilateral agreements, being an agreement between two 
particular States, tend to have more contractual provisions, but that does not mean that bilateral 
treaties are mere contracts. While repetitive bilateral practice, as noted above, can lead to 
creation of general legal norms, certain provisions of bilateral treaties, especially those 
formulated in broad, not project-specific terms, may well influence development of general space 
law serving as a blueprint for future cooperation between other States.  
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, notably, 
follows precisely the proposed approach. Article 101 defines international law as including law 
contained in widely accepted multilateral agreements. It continues, however, to pronounce that 
“undertakings of a particular state or international organization under a particular international 
agreement—for example, the obligation of a state under a bilateral tax treaty with another state—
are binding under international law, but the substantive content of such undertakings is not 
international law applicable generally.” Comment (f) to Article 102 further states: “Ordinarily, 
an agreement between states is a source of law only in the sense that a private contract may be 
said to make law for the parties under the domestic law of contracts.” Hence, following an 
analogy to a domestic contract, a bilateral treaty establishing legal rights and obligations of its 
parties might serve as a precedent for other States, and, conditional to wide acceptance of its 
relevant provisions, might transform into a norm of customary law. Moreover, the qualification 
of the comment to ‘ordinary’ circumstances signals that not every bilateral treaty is of 
                                                        
4 See, V.D. Degan, Sources of International Law (1997), at 489. 
5 Id. at 491. 
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contractual nature and that it might well include ‘law-making’ provisions on a par with more 
peculiar articles.  
The importance of the distinction between the ‘law-making’ and ‘contract’ treaties and 
their respective provisions lies primarily in the political dimension of bilateral cooperation, not 
the legal one. Overall, international cooperation may be understood as a politico-legal concept: 
“It is a political concept in the sense of being based on the premise that, according to certain 
principles, States and their governments are motivated by a constructive and positive spirit of 
seeking peace through an organized international community in order to fundamentally change 
the nature of relations among independent States. In the legal concept, it arises from the 
implementation of the principle of international cooperation of States which has certain 
repercussions not only in the institutions established through this cooperation, but primarily in 
the content which jurists are obliged to give to this principle.”6 It is suggested that in bilateral 
cooperation the political component is emphasized to a greater extent than on a regional or 
universal level in a sense that States are capable of construing their institutional relations paying 
less attention to the generally accepted content of the principle of cooperation, tailoring their 
relations to the unique institutional and political circumstances prompting cooperation. Thereby, 
the somewhat controversial distinction between the ‘contract’ and ‘law-making’ provisions 
serves as a legal pathway to political considerations in the course of legal analysis of bilateral 
treaties, allowing to pinpoint provisions that have been incorporated in the text in the course of 
political compromise – thus, being of a ‘contract’ nature – and those bearing greater ‘law-
making’ importance in the context of the treaty. 
Further, in the context of the analysis of bilateral cooperation, another theoretical 
proposition should be added. “If a treaty imposes upon the contracting parties the obligation to 
conclude with one another in the future a treaty on certain subject matters, two cases must be 
distinguished: the first treaty does, or does not, constitute and agreement on certain points. If the 
first treaty already constitutes an agreement on certain points, it is not a pactum de contrahendo 
(a treaty imposing upon a contracting party the obligation to conclude in the future another treaty 
on a certain subject matter), but a treaty imposing substantive obligations upon the contracting 
parties, the obligation to do something or to forbear from doing something, not the obligation to 
                                                        
6 B. Babovic, The Duty of States to Cooperate with One Another in Accordance with the Charter: Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation (1972), at 289-90, cited in N. Chukeat, 
International Cooperation for Sustainable Space Development, 31 J. Space L. 315 (2005), at 316-17. 
 415 
work towards or establish a treaty. It may be a so-called preliminary treaty, determining only 
certain important points, and requiring to be completed by a subsequent so-called definitive 
treaty, determining other, less important points. If the first treaty does not constitute an 
agreement on certain points, it establishes only the obligation to enter into negotiations for 
conclusion of a treaty, not the obligation to conclude a treaty.”7 In other words, a preliminary 
treaty and a treaty of intent should be distinguished, whereas a definitive treaty, covering details 
of bilateral relations, might further complement both.  
 This distinction, however, does not affect the legal nature of a treaty and primarily serves 
as a tool for analysis of the scope of obligations asserted by the treaty and the expected ways of 
further cooperation between the parties. The legal dogma that “a treaty enters into force at the 
moment when the concordance of will of the parties has been reached”8 leads to a 
straightforward conclusion: once State-parties to the treaty have agreed on its terms, irrespective 
of whether the treaty covers every right and every obligation of both parties, or requires 
conclusion of an additional ‘definitive’ treaty, or enunciates an agreement to conclude another 
treaty that would set forth parties’ respective rights and obligations, an agreement has been 
reached on these particular terms, and the treaty enters into force, unless the treaty states 
otherwise.  
The value of bilateral agreements lies not only in their legally binding nature, but also 
due to a limited number of parties, in the fact that they can be more easily negotiated and 
amended, and can be structured to suit the special needs of particular bilateral relations.9 
Primarily due to their flexibility bilateral treaties occupied a prominent place in international 
space cooperation from the first years of space era. For example, by 1963 the United States 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had cooperative ventures formalized 
through bilateral treaties with some forty countries regarding tracking stations, exchanges of 
personnel and joint space experiments.10 Bilateral cooperation between nations is even 
considered by some to be the primary method used to realize and promote international 
                                                        
7 H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law (1950), at 343. 
8 Id. at 354. 
9 Cf., S. Murphy, Role of Bilateral Defense Agreements in Maintaining the European Security Equilibrium, 24 
Cornell Int’l L. J. 415 (1991), at 415-16. 
10 See, R.N. Gardner, Cooperation in Outer Space, 41 Foreign Aff. 344 (1962-1963), at 358. 
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activities, especially in the field of space.11 Although the primary role of bilateral treaties is 
subject to argument, they unquestionably have played a prominent part in advancement of 
international space cooperation. 
Initially some authors, however, were rather critical of the role of bilateral treaties in 
space cooperation. “It is only within the U.N. that all the nations can consider in toto aerospace 
problems of law. Any other alternative, such as mere bilateral agreements between the United 
States and USSR, would be vastly inferior, owing to the global and extra-global nature of space 
flight. The aerospace adventure is unique in that it is an undertaking by mankind rather than by 
any one man or group of men. Only a forum that permits discussion by mankind rather than a 
group of men would be a plausible alternative. The U.N. most closely approaches this concept, 
idealistically.”12  
The cited view refers to the earlier distinction between ‘law-making’ and ‘contract’ 
treaties. Acquiescing that a singular bilateral treaty even between the dominating space powers 
can hardly substitute for universal treaties establishing a comprehensive legal regime, bilateral 
cooperation should not be regarded useless due to its limited scope of application. Bilateral 
treaties play a distinctive role in promotion of international cooperation, allowing States to tailor 
ways and means of collaboration to the unique circumstances of a particular project, or to the 
state of affairs – predominantly in a political, but also economic, sphere – between cooperating 
nations. The bottom line is that different treaties are performing different functions, and, hence, a 
treaty establishing a comprehensive legal regime, being unquestionably an important element in 
international regulation, cannot take over functions performed by bilateral treaties.  
In 1963 a scholar observed that the United States agreements on space cooperation dealt 
with a variety of matters, including such matters as launching and recovery arrangements in the 
Cape Canaveral-Bahamas area, space vehicle observation, tracking and communication stations 
and facilities throughout the world, upper atmosphere research, and inter-continental testing in 
connection with experimental satellites.13 He prophetically predicted that further types of 
bilateral agreements would be added as further developments occur, including agreements 
                                                        
11 See, N. Chukeat, International Cooperation for Sustainable Space Development, 31 J. Space L. 315 (2005), at 
336. 
12 G.H. Staub, 1975: A Space Odyssey, 8 Int’l L. 41 (1974), at 54. 
13 C.W. Jenks, Space Law (1965), at 82. 
 417 
dealing with matters of guest payloads, operation of various types of satellites and facilities for 
launching from the territory of cooperating States.14 
Today bilateral agreements “range from arrangements for technical assistance, education 
and training, financial assistance for space projects, to the establishment of a network of satellite 
communication systems. Cooperation extends from basic science to operational applications. 
They include bilateral cooperation between space-faring countries, and between the space-faring 
nations and developing nations, as well as between international organizations and developed 
countries or developing countries. However, there has been increasingly little bilateral 
cooperation between the developing countries.”15 A recent paper voiced similar concerns: 
“Examination of bilateral agreements on space cooperation concluded by NASA reveals that 
their principal beneficiaries are again the advanced nations. The usefulness of these agreements 
to the United States’ space effort is obvious. Without the agreements the U.S. would experience 
considerable difficulties in the conduct of its space activities. However, the technologically 
advanced partners of the United States also receive significant benefits through bilateral 
exchanges. […] In contrast, the benefit accruing to the bilateral partners of the United States who 
have only their territory to offer in exchange are minimal.”16 
These opinions support the suggestion made earlier that bilateral treaties are the results of 
not only legal, but also to a great extent political concessions and trade-offs. In other words, it is 
unlikely that a State would sign a treaty that would bring exclusively negative consequences or 
would bring none at all. A more plausible explanation is that a less developed partner-State that 
appears to receive minimal benefits in space area would receive benefits elsewhere. Stopping 
here to avoid getting into political speculations, it is suggested in evaluation of bilateral treaties 
to consider not only immediate short-term results or aims of the parties, but also to reflect on 
more far-reaching consequences of cooperation promoted by a particular treaty. Although the 
exact scope of such consequences can only be assumed, and, legally speaking, they do not affect 
the nature of cooperation, they might bear importance for more general evaluations.  
With these preliminary theoretic considerations in mind, the analysis of specific bilateral 
treaties will be commenced, starting with those concluded by the Russian Federation, followed 
                                                        
14 Id. at 86. 
15 N. Chukeat, International Cooperation for Sustainable Space Development, 31 J. Space L. 315 (2005), at 337. 
16 I.A. Vlasic, “The Relevance of International Law to Emerging Trends in the Law of Outer Space,” in C.E. Black 
and R.A. Falk (eds.), The Future of the International Legal Order, Volume 2: Wealth and Resources (2015), at 308-
09. 
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by the analysis of the United States bilateral practice and the bilateral cooperation of the two 
States among each other. 
 
13.1.2 Russian Bilateral Treaties 
Russia has concluded fifty-six bilateral treaties on space cooperation; in addition, it has 
signed three protocols and five memoranda of understanding. In the course of the present 
analysis the following bilateral agreements will be reviewed: 
- An Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of 
the Republic of Belarus on Cooperation in Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful 
Purposes, of March 15, 2011, entered into force December 26, 2012; 
- Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the 
Republic of Belarus on Cooperation in Use and Development of the Russian Global 
Navigational Satellite System GLONASS, of December 13, 2013, entered into force July 2, 
2014; 
- Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia on Cooperation in Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful 
Purposes, of December 1, 2006, entered into force March 1, 2010; 
- Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia on Cooperation in Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful 
Purposes, of February 21, 2011, entered into force November 21, 2014; 
- Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the 
Republic of Chile on Cooperation in Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful 
Purposes, of November 19, 2004, entered into force May 8, 2008; 
- Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the 
French Republic on Long-Term Cooperation in Development, Creation and Use of Rocket-
Launchers and in Placement of the Rocket-Launcher “Soyuz-ST” in the Guiana Space 
Center, of November 7, 2003, entered into force April 1, 2007; 
- Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan on Cooperation in Creation and Launch of the Kazakh 
Communication and Broadcasting Satellite “KAZSAT-2”, of July 16, 2011, entered into 
force December 2, 2011; 
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- Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the 
United States of Mexico on Cooperation in Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful 
Purposes, of May 20, 1996, entered into force November 29, 1996. 
An Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government 
of the Republic of Belarus on Cooperation in Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful 
Purposes17 is one of the latest additions to the bilateral cooperative network of Russia and is 
exemplary of the approach Russia is using in its bilateral space relations. It should be recalled 
that Belarus has not inherited a part of the former Soviet space complex and cannot be 
considered particularly active in exploration and use of outer space. Nevertheless, Russia 
concluded this treaty, followed by another treaty, which will also be discussed further, with a 
less-developed country not possessing a national space agency.18 
Modern Russian bilateral treaties traditionally open with an article providing elaborated 
definitions of the terms used, and space treaties are no exception. Article 1 of the Agreement 
with Belarus defines ‘cooperative activities’ as follows: “Activities in furtherance of the present 
Agreement, connected to exploration and use of outer space and application of space technology 
for peaceful purposes, which is defined as such in agreements (contracts), including cooperative 
activities concerning protected goods and technologies.” So at the outset it is unequivocally 
stipulated that the Agreement only establishes the most general legal basis for future cooperation 
that should be detailed in separate agreements and contracts.  
Article 4, defining the scope of cooperation, enumerates ultimately all possible spheres of 
cooperation, leaving open the opportunity for addition of other areas of cooperation subject to 
agreement of the Parties. Article 5 lists forms of cooperation, which include planning and 
performance of cooperative programs, exchange of scientific and technical information, 
facilitation of access to governmental space exploration and use programs, utilization of 
terrestrial objects and systems for space launches, organization of professional education, 
exchange of personnel, holding of symposiums, conferences and the like. An open-ended clause 
potentially allows for addition of other forms of cooperation. Overall, the Agreement is not 
                                                        
17 Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitelstvom Rossiiyskoi Federatsii I Pravitelstvom Respubliki Belarus’ o Sotrudnichestve 
v Oblasti Issledovaniya I Ispolzovaniya Kosmicheskogo Prostranstva v Mirnykh Zelyakh [An Agreement between 
the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Belarus on Cooperation in 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes] of March 15, 2011, entered into force December 26, 
2012, Biulleten’ Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov [Bulletin of International Treaties] No. 8 2013. 
18 A governmental agency designated by the Republic of Belarus to implement provisions of the Agreement is the 
National Academy of Sciences. 
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aimed at any particular type of cooperation, but rather constitutes a basis for any cooperation that 
might be commenced in future. Essentially, this is a framework agreement.  
Following provisions of the Agreement prove the correctness of the conclusion made. 
Financing of cooperative projects remains a responsibility of each Party and neither Party bears 
any financial responsibility or should be considered obliged to provide financing of cooperation. 
A complete absence of any kind of financial obligations can hardly result in fruitful cooperation, 
especially in such a tremendously costly endeavor as space exploration is; financial 
arrangements, therefore, are left for settlement in separate project-specific agreements referred to 
earlier in the Agreement. Terms and conditions of information exchange asserted in Article 9 are 
of a fairly unspecific nature as well, primarily calling for prompt access to data and information 
obtained during cooperative activities and prohibiting transfer of such information to third parties 
unless the Parties agree otherwise. References are made to provisions of national laws of 
respective Parties in discharge of the obligation to protect confidential and sensitive information, 
and to additional agreements between the Parties and their cooperating agencies with respect to 
special ways of treatment of information, should such become necessary.  
Article 10, providing for protection of property and technology, follows the same 
structure, declaring the need to secure necessary protection but leaving details to national 
regulations of the Parties and additional agreements. Surprisingly, the Agreement does not 
provide for any relaxation of export control requirements in transfer of goods, services and 
technologies used in cooperative programs, which are notoriously stringent in former Soviet 
States. Addendum 1 to the Agreement sets forth export control requirements in greater detail, 
including certification, marking, transportation and customs clearance details. Articles 11 and 12 
provide for a broadly construed tax and customs exemption and a cross-waiver of liability. 
Article 13 suggests that the Parties shall strive to settle all disputes in a friendly manner through 
diplomatic channels; in case a dispute cannot be resolved, it shall be referred to an ad hoc 
arbitration. 
A year after the Agreement had come into force, the Parties concluded another 
agreement, setting forth the legal basis for cooperation in use and development of the Russian 
global navigational satellite system GLONASS.19 This Agreement stipulates that the Parties are 
                                                        
19 Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitelstvom Rossiiyskoi Federatsii I Pravitelstvom Respubliki Belarus’ o Sotrudnichestve 
v Oblasti Ispolzovaniya I Razvitiya Rossiyskoi Globalnoi Navigazionnoi Sputnikovoi Sistemy GLONASS 
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to be guided by the provisions of the 2011 Agreement and aims at “creation of an organizational-
legal basis for mutually beneficial cooperation in particular areas of joint activities in use and 
development of the system GLONASS and of appropriate satellite navigational technologies.”20 
To this end, the Parties agreed to cooperate in development of GLONASS additional facilities 
that would allow using the system by end users of navigational signals on the territory of 
Belarus, to cooperate in development and manufacturing of navigational equipment, to cooperate 
in promotion of competitive goods and services on Russian, Belarusian and international 
markets, and to cooperate in development of navigational and informational services based on 
the system GLONASS, at the same time ensuring their compatibility. Additional areas of 
cooperation might be included subject to agreement of the Parties or of their appropriate 
agencies.  
Further articles of the Agreement essentially reiterate the same general guidelines as the 
2011 Agreement, albeit more concisely, regarding the designated cooperating agencies, forms of 
cooperation, financial arrangements, property protection, exchange of information, intellectual 
property and liability. Toward the end, Articles 12 and 13 establish agreement-specific 
provisions. Article 12 stipulates that the system GLONASS is under the jurisdiction and control 
of the Russian Federation, confirms that Russia retains all rights on the radio frequency spectrum 
allocated by the International Telecommunication Union, and asserts that the Belarusian satellite 
facilities and terrestrial infrastructure located on the territory of the Republic of Belarus shall be 
under the jurisdiction of Belarus. Article 13 states that Russia provides to the Republic of 
Belarus access to signals of medium precision free of charge, and that it shall not suppress 
precision of location determination. In turn, Belarus agrees to provide an opportunity to use 
information obtained using system-related equipment under its jurisdiction. Finally, it is stated 
that questions of utilization of the signal of high precision shall be considered in the course of 
military cooperation, and, thus, shall be subject of a separate agreement. Overall, this Agreement 
is using fairly broad terms in setting forth the legal regime of cooperation with respect to a 
particular sphere of space applications, in this sense following the pattern of the 2011 
Agreement.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
[Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Belarus on 
Cooperation in Use and Development of the Russian Global Navigational Satellite System GLONASS] of 
December 13, 2013, entered into force July 2, 2014, Biulleten’ Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov [Bulletin of 
International Treaties] No. 2 2015. 
20 Article 2 of the Agreement. 
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Generally, bilateral agreements on cooperation in exploration and use of outer space 
concluded by Russia in the twenty-first century follow the same pattern as the 2011 Agreement 
with the Republic of Belarus. The Agreement with Indonesia in essence reiterates the same 
principles of cooperation, although it introduces certain formatting and structural changes.21 
Particularly, it does not contain an article defining terms used in the agreement. Article 1 of the 
treaty defines the goal of cooperation as “establishment of organizational and legal basis for 
mutually beneficial cooperation in particular areas of joint activities in exploration and use of 
outer space and application of space technology for peaceful purposes.” The article goes on to 
enumerate four methods of achievement of the stated goal, which effectively reiterate in a more 
concise form provisions of Article 5 ‘Forms of Cooperation’.  
The second difference from the 2011 Agreement is inclusion of Article 2 entitled ‘Legal 
Basis’, which reads: “Cooperation in furtherance of the present Agreement is to be performed in 
accordance with national laws of the Parties, in compliance with general principles and norms of 
international law and without prejudice to performance by the Parties of their obligations and 
entertainment of their rights in accordance with other international treaties, to which they are 
parties.” Such a provision is not common in modern Russian bilateral treaties, and is most likely 
to be a concession to demands of Indonesia. Recently the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation in its ruling explained that despite provisions of the Constitution to the contrary, 
principles and norms of international law do not apply directly on the territory of the Russian 
Federation and do not have priority over national laws.22 A bill proposing amendments to the 
                                                        
21 Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitelstvom Rossiiyskoi Federatsii I Pravitelstvom Respubliki Indoneziya o 
Sotrudnichestve v Oblasti Issledovaniya I Ispolzovaniya Kosmicheskogo Prostranstva v Mirnykh Zelyakh [An 
Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on 
Cooperation in Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes] of December 1, 2006, entered into force 
March 1, 2010, Biulleten’ Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov [Bulletin of International Treaties] No. 9 2010. 
22 Postanovlenie Konstituzionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii “Po Delu o Proverke Konstitsuonnosti Polozheniy 
Statiy 1 Federalnogo Zakona “O Ratifikatsii Konventsii o Zashite Prav Cheloveka I Osnovnikh Svobod I Protokolov 
k Nei”, punktov 1 I 2 statiy 32 Federalnogo Zakona “O Mezhdunarodnikh Dogovorakh RF”, chastey pervoi I 
chetvertoy statiy 11, punkta 4 chasti chetvertoi statiy 392 Grazhdanskogo Prozessualnogo Kodeksa RF, chastei 1 I 4 
statiy 13, punkta 4 chasti 3 statiy 311 Arbitrajnogo Prozessualnogo Kodeksa RF, chastei 1 I 4 statiy 15, punkta 4 
chasti 1 statiy 350 Kodeksa Administrativnogo Sudoproizvodstva RF I punkta 2 chasti chetvertoy statiy 413 
Ugoglovno-Prozessualnogo Kodeksa RF v Svyazi s Zaprosom Gruppi Deputatov Gosudarstvennoy Dumy” N 21-P 
ot 14.07.2015 [Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation “On the Case of Examination of 
Compliance with the Provisions of the Constitution of Provisions of Article 1 of the Federal Statute “On Ratification 
of the Convention on Protection of Human Rights and Main Freedoms and Protocols”, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 
32 of the Federal Statute “On International Treaties of the Russian Federation”, parts one and four of article 11, 
paragraph 4 of part four of article 392 of the Civil Procedural Code of the Russian Federation, Parts 1 and 4 of 
Article 13, paragraph 4 of part 3 of article 311 of the Code of Arbitration Procedure of the Russian Federation, parts 
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Constitution to repeal the contentious provision has already been proposed and is likely to be 
adopted within a year; therefore, the cited provision, even in those few Russian treaties 
containing one, is likely to lose its force on the national plane, although in accordance with 
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that would not alter international 
obligations of Russia on the international plane.  
Article 14 sets forth a fairly unspecified obligation of the Parties to ‘facilitate’ 
immigration support to those citizens of the other contracting Party who arrive to or reside in the 
respective State performing functions in accordance with the Agreement. It should be noted that 
the wording used does not necessarily give any preference to the citizens of the contracting 
States, and suggests that this obligation is expected to be performed in a good-faith manner, but 
hardly more. Quite clearly, it is not a waiver of immigration requirements or even their 
relaxation. Such a provision is absent from the 2011 Agreement with Belarus due to participation 
of both Russia and Belarus in the Customs Union as established the Treaty on Eurasian 
Economic Union,23 which gives the right to the citizens of the two countries to reside and work 
in the other country without the need to comply with any immigration requirements. Overall, the 
enumerated discrepancies are not of a substantive nature, and rather reflect preferences of the 
contracting Parties in formulation of the treaties. 
Some bilateral treaties, including those concluded with Cuba and Chile, while following a 
similar structure and providing the legal framework for future cooperation in most broad terms, 
add provisions aiming at creating an institutional basis for communication between cooperating 
agencies of the parties. Article 6 of the Agreement with Cuba, for example, reads: “The Parties, 
cooperating agencies and designated organs and organizations may create joint working groups 
in order to work through the details of particular aspects of cooperative activities, prepare 
proposals on new areas and forms of such activities and also on organizational methods and 
ways for development of mechanisms of cooperation within the framework of the present 
Agreement.”24 Further, both agreements include an article entitled ‘Expansion of the Forms of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
1 and 4 of article 15, paragraph 4 of Part 1 of Article 350 of the Code of Administrative Procedure of the Russian 
Federation in Connection to the Request of the Group of members of the State Duma of July 14, 2015], 
pravo.gov.ru. 
23 Dogovor o Evraziyskom Ekonomicheskom Souyze [The Treaty on Eurasian Economic Union] of May 29, 2014, 
entered into force on January 1, 2015, available at the official website of the Russian Foreign Ministry 
archive.mid.ru. 
24 Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitelstvom Rossiiyskoi Federatsii i Pravitelstvom Respubliki Kuba o Sotrudnichestve v 
Oblasti Issledovaniya I Ispolzovaniya Kosmicheskogo Prostranstva v Mirnykh Zelyakh [An Agreement between the 
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Cooperation’ requiring the Parties and their cooperating agencies to provide support in the 
development of different forms of cooperation and collaboration between individuals and 
companies of both States, and to strive toward possible utilization of results of their work in 
performance of cooperative activities undertaken in the furtherance of the Agreement.25 
Both Agreements also include a separate article outlining the need for and procedure of 
bilateral consultations between the Parties and their cooperating agencies or other designated 
organs. These consultations might consider all types of questions, ranging from ways and means 
capable of strengthening cooperation in general to a particular recommendation regarding 
performance of a certain project. Government-level consultations might also conclude with 
adoption of additional agreements elaborating the general principles of cooperation or amending 
legal and organizational basis of joint activities.26 
The mechanism of consultations is widely used by States in their bilateral relations, and 
space cooperation is no exception. With respect to bilateral air agreements an eminent scholar 
enumerated several reasons behind the importance of consultations requirements and some of 
them may be adapted to the space environment. First, consultations between the contracting 
States enable them to control and supervise operation of the agreement and observance of its 
terms by the designated implementing agencies of both parties. Second, the consultations 
mechanism serves as the preliminary to arbitration or another dispute resolution mechanisms to 
supervise activities of the implementing agencies in the course of implementation of the 
agreement, and resolution of any possible disagreements between the implementing agencies or 
between an implementing agency and a State.   
Third, consultations are used as means of elevating an issue to the inter-State level. “In 
many ways, this third type of consultation is very similar to the second one, except that it is 
perhaps a little less structured. … Consultation here is used merely as means either to enable a 
contracting State to obtain further details about a given situation and, if necessary, to make its 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on Cooperation in 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes] of February 21, 2011, entered into force November 21, 
2014, Biulleten’ Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov [Bulletin of International Treaties] No. 3 2015. 
25 Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitelstvom Rossiiyskoi Federatsii I Pravitelstvom Respubliki Chily o Sotrudnichestve v 
Oblasti Issledovaniya I Ispolzovaniya Kosmicheskogo Prostranstva v Mirnykh Zelyakh [An Agreement between the 
Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Chile on Cooperation in Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes] of November 19, 2004, entered into force May 8, 2008, Biulleten’ 
Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov [Bulletin of International Treaties] No. 1 2009, Article VIII. 
26 Article 12 of the Agreement with Cuba, and Article XII of the Agreement with Chile.  
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own views known to the other Party, or to keep the other Party informed of a given situation so 
that, if it so wishes, it can make its views known. It is a way of opening the channels of 
communication between the contracting States in matters which otherwise might be treated as 
falling solely within the competence of one of the Parties alone. The purpose of consultation in 
this instance is, therefore, more the avoidance than the resolution of disputes.”27 Four, 
consultations may be used for the purpose of reviewing changed circumstances as a matter of 
good will. Finally, they may be used for the purpose of changing the agreement. Also in some 
cases, depending on particular provisions of the treaty in question, consultations serve as means 
for settlement of disputes and a precondition to the referral of a dispute for resolution in 
accordance with agreed upon procedures. 
In case of the Russian treaties, all these reasons behind inclusion of the consultations 
requirement are present except for its role as a preliminary step in the dispute resolution process. 
The dispute settlement mechanism is set forth in great detail in the text of the Agreement; 
moreover, the article establishing the consultations requirement does not provide for the dispute 
settlement role of either government- or agency-level consultations. In the end, the mechanism of 
consultations is a helpful tool in promotion of friendly relations of the Parties to the agreement, 
providing a flexible mechanism of a less formal, compared to the diplomatic channels, method of 
communication.  
Now two treaties concluded to perform a particular project will be briefly reviewed. It 
should be noted, though, that this type of treaties is comparatively rare in Russian practice since 
the overwhelming majority of the space treaties follow the pattern of the agreements examined 
above. 
One example of a project-oriented space treaty is the Agreement between France and 
Russia on long-term cooperation in development, creation and use of rocket-launchers and in 
placement of the rocket-launcher “Soyuz-ST” in the Guiana Space Center.28 In addition to 
                                                        
27 B. Cheng, Role of Consultation in Bilateral International Air Service Agreements, as Exemplified by Bermuda I 
and Bermuda II, 19 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 183 (1981), at 190. 
28 Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitelstvom Rossiiyskoi Federatsii i Pravitelstvom Franzuzskoy Respubliki o 
Dolgosrochnom Sotrudnichestve v Oblasti Razrabotki, Sozdaniya I Ispolzovaniya Raket-Nositeley I Razmesheniya 
Raketi-Nositelya “Souyz-ST” v Gvianskom Kosmicheskom Tsentre [An Agreement between the Government of the 
Russian Federation and the Government of the French Republic on Long-Term Cooperation in Development, 
Creation and Use of Rocket-Launchers and in Placement of the Rocket-Launcher “Soyuz-ST” in the Guiana Space 
Center] of November 7, 2003, entered into force April 1, 2007, Biulleten’ Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov [Bulletin 
of International Treaties] No. 6 2007. 
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general provisions on financial arrangements, a cross-waiver of liability, immigration and 
customs matters, information exchange, intellectual property protection and technologies 
protection, the Agreement provides detailed definitions of all terms, including the technical ones, 
sets forth a comprehensive list of rights and responsibilities of cooperating agencies, and 
enunciates the procedure of rocket-launcher registration and management. Furthermore, Article 
17 stipulates: “Due to the long-term, complex and evolutionary nature of cooperation in 
accordance with the present Agreement, the Parties, acting through cooperating agencies, shall 
inform each other of changes that might affect the process of cooperation, and shall agree on 
joint consultations with regard to all questions arising in the process of cooperation.”  
Another project-specific agreement was concluded with Kazakhstan in 2011.29 Formally 
the goal of this Agreement is a cooperative development and launching of a Kazakh satellite to 
the geostationary orbit; in effect, the Agreement requires the Russian space industry to 
manufacture this satellite, launch it from Russian launching facilities, provide orbital and radio 
frequency slots, which were allocated to Russia by the International Telecommunication Union, 
necessary for operation of this satellite, and, finally, provide tracking and monitoring facilities. 
Kazakhstan, in turn, is required to register the satellite in accordance with the 1975 Registration 
Convention. The Agreement is silent about financial arrangements between the Parties, its 
cooperating agencies or companies charged with actual manufacturing of the satellite. Recalling 
that States participating in bilateral agreements are rational actors, it is reasonable to suggest that 
Russia should gain some benefits from execution of this Agreement, even if not in the form of a 
payment for the provided goods and services. 
Concluding the overview of selected Russian bilateral treaties on cooperation in 
exploration and use of outer space, it is clear that in most cases the treaties should be 
characterized as framework agreements enunciating the legal and organizational basis for future 
cooperation in most general terms. At the same time, these treaties provide certain rights and 
obligations of the parties, thereby not allowing classifying them as treaties of intent. On the one 
hand, they do provide for a need to conclude separate agreements with respect to particular 
                                                        
29 Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitelstvom Rossiiyskoi Federatsii i Pravitelstvom Respubliki Kazakhstan o 
Sotrudnichestve v Oblasti Sozdaniya I Zapuska Kazakhstanskogo Sputnika Svyazi I Veschaniya “KAZSAT-2” [An 
Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
on Cooperation in Creation and Launch of the Kazakh Communication and Broadcasting Satellite “KAZSAT-2”] of 
July 16, 2011, entered into force December 2, 2011, Biulleten’ Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov [Bulletin of 
International Treaties] No. 12 2012. 
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projects and programs. On the other, however, they specify rights and obligations of the parties 
in use of data obtained during cooperative activities, in protection of national property and 
others, thereby, making their classification as preliminary treaties in the dichotomy advocated by 
Kelsen,30 or as framework treaties as it is suggested labeling them, more justified.  
 
13.1.3 United States Bilateral Treaties 
In the course of the present analysis the following bilateral agreements will be reviewed: 
- Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Argentine Republic on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
of October 25, 2011, entered into force July 30, 2013; 
- Agreement between the United States of America and Japan effected by exchange of notes 
on Tracking Station in Okinawa, entered into force September 2; 
- Agreement between the United States of America and Australia on Tracking Stations: 
Transit Navigational Satellite Program effected by exchange of notes, entered into force 
June 5, 1961;  
- Agreement between the United States of America and Senegal effected by exchange of 
notes on Space Cooperation: Vehicle Tracking and Communication Facility, entered into 
force February 5, 1981; 
- Agreement between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Norway for 
Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Outer Space with annex. Signed October 20, 2000, and 
November 14, 2001; Entered into force November 14, 2001; 
- Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Sweden 
for Cooperative Activities in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. 
Signed October 14, 2005; Entered into force October 14, 2005; 
- Implementing arrangement between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of 
the United States of America and the Swedish National Space Board of the Kingdom of 
Sweden for Cooperation in Aeronautic and Space Research Using Nanosatellite 
Technologies. Signed at Washington and Solna May 10 and 19, 2011; Entered into force 
May 19, 2011; 
                                                        
30 Cf., H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law (1950), at 343. 
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- Implementing Arrangement between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of 
the United States of America and the Norwegian Space Centre of the Kingdom of Norway 
on the Interface Region Imaging Spectrograph (IRIS) Mission. Signed at Washington and 
Oslo December 14, 2010 and January 10, 2011; Entered into force January 10, 2011; 
- Memorandum of Understanding between the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration of the United States of America and the National Commission on Space 
Activities of the Argentine Republic Concerning the Flight of the SAC-A Mission on the 
Shuttle. Signed at Buenos Aires October 16, 1997; Entered into force October 16, 1997; 
- Agreement between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the United States 
of America and the National Institute of Aeronautics and Space of the Republic of Indonesia 
for Cooperation on the Southeast Asia Composition, Cloud, Climate Coupling Regional 
Study. Signed at Washington and Jakarta May 31 and June 19, 2012; Entered into force 
June 19, 2012; 
- Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of the Republic of Indonesia on Scientific and Technological Cooperation. Signed at Jakarta 
March 29, 2010; Entered into force February 16, 2011; 
- Space Cooperation Agreement between the United States of America and Ukraine. Signed 
March 21, 2008; Entered into force January 22, 2009. 
Historically, “America’s first partner in a medium-scale enterprisory activity was Great 
Britain: together they launched the first “international satellite,” built and sent aloft by the United 
States, but with important instruments engineered by British scientists. Japan participated in the 
next joint satellite launching effort, and a joint space undertaking with Canada sent the 
“Alouette” aloft. Italy, another member of the Western Bloc, has participated with NASA in 
rocket probes, as have Sweden, Britain, and Australia; and NASA has plans for joint space 
programs with Japan, Norway, Pakistan, India and France.”31 Today, a majority of US bilateral 
space treaties have been concluded with developed States and States actively participating in 
space activities. Despite the justified criticism of such a state of affairs, emphasizing the need to 
include less developed nations in space cooperation and, thus, enjoyment of benefits of space-
                                                        
31 M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 877. 
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related technologies,32 dominating cooperation with developed nations cannot be considered 
surprising.  
It has been suggested that four factors – culture, exposure to crisis, past experience and 
dedication to concepts of world public order – have influenced the forms of bilateral cooperation 
and partners States are choosing in their bilateral relations.33 Culture and past experience, along 
with public order values, seem the most relevant in the space cooperation context. One would 
doubtless find cooperation more fruitful and less complicated when a partner shares similar 
cultural, social and economic values, and due to his experience has a comparable level of 
expertise, or at least matching capabilities. The presence of just one factor, though, would not be 
enough for a truly successful cooperation. In 1962 the Soviet Union and the United States 
concluded the Bilateral Space Agreement, which, however, was not considered by its 
contemporaries as a basis for full-scale cooperation between then the only two space powers in 
the world,34 and did not bring to life broad cooperation between the two States in the years that 
immediately followed its conclusion. So despite the matching past experience – that is space 
expertise – ideological and cultural differences were too vast to allow meaningful joint work.  
According to the United States State Department 2013 edition of the Treaties in Force 
with 2014 Supplement,35 the United States has sixty-eight bilateral space cooperation treaties in 
force. It comes as no surprise that bilateral US treaties with developing nations creating a general 
framework for cooperation are non-existent. Approximately another fifty US bilateral 
agreements provide for cooperation using space-based technology, including agreements on 
scientific and technical cooperation, telecommunications, agreements on mutual legal assistance, 
which, strictly speaking, should not be considered space-specific treaties.  
The compendium distinguishes a separate category of treaties concerning tracking 
stations that accounts for nine treaties and one memorandum of understanding concluded with 
the United Kingdom regarding the placement of the US tracking station in the Cayman Islands. 
The majority of these agreements were concluded in the 1960s, and they vary in the scope of 
parties’ rights and obligations in establishment and operation of tracking stations and necessary 
                                                        
32 Cf., I.A. Vlasic, “The Relevance of International Law to Emerging Trends in the Law of Outer Space,” in C.E. 
Black and R.A. Falk (eds.), The Future of the International Legal Order, Volume 2: Wealth and Resources (2015), 
at 308-09. 
33 See, M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 877. 
34 Cf., C.W. Jenks, Space Law (1965), at 86. 
35 Available on WestLaw Next. 
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facilities. The agreement with Japan, for example, provides that the Government of Japan will 
establish the ‘Okinawa Satellite Tracking Station’, as the branch office of the Japanese National 
Space Development Center.36 The agreement with Australia stipulates that the program will be 
conducted by cooperating agencies of each government, allows for participation of the 
cooperating agency of Australia in operation of the established facilities, and specifies terms and 
conditions of necessary personnel admission to Australia and their fiscal and customs 
privileges.37 The agreement with Senegal, in addition to designation of cooperating agencies and 
provision for the United States personnel and equipment fiscal and immigration privileges, 
asserts the United States’ obligation to train six Senegalese technicians in station operation and 
maintenance, to employ to the greatest extent possible Senegalese contractors in construction of 
tracking station facilities, and to make the facilities available for visits by general public.38 
Strictly speaking, these and other tracking stations agreements are not outer space 
bilateral treaties since they regulate earthbound activities. While construction of terrestrial 
tracking stations is necessary for performance of outer space activities, outer space activities, 
however, should not as per provisions of these agreements, include the counter-party of the 
agreement providing its territory for the construction of a tracking station. In other words, 
cooperation of the two States does not extend to outer space.  
These agreements are, though, a notable example of trade-offs involved in a bilateral 
negotiations process. It has been argued above that it is highly doubtful that any State would 
conclude a treaty detrimental to its interests; and each of the three tracking stations treaties 
provides for some benefits of the hosting State. Australia is entitled to participation in the project 
along with the United States and is allowed to get access to certain derived information; Japan 
ultimately obtains operational rights of the facility through the specially established entity; 
Senegal, apparently due to lack of its interest in direct participation in the project, obtained 
financial and educational preferences. While these benefits are not exactly equal in value, 
bilateral treaties are not supposed to provide equal value to each party of each treaty.  
                                                        
36 Agreement between the United States of America and Japan effected by exchange of notes on Tracking Station in 
Okinawa, entered into force September 2, 1968, T.I.A.S. No. 6558, 19 U.S.T. 6011. 
37 Agreement between the United States of America and Australia on Tracking Stations: Transit Navigational 
Satellite Program effected by exchange of notes, entered into force June 5, 1961, T.I.A.S. No. 4779, 12 U.S.T. 789. 
38 Agreement between the United States of America and Senegal effected by exchange of notes on Space 
Cooperation: Vehicle Tracking and Communication Facility, entered into force February 5, 1981, T.I.A.S. No. 
10088, 33 U.S.T. 1028. 
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There are two types of bilateral space treaties concluded by the United States: general 
treaties establishing the legal and organizational framework for cooperation, which are 
concluded on the governmental level, and project-specific agreements concluded between the 
cooperating agencies. The first type of agreements may be designated either an ‘Agreement’ or a 
‘Framework Agreement’; the name of the treaty does not affect the substance of its provisions. 
The second type of agreements may be designated an ‘Agreement’, a ‘Memorandum of 
Understanding’, or an ‘Implementing Arrangement’; here the choice of the agreement’s title also 
does not affect its substance. A form of a memorandum of understanding was traditional for 
agreements concluded in the twentieth century, while a form of an implementing arrangement is 
of a more recent origin and is used to conclude inter-agency agreements with the nations the 
United States has bilateral treaties establishing the general legal framework for cooperation. An 
inter-agency agreement on space cooperation is designated an ‘Agreement’ when it aims at 
regulation of project-specific relations with a State the United States does not have a general 
treaty with on cooperation in exploration and use of outer space.  
Treaties concluded on the inter-governmental level and establishing the general legal and 
organizational framework of cooperation in exploration and use of outer space, which will be 
further referred to as ‘framework treaties’, generally follow a uniform structure. One of the 
earlier framework treaties that still remains in force is the Agreement with Norway.39 It has 
twelve articles and in general terms regulates customs and immigration matters, the procedure of 
exchange of technical data, and goods and intellectual property rights. Article 1 ‘Scope of 
Activities’ at the outset asserts that the Parties “shall identify areas of mutual interest and seek to 
develop cooperative programs in the peaceful uses of outer space and shall work closely together 
to this end.” Recalling the two sides of the principle of cooperation: the ‘obligation of result’ and 
the ‘obligation of effort’, it should be concluded that this Agreement eloquently sets forth the 
‘obligation of effort’ in cooperation between the contracting States.  
In other words, although this is a treaty concluded specifically to promote cooperation 
between the two States, it does not go as far as to mandate cooperation in exploration and use of 
outer space in general; rather, it seeks to confirm the existing ‘obligation of effort’ and the 
existing mutual interest in cooperation, and to create the legal basis for cooperation on particular 
                                                        
39 Agreement between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Norway for Cooperation in the Civil Uses 
of Outer Space with annex. Signed October 20, 2000, and November 14, 2001; Entered into force November 14, 
2001, T.I.A.S. No. 13172. Extension of October 23, 2006, T.I.A.S. 13172. 
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projects. The ‘obligation of result’ comes into existence only upon conclusion of inter-agency 
project-specific agreements. Russian bilateral space treaties due to their unspecific, even generic 
nature also cannot be considered as creating the ‘obligations of result’, leaving this task to further 
project-specific additional agreements. Thereby, at least in this regard both States are following 
the same method of structuring bilateral space cooperation.  
Further, Article 1 of the Agreement with Norway enumerates areas and forms of possible 
cooperation, leaving the list open for possible extension should the Parties agree so. Article 2 
designates the implementing agencies and requires that “the specific terms and conditions for 
Programs shall be set forth in implementing arrangements between the implementing agencies,” 
which might include provisions related to the nature and scope of a particular program, 
individual rights and responsibilities of the agencies, financial, technical and other arrangements.  
Implementing arrangements concluded between the States bound by framework treaties, 
despite their obviously different subjects, are arranged in similar ways. They are structured into 
twelve articles, which set forth a detailed description of the cooperative project, exact 
responsibilities of each implementing agency, intellectual property rights, particularities of the 
cross-waiver of liability as applied to the project, rules of data and goods exchange, and provide 
detailed contact information of the participating agencies. Each implementing arrangement 
includes an article entitled ‘Release of Results and Public Information’, requiring that the 
implementing agencies make the final results obtained from the cooperative project “available to 
the general scientific community through publication in appropriate journals or by presentations 
at scientific conferences as soon as possible and in a manner consistent with good scientific 
practices.”40 
This provision is repeated verbatim in every project-specific agreement of the United 
States. Acknowledging that the cooperating States preserve the right to decide what final results 
can and should be made available to the general public, still the information release requirement 
is of great moral and legal importance. The principle that the exploration and use of outer space 
                                                        
40 Article 6 of the Implementing arrangement between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the 
United States of America and the Swedish National Space Board of the Kingdom of Sweden for Cooperation in 
Aeronautic and Space Research Using Nanosatellite Technologies. Signed at Washington and Solna May 10 and 19, 
2011; Entered into force May 19, 2011, T.I.A.S. No. 11-519. Article 8 of the Implementing Arrangement between 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the United States of America and the Norwegian Space 
Centre of the Kingdom of Norway on the Interface Region Imaging Spectrograph (IRIS) Mission. Signed at 
Washington and Oslo December 14, 2010 and January 10, 2011; Entered into force January 10, 2011, T.I.A.S. No. 
11-110. 
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shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries finds one of its possible 
practical applications in this requirement.41 The Draft Code of Rules on the Exploration and Uses 
of Outer Space prepared by a Study Group of the David Davies Memorial Institute of 
International Studies in 1962 specifically declared that in the exploration and use of outer space 
States and international bodies should arrange for the greatest practicable interchange of 
scientific information and personnel.42 
Eminent scholarly work stated: “The importance, however, of enlightenment as an 
objective transcends educational boundaries; knowledge is increasingly regarded as a power and 
respect asset in the arena of international politics. It is therefore safe to predict that one of the 
primary objectives of all participants in the world power and social processes will in the 
foreseeable future be directed toward the acquisition of new knowledge through both direct 
participation in space exploration as well as through demands for sharing in the experience 
gained by others. The many immediately practical applications of the new knowledge gained 
from space activities add, on any scale of demanded values, a special sense of urgency to this 
objective.”43 A blanket inclusion of the scientific information release requirement proves that 
enlightenment has taken a prominent place in objectives pursued by the United States in the 
exploration and use of outer space.  
All project-specific agency-level bilateral agreements regardless of their designation 
reproduce a similar structure. The Memorandum of Understanding with Argentina Concerning 
the Flight of the SAC-A Mission on the Shuttle,44 for example, mirrors the structural approach 
used in the reviewed implementing arrangements, adding several provisions peculiar to the 
undertaken project. Since the SAC-A is a small satellite, provisions regarding its management 
and registration had to be added in the text of the Memorandum.  
                                                        
41 J. Gabrynowicz suggested that the United States interprets ‘benefit’ of  Art. I of the Outer Space Treaty as: “All 
nations may have access to data.” So data is understood as data that is being shared. This policy is incorporated in 
both multilateral and bilateral treaties. See, J. I. Gabrynowicz, Keynote: The Legal Evolution of a ‘Use’ of Space: 
The Case of Remote Sensing, 58th IISL Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Technical Programme “7th Nandasiri 
Jasentuliyana Keynote Lecture on Space Law and Young Scholars Session,” IAC-15.E7.1.1. Not yet published as of 
November 2015. Thereby, this is one example of this policy implementation. 
42 C.W. Jenks, Space Law (1965), at 151. 
43 M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 23. 
44 Memorandum of Understanding between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the United States 
of America and the National Commission on Space Activities of the Argentine Republic Concerning the Flight of 
the SAC-A Mission on the Shuttle. Signed at Buenos Aires October 16, 1997; Entered into force October 16, 1997, 
T.I.A.S. No. 12893. 
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The Agreement with Indonesia on Southeast Asia Composition, Cloud, Climate Coupling 
Regional Study has been concluded between the implementing agencies of the cooperating 
States.45 Its main difference from the previously analyzed agreements is that it was not 
concluded with a reference to a framework government-level space treaty; rather the 
Agreement’s Preamble provides reference to the Agreement between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on Scientific and 
Technological Cooperation.46 Although substantively and structurally this Agreement is not 
different from the earlier analyzed implementing arrangements or the memorandum of 
understanding, the absence of the framework space treaty between the two States, apparently, 
caused the choice of a different designation for this agreement. Moreover, it can be suggested 
that the reference to the treaty concluded in a different sphere of foreign relations – in 
accordance with the US State Department’s United States Treaties in Force, which uses a fairly 
rigid subject-matter classification of the treaties – was necessary to allow conclusion of this 
Agreement on an inter-agency level and to avoid the need for its ratification. 
In accordance with the Treaty Clause of the United States Constitution, every 
international treaty must be ratified by a two-thirds majority vote of the Senate. This 
supermajority vote requirement is essential in the system of checks and balances but might be 
time consuming and in some cases might prove detrimental to international cooperation. 
Therefore, the reference in agency-level agreements to bilateral treaties that have already been 
ratified in accordance with provisions of the Constitution allows avoiding the requirement for 
their ratification on the premise that the Senate has already given its approval to activities falling 
within the scope of the treaty, especially when the treaty itself calls for conclusion of additional 
agreements or implementing arrangements. In this case, the treaty with Indonesia on scientific 
cooperation in Article VI stipulates that cooperation be discharged through implementing 
arrangements or other agreements, and Article II includes ‘space, nanotechnology and advanced 
technologies, including remote sensing’ in the areas of cooperation in achievement of the treaty’s 
objectives. Description of the program provided in Article 1 of the 2012 Agreement with 
                                                        
45 Agreement between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the United States of America and the 
National Institute of Aeronautics and Space of the Republic of Indonesia for Cooperation on the Southeast Asia 
Composition, Cloud, Climate Coupling Regional Study. Signed at Washington and Jakarta May 31 and June 19, 
2012; Entered into force June 19, 2012, T.I.A.S. No.12-619.1. 
46 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia on Scientific and Technological Cooperation. Signed at Jakarta March 29, 2010; Entered into force 
February 16, 2011, T.I.A.S. No. 11-216. 
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Indonesia leaves no doubt that it falls within the scope of cooperation covered by the 2011 
Agreement on scientific cooperation.  
The practice of the recent years has introduced several changes to the structure of 
bilateral framework space treaties concluded by the United States. The agreements with 
Argentina and Ukraine are the prominent examples of the currently adhered to configuration of 
bilateral space treaties.47 Overall, there are four changes. First, the latest framework treaties 
include an article defining the terms used, including the terms ‘Launch Vehicle’, ‘Payload’, 
‘Protected Space Operations’, ‘Related Entity’ and ‘Transfer Vehicle’. The designated 
implementing agencies are now also enumerated in the definitions article. Second, Article 13 of 
both Agreements asserts the obligation of the implementing agencies to decide as to which 
agency will request the respective government to register a spacecraft in accordance with the 
1975 Registration Convention in cases when a particular project, as enunciated in an appropriate 
implementing arrangement, involves a launch. 
Third, a new article entitled ‘Consultations and Settlement of Disputes’ has been added. 
Although substantively similar provisions were included in earlier framework treaties,48 the title 
of the article now reflects the twofold role played by consultations: on the one hand, they serve 
as a mechanism to review implementation of the activities undertaken pursuant to the treaty, and 
on the other, they function as a preliminary mechanism in the dispute resolution process. 
Recalling the five reasons behind inclusion of the consultation mechanism in bilateral 
treaties,49 a conclusion can be drawn that consultations in the context of the bilateral space 
treaties of the United States are designed to perform only three of those functions.50 The text of 
the article clearly states that in the event questions arise with regard to the implementation of 
                                                        
47 Space Cooperation Agreement between the United States of America and Ukraine. Signed March 21, 2008; 
Entered into force January 22, 2009, T.I.A.S. No. 09-122. Framework Agreement between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the Argentine Republic on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space. Signed October 25, 2011; Entered into force July 20, 2013, T.I.A.S. No. 13730. 
48 See e.g., Article 3 of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Norway for 
Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Outer Space, which is entitled ‘Consultations’ and provides that (1) “the 
Implementing Agencies shall consult, as deemed appropriate and necessary, to review the implementation of 
activities undertaken,” and (2) “in the event questions arise regarding the implementation if programs under this 
Agreement, the questions will be resolved by the program managers of the programs involved.” Although the 
second part of the article nowhere explicitly mentions ‘consultations’, a context reading of the Article suggests that 
consultations are also a preferred initial method of communication in dispute resolution.  
49 See, B. Cheng, Role of Consultation in Bilateral International Air Service Agreements, as Exemplified by 
Bermuda I and Bermuda II, 19 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 183 (1981), at 190. 
50 The five reasons are: control and supervision of the operation of the agreement; a preliminary to arbitration or 
other dispute resolution mechanism; the means of elevating an issue to the inter-State level; review of changed 
circumstances as a matter of good will; and change of the agreement. 
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activities pursuant to the treaty, they should either be resolved by the project managers, or in case 
of their inability to reach an agreement, “the matter will be referred to a more senior level of the 
Agencies for joint resolution.”51 Thus, consultations cannot be used to elevate the dispute to the 
inter-State level, but remain the inter-agency mechanism of communication. Further, Article 16 
unequivocally states that amendments to the treaty can only be made by mutual written 
agreement of the Parties: first, the Parties are defined as the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of Ukraine or Argentina respectively – so clearly the inter-agency 
agreement is not sufficient, and, second, the written form of the agreement needed to introduce 
an amendment goes beyond the type of communication the consultations mechanism provides.  
It has been earlier suggested that consultations is a helpful mechanism due to its 
flexibility and less formalized form; these, thereby, are precisely the reasons behind limiting the 
functions of the consultations mechanism as well. An amendment to a legally binding treaty is 
equally legally binding; the stance of the United States on additional legally binding documents 
in the area of space activities is widely known, so it comes as no surprise that the US State 
Department has reserved the exclusive right to negotiate amendments. Involvement of 
government-level officials in the resolution of a dispute in a sensitive business of outer space 
activities might have long-term strategic consequences, so it seems wise, predominantly from a 
political perspective, to leave the possibility of government involvement to be decided by the 
government, not the implementing agencies. Overall, even with the named limitations, 
consultations are capable of facilitating proper and prompt communication of the agencies 
involved, and that seems to be their greatest value.  
The final change introduced in the most recent framework treaties can be found in the 
entry into force clause. Article 17 of both the treaty with Ukraine and with Argentina states: 
“This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the last note of exchange of diplomatic 
notes in which the Parties notify each other of the completion of their internal procedures 
necessary for the entry into force of this Agreement.” By contrast, Article 11 of the Framework 
Agreement with Sweden reads: “This Framework Agreement shall enter into force upon the date 
of signature and shall remain in force for ten (10) years unless terminated in accordance with 
Article 12.” Apart from consequences this addition bears on national practices of the contracting 
                                                        
51 Article 14 of the Space Cooperation Agreement between the United States of America and Ukraine. Signed March 
21, 2008; Entered into force January 22, 2009, T.I.A.S. No. 09-122 
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States, it has one important international implication. Space activities are notoriously costly; 
hence, prompt allocation of funds for space projects is crucial for their successful completion. 
Due fulfillment of the ratification requirement, read approval by the legislature, before the treaty 
enters into force ensures that necessary funds would be made available by national parliaments 
when the active stage of cooperation commences pursuant to the provisions of the treaty.  
Bilateral US space treaties concluded in the twentieth century were quite diverse in their 
forms (many were concluded in the form of Exchange of Notes) and in their structure and 
substance of mutual rights and obligations. The majority of these treaties, however, has already 
expired and has mostly historical value. The twenty-first century has been marked by a greater 
uniformity, as has been shown above. In the era when a space launch ceased to be an event 
deserving front-page headlines throughout the world, and space activities have become more 
regular, maybe even mundane, an individual approach to every agreement concluded with 
respect to cooperative space activities is a time-consuming luxury few governments can, or wish, 
to afford. The uniform approach to space cooperation yields many benefits, including shorter 
negotiation times, predictability in allocation of responsibility among State agencies involved, 
more transparent accountability, fast-track funding procedures (at least in theory) and the like. 
And surely it provides an opportunity for researchers to draw general conclusions about the 
tendencies and trends in the US bilateral space cooperative practice, which is much appreciated.  
 
13.1.4 United States-Russia Bilateral Treaties 
Bilateral treaties concluded between the United States and, firstly, the Soviet Union, and 
now Russia will be briefly reviewed. These treaties, however, will not be analyzed using a six-
criteria analysis. First, some of them have exclusively historical value and have long ago expired; 
hence, their comprehensive analysis will add little value to the achievement of the goal of the 
present book, striving to analyze the contemporary forms of international space cooperation. 
Second, those treaties that are currently in force are reviewed with one peculiar purpose: to 
provide the reader with the broad picture on bilateral cooperative practice of the two States and 
to provide an understanding of whether the approach to bilateral cooperation among each other 
and with other States varies.  
A disclaimer should be provided: to preserve credibility among researchers on both sides 
of the Atlantic, only those bilateral agreements will be analyzed that are considered legally 
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binding treaties by both States, meaning that protocols,52 implementing arrangements53 and 
similar documents will not be included in the scope of the present analysis. That leaves only two 
bilateral treaties currently in force: the Agreement concerning the procedure for the customs 
processing and duty-free entry of goods54 and the Agreement concerning cooperation in the 
exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.55  
The first bilateral agreement between the two ‘space powers’ was concluded in 1962 on 
the initiative of President Kennedy. The negotiations with the Soviet Union proceeded in an 
informal manner, giving the contemporaries an impression that the chances for a major 
American-Soviet space program looked slim, though such a possibility was not automatically 
excluded.56 The Bilateral Space Agreement of June 8, 1962 between the Soviet Union and the 
United States consisted of the Summary of Understandings between the Academy of Sciences of 
the Soviet Union and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the United States, 
subsequently confirmed and implemented by the First Memorandum of Understanding between 
the two agencies of 1963. “The Agreement provides for a coordinated meteorological satellite 
program, passive communications satellite experiments, a magnetic field survey through the use 
of artificial satellites, and future discussions by the scientists of the two countries of scientific 
results obtained from deep space probes. … In these arrangements we have perhaps the first 
practical premonition of what might ultimately develop into a “space for peace pool” 
transcending political differences.”57 
                                                        
52 E.g., Protocol to the implementing agreement of October 5, 1992 on human space flight cooperation. Signed at 
Moscow December 16, 1993; Entered into force December 16, 1993, T.I.A.S. No. 12522. 
53 E.g., Implementing agreement on the flight of the Russian Lunar Exploration Neutron Detector (LEND) on the 
United States Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO). Signed at Moscow October 3, 2007; Entered into force October 
3, 2007, T.I.A.S. No. 07-1003. 
54 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian 
Federation Concerning the Procedure for the Customs Processing and Duty-Free Entry of Goods Transported within 
the Framework of US-Russian Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Space for Peaceful Purposes. Signed at 
Moscow December 16, 1994; Entered into force August 26, 1996, T.I.A.S. No. 12588. 
55 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian 
Federation Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, with annex. 
Signed at Washington June 17, 1992; Entered into force June 17, 1992, T.I.A.S. No. 12457. Amendments and 
extensions: June 13 and 16, 1997; July 3 and August 9, 2002; December 3 and 26, 2007 and January 25, 2008, 
T.I.A.S. No. 07-1227.1. Although formally the latest extension of the 1992 Agreement has expired in 2012, both 
States include the 1992 Agreement in the list of bilateral treaties currently in force. 
56 Cf., M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 8. 
57 C.W. Jenks, Space Law (1965), at 86. 
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Next was the Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space for Peaceful Purposes of 1972,58 which was later hailed an ‘umbrella treaty’. This label, 
however, does not reflect the quite narrow scope of that treaty focusing on scientific space 
activities. Article 1 limits the scope of cooperation to “fields of space meteorology; study of 
natural environment; exploration of near earth space, the moon and the planets; and space 
biology and medicine.” Methods of cooperation focus on scientific exchange, not joint activities 
in practical applications. Article 3 expresses hope that “joint scientific experiments in future” 
might become a part of two-State cooperation, envisaging docking of an Apollo-type spacecraft 
and a Soyuz-type spacecraft. Article 5, being apparently the reason for the treaty’s nickname, 
reads: “The Parties may by mutual agreement determine other areas of cooperation in the 
exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.” The wording of this provision, 
however, is so weak and unspecified that it hardly amounts even to an introductory agreement to 
work toward identification of possible areas of mutually beneficial cooperation.  
The scope of the treaty is, on the one hand, too specific to be regarded a framework 
treaty, and on the other, too broad, and its wording too vague to constitute a project-specific 
agreement. Overall, not one article in this six-article treaty sets forth rights and obligations of 
cooperating States; rather it guides the States to “develop cooperation,” what, recalling the 
overall thrust of the Outer Space Treaty and provisions of the United Nations Charter, does not 
add anything to the principle of cooperation as between these two States. It is suggested that this 
treaty is one example of a treaty of intent; the only specific provision that might be considered as 
establishing obligations of the Parties can be found in Article 3, which, however, only instructs 
States “to carry out projects for developing compatible rendezvous and docking systems” in 
order to provide the opportunity for cooperation in the future. So the States are expected to 
engage in construction of certain equipment, while it is not at all clear whether the construction 
should be a joint venture or should be performed by each State separately, that can be used in the 
‘envisaged’ cooperative endeavor, should such cooperation at all take place – since nothing in 
the treaty establishes legal or organizational basis for such cooperation. It seems that such a 
construction fits perfectly the definition of a treaty of intent. And the duration clause – only five 
                                                        
58 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. Signed May 24, 1972; 
Entered into force May 24, 1972, T.I.A.S. No. 7347, 23 U.S.T. 867. 
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years – indirectly indicates, one, the cautiousness of the cooperating States, and two, their 
uncertainty that cooperation based on this treaty would indeed last. 
The last treaty with the Soviet Union was concluded in 1987.59 It mandated cooperation 
of the two States in performance of sixteen cooperative projects in such fields of space science as 
solar system exploration, space astronomy and astrophysics, earth sciences, solar-terrestrial 
physics and space biology and medicine. The primary method of cooperation was mutual 
exchange of scientific information and delegations. Work of the designated agencies should have 
been organized using joint working groups, but it was specifically noted that each 
recommendation of the working groups was subject to approval on governmental level.  
Just as the previous US-Soviet space treaties, this Agreement did not address matters that 
are now a part of every bilateral agreement: financial arrangements, customs and immigration 
requirements, export control, intellectual property and liability. The treaty, however, specifically 
provided for an exchange of personnel – so one would expect immigration procedures to be 
involved; allowed for an exchange of scientific equipment where appropriate – so matters of 
customs clearance and export control were similarly relevant; and called for joint activities in 
space science, which might well have resulted in inventions subject to intellectual property 
rights. Article 4 of the Agreement settled all these issues at once, leaving their resolution to 
diplomatic offices of the two States: “Cooperative activities under this Agreement, including 
exchanges of technical information, equipment and data, shall be conducted in accordance with 
international law as well as the international obligations, national laws, and regulations of each 
Party, and within the limits of available funds.” 
This Agreement, being more specific in its scope and rights and obligations of the 
cooperating States, also incorporated a different duration clause, setting the term to five years, 
but providing for a possibility of further extensions by an exchange of notes between the Parties. 
Although the extension procedure had never been used, since in 1992 the new treaty, now with 
Russia was already concluded, its inclusion signaled that the two States, while preserving a 
cautious approach, appreciated the value of cooperation with each other and, hence, provided for 
an opportunity to extend the period of cooperation should they find it desirable. Moreover, now 
that cooperation obtained more or less detailed characteristics and ceased to be an amorphous 
                                                        
59 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
concerning cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, with annex. Signed at 
Moscow April 15, 1987; Entered into force April 15, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 11433, 2192 U.N.T.S. 203. 
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concept as it used to be in the 1972 Agreement, the possibility of the longer-than-five-years term 
of cooperation seemed quite real, and arrangements had to be made to accommodate this 
possibility.   
In late 1991 the world had awoken to one less empire and fifteen more independent 
States. Dissolution of the Soviet Union brought a new perspective on space cooperation between 
Russia and the United States, and promotion of bilateral cooperation was the first step in the 
process of rapprochement between the former rivals. In 1992 the United States and Russia 
concluded the Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space 
for Peaceful Purposes, which continues up until today to be the legal basis for space cooperation 
of the two States.60  
This Agreement, from a legal perspective, is a big step forward compared to the 1987 
Agreement, though it has preserved the framework nature. First, the Preamble notes commercial 
applications of space technologies as one of the potential areas of cooperation. Commercial 
space activities were unthinkable in the Soviet Union; dismantling of the communist system 
allowed the States to properly note and highlight the growing trend of space commercialization 
in the treaty. Second, Article I sets forth a much broader scope of possible cooperation, including 
fields of space science, space exploration, space applications and space technology. Presumably, 
this Agreement creates the legal basis for cooperation in any and all possible areas of space 
exploration and use. Thus, the Agreement abandons the earlier used restriction of cooperative 
activities to the field of space science using exchange of scientific information and personnel; 
now practical joint endeavors in outer space have finally become possible.  
Third, Article III of the Agreement acknowledges its framework nature and instructs the 
appointed implementing agencies to conclude specific written agreements that define the nature 
and the scope of the project, the individual and joint responsibilities of the cooperating agencies, 
financial arrangements and protection of individual property. Thereby, the legal basis for long-
term cooperation in space between the United States and Russia has been established. 
Fourth, the Agreement includes an article establishing the consultations requirement. 
What distinguishes Article IV of this treaty from all other articles requiring consultations in all 
other bilateral treaties reviewed earlier is that, first, it calls for government-level consultations, 
                                                        
60 Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. Singed June 17, 1992; Entered into force June 17, 1992, 
T.I.A.S. No. 12456, 1992 W.L. 877273. 
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second, that it requires that consultations be held annually, and third, that they can only be used 
to review the progress of cooperation and propose new activities, not to settle arising questions. 
The first difference is the most notable; despite the designation of cooperating agencies in the 
same treaty, the States remained circumspect in their relations and considered government-to-
government communication the best way to ensure that their relations stay amicable.  
Fifth, the Agreement asserts obligations of the Parties to ensure adequate and effective 
protection of intellectual property created or furnished under this Agreement. The Annex to the 
Agreement elaborates the definition of intellectual property as used for the purposes of the 
Agreement, establishes the rules of allocation of intellectual property rights and provides for 
special treatment of business-confidential information. Although this Annex can hardly be hailed 
as creating a comprehensive intellectual property regime, it covers basic legal principles, 
establishing the much-need foundation for specific implementing arrangements.  
The duration clause has been exported from the 1987 Agreement, apparently, due to 
benefits such approach provides. The Agreement had been extended three times, and the last 
extension expired in 2012. Nevertheless, both States include the 1992 Agreement in their lists of 
bilateral treaties in force, prompting to consider it as such. Overall, although the Agreement 
provides only a cursory outline of the legal framework for cooperation in outer space, it proved 
to be sufficient to facilitate expansion of joint space-related activities of the two States. It is 
suggested that the practice of concluding a framework treaty that is complemented by specific 
implementing arrangements when necessary is a convenient legal tool in establishment of long-
term relations without unduly limiting possible ways and means of cooperation – after all, in a 
technology intensive field of space activities, prediction of the way space cooperation might 
evolve in twenty years is a task difficult to attain.  
The second US-Russia bilateral space treaty that is currently in force deals with particular 
issues of duty-free entry of goods transported in connection with cooperative activities of the 
States.61 The Agreement contains five concise articles that designate the cooperating agencies, 
require them to provide lists of transported goods to appropriate customs organs and mandate the 
entry of these goods to be duty-free. Article 4 adds that subject to separate arrangements some 
                                                        
61 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian 
Federation Concerning the Procedure for the Customs Processing and Duty-Free Entry of Goods Transported within 
the Framework of US-Russian Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Space for Peaceful Purposes. Signed at 
Moscow December 16, 1994; Entered into force August 26, 1996, T.I.A.S. No. 12588. 
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goods and technologies necessary for implementation of the 1992 Agreement62 might be 
supplied on a free-of-charge basis. Finally, due to the obvious need to implement provisions of 
the Agreement on a national level, namely by way of incorporation of relevant duty-free clauses 
in the customs laws of the two States, Article 5 stipulates that the Agreement enters into force 
after an exchange of diplomatic notes in which the Parties notify each other of the completion of 
their internal procedures necessary for the treaty’s entry into force. 
Concluding the review of the US-Russia bilateral space treaties, two observations are 
due. First, bilateral cooperation between these two States, despite the outlined specifics, follows 
the approach advanced by both Russia and the United States, namely conclusion of framework 
agreements that create a basis for further elaboration of particular projects, corresponding rights 
and obligations of the parties and the like. While the framework nature of the US-Russia treaty is 
more ‘exaggerated’ compared to other bilateral space treaties of the two countries currently in 
force in that it provides only ‘bones’ of the legal regime, failing to regulate many issues that are 
normally addressed in modern bilateral treaties, that does not alter the overarching approach of 
the two States to space cooperation, no matter the counter-party.  
Second, despite the scope of space cooperation between the two States, two treaties were 
deemed sufficient to provide the legal foundation for such cooperation. More broadly, the 
framework nature of the majority of concluded space treaties essentially presupposes that just 
one treaty is generally enough, unless specific sensitive issues should be addressed in a legally 
binding way. Intensity of cooperation does not affect the density of legally binding treaties 
necessary to regulate cooperative activities. That is the main feature and also the main benefit of 
framework treaties, as it will be shown below.  
 
13.2 Six-Criteria Analysis 
 
                                                        
62 One might wonder, though, whether any goods and technologies might become necessary to implement a 
framework treaty. The chosen wording seems to be a compromise to facilitate usage of the same wording in both 
English and Russian texts of the Agreement, which unfortunately led to this confusing formulation.  
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13.2.1 Membership/Participation 
13.2.1.1 Russian Bilateral Treaties 
Russia has concluded fifty-six bilateral treaties on space cooperation with twenty-three 
countries and one international organization, the European Space Agency; in addition, it has 
signed three protocols with Korea and Kazakhstan and five memoranda of understanding with 
four States. Notwithstanding the designation and the type of an agreement, Russia concludes 
space agreements exclusively with ‘traditional’ subjects of international law – sovereign States 
and international intergovernmental organizations – making States its prime counter-party in 
bilateral space cooperation. 
 
13.2.1.2 United States Bilateral Treaties 
The United States has sixty-eight bilateral space cooperation treaties in force concluded 
with nineteen States and one international organization – the European Space Agency. Just as 
Russia, the United States follows the traditional approach in choosing its counter-parties in 
bilateral space cooperation. The European Space Agency seems to be the only exception from 
the apparent, although non-written law of bilateral space cooperation stating: Cooperate 
exclusively with States. Despite existence of multiple space organizations neither the United 
States, nor Russia deemed it necessary to conclude bilateral treaties with any of these. It is 
suggested that the uniquely important role of the European Space Agency, which oftentimes in 
effect acts as a representative of its members, or even broader as a representative of the European 
space sector generally, warranted conclusion of the existing bilateral space treaties. 
 
13.2.2 Secretariat 
13.2.2.1 Russian Bilateral Treaties 
While some bilateral treaties, for example those with Chile and Cuba, provide for an 
establishment of working groups in connection with the implementation of the treaties and 
require holding bilateral meetings – consultations – they both are envisioned as ad hoc 
arrangements commenced only when and if necessary, and arrangement of which necessitates 
separate planning. None of the analyzed treaties enunciate a detailed procedure of these 
meetings, their locations, frequency and the like, therefore, leading to a conclusion that if a 
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secretariat is deemed necessary in connection with any of these meetings, it is appointed on an 
ad hoc basis.  
 
13.2.2.2 United States Bilateral Treaties 
None of the analyzed United States treaties provide for the need to establish formal 
working groups or similar organs, but every treaty enunciates the consultations procedure. 
Contextual reading of relevant provisions prompt the conclusion, as had been noted above, that 
consultations always remain the inter-agency informal and non-written mechanism of 
communication. The only treaty that provides for annual government-level consultations, the 
1992 treaty with Russia, sets forth this mechanism, most likely, for political reasons and, despite 
presumably more formalized procedure, does not set forth a procedure for these meetings 
organization. That leads to a conclusion that none of the United States treaties necessitates 
creation of a permanent secretariat; an ad hoc organ performing secretarial functions would 
suffice for both formal consultations and informal agency-level consultations. 
 
13.2.3 International Legal Personality 
Since neither Russian, nor United States bilateral treaties create permanently working 
secretarial organs, no entity possibly possessing international legal personality could have been 
created. 
 
13.2.4 Term of Existence 
13.2.4.1 Russian Bilateral Treaties 
Article 15 of the 2011 Agreement with Belarus enunciates that the Agreement shall 
remain in force for ten years and will automatically be extended for another ten-year period 
unless any Party informs the other of its intention to terminate the Agreement. The Agreement 
does not provide for a separate withdrawal or termination procedure, apparently resorting to the 
general rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The 2013 GLONASS Agreement 
with Belarus, in accordance with Article 14 provisions, shall remain in force for an indefinite 
period conditional to continuing validity of the 2011 Agreement. Unlike the 2011 Agreement, 
this one provides for a termination clause, requiring a 6-month advance notification. 
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The 2006 Agreement with Indonesia uses a different duration clause. Here the 
agreement’s duration is limited to five years, though an automatic procedure is foreseen unless 
any Party duly informs the other of its intention to terminate the treaty.  
The treaties with Cuba and Chile contain a noteworthy provision that cannot be found in 
any US space treaty. Paragraph 2 of Article 15 of the Russia-Cuba Agreement in the relevant 
part states: “The present Agreement is concluded for an indefinite period.” Although in effect 
this duration clause is not different from that establishing a 10-year duration term with an 
automatic extension unless parties agree otherwise, a modern treaty intended to perpetually 
remain in force is a rarity in treaties concerning bilateral cooperation. One scholar has noted: “It 
is scarcely to be doubted that treaties are ordinarily consummated after a due consideration by all 
parties of the possible benefits which may in the future accrue to them through the operation of 
the treaty under consideration. It so happens that one state often finds that it has made a bad 
bargain, or that it failed to take into consideration future contingencies that might operate to its 
disadvantage. Thus the state may find itself bound either for a term of years or in perpetuity to a 
contract, the execution of which may entail varying degrees of injury to itself.”63 
The majority of contemporary bilateral treaties contain a withdrawal clause; even in its 
absence, provisions of Article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties give a State 
not willing to continue to be bound by the treaty in question an opportunity to withdraw. It has 
been correctly noted that if one assumes that States concluding a treaty are rational actors, 
duration and withdrawal clauses must bring certain advantages, or they would not appear in the 
agreements.64 It follows, then, that the ‘indefinite duration’ clause was, first, meticulously 
elaborated by the contracting States, and, second, that such a clause was deemed most beneficial 
for both parties. But to understand reasons behind choosing one duration clause over the other, 
which clearly cannot be random, one should understand differences in the circumstances 
surrounding conclusion of the agreement in question, including the cooperation problems it is 
trying to solve.65  
While it can be assumed with certainty that one of the reasons behind the treaty was the 
desire to formalize cooperation in exploration and use of outer space, even should it commence 
                                                        
63 J.P. Bullington, International Treaties and the Clause “Rebus Sic Stantibus”, 153 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 
(December, 1927), at 153. 
64 Cf., B. Koremenos and A. Nau, Exit, No Exit, 21 Duke J. of Comp. & Int’l L. 81 (2010), at 83. 
65 Id. at 85. 
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at some point in future, there is not much more reliable information to base conclusions on 
regarding the reasons behind wording of this or that article. Identification of some – though 
likely not all – reasons behind certain provisions included in a multilateral treaty is an 
analytically easier task since, first, travaux préparatories are often publicly available and serve 
as a good source to understand moods, concerns and views of negotiating parties, and, second, 
the very fact that a certain group of States has come together is already suggestive of their 
intentions. In case of a bilateral treaty the task becomes more complicated because it is a true 
rarity when ‘behind the scenes’ of bilateral negotiations are made public, and, of course, because 
State-to-State relations embrace an abundance of political, social, economic, cultural, historical 
and even personal considerations that cannot become known to an outsider.  
Based on the general thrust of the treaties and, to some extent, on subjective 
considerations of a politico-moral character, it is suggested that there are generally three types of 
duration clauses that are used in treaties pursuing different goals. First, the ‘indefinite duration’ 
clause is used in framework agreements aimed at establishment of the legal and organizational 
basis for future-oriented cooperation with a State that is considered a strategic partner. Second, 
the long-term duration clause with a provision for possible extension is used in framework 
agreements aimed at establishment of the legal and organizational basis for cooperation that is to 
be commenced in the short term. While in both cases framework agreements are aimed at 
creation of a comprehensive cooperative regime that is supposed to be used for the years to 
come, the temporal proximity of the launching of cooperating activities prompts the contracting 
States to express caution. The first cooperative project might well go wrong inducing a 
contacting State to terminate the agreement; while, legally speaking, withdrawal from a treaty 
concluded for a limited time and from that concluded for an indefinite period would not differ, 
politically these are quite different situations.  
A recent article on exiting treaties shows that a breach of treaty obligations and a 
complete withdrawal of a State yield different payoffs, particularly that “[t]he choice to 
denounce, together with any explanation the state offers to justify its decision, may signal an 
intent to ‘play by the rules’ of future treaties as well. As a result, harm to the withdrawing state’s 
reputation as a law abiding nation may be minimal.”66 Using the same logic, it is suggested that a 
withdrawal from a treaty that was intended to last presumably forever in the first years of its 
                                                        
66 L.R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1579 (2005), at 1622. 
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existence would signal that this State is incapable of maintaining long-term partnership relations, 
that its selfish interests are above values of cooperation. A withdrawal from a limited-term treaty, 
however, may not entail similar consequences: at the outset the contracting States agreed to limit 
the term of their cooperation, so there is no surprise that cooperation might come to an end.  
The third type of a duration clause is a simple limited term without an extension 
provision, which, nevertheless, might provide for extension of the duration term subject to a 
separate agreement of the States. This is the most common type of a duration clause that can be 
found in bilateral space treaties of the United States.  
Bilateral space treaties of the Russian Federation do not normally use this type of 
duration clause, even in project-specific agreements. The 2003 Agreement with France, for 
example, uses the second type of a duration clause, stating in Article 19 that the treaty shall 
remain in force till December 31, 2016, and that afterwards its term shall be extended 
automatically for following 10-year periods. The 2011 Agreement Kazakhstan, by contrast, uses 
a quite peculiar duration clause: the result of cooperation pursuant to this Agreement is a tangible 
satellite, and for this reason the duration of the treaty is conditional to completion of the process 
of the satellite construction and launching. 
Overall, the treaties tend to be concluded for a long period with further automatic 
extension, effectively making them expected to remain in force for an indefinite period of time. 
On the one hand, such an approach to bilateral cooperation signals that Russia tends to conclude 
just one framework treaty and proceed with cooperation using less formal, usually inter-agency, 
agreements. Out of the twenty-three States Russia has bilateral space treaties with, with fourteen 
of them it has just one treaty that follows the described above structure. On the other hand, some 
States Russia has concluded treaties with, were not actively involved in space activities at the 
time of the treaty conclusion, and, thus, these treaties appear to serve strategic long-term goals. 
Except for the obvious example of the recent treaty with Cuba, earlier occasions can also be 
 449 
found. The bilateral space treaty with Mexico was concluded in 1996,67 but only as of 2015 have 
the two States engaged in a cooperative undertaking, which, unfortunately, ended with a fiasco.68 
` 
13.2.4.2 United States Bilateral Treaties 
Generally, the duration clause of both framework agreements and implementing 
arrangements provides that the agreement shall remain in force for ten years. Project-specific 
agreements may include different duration clause due to specifics of the project. The 
Memorandum of Understanding with Argentina Concerning the Flight of the SAC-A Mission on 
the Shuttle,69 for example, has the duration of the agreement subjected to completion of the 
mission, which also includes a “period for data analysis not to exceed three years.” 
Overall, over the fifty years since the United States embarked on bilateral space 
cooperation, it has concluded dozens of agreements on various aspects of space exploration and 
use. The United States space agreements, however, are rather cautious in their duration clauses, 
and many of the earlier treaties have ceased to be in force. For example, the first framework 
treaty with Argentina had been concluded in 1991 and expired in 2006. The currently enforced 
treaty was negotiated only five years later, in 2011. So instead of extending the previous treaty, 
or rushing to conclude another agreement, the Parties that had been bound by a space 
cooperation agreement for fifteen years and had undertaken more than one cooperative mission, 
opted for a temporary intermission. Acknowledging that a multitude of reasons, of both national 
and international character, might have affected this decision, it certainly indicates that bilateral 
space treaties in the US practice are concluded primarily when there is an actual need in 
cooperation. That is a drastic difference from the practice of Russia to conclude framework 
treaties for long periods with automatic extensions, or sometimes even for indefinite periods, 
                                                        
67 Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitelstvom Rossiiyskoi Federatsii i Pravitelstvom Meksikanskih Soedinennih Shtatov o 
Sotrudnichestve v Oblasti Issledovaniya I Ispolzovaniya Kosmicheskogo Prostranstva v Mirnykh Zelyakh [An 
Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of Mexico 
on Cooperation in Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes] of May 20, 1996, entered into force 
November 29, 1996, Biulleten’ Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov [Bulletin of International Treaties] No. 4 1997. 
68 R.M. Herszenhorn, Russian Rocket Carrying Mexican Satellite Is Said to Crash in Siberia, The New York Times, 
May 16, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/world/europe/russian-rocket-carrying-mexican-
satellite-is-said-to-crash-in-siberia.html?_r=0. 
69 Memorandum of Understanding between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the United States 
of America and the National Commission on Space Activities of the Argentine Republic Concerning the Flight of 
the SAC-A Mission on the Shuttle. Signed at Buenos Aires October 16, 1997; Entered into force October 16, 1997, 
T.I.A.S. No. 12893. 
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with States, which might not be able to meaningfully cooperate in space activities in the 
foreseeable future, predominantly due to strategic considerations.  
 
13.2.5 Binding Force of Documents Produced 
13.2.5.1 Russian Bilateral Treaties 
The 2006 Agreement with Indonesia allocates a separate article to state that 
organizational, financial, legal and technical terms of particular projects and programs shall be 
the subject of separate agreements, which are to be concluded in written form and shall be in 
compliance with international obligations of the Parties. The same provisions were incorporated 
in the 2011 Agreement with Belarus in article 6, which confirms that all “organizational, 
financial, legal and technical terms of performance of particular programs and cooperative 
projects in furtherance of the present Agreement shall constitute a subject for separate 
agreements directly between the Parties or separate agreements (contracts) between participants 
of cooperative activities.”  
By and large, almost every treaty includes a similar provision that in effect levies the 
burden of project-specific arrangements onto project-specific agreements and contracts. That, 
however, by no means signals that conclusion of project-specific agreements is mandated by 
relevant treaties. Project-specific documents are to be concluded only when and if cooperating 
States consider it necessary; therefore, while these documents are concluded within the 
framework of the general treaty, their conclusion is not required. Hence, these project-specific 
agreements do not necessarily fall within the category of ‘documents produced’ within the 
relevant mechanism of cooperation: they are concluded under the umbrella of the treaty, but they 
preserve distinct independence, at least in terms of their negotiation procedure. The bottom line 
is that none of the analyzed treaties contains an explicit authorization for conclusion of the 
project-specific agreements, merely explaining that they are necessary for regulation of certain 
matters, thus questioning the very fact that they are ‘produced’ within the mechanism of 
cooperation of a particular treaty.  
The necessary project-specific agreements are either concluded in the form of private law 
civil contracts or, on the public international level, by way of conclusion of memoranda of 
understanding, protocols, interim agreements and the like. Only in exceptional cases touching 
upon vital interests of the Russian Federation the project-specific agreements are concluded on 
 451 
an intergovernmental level in the form of a treaty; multiple bilateral treaties with Kazakhstan 
regarding utilization of the Baykonur Cosmodrome, which is considered a strategic asset, support 
this conclusion. 
The Russian Foreign Ministry does not consider protocols, memoranda of understanding 
and similar implementing agreements to be treaties and, hence, does not include these in the list 
of Russian bilateral treaties in force.70 The obvious advantage of these types of agreements, thus, 
is the absence of a need for their ratification. Generally, in Russian bilateral practice a 
memorandum of understanding is concluded either to formalize interest of two States in 
cooperation and agree on development of a legally binding treaty,71 or to specify rights and 
obligations of contracting States in performance of a particular project, when a general legally 
binding treaty between these parties is already in force.72  
To summarize, even if a proposition that project-specific agreements are produced within 
the mechanism of cooperation of framework treaties is accepted, it is undisputed that these 
agreements are legally non-binding on the international plane.  
 
13.2.5.2 United States Bilateral Treaties 
Framework treaties of the United States resemble Russian practice requiring that “the 
specific terms and conditions for Programs shall be set forth in implementing arrangements 
between the implementing agencies,” which might include provisions related to the nature and 
scope of a particular program, individual rights and responsibilities of the agencies, financial, 
technical and other arrangements. All framework treaties specifically note that such 
“Implementing Arrangements shall incorporate by reference and be subject to this Framework 
                                                        
70 See, The List of Bilateral Treaties of the Russian Federation on the official website of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry at http://archive.mid.ru/spd_md.nsf/webcantr/. Full texts of protocols and memoranda of understanding is 
available at the official website of the Russian Space Agency at www.federalspace.ru. 
71 Memorandum o Vzaimoponimanii Mezhdu Federalnim Kosmicheskim Agenstvom I Ministerstvom Nauki I 
Institutom Telekommunikatsii I Pochti Respubliki Nicaragua po Voprosam Sotrudnichestva v Oblasti Issledovaniya 
I Ispolzovaniya Kosmicheskogo Prostranstva v Mirnikh Zelyakh [Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
Federal Space Agency and the Institute of Telecommunication and Post of the Republic of Nicaragua Concerning 
Cooperation in Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes] of December 18, 2008, available at the 
official website of the Russian Space Agency www.federalspace.ru. 
72 Memorandum o Vzaimoponimanii Mezhdu Federalnim Kosmicheskim Agenstvom I Ministerstvom Nauki I 
Tekhnologii Federativnoy Respubliki Brazilii Otnositelno Sotrudnichestva v Osuschestvlenii Kosmicheskoi 
Deyatelnosti [Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Space Agency and the Ministry of Science and 
Technology of the Federative Republic Brazil Concerning Cooperation in Performance of Outer Space Activities] of 
November 22, 2004, available at the official website of the Russian Space Agency www.federalspace.ru. 
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Agreement unless the Parties agree otherwise,”73 thus confirming the foundational role played by 
the framework treaties in project-specific cooperation. Thereby, while framework treaties 
constitute the legal basis for project-specific agreements, they, just as Russian treaties, do not 
require or explicitly authorize particular organs to conclude project-specific documents. In the 
US practice project-specific documents are normally entitled either ‘implementing arrangements’ 
or ‘memoranda of understanding’.  
It is notable that the Treaties in Force enumerates memoranda of understanding and 
implementing arrangements on a par with more traditionally entitled bilateral ‘agreements’, for 
example the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Argentina 
concerning the flight of the SAC-A Mission on the (NASA space) shuttle is included in the list. 
Therefore, it should be determined whether the inter-agency project-specific bilateral space 
agreements of the United States regardless of their designation are legally binding treaties. 
As applied to the area of mutual legal assistance, an opinion has been expressed that a 
memorandum of understanding should not be considered equal to a treaty because it does not 
engage the executive or the legislature in negotiations, deliberation, or signature. Rather, 
memoranda of understanding are considered “good-faith agreements, affirming ties between 
regulatory agencies based on their like-minded commitment to getting results.”74  
With respect to bilateral defense treaties of the United States, it has been explained that 
implementing agreements concluded pursuant to a framework agreement created the bilateral 
legal basis for respective cooperation;75 nothing in the texts of the framework treaties and the 
implementing arrangements on cooperation in space activities indicates that this evaluation does 
not stand in the space context. First, the texts of these agreements use the verb ‘shall’ to set forth 
obligations of the implementing agencies. Second, the provisions regarding agreements’ 
amendment, duration, entry into force and termination are similar to those used in the framework 
treaties. Third, the clause giving priority to the text of the framework treaty in case of a conflict 
with provisions of the implementing arrangement does not by itself indicate a legal force of 
                                                        
73 Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Sweden for Cooperative 
Activities in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. Signed October 14, 2005; Entered into 
force October 14, 2005, State Dept. No. 05-286. 
74 A.-M. Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 Foreign Affairs 183 (1997), at 187. 
75 Cf., S. Murphy, Role of Bilateral Defense Agreements in Maintaining the European Security Equilibrium, 24 
Cornell Int’l L. J. 415 (1991), at 420. [emphasis added]  
 453 
either document.76 Finally, inclusion of these agreements in the compendium of the United States 
treaties in force is an authoritative argument in favor of their legally binding nature in its own 
right.77 
 
13.2.6 Existence of Opportunity to Modify Obligations 
The analyzed bilateral treaties, due to the very fact of them being legally binding 
international agreements, are regulated by the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties. Hence, Article 39 of the Convention, which reads: “A treaty may be amended by 
agreement between the parties,” applies to the analyzed treaties as well. Two other articles of the 
Convention, however, do not apply to bilateral treaties because their application is explicitly 
limited to multilateral treaties. Since any bilateral treaty has only two parties, there is no need for 
elaborate rules of their amendment; mere agreement in favor of amendment is sufficient. 
“Naturally, bilateral treaties can be amended more easily than multilateral. The parties 
can always agree to an amendment: the only question is the form in which it is to be expressed. 
Sometimes the treaty will contain an amendment clause.”78 Russian bilateral treaties, indeed, 
include an amendment clause only occasionally, while the treaties of the United States include 
such a clause in every agreement. The United States amendment clause with minor editorial 
variations always reads: “These Parties may amend this Agreement by mutual written consent.” 
Russian treaties include an amendment clause in approximately half of the treaties. Although the 
exact formulation of the clause varies from treaty to treaty, sometimes even requiring conclusion 
of a separate Protocol to effectuate an amendment, substantively the clause boils down to the 
contents of the United States’ amendment clause formulation.  
Clearly, “there may be reasons why an amendment clause is not wanted or is not 
desirable,”79 and oftentimes the reasons are of political nature. While the amendment clause has 
                                                        
76 See e.g., Article 7 of the Implementing arrangement between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
of the United States of America and the Swedish National Space Board of the Kingdom of Sweden for Cooperation 
in Aeronautic and Space Research Using Nanosatellite Technologies, which in relevant part reads: “In the event of a 
conflict between the provisions of this Implementing Arrangement and the Framework Agreement, the terms of the 
Framework Agreement shall prevail.” 
77 It should be recalled that the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States in Article 102 
considers as sources of international law only those international agreements that create binding obligations between 
the parties to the agreement. Therefore, it should be presumed that in the US practice international agreements are 
only then considered a part of international law when they are legally binding.   
78 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2013), at 234. 
79 Id. 
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an obvious advantage, that is specification of the means by which the amendment is put into 
effect, its absence does not affect the right of contracting States to amend the treaty in question. 
In case of a bilateral treaty, where only two parties are involved and the danger of creating 
multiple separate legal regimes for different parties of the treaty is not present, the amendment 
clause is of lesser relevance and importance.  
 
13.3 Evaluation and Conclusions 
 
This concludes the overview of selected bilateral space treaties of the United States and 
Russia. It has been shown that currently the practice of both States is to conclude framework 
agreements that establish the general legal and organizational regime for cooperation, and to 
formalize cooperation on particular projects using some form of implementing arrangements on 
the inter-agency level. It has also been shown that the ‘obligation of result’ in cooperation gets 
its legal formalization only in such implementing project-specific arrangements.  
It is suggested that such an approach to bilateral cooperation is triggered by two 
considerations. First, it eliminates the need to go through a laborious process of a government-
level negotiation and later ratification of each agreement pertaining to implementation of a 
particular project. In the case of the United States, where implementing arrangements are 
considered legally binding treaties, reference in the implementing arrangements to the 
framework treaty allows circumventing the need for ratification due to the presumed blanket 
agreement granted by the Senate for all cooperation falling within the scope of the framework 
agreement. In case of Russia, such implementing arrangements are not considered legally 
binding and, thus, the question of their ratification does not even come up.  
Intensification of space activities in general and of cooperative space endeavors in 
particular justifies this approach. On the one hand, grand and evolving projects akin to the 
International Space Station demand that sometimes an agreement should be reached within a 
short period of time, making the need for ratification an impediment to successful cooperation. 
On the other, space cooperation becomes more technically complicated, and it is not the 
legislature’s task to profess particularities of space technology. Thereby, while the decision as to 
partners in space cooperation and scope of such cooperation is the one the executive must not 
make without the consent of the legislature, the elaboration of details of ways and means to 
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implement cooperative projects can be better handled by agencies with professional expertise in 
these matters.   
The second reason behind resorting to the framework treaty-implementing arrangement 
structure of cooperation is the wish to limit the breadth of legally binding obligations in the area 
of space exploration and use. Conclusion of a framework treaty does not ipso facto create the 
obligation to cooperate in its ‘obligation of result’ dimension; thus, it does not create the 
obligation the other party might legally enforce.80 Acknowledging that States, being rational 
actors, conclude treaties only when they expect certain benefits to be derived from the treaty, 
oftentimes circumstances change, sometimes dramatically, along the way, changing attitudes of 
the parties toward each other and toward prospects of cooperation. Only a project-specific 
agreement, outlining rights and obligations in greater detail can become legally enforceable. And 
such an agreement is concluded only if and when projected cooperation is considered desirable 
by both parties, and when both parties find the legal enforceability an advantage rather than a 
limitation to their freedom of activities. By way of conclusion, it should be again reiterated that 
with respect to space cooperation this approach should be considered favorable. Manfred Lachs 
famously proclaimed: “[L]aw calls for cooperation, and cooperation calls for law,”81 and with 
this approach the law is present, and cooperation would follow. 
In Russian practice at least one example of a bilateral framework treaty concluded with a 
State that is currently not active in outer space activities has been encountered. More treaties, 
including those with Mexico and Belarus, were concluded when these States did not engage in 
exploration and use of outer space. Earlier in the chapter scholarly opinions expressing concern 
regarding a relatively small involvement of less developed States in space cooperation and lesser 
benefits these States are obtaining from bilateral cooperation have been noted.82 There is no 
simple recipe to transform this state of affairs; efforts from both developed and developing 
nations would be required. Nevertheless, it is suggested that the practice of concluding bilateral 
framework agreements establishing a legal and organizational framework for cooperative space 
activities is a step toward resolution of the problem of States’ uneven inclusion in space affairs.  
                                                        
80 For a theoretical discussion regarding the enforceability of the principle of cooperation in its ‘obligation of effort’ 
dimension and its correlation with the principle of pacta sunt servanda, see Chapter 1, at 25-26. 
81 M. Lachs, The Law of Outer Space: An Experience in Contemporary Law-Making (2010), at 27. 
82 See, N. Chukeat, International Cooperation for Sustainable Space Development, 31 J. Space L. 315 (2005), at 
337. Also see, I.A. Vlasic, “The Relevance of International Law to Emerging Trends in the Law of Outer Space,” in 
C.E. Black and R.A. Falk (eds.), The Future of the International Legal Order, Volume 2: Wealth and Resources 
(2015), at 308-09. 
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The most obvious advantage of this practice is creation of a legal basis. Once a certain 
project is conceived, proceeding to actual cooperative actions is a far easier task when the legal 
regime is already in place. Keeping in mind that involvement of an additional partner in a 
national project should be made at an early stage, when modifications to the project necessary to 
accommodate a larger number of participants are still possible, and the process of 
intergovernmental negotiation of a treaty might take long time, the offer for cooperation might 
become moot because of the advancements in the project development. Another advantage of 
having a treaty in place is that its negotiation, along with communication pursuant to the treaty 
once it is in force, allows the parties, especially the cooperating agencies, to get acquainted, to 
understand each other’s priorities and capabilities. It is a valuable addition to bilateral relations 
since not the governments, but the appointed agencies are performing a particular project; and 
agency-to-agency relations make necessary contacts, updates or any other exchange of 
information more expeditious, thus raising the chances of development of a joint project. The 
final advantage is that an existing treaty ‘raises awareness’: once parties are aware of each 
other’s readiness to take on certain obligations, the partner-State ceases to be just a State you do 
not conduct cooperative activities with and moves to a group of States you might be willing to 
involve in your next project. 
Space cooperation between Russia and Belarus is an example to the point. Until 2012 
Belarus was not actively participating in space activities, and the 2011 framework Agreement 
with Russia was filling the blank space of Belarusian international space relations. An existing 
legal framework prompted Russia to consider benefits of cooperation with Belarus, and in 2012 
the Agreement on utilization of the GLONASS system was concluded.83 This Agreement is 
beneficial to Belarus, providing access to location services to end users on its territory and 
furnishing an opportunity to launch and operate its national satellite. But this Agreement is no 
less beneficial to Russia, which is striving to make its GLONASS system truly global, and which 
will also benefit from access to data obtained using the Belarusian GLONASS facilities. 
Therefore, a mutually beneficial arrangement has been made, at the same time, affording benefits 
of space activities to a less developed country.  
                                                        
83 It is also quite plausible that the 2011 Agreement was concluded in lieu of the mooted GLONASS project, and the 
2012 Agreement came as a necessary elaboration of the legal regime. Whatever the actual chronology of 
cooperation was, the 2011 Agreement served a proof that Russia was ready to cooperate with Belarus, and once the 
framework treaty was in place, commencement of actual cooperation was a matter of time and politics. 
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The choice of a partner to conclude a treaty with, however, is influenced by a myriad of 
factors and considerations of legal, economic and political nature. Every treaty requires a 
meticulous elaboration of the advantages and drawbacks stemming from its provisions. In the 
area of space activities, where national security concerns are at a higher level, cooperation has 
many political implications, and, thus, almost by definition cannot be commenced with all or 
even a majority of States. But once a level of trust and friendship required from a political 
standpoint is achieved, consideration of prospective space cooperation becomes possible; and at 
this point conclusion of a framework treaty might be well justified. The Agreement between 
Russia and Cuba, which was concluded as a result of closer relations between the two countries, 
is one promising example of involvement of a less developed State in space cooperation. 
Conclusion of framework treaties across the board, whether or not any cooperation is 
planned or might become conceivable in foreseeable future, of course, is not the best way to 
alleviate the problem of limited access of less developed nations to space capabilities. For one, a 
framework treaty per se does not equal joint activities; there is a long way between the 
establishment of a legal basis and its practical application. More importantly, conclusion of 
treaties concerning cooperation when in reality no cooperation is expected undermines the 
integrity of international law and can hardly be found compatible with the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda. Therefore, while the practice of concluding framework treaties with the States not yet 
involved in space activities have brought many positive results and, thus, should be commended, 
it should only be commended if conclusion of a treaty is supported by a good-faith intent to 
proceed with cooperation. 
While both Russia and the United States conclude framework space agreements further 
complemented by project-specific implementing arrangements, the two States have different 
approaches to the duration clauses of their framework treaties: whereas the United States tends to 
limit the treaty duration to ten years with a possibility of its extension subject to agreement of the 
parties, Russian treaties normally include either a ten-year duration clause with automatic 
extension or provide for an indefinite duration period. The substance of the framework space 
treaties of the two States, at the same time, is fairly similar. Legally speaking, there is no 
indication as to reasons behind the varying duration clauses,84 and it may be assumed that the 
difference is caused predominantly by political contemplations or preferences.  
                                                        
84 Political and legal sciences both distinguish between duration clauses that require tacit and express consent to 
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It is suggested that a limited term that may be extended by mutual agreement of the 
cooperating States is preferable, primarily due to its tendency to encourage prompt 
commencement of cooperation. A treaty with a limited term incentivizes the States to use the 
benefits of having a legal basis in place while the treaty is still in force, whereas a presumably 
indefinite period of the treaty duration allows postponing joint activities; and nothing precludes 
the States from extending the term should cooperation prove beneficial when the ten-year period 
is over. This, however, is a subjective point of view of the author that is based primarily on 
socio-political reflections of the cooperative dynamic. From a legal standpoint, the two 
approaches to the duration clause are equally reasonable. 
The requirement for release of scientific information that can be found in every US 
bilateral space treaty should be commended. Designation of outer space as “a province of 
mankind” is not an extravagant way of saying that outer space is above every single person on 
earth; it is a guiding principle that States must strive to follow in their national and cooperative 
space activities. The least costly, but nevertheless one of the most effective ways to incorporate 
this principle is to provide public access to scientific results of space activities. Space-based 
science delivered technology that changed the world,85 but it still remains an asset available to a 
minority of States. Release of scientific results makes outer space one step closer to truly being a 
province of mankind. And it is only unfortunate and inconsiderate that Russia has decided 
against promotion of enlightenment in its bilateral practice.  
Finally, the treaties concluded in the recent years adopted the practice of including a 
comprehensive list of definitions used in the treaty. It is suggested that this practice should be 
continued. Framework treaties, creating the general legal basis for cooperation, aim at 
establishing a solid foundation for future joint endeavors. One of their tasks is to ensure that 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
extension of the treaty, they attribute both types of clauses to States’ willingness to provide a ‘form of insurance’ 
against continuation of cooperation against their will. E.g., see, B. Koremenos, Contracting Around Uncertainty, 99, 
4 Am. P. Science Rev. 549-565 (2005), cited in M.S. Copelovitch and T.L. Putnam, Context Matters: International 
Institutions and the Limits of Rational Design, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political 
Science Association 67th Annual National Conference (2009), available at 
<http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p361335_index.html. See also, L.R. Helfer, “Flexibility in International 
Agreements,” in J. Dunoff and M.A. Pollack (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and 
International Relations (2013), at 190; A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law Practice (2013), at 251. Therefore, despite the 
obvious differences between the two duration clauses, from both legal and political perspectives, they represent 
cautious approach of States toward envisioned duration of future cooperation, whereas the major difference is the 
degree of cautiousness. 
85 For a concise list of the most drastic changes space science has brought into people’s lives see, T. Radford, What 
Has Space Exploration Ever Done for Us?, The Guardian, 6 February 2013, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/science/2003/feb/06/spaceexploration. 
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cooperation triggers as few controversies and disagreements between the cooperating States as 
possible; and uniform interpretation of terms is one of the valuable tools in achievement of this 
task.  
Overall, there is a tendency toward greater uniformity of structure and content of bilateral 
space treaties, which should be continued. The recent scholarly work after analyzing three 
bilateral space treaties in specific areas of cooperation concluded: “[T]hey may well serve as 
blueprints for future occasions where states want to combine their respective launcher 
technology and launch port operations or their launch operations and their remote sensing 
technology.”86 The bottom line is that borrowing best practices from the legal experience of 
other States may well be beneficial for the cooperating States themselves and generally for the 
development of international space law. That, however, does not mean that an individual 
approach should be eliminated from space cooperation. Every State is unique in its space 
capabilities; and inventive genius and competition are the factors that fueled the drive toward the 
high-technology world, as we know it today. The continuing utilization of the framework treaty-
implementing arrangement structure of cooperation would allow achieving uniformity and 
adoption of best practices on the one hand, and tailoring the guiding legal regime to those grand 
endeavors that are yet to be seen, on the other.
                                                        
86 F.G. von der Dunk, “International Space Law,” in F.G. von der Dunk, Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 118. 
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Chapter 14. Results: Forms of Cooperation and Their Applicability 
 
In the introductory chapter of the book it has been suggested that cooperation is a 
complex multi-faceted phenomenon that can be analyzed from a legal, political, historical or 
socio-economic perspective; each viewpoint would highlight certain features of cooperation, 
emphasize different functions of cooperative activities and offer somewhat varying conclusions 
as to the importance and effectiveness of cooperation. Since the present research is legal in its 
perspective, albeit socio-economic and, to a limited extent, political considerations have also 
played a role in the preceding analysis, in this final chapter the conclusions will be limited to the 
role of cooperation in promotion of the legal order for outer space activities and in enhancement 
of the collaborative efforts of States through utilization of various legal instruments. 
It should be recalled that the goal of this book is to propose the most effective forms of 
international legal cooperation in attainment of future cooperative space projects. The analysis of 
twelve contemporary mechanisms of cooperation has provided sufficient empirical basis for 
broader theoretical conclusions. It, however, has not yet provided the necessary theoretical basis 
for the conclusions the book is aiming at. Therefore, before proceeding with the overview and 
summary of the results of the preceding chapters, theoretical considerations regarding the need 
for cooperation and its role in modern international community should be addressed.   
This chapter will be structured in three parts. The first one will provide general 
reflections regarding the phenomenon of cooperation, identify several influential theoretical 
approaches to the analysis of cooperative activities and suggest why States choose different 
methods of cooperation in achievement of their goals. International space law is a part of general 
international law and, more broadly, a part of international relations; hence, while conclusions of 
this part will focus on outer space activities, they will unavoidably be premised on theoretical 
deductions that have their empirical basis in various other areas of States’ collaborative 
activities.  
The second part of the chapter will present a summarizing overview of the conclusions 
made throughout the book. For the sake of clarity and convenience, the overview will be 
presented in the form of a table outlining conclusions regarding currently existing forms of 
cooperation. At that point a distinction between a mechanism (or a method) of cooperation and a 
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form of cooperation will be explained in greater detail. Simply put, a form of cooperation is a 
broader category that may include several mechanisms of cooperation that are characterized by a 
substantial similarity in their institutional structure. Based on the six criteria analysis of the 
twelve mechanisms of cooperation, the currently existing forms of international legal 
cooperation will be enumerated. Further, their institutional features will be discerned and the 
matters that can be better addressed using each one will be identified. Finally, the chapter will be 
concluded by broadly formulated suggestions for future development of international legal 
cooperation in exploration and use of outer space. 
 
14.1 Why Cooperate? 
 
“It is undisputed that the dominant contemporary paradigm for international cooperation 
is liberal internationalism. The postwar story of cooperation is one of an ever-increasing number 
of international institutions, constituted by a legally binding treaty, with expanding powers of 
governance. The paradigmatic case is the United Nations system: an international organization, 
constituted by treaty, which, in turn, has generated many other organizations and treaties.”1  
The United Nations indeed exemplifies all sides of contemporary international legal 
cooperation: it is a universal international intergovernmental organization with a broad mandate, 
based on an international treaty of a similarly general scope; it has the right to consider most 
matters of international relations and adopt decisions, some of which are legally binding on all 
States; it has an extensive institutional structure that includes not only specialized organs, but 
also dispute resolution procedures and judicial organs. In this sense, however, the United Nations 
is hardly paradigmatic since no other currently existing international organization comes close to 
the United Nations in terms of institutional structure, breadth of mandate and legal authority. 
Rather, the United Nations is an example of quintessential modern international legal 
cooperation, whereas other international mechanisms are ‘watered-down’ drops of its 
quintessence.  
Moreover, creation of the United Nations was triggered by a quite peculiar set of 
circumstances. Certain reasons behind its creation have also served an impetus toward creation 
of many other currently existing mechanisms of cooperation, but none has the same complex 
                                                        
1 K. Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of 
International Law, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (2002), at 17. 
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intricate network of legal, political and economic considerations underpinning its existence. In 
other words, the United Nations’ purposes and reasons for existence as well as its institutional 
composition embrace the whole spectrum of such purposes, reasons and various elements of 
institutional composition existing in modern international law. For this reason, the United 
Nations is not a proper subject for the analysis aiming at understanding reasons behind 
international cooperation in general, simply because any conclusions would be too broad and 
thus inapplicable to any other mechanism of cooperation, except for the United Nations itself.  
Generally, analysis of any singular mechanism of cooperation would not be sufficient to 
draw conclusions applicable to each and every other mechanism of cooperation. Likewise, 
analysis of just one category of international organizations cannot explain the need for 
cooperation using treaties or conferences. The preceding analysis, covering twelve different 
mechanisms of varying membership, legal force, goals and institutional composition, is premised 
precisely on this understanding. The following abstract considerations are premised on the 
conclusions made by both legal scholars and scholars of social and political sciences in an 
attempt to embrace a representative, and thus widely applicable, spectrum of reasons behind 
cooperation. Some opinions referred to are expressed as applied to a certain category of 
mechanisms of cooperation, most often to international organizations; that limitation will be 
disregarded in appropriate cases, because the distinction between the overarching reasons for 
cooperation using an international organization and a less-institutionalized entity are often 
negligible, at least for the purposes of drawing abstract conclusions.  
It should be acknowledged that while cooperation using international treaties and 
cooperation by way of international conferences are substantially different, the ultimate goal, just 
as in the case of an international organization, is the achievement of a state of coordination 
between activities of participating nations in a specific area. In this sense, therefore, the 
overarching reasons for cooperation are substantively similar, or at the very least compatible, for 
all three categories of cooperation. In the preceding chapters, where the analysis focused on the 
practice of cooperation, the purposes of each reviewed mechanism were addressed in great 
detail. And in this part of the book, which focuses on theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of 
cooperation, the review will proceed on the abstract level, disregarding specifics not affecting the 
overall motivation for cooperation. 
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There are generally two types of cooperation: simple and difficult. A pure coordination 
problem, where all players have an incentive to cooperate, but cooperation requires that they 
coordinate their actions, is characteristic of simple cooperation. Relations between the United 
States and Canada are a good example of simple coordination. The ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ is a 
typical problem of difficult cooperation.2 It is easy to guess that cooperation in cases of simple 
cooperation is more easily achievable than in difficult situations. Despite the seeming 
obviousness of the preceding discussion, two considerations should be emphasized: first, States 
not always resolve simple cooperation issues using appropriate, read easy and informal, 
approaches to cooperation; and second, one matter can evolve from being a simple cooperation 
problem to becoming a difficult one. 
In some situations a potential conflict is not obvious and might be perceived as a simple 
coordination problem. It has been suggested that the Antarctic Treaty,3 and quite possibly the 
Outer Space Treaty due to regular comparison of the regimes of the two treaties4 and 
comparable, although not in a strictly legal sense, statuses of the Antarctica and that of outer 
space as res communis, is one such example. The Antarctic Treaty bans the establishment of 
military bases and the testing of weapons on the continent, suspends territorial claims and sets up 
inspection systems. When the Treaty was signed in 1959, the prohibitions of the treaty had little 
practical effect because States were already generally in compliance; in this sense, the treaty was 
trying to resolve a coordination problem. “Looking forward from the time of the signing, 
however, it is plausible that the parties had concerns about how the importance of Antarctica and 
therefore the payoffs to the parties might change. If the interests of the parties changed, whether 
for economic ([for example], the discovery of oil or mineral reserves), strategic, or other reasons, 
the game might become a prisoner’s dilemma. By establishing a treaty rather than a more 
informal set of norms, the parties solidified the cooperative regime.”5 
Thereby, it might be concluded that at the time the Outer Space Treaty was adopted, 
cooperation in outer space could still be classified as easy cooperation because States were 
generally in compliance with prohibitions contained in the Treaty. Over time, however, with 
                                                        
2 Cf., A. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (2008), at 25-29. 
3 The 1959 Antarctic Treaty, done December 1, 1959; entered in force June 23, 1961. 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 
71, 19 I.L.M. 860 (1980). 
4 E.g. see, M.S. Race, “Environmental Protection: Comparison of the Antarctic and Outer Space Treaties,” in P. 
Berkman et al. (ed.), Science Diplomacy: Antarctica, Science and the Governance of International Spaces (2011), at 
143-52. 
5 A. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (2008), at 57. 
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growing exploration and use of outer space, the area has become more competitive and the 
benefits of being involved in outer space activities have drastically increased. The sequence of 
technological, economic and legal events reviewed in detail in Chapter 1 has led to the status of 
outer space as a highly valuable resource demanding formal regulation, where cooperation 
ceased to be a simple coordination game, where each participant does not lose anything due to 
cooperation and only benefits from such low-cost coordination. 
Outer space, just as a number of other areas, is a shared common limited resource. “The 
promise, as confirmed by experience both within particular states and internationally, of the 
greater achievement which so often inheres in the organized inclusive exploitation of a sharable 
resource is too well known, and the necessities for greater achievement are too compelling. The 
different peoples and communities can be expected increasingly to demand the establishment, for 
many different value objectives, of new forms of organization which will both assemble base 
value largely irrespective of existing territorial boundaries and directly engage in space 
operations.”6 The ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ is the most obvious conflict arising out of joint usage of a 
common shared limited resource,7 which, in the case of space exploitation, is aggravated by the 
‘free rider problem’.8  
In the context of outer space activities, cooperation becomes more beneficial than non-
cooperation only in the long-term perspective; in the short-term perspective a State might often 
expect greater benefit from non-cooperation. To illustrate this, a scenario of the prisoner’s 
dilemma is explored below. For the purposes of the ensuing discussion States should be 
presumed to be rational actors acting out of a rational desire to maximize its benefits, despite the 
fact that in real life States are often acting irrationally.  
Real-life international legal relations, of course, are much more complicated than even an 
asymmetrical two-round prisoner’s dilemma game, and are affected by a multitude of explicit 
and implicit considerations of all participants. The outcome, however, can be predicted using the 
simplified model of the prisoner’s dilemma game: a selfish, or in terms of the theory – a rational 
choice (to betray the accomplice in the hope to get a lower sentence for cooperation with a 
detective) is the most beneficial, but the chances that the accomplice would as well betray the 
                                                        
6 M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 872. 
7 For an extensive review of the Prisoner’s Dilemma see, S. Kuhn, “Prisoner’s Dilemma,” in Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (2014), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/#Bib. 
8 For an extensive review of the Free Rider Problem see, R. Hardin, “The Free Rider Problem,” in Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2003), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-rider/#pagetopright. 
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other are the highest, leading both prisoners to a less beneficial result than that that could have 
been achieved should both have remained silent in a ‘cooperative’ effort. Having once 
experienced the negative outcome of a non-cooperative behavior, in the second round a rational 
actor would more likely opt for cooperation in an attempt to achieve a more beneficial result. A 
multitude of factors affect development of the model, and more so of an actual behavior, but the 
lesson to be learned is that cooperation, all else constant, is the preferred route for rational actors 
in the long-term perspective.  
The free rider problem is another complication that might negatively affect cooperation; 
however, as it will be shown below, non-cooperation is again expected to be more beneficial 
only in the short-term perspective, and in the long-term perspective benefits of cooperation tend 
to increase. The free rider problem incentivizes States to covertly abstain from cooperation to 
benefit from others’ compliance and at the same time limit their own expenses. But in the long-
term perspective, which is the one that should be considered to understand reasons behind 
cooperation in general, the strategy of covert abstention is counter-productive and either leads to 
reputational sanctions for the abstaining State,9 or to non-achievement of the proclaimed goal 
because a majority or a significant number of cooperating actors decided to abstain from 
cooperation hoping to piggyback on others’ compliance. In the most general terms, hence, 
rational actors are more likely than not to choose cooperation in situations of conflicting interests 
that are expected to last for a while.  
Therefore, States’ cooperation in both the context of a prisoner’s dilemma and the free 
rider problem is triggered by a rational desire to achieve the most beneficial outcome. This 
conclusion, however, does not imply that cooperation is always a preferable option for States; to 
the contrary, States are hostile to cooperation and only would choose to cooperate if it increases 
their payoffs, which it often does in the case of an existing conflict with regard to a common 
shared limited resource. The critical factor here is whether the payoffs of cooperation outweigh 
risks and inconveniences of cooperation. 
                                                        
9 A. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (2008), at 33 (“The term “reputational 
sanction” refers to the cost imposed on a state when its reputation is damaged. Reputational sanctions, then, are not 
punishments at all, or at least they are not intended as such. When a state makes a compliance decision (i.e., when it 
chooses to comply or violate) it sends a signal about its willingness to honor its international legal obligations. Other 
states use this information in this decision to adjust their own behavior. A state that tends to comply with its 
obligations will develop a good reputation for compliance, while a state that often violates obligations will have a 
bad reputation. A good reputation is valuable because it makes promises more credible and, therefore, makes future 
cooperation both easier and less costly.”). 
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So the basic premise for cooperation is the resolution of a conflict with regard to a 
common shared resource in a way that yields optimum benefits to all participants. In certain 
situations States would opt for deviation from cooperation or abstain from cooperating at all, but 
these decisions are triggered by varying factors that cannot be easily summarized in one abstract 
model. So for the present purposes it is suggested to assume that digression from cooperative 
behavior is caused by case-specific circumstances, which should be reviewed on a case-by-case 
basis, but that in general cooperation provides the optimum outcome, and hence States engage in 
cooperation primarily to achieve one. This, however, is an exceptionally broad conclusion that 
can hardly satisfy a research looking to answer the question of why do States choose to 
cooperate. 
In most general terms, cooperation is an act of delegation of individual States’ powers. In 
essence, cooperation results in limitation of States’ freedom of action for the sake of successful 
achievement of a cooperative goal. “The delegation is premised upon the division of labor and 
gains from specialization.”10 These two gains are common for all categories of cooperation. 
Conferences provide necessary specialization and are attended by States’ representatives 
focusing on issues under consideration; treaties focus on certain aspects of cooperation and 
regulate legal issues, leaving, in most cases, technical issues to be resolved through other means; 
international organizations are quintessential examples of these two features that hardly need 
further elaboration.  
International organizations are also the ‘perfect’ agents of their principals – States. They 
provide an opportunity not only for short-term delegation, as conferences do, and are not static as 
treaties are. They create a dynamic environment where cooperative goals can be performed 
within the limits and by the rules established by member-States. Thus, international 
organizations are said to have five additional benefits that induce delegation: managing policy 
externalities, facilitating collective decision-making, resolving disputes, enhancing credibility 
and creating policy bias.11  
As the benefits from delegation increase, all else constant, States are generally more 
likely to delegate authority. The higher the benefits of delegation, particularly gains from 
division of labor and specialization, the higher the chances that these benefits would outweigh 
                                                        
10 D.G. Hawkins et al., “Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent 
Theory,” in D.G. Hawkins et al. (eds.), Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (2206), at 13. 
11 Id. 
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risks and inconveniences of cooperation. Moreover, if the benefits from division of labor and 
specialization are significant, it increases the chances that a larger number of States would 
consider such cooperation beneficial. That is so because risks and inconveniences associated 
with cooperation might be quite different for different States. For example, if financial 
contributions to the budget of a new organization are calculated based on gross domestic 
product, membership in such an organization might turn out to be more burdensome for a State 
with a large gross domestic product than that for a less wealthy State, while providing similar 
benefits from cooperation to both States. Here the question for a wealthier State would be 
whether the benefits from cooperation outweigh the financial burden. If the benefits from 
cooperation are significant, higher financial burden is less likely to deter a State from joining the 
organization, therefore increasing the chances of delegation.  
Scholars have identified a multitude of other benefits of concerted actions using one or 
the other category of cooperation.  
One advantage of organized strategies, in contrast with unrelated and 
diverse unilateral strategies, is in permitting a greater flexibility and range in 
choice of the goals of activity. When assets are employed economically, total 
opportunities are enhanced. Another advantage of organized strategies is in the 
minimization of harmful interference. Rules of the road and of the game are much 
more easily established and maintained, with corresponding increases in 
efficiency, when strategies are organized. Strategies are ambivalent in their 
bearing upon military and non-military purposes and may, finally, be more readily 
controlled in their dedication to non-military purposes when participation in them 
is organized, rather than unorganized.12 
Ultimately, cooperation allows achieving the optimum result, using resources more 
efficiently, ensuring easier and more effective control, benefitting from specialization, limiting 
externalities and lowering the costs by way of enhancing credibility. There is one factor that 
unites all these positive gains from cooperation: the economy in the broadest sense of the word. 
Cooperation lowers the costs of achieving the same goal compared to a State acting solo. In case 
of a prisoner’s dilemma conflict, however, cooperation leads to the optimum result, while a 
digression from cooperation yields the deviating participant the highest gain. It should be 
recalled, though, that the highest gain could only be achieved once: unilateral digression from 
cooperation undermines a State’s reputation, thus creating the risk of being mistrusted in the next 
                                                        
12 M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 883. 
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conflict, thereby, raising costs in the long-term perspective. In other words, “a violation by one 
side would likely provoke violation by the other side. The one to violate initially would enjoy a 
one-period gain, but thereafter the [agreement] might collapse, in which case both parties would 
return to the noncooperative outcome,”13 which is the least beneficial outcome for all parties. 
The bottom line is that States weigh their ability to realize their aims by acting alone 
versus acting in concert with other States. “Powerful states are able to obtain their goals through 
their own influence and capabilities. As a result, they have a more attractive “outside option” 
and, if they choose to do so, can move effectively to realize their preferences.”14 Thus, it is 
suggested to recognize the economy, in both a financial and a transactional sense, as another 
important motivation behind resorting to cooperation.  
Financial economy refers to the State’s ability to achieve the result by sharing expenses 
with its partners. Invitation of Russia to the ISS project, it should be recalled, was in part 
triggered by the budget limits placed on the project by the US Congress. As a result of 
cooperation with Russia, the ISS project was sufficiently funded and so became operational 
within a shorter period of time.  
Transactional economy refers to the results a State achieves if it is viewed as a reliable 
rule-abiding partner. Basically, a State that keeps its promises is a more trustworthy partner, who 
is less likely to be suspected of possible future violations. So cooperation with such a State 
involves fewer risks, in the end resulting in lower transactional costs of cooperation negotiation 
and maintenance. For example, within the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme adoption of every 
decision requires unanimity of all four participating States. The period when the Programme 
Agreement was negotiated was marred by controversies not only between the United States and 
Soviet Union, but also between the United States and European countries. So the choice was 
made in favor of a more complex, and therefore more expensive, procedure of decision-making 
as a result of conflicts and mistrust between the cooperating States. 
Financial economy is a powerful incentive toward cooperation for a majority of States; 
transactional economy might be even more important than the financial one, but only in the long-
term perspective. Considerations of economy are quite complex and would be decided by each 
State on a case-by-case basis. For example, financial economy might be a negligible factor when 
                                                        
13 A. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (2008), at 32. 
14 D.G. Hawkins et al., “Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent 
Theory,” in D.G. Hawkins et al. (eds.), Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (2206), at 22. 
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considering issues pertaining to national security, while transactional economy with its ability to 
influence State’s reputation along with financial expenses in the long-term perspective might 
prove a quite influential factor in arriving at a decision of whether to cooperate and if so, using 
what methods.  
Being the quintessential incarnation of cooperation, international organizations are the 
most often analyzed category of cooperation. A recent article eloquently analogized an 
international organization to Dr. Frankenstein’s monster. “Dr. Frankenstein created his monster 
in an attempt to improve on a world populated only by humans. States create IOs with the hope 
of enhancing international cooperation beyond what can be achieved by states alone. Like 
Frankenstein’s monster, IOs created by states may behave differently than expected. There is 
always a risk that an IO will impact the system in ways that harm, rather than help, the interests 
of states.”15 While the Frankenstein problem is real, there are only two ways to avoid the 
problem: not to create an entity with separate legal personality, or effectively deprive an 
organization of any important or even somewhat meaningful powers. The author, however, 
arrives at a conclusion that greater reliance on international organizations would produce benefits 
that outweigh the risk of creating a monster. 
By and large, any mechanism of cooperation, be it an international organization, a treaty 
or an international conference, is created not because States are unable to achieve the same goals 
on their own, but because through cooperation they are able to do necessary things better or more 
easily than they would acting individually. Therefore, gains from cooperation must significantly 
outweigh limits imposed by the need to act with reference to wishes of partners in cooperation. A 
choice of an appropriate mechanism of cooperation draws the line between cooperation and non-
cooperation. If States, as nowadays in the area of space activities, are not willing to bind 
themselves with new legal obligations, a proposal to cooperate through such a mechanism almost 
by definition would stop there. The preceding reflections are applicable virtually to all spheres of 
cooperation involving a common shared limited resource, and particularly to outer space, which 
is undoubtedly an example of such. 
Despite the obvious spatial difference between outer space activities and all other 
international relations, Jenks correctly noted: “Man’s activities in space are a projection of his 
life on earth. It is for this reason that the suggestion sometimes made that responsibility for 
                                                        
15 A. Guzman, Doctor Frankenstein’s International Organizations, 24 Eur. J. Int’l L. 999 (2013), at 1000. 
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international action in respect of space matters should be concentrated in a special agency for the 
purpose is so lacking in realism. Space telecommunications are by their nature a part of 
telecommunications generally, the demilitarization of space cannot be divorced from the general 
problem of disarmament, and the problem of law and order in space is but a new phase of the 
perennial problem of peace on earth and goodwill among men.”16 So while appreciating the 
unique physical characteristics of outer space, its legal regulation is earth-bound.  
The seminal scholarly work on space public order suggested: “The immense expanses of 
outer space, with its rich and varied resources, permit a high degree of shared, cooperative 
exploitation. As a medium of movement and travel, as a ground for scientific and military 
experimentation, as a location for the establishment of permanent bases and as a resource for 
exploitation, outer space may be enjoyed by many participants simultaneously, subject only to 
the requirements of safety and order.”17 Another scholar from the same era opined that space 
cooperation had major policy as well as legal grounds: “Such [cooperation] is clearly in the 
general spirit of the recognition by the Declaration of Legal Principles [of 1961] of the “common 
interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful 
purposes”, and the desire expressed therein to contribute to “broad international cooperation in 
the exploration and use of space” and thereby to “to the development of mutual understanding” 
and “the strengthening of friendly relations between nations and peoples”; it constitutes a method 
of giving effect to the principle that “the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on 
for the benefit and in the interests of all mankind”. Cooperative arrangements relating to space 
are becoming increasingly important in practice.”18 
These views, dating back to the 1960s, correctly noted factors that further contributed to 
proliferation of space cooperative endeavors. They, however, do not offer a space-specific 
reasoning for cooperation that can be characterized as substantially different from the factors 
motivating cooperation in general outlined above. Throughout the research only one opinion 
suggesting existence of a space-specific motivation for cooperation has been identified, which, 
however, was mostly relevant during the first decades of the space era and has only limited 
relevance today.  
                                                        
16 C.W. Jenks, Space Law (1965), at 316. 
17 M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 516. 
18 C.W. Jenks, Space Law (1965), at 214-15. 
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The argument is premised on the fact that exploration and use of outer space is a 
notoriously costly enterprise, especially when military-related uses are considered. “Such major 
space programs will continue to require that vast expenditures and great individual sacrifice, very 
few, if any, territorial communities will be able to afford efforts unilaterally without in the 
process becoming “garrison states.” It may be doubtful whether in a democracy it will be 
possible to persuade a majority of citizens voluntarily to accept prolonged deprivations of many 
values in exchange merely for a promise of rich compensation in the future from activities in 
outer space.”19 The authors concluded that continuous maintenance of space programs on a 
unilateral basis would be only possible with the emergence of the regimes with the 
characteristics of despotism.  
Therefore, cooperation with its allocation of expenditures among participants of the joint 
enterprise would prevent a shift of formerly democratic regimes to autocracy in their attempt to 
maintain space supremacy. Nowadays, the threat of such a transformation does not seem realistic 
for stable democracies, but might still bear certain relevance for newer democracies with a 
traditionally strong favoring of a powerful military. The broader conclusion is that in the context 
of outer space activities the gains of economy, particularly of financial economy explained 
above, are a greater incentive toward cooperation than in many other areas, where costs of 
unilateral activities are not so prohibitively high. So even this argument, strictly speaking, does 
not offer any new reasoning for why States choose to cooperate apart from those already 
identified.  
Acknowledging that establishment of outer space legal cooperation had many peculiar 
characteristics that cannot be found in any other area of international cooperation, especially the 
unprecedented pace of commencement of cooperation and the unprecedented level of 
cooperation between the Cold War rivals, overall it was triggered by the same set of overarching 
factors. This conclusion is of great importance for the following discussion. The goal of the 
present book is to propose the most appropriate forms of cooperation for different future space 
projects. The search for such forms is two-fold: on the one hand, any recommended form of 
cooperation has to have an adequate institutional structure to attain the goals of the cooperative 
endeavor, and on the other, it has to offer significant benefits to stimulate cooperation in the first 
place. While the analysis of the twelve modern mechanisms of cooperation is sufficient to 
                                                        
19 M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 84-85. 
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identify the first element, determination of the second element is only possible by weighing 
institutional benefits provided by the form of cooperation against the benefits States usually look 
for in cooperation. Division of labor, gains from specialization, and financial and transactional 
economy are the three predominant motivations for cooperation.  
Therefore, States are only willing to cooperate in a good faith manner when the 
institutional structure of a particular mechanism is capable of performing necessary functions, 
and if benefits from division of labor, specialization and economy outweigh the risks of limiting 
their autonomy, or the risks of ‘creating a monster’. It was suggested: “It is of paramount 
importance that the future development of space law should be shaped and molded by a 
continuing partnership of bold statesmanship, imaginative legal vision, and thorough grasp of the 
scientific and technological factors involved.”20 In the proposed interpretation the “bold 
statesmanship” is taking the risks of limiting States’ authority, the “imaginative legal vision” is 
the choice of an efficient institutional structure, and the “grasp of scientific and technological 
factors” is a greater reliance on division of labor and specialization. These factors will serve as a 
theoretical basis in a search for the most appropriate forms of cooperation in exploration and use 
of outer space.  
 
14.2 Summary of Mechanisms of Cooperation 
 
Findings of the preceding twelve chapters are summarized in Table 1. It outlines a 
category each mechanism belongs to, the features of each mechanism that are deemed important 
for the overall functioning of the mechanism, and the goals of the mechanism as they are stated 
in underlying documents and clarified by subsequent practice; the table also proposes 
conclusions as to effectiveness of each mechanism. It should be stressed that the form of the 
table forces omission of important details and usage of over-generalized conclusions. But this 
format provides a convenient at-a-glance overview of the results of the research and therefore is 
deemed appropriate for the present purposes. Overall, it is suggested that two mechanisms are 
ineffective in achieving their goals and one mechanism – the International Civil Aviation 
Organization – might not be effective in performance of space-specific functions despite its 
undisputed success in civil aviation.  
                                                        
20 C.W. Jenks, Space Law (1965), at 313. 
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Initially, the methodology used in this book has been premised on the assumption that 
generally three categories of mechanisms of cooperation exist. The summary table lists four 
categories: international organization, treaty, conference and hybrid. The last category of 
cooperation has been identified as a result of the analysis, which showed that some mechanisms 
of cooperation simply do not fit in any traditional category. And though historically two out of 
three identified hybrid mechanisms were created in the 1980s, they have never been treated as 
such from a theoretical perspective. The COSPAS-SARSAT Programme was classified by some 
scholars as an international organization, and the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites was 
generally perceived to be an ‘informal’ entity. Nowadays, this theoretical ambiguity is 
substituted by a less rigid approach to understanding of the existing ways and means of 
international cooperation.  
Since the goal of the book is to identify the most appropriate forms of cooperation, a 
simple enumeration of mechanisms and categories of cooperation they belong to is not enough. 
The term ‘form of cooperation’ is not used consistently in different contexts,21 so the present 
definition is proposed exclusively for the purposes of the present book. The form of cooperation 
is understood as a general denomination for mechanisms of cooperation that pursue substantially 
similar cooperative goals and possess an inextricable institutional connection. Mechanisms of 
cooperation designated to one form of cooperation need not be institutionally identical or 
perform exactly the same goals; rather, they should be substantially homogeneous in their 
cooperative goals and rely on similar sets of institutional characteristics in their work. 
Application of the definition to particular mechanisms will further clarify the definition. 
Based on the summary provided in Table 1, it is proposed to identify five forms of 
cooperation currently used in international legal cooperation of States in exploration and use of 
outer space. These are: the United Nations system, technical international organizations, hybrids, 
framework-contract-treaties and regional space international organizations.   
 
                                                        
21 E.g., in the US federalism context the term is used to describe influence of state law, federal law and decisions of 
the US Supreme Court on interpretation of federal constitution and respective state laws. One form of such 
cooperation is voluntary adoption by the state of legislative standards set by the Congress or by the latter of those set 
by the states. (See, Foreword, 23 Iowa L. Rev. (1937-1938), at 457.) By contrast, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 
states that it “is founded on the European Communities supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation 
introduced by this Treaty.” (See, D. Vataman, “Considerations on the Evolution of the Legal Personality of the 
European Union,” in T.U. Maiorescu, 2012 Law Annals (2012), at 174.) 
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14.2.1 United Nations System 
The form of the United Nations system includes three mechanisms: the UNISPACE 
conferences, the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the Outer Space 
Treaty with three elaborating conventions. Despite the obvious fact that these three mechanisms 
belong to different categories of cooperation, seemingly undermining the methodological 
approach endorsed in this book, evaluation of these mechanisms in the context of the definition 
of a form of cooperation and taking into consideration factors favoring cooperation identified 
earlier in the chapter, makes it clear that no controversy exists. 
From an institutional perspective, all three mechanisms are inextricably connected by 
way of their inclusion in the United Nations system. The UNISPACE conferences are being held 
using United Nations facilities, they have been commenced pursuant to political decisions made 
within the United Nations organs, they have seen broad participation primarily due to their 
endorsement by the United Nations, and generally they have relied on the United Nations 
influence in achievement of their goals. COPUOS is an organ within the structure of the United 
Nations; hence, by definition it cannot exist outside the organization’s system. The Outer Space 
Treaty along with three elaborating conventions is the direct result of efforts undertaken by 
members of the United Nations using the organization’s capabilities. 
More broadly, all three mechanisms are the creations of the United Nations and would 
have hardly been possible in the absence of the organization. The United Nations with its 
immense political authority, organizational capacity and broad mandate made possible coming 
into existence of these three mechanisms. It should be recalled that proposals for establishment 
of a specialized universal space organization have been made since the early years of the space 
era, the earliest one dating back to 1959.22 Although analogous proposals saw some support over 
the years, the mainstream opinion has always opposed such proposals. Apart from doubts with 
respect to the ability of such an organization to gain wide support of States and hence to address 
issues of outer space exploration and use in an effective way, the United Nations has been 
always seen as the most authoritative international organization that can be trusted to address 
issues of outer space exploitation. The bottom line is that from the early years of the space era, 
when neither the legal regime, nor the cooperative network had been yet established and the 
chances of creation of a specialized space organization had theoretically been higher, the United 
                                                        
22 See, M. Smirnoff, “The Role of the I.A.F. in the Elaboration of the Norms of Future Space Law,” in Proceedings 
of the International Institute of Space Law (1959), at 147. 
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Nations was viewed as the tool for establishment of the general principles of international space 
law. None of the three mechanisms, or even their analogues, could have been created outside the 
United Nations. 
The UNISPACE conferences, COPUOS and the Outer Space Treaty rely not only on the 
United Nations administrative capabilities, but also on its authority and universal membership of 
all States, which provide every decision adopted within the system with significant credibility on 
the international plane.23 Simultaneously, they rely on the broad mandate of the United Nations 
in a sense that all three mechanisms address a wide range of questions pertaining to outer space 
activities. The agenda of the UNISPACE conferences has been gradually expanding over the 
years; COPUOS is a unique body with a broad and open mandate, which allowed its members to 
raise and consider various topics related to the use of outer space as outer space activities have 
been evolving;24 the Outer Space Treaty and the three elaborating conventions have transformed, 
at least in part, into customary norms and continue to gain more and more support among 
nations. All these dynamics have been possible primarily due to the all-embracing mandate of 
the organization within which they exist.  
Just as the three mechanisms depend in their existence on the United Nations, the United 
Nations depends on these mechanisms for its relevance in matters of outer space. In a sense, 
these are the incarnations of the United Nations ‘organs’ dealing with questions of outer space 
exploration and use. Should they be eliminated, the organization’s role in space matters would be 
all but wiped out.  
Considering purposes of these mechanisms, it is suggested that they are also inextricably 
connected to the United Nations. The Outer Space Treaty and the elaborating conventions have 
the most static purpose of all three, namely the establishment of the general legal regime for 
outer space activities. It has been noted multiple times that adoption of a new space treaty is 
unlikely; adoption of a space treaty refining general principles of outer space activities along the 
lines of the proposal of the Russian Federation of 2000 is even more unlikely.25 Adoption of the 
Outer Space Treaty and the elaborating conventions was possible only within the framework of 
                                                        
23 Cf., M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 109. 
24 Cf., K.-U. Schrogl, Is UNCOPUOS Fit for the Future: Reflection at the Occasion of the 50th Session of its Legal 
Subcommittee 2011, 60 ZLW 93 (2011), at 93. 
25 Proposal by the Russian Federation for a New Agenda Item “Advisability of Developing a Single Comprehensive 
United Nations Convention on the Law of Outer Space” for Consideration by the Legal Subcommittee at its fortieth 
session as a single issue/item for discussion, A/AC.105/C.2/L.220 (2000).  
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the United Nations during the first decades of the space age, when the political and legal 
environment was uniquely favorable for such an endeavor. The chances of all necessary factors 
coming together again are slim. Similarly unlikely is the situation when negotiation of a 
comprehensive space treaty is supported by a majority of States. 
The General Assembly resolution establishing COPUOS defined the Committee’s 
mandate in rather unspecific terms, leading to varying views on the role of COPUOS, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. The Committee has been evolving over the years of its existence and has 
gone through four stages, and during each stage it has been performing quite different functions. 
At the same time, the Committee has always been focused on the review of the general issues 
pertaining to the legal regime of outer space activities of sovereign States. State-centricity of the 
Committee’s work coupled with its regulation-oriented mandate significantly limits the tasks the 
Committee is capable of performing. While it has been earlier suggested that the Committee has 
the potential for further development, it would continue to be restricted by the limits defined 
above. The institutional structure of the Committee is adequate, with caveats discussed at length 
in the pertinent chapter, for the functions bestowed onto it in 1959 by the General Assembly 
resolution; but it is definitely not appropriate to deal with a multitude of other space-related 
matters, especially in the area of space applications.  
The UNISPACE conferences are the most flexible and adaptable mechanism, but even so 
they remain inextricably connected to the United Nations. Topics discussed at the UNISPACE 
conferences are influenced by the discussions within the United Nations General Assembly and 
COPUOS; decisions adopted at the conferences have political value primarily due to their United 
Nations’ endorsement; recommendations of the conferences are implemented owing to support 
provided by the United Nations machinery. Theoretically, the success of the UNISPACE 
conferences may be repeated outside the United Nations framework, but practically this scenario 
is quite unlikely precisely due to the institutional and substantive connection between the 
conferences and the United Nations, particularly the other two space mechanisms of the 
organization.  
The general conclusion is that none of these three mechanisms can be replicated outside 
the United Nations system. This conclusion is premised on both the unique nature of the United 
Nations, which is a universal organization with a very broad mandate that does not currently 
have any analogues, and the history of these mechanisms’ establishment and development that 
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cannot be repeated: despite the claim that history repeats itself, the Sputnik 1 flight with its earth-
shattering consequences for the perception of humans as Earth-bound creatures can never happen 
again. Similarly, none of these mechanisms can be used to fulfill functions different from those 
they have been successfully performing. The Outer Space Treaty cannot be reasonably expanded 
by way of addition, say, technical annexes to regulate space traffic; COPUOS cannot be 
transformed into an agency overseeing space traffic management; and the UNISPACE 
conferences can hardly become a ‘plenary organ’ developing technical annexes to the Outer 
Space Treaty.  
The first identified form of cooperation is an example of how different mechanisms 
might be substantially similar in their goals and institutional approach without belonging to the 
same category of cooperation. The mechanisms designated as belonging to this form of 
cooperation have played a paramount role in establishment of the legal regime of outer space and 
in promotion of international cooperation. They have not lost their relevance today and continue 
delivering remarkable results. Nevertheless, these three mechanisms are one of their kind, sui 
generis in a sense. While they all should be praised as examples of successful international legal 
cooperation, none of them is a model to be used in future cooperative space projects. 
 
14.2.2 Technical International Organizations 
This form of cooperation includes two mechanisms: the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Both organizations have 
universal membership that includes State-members of the United Nations. Both organizations 
have broad coordinating mandates within their areas of functioning. And both organizations 
focus on the technical side of cooperation, paying less attention to policy considerations. Despite 
the differences in the subject matters of the two organizations, generally their purposes and 
institutional structures are quite similar.  
“In the past two centuries, IOs have become indispensable entities in international society 
and their law has become an important part of the international legal order. They have been 
created out of practical necessity: a need for permanent and structured international cooperation 
in an increasing number of areas that could no longer be regulated effectively by individual 
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States alone.”26 ITU and ICAO are two exemplary instances where the organizations are 
performing necessary functions that can be better performed through multilateral coordination. In 
the terms of the theory of games, both organizations are solving a so-called distributional 
conflict.  
In a distributional conflict, participants strictly prefer coordinating their actions to not 
coordinating, “but the players prefer to coordinate on different equilibriums. After a focal point 
(meaning a solution that seems natural or relevant for the parties) is chosen, the parties have no 
incentive to defect, but the process of choosing a specific outcome may be sensitive to 
differences in bargaining power among the parties. The allocation of radio frequencies and 
policies addressing satellite communication is arguably an example of such a situation.”27 Such 
situations are colloquially referred to as ‘coordination problems’ discussed earlier in the Chapter, 
meaning that no obvious conflict between players exits. A clear consequence of the nature of 
cooperation in these cases is that States have a very strong motivation toward cooperation 
because gains are most likely to outweigh any risks. 
That, however, does not mean that any institutional structure would suffice to solve the 
coordination problem. Initially parties, as noted above, prefer coordination, but to proceed with 
cooperation a mutually satisfactory equilibrium has to be found. Finding the most appropriate 
institution for coordination is finding the equilibrium.  
There are four broad reasons for the ITU and ICAO successes in technical coordination 
of the two spheres critically important to every State. First, they have universal membership. In 
matters requiring coordination this is an essential element without which coordination is often 
meaningless. Second, the universal support allows focusing on development of the most effective 
standards without the need to include concessions designed to attract broad support.  The rational 
choice theory provides a clear explanation: “When negotiating an agreement, states interested in 
a relatively strong set of substantive commitments and broad membership often face a trade-off. 
On the one hand, they can prioritize large membership, but if transfers are difficult to arrange, 
this may require a watering down of the substance of the agreement. On the other hand, they may 
insist on stringent substantive standards in the agreement. This would establish rules that more 
                                                        
26 N. Blokker, “General Introduction,” in R. Virzo and I. Ingravallo (eds.), Evolutions in the Law of International 
Organizations (2015), at 12.  
27 A. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (2008), at 28. 
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closely approximate their preferred outcome, but would also cause some affected states to opt 
out of the agreement.”28  
But when a majority of States are already members of the organization, the contents of 
the developed documents are no longer the reason for their choice to join the organization or not. 
They have already agreed to the provisions of the constituent treaty and are generally in 
agreement with the policies promoted by the organization. By contrast, the contents of the 
organization’s constituent treaty are the decisive factor in States’ decision to join: if the 
provisions are strong and the support for them is low, then the provisions would be watered 
down for the sake of the larger membership. In ITU and ICAO a broad support is already 
present, so the need for trade-offs and concessions affecting the quality of the developed 
standards is absent. 
Third, both organizations focus on technical issues, leaving policy matters outside their 
jurisdiction. In the ITU context it has been shown that sometimes disregarding policy 
considerations might lead to unforeseeable negative results.29 That, however, is a trade-off for 
efficient technical regulation. Finally, both organizations are empowered to adopt legally binding 
decisions, elevating the chances of widespread compliance. Instances where international 
organizations are authorized to adopt legally binding rules without the consent of all affected 
States are few. “One can immediately see the Frankenstein problem at work in these exceptional 
situations. Exposing oneself to binding international rules created without one’s consent, and 
perhaps even over one’s objection, is a risk for a state. If one has these risks in mind, it may not 
seem surprising that states almost never grant this authority to IOs.”30 Usually, with an obvious 
exception of the United Nations Security Council, the ability to impose binding rules is restricted 
to documents with a limited and technocratic subject matter,31 which is true for both ITU and 
ICAO.  
The legally binding nature of a document, however, does not ipso facto guarantee that it 
is going to be complied with. International practice has ample examples of good faith 
compliance with legally non-binding documents and egregious violations of legally binding 
norms. In the ITU context, compliance with the standards is a matter of simple logic due to 
                                                        
28 A. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (2008), at 172. 
29 Supra, para. 5.3.1. 
30 A. Guzman, Doctor Frankenstein’s International Organizations, 24 Eur. J. Int’l L. 999 (2013), at 1022. 
31 Id.  
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physical characteristics of the radio spectrum. In the ICAO context, compliance is similarly a 
matter of logic since every State wants to ensure safe and secure international air transportation 
of its citizens and cargo, which is impossible if traffic control rules are established on national 
levels without any coordination. Once scholar opined with respect to compliance with ICAO 
Standards and Recommended Practices: 
In practice there is a powerful motivation for all States wishing to 
participate in international air transport to comply with the standards as closely as 
possible. While it may be argued that the SARPs represent only ‘soft law’ they 
cannot be disregarded with impunity. A phrase has been coined that the force of 
the SARPs could be compared with that of the ‘law of gravity’: compliance is 
simply unavoidable in practice and non-compliance would have serious 
consequences.32 
That brings the discussion back to the type of cooperation represented by these two 
international organizations. Coordination problems are easily solved without the need for 
coercion or imposition of liability for digressions because every participant is willing to 
cooperate. 
Thereby, it is quite puzzling why States opted for legally binding cooperation in solving 
these coordination problems. Similar results could have been achieved through more flexible, 
read less costly, mechanisms not requiring lengthy negotiation of the legally binding conventions 
establishing ITU and ICAO.33 One possible explanation is that in the years following the end of 
the Second World War “an international organization was established almost automatically as 
soon as an international problem and the need to cooperate were identified.”34 In more recent 
years, however, the opposite attitude has become predominant.35 
That leads to a discussion of whether a technical international organization is currently an 
appropriate form of cooperation in exploration and use of outer space. Overall, technical 
international organizations are capable of successfully performing a number of tasks that are 
currently on the space agenda; the problem of space debris and the need for space traffic 
management are just two examples. Matters requiring continuous coordination with a focus on 
technical matters are successfully addressed using this form of cooperation. The conclusion is, 
                                                        
32 M. Milde, International Air Law and ICAO (2008), at 164. 
33 Cf., A. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (2008), at 127. 
34 H.G. Schermers and N.M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (2011), at vi. 
35 Id. 
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however, that technical international organizations are not the preferable route for dealing with 
pertinent issues. 
First, from a purely practical perspective, creation of a new international organization 
with sufficient powers to effectively address technical aspects of cooperation in space is quite 
unlikely in the mid-term perspective for political reasons. Creation of an international 
organization is a lengthy process, requiring meticulous drafting of its constituent documents, 
which by definition have to be legally binding treaties, what seems an insurmountable obstacle in 
its own right. That is so, first, due to the complexity of the treaty-drafting process, and second, 
due to States’ unwillingness to adopt any more legally binding documents regulating space 
activities.  
Apart from this practical consideration, theoretical reflections also indicate that technical 
international organizations are not the most constructive solution for future space cooperative 
projects. ITU and ICAO are unquestionably successful in performing tasks they have been 
charged with. But, as it has been noted above, creation of a legally binding mechanism is not at 
all necessary for the types of issues they are addressing, which are mere coordination problems. 
In a situation where the motivation to cooperate dominates only the most cumbersome 
mechanism might shift the balance away from cooperation. But more importantly, in a situation 
where the motivation to cooperate dominates, there is no need to go an extra step in an attempt to 
prevent digressions.  
An interconnectedness of public and private space activities that is only expected to 
deepen in the coming years will increase the number of technically intensive matters requiring 
continuous coordination. In a world that already has a multitude of international organizations, 
and where dissatisfaction with the results of their work and clear frustration with the costs of 
their maintenance are piling up, States are wary of creating new organizations. Many technical 
matters that already require coordination and that will surface in the coming years can be 
effectively addressed using a less formal approach to cooperation, which eliminates drawbacks 
of international organizations, but provides the necessary cooperative basis. Coordination 
problems need only finding an equilibrium for their successful resolution; so if the necessary 
level of cooperation can be achieved with less resources, it defies logic to spend as much 
resources as if a prisoner’s dilemma has to be solved.  
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Nowadays, therefore, in a sensitive area of space activities a more flexible approach 
might be prudent. Some suggest that it is possible to conclude that international organizations 
“ceased to be a model in the sense of an ‘archetype’, i.e. a perfect example to reproduce, but 
rather amounts to a ‘prototype’, i.e. a pattern to improve rather than to reproduce as such. To 
play with words, the model models itself with the development of international relations.”36 
States are adjusting the traditional approach to international organizations depending on the 
functions the organization is intended to perform. It is suggested that currently it is advisable to 
reevaluate the approach to cooperation and to ‘model’ future institutional frameworks to fit the 
new developments and to adequately address political realities. Exclusion of the form of 
technical international organizations from the list of the suggested forms of future space 
cooperation requires proposal of an adequate substitute, which will be made in the concluding 
part of the Chapter.   
 
14.2.3 Hybrids 
This form of cooperation includes three analyzed mechanisms of cooperation: the 
Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS), the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme and the 
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (Code). In the relevant chapters institutional features 
of each of the mechanisms have been analyzed in detail. A conclusion has been offered that the 
hybrids are most appropriate for coordination of activities in space applications and that they 
perform regulatory tasks less effectively. The goal of this part of the book is to identify with 
greater precision institutional features necessary for the hybrids in performing different types of 
tasks.  
The perception of an international system of nation-states rested on the 
assumption that clear-cut distinctions were in place between the national and the 
international and between the public and the private. But [] these distinctions have 
become increasingly blurred or, alternatively, the assumption that they were ever 
clear-cut has been increasingly undermined. A vast field of regulatory phenomena 
has emerged which does not fit into well-established legal and social scientific 
categories which national and international law traditionally have relied on. 
Hybridization has become common place insofar as the combined forces of 
globalization and privatization and an increased reliance on self-regulation have 
                                                        
36 M.-C. Runavot, “The Intergovernmental Organization and the Institutionalization of International Relations,” in 
R. Virzo and I. Ingravallo (eds.), Evolutions in the Law of International Organizations (2015), at 22. 
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resulted in the emergence of regulatory arrangements which combine elements 
from several legal orders.37  
Nowadays, the hybridization of international law, both regulatory and institutional, is 
hardly challenged by anyone.  
But in the 1960s institutional hybridization was considered an undesirable scenario:  
It may be necessary, as we have seen, for an enterprise to engage in many 
activities – such as the hiring of personnel and equipment, the purchase of land 
for launching sites and other purposes, the issuance of securities in world money 
markets, the acquisition and holding of patents, and the presentation of claims for 
wrongful deprivations – the effective performance of which must require at least a 
modest degree of legal capacity. An enterprise lacking such familiar competences 
as those involved in claiming access to tribunals, being subjected to 
responsibility, making agreements, and acquiring and controlling assets would be 
able to act only through extraordinarily cumbersome machinery. It would possess 
neither the flexibility to adjust rapidly to new situations nor the capability to 
compete successfully with other participants in space exploitation; and it might, 
further, expose its individual members to wholly unanticipated and impolitic 
responsibilities and liabilities.38  
It is ironic that then the hybrids were perceived as not possessing the necessary 
flexibility, and today flexibility is the main argument in favor of the hybrids. The lesson to be 
learned, apparently, is that every conclusion is a matter of the vantage point of the author. Hence, 
the following conclusions are also believed to be correct from the standpoint of a researcher in 
2016. 
The hybrid, as it is understood in this book, is an intergovernmental entity that combines 
features of an international organization and an international conference. It is generally believed 
that the hybrids are creations of the many challenges faced by the traditional system of 
internationalism, the deepest one being the persistent unwillingness of states to yield further 
power coupled with multiplying difficulties in arriving at a widely acceptable agreement due to 
the dramatic increase in the number of States in recent decades.39 Technological advancements 
and intensifying utilization of multinational infrastructures in purely national activities, whereas 
                                                        
37 P.L. Kjaer, “Introduction,” in P. Jurčys, P.L. Kjaer and R. Yatsunami (eds.), Regulatory Hybridization in the 
Transnational Sphere (2013), at 3. 
38 M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 890-91. 
39 See, K. Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of 
International Law, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (2002), at 17.  
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usage of communication satellites owned and operated by transnational corporations is just one 
example, made international coordination as essential as ever.  
The technique of ‘autonomous institutional arrangements in multilateral agreements’ was 
introduced in 1971 in the Ramsar Convention,40 which was supported by a standing committee, a 
scientific review panel and a secretariat.41 Protection of the environment embodies two features 
that are believed to trigger hybridization of international cooperation: it is a matter of 
international concern that can only be addressed through concerted actions of many nations, but 
it is still a matter primarily requiring actions on the national level, thus prompting States to allow 
only limited delegation to the international institutions. Some fifteen years after the Ramsar 
Convention had been signed, the first hybrid, the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, was 
established in the space area.  
The reasons for choosing hybrid mechanisms, often referred to as soft international 
organizations,42 are manifold:  
Countries choose soft IOs when they value rapid decision-making and 
confidentiality, when they prefer to have a broad range of issues on which the 
body’s activity can be centered according to subjective and/or objective changing 
circumstances, when they want to start an activity of soft cooperation representing 
the first step in the creation of a formal international organization, etc. Some 
commentators have argued that there has been a real move away from IOs to a 
more informal mode of cooperation; they have also noted that international 
cooperation has increasingly been organized through mechanisms ‘that were 
deliberately kept at the fringes of international law’. In them the lack of elements 
traditionally characterizing formal IOs (treaties or other instruments governed by 
international law as the individual constitution, international legal personality, 
autonomous will, separate permanent organs, a secretariat, etc.) emerges; vice 
versa, the functions assigned to them by the States can be identical or similar to 
those carried out by formal IOs.43 
                                                        
40 Art. 6, 8 of the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially as Waterflow Habitat, February 2, 
1971. 996 U.N.T.S. 245; T.I.A.S. 11084; 11 I.L.M. 963 (1972). 
41 See, M.-C. Runavot, “The Intergovernmental Organization and the Institutionalization of International Relations,” 
in R. Virzo and I. Ingravallo (eds.), Evolutions in the Law of International Organizations (2015), at 36. 
42 It is suggested that a term ‘soft international organization’ is confusing given the long-standing tradition to equate 
‘international organizations’ and ‘intergovernmental organizations’, the latter being described in fairly rigid terms; 
hence, it is proposed to use the broader term ‘hybrid mechanism of cooperation’. 
43 A. Di Stasi, “About Soft International Organizations: An Open Question,” in R. Virzo and I. Ingravallo (eds.), 
Evolutions in the Law of International Organizations (2015), at 45. 
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By and large, the hybrids offer significant advantages. Multilateral organizations are 
cumbersome and bogged down by procedural rules. In a situation where fundamental concerns 
over sovereignty are endemic, flexible and adaptable hybrid mechanisms foster experimentation 
and innovation. “They dispense with the juridical equality and the time-consuming formality of 
traditional international organizations.”44  
Some attempt to designate the prevalence and overall success of the hybrids to the fact 
that they bring together specialized domestic officials in a peer-to-peer environment. The 
argument suggests that such an environment allows drafting the most effective measures because 
specialized domestic officials would draft only such measures that are capable of actually being 
implemented on national levels, and that thereby reduces the risk of digression from adopted 
‘obligations’.45 This argument in effect suggests that usage of a hybrid form of cooperation 
transforms the problem being discussed into a simple coordination problem, where cooperation 
is preferred by default. While the involvement of specialized domestic officials and the conduct 
of negotiations in a somewhat less formal peer-to-peer environment positively affect the outcome 
of negotiations, neither can change the nature of the problem being discussed from a true conflict 
into a simple coordination problem. And in this sense the argument goes too far.  
A mere choice of the form of cooperation, obviously, cannot transform an issue from a 
prisoner’s dilemma conflict into a coordination problem where each player by default prefers 
coordination. The fact that States, and maybe international organizations, have come together to 
institute an informal entity to address issues requiring coordination is, by contrast, indicative of 
the intentions of those involved. Overall, any cooperative initiative, be it a proposal to establish 
an international organization or a treaty, is indicative of the emerging understanding that a matter 
in question needs international attention and requires cooperative efforts. Legally binding 
arrangements, at the same time, can serve a multitude of other purposes, predominantly in the 
sphere of reputation and trade-offs, primarily due to their legal force.  
Non-binding informal undertakings, often integrated into or part of (but not to be equated 
as such to) hybrids, lack such a bargaining potential. Non-compliance with any or all 
                                                        
44 K. Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of 
International Law, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (2002), at 24. 
45 Id.  
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‘obligations’ endorsed by way of ‘soft law’ acts of hybrid entities46 does not entail reputational 
risks similar to those resulting from digression from formal legally binding documents; neither 
does it serve as an indicator of possible future behavior of a non-complying State. These 
mechanisms are premised on the understanding that compliance with any of its documents is 
voluntary. Therefore, the non-compliance does not amount to an unforeseen digression. From 
this perspective, establishment of a hybrid mechanism is a firm indicator of a good-faith intent to 
commence cooperation for the benefit of all participants. 
Moreover, a legally non-binding arrangement only makes sense when widespread 
compliance is expected. The hybrids tend to lack any enforcement mechanisms or liability 
regimes for violation of ‘obligations’, making it impossible to compel a violator to bring his 
behavior in compliance. The free rider problem is also diminished in the context of hybrids: 
since the mechanism is informal, participation is voluntary and is less of a signal of a State’s 
reputation as a responsible member of the community. If a State chooses to join the hybrid 
mechanism, it does so because gains from cooperation outweigh risks entailed in cooperation, 
and not merely to underline its willingness to be a responsible member of the community. With 
such a motivation in place, free-riding is quite unlikely: if one wants to piggyback on others’ 
effort, why not just refrain from joining and enjoy free perquisites?  
Paradoxically, in a sterile environment of a theoretical analysis, informal mechanisms of 
cooperation, often perceived to be unstable and thus unreliable, present themselves as firm 
indicators of the desire to cooperate in a good faith manner, to comply with adopted decisions 
and to limit digressions for the sake of the coordination’s success. In practice, of course, 
achievement of all these benefits of hybrid cooperation requires a proper choice of the used 
institutional structure. The appropriate institutional structure is a necessary prerequisite by itself. 
At the same time, an appropriate institutional structure ensures that those participants who would 
make functioning of the mechanism feasible and successful join the arrangement.  
That leads to the discussion of the features of mechanisms belonging to the hybrid form 
of cooperation in outer space that should be present unless participating States decide otherwise, 
to be an appropriate tool in future cooperative space projects. Based on the existing practice, a 
set of features characteristic to the hybrids has been proposed. These are: “[A]bsence of an 
                                                        
46 Here the conclusion is limited exclusively to legally non-binding documents produced within mechanisms falling 
in the hybrid form of cooperation and is not intended to apply to legally non-binding documents produced by 
international conferences or international intergovernmental organizations. 
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international treaty as a constituent instrument; operativity and institutional effectiveness as 
evidence of their existence; wide recourse to acts of ‘soft law’; frequent adoption of a top-down 
procedure (at the highest level) in decision-making activities.”47 The preceding analysis, 
however, rebuts the conclusion that the absence of an international treaty as a constituent 
document is an immutable characteristic of mechanisms belonging to the hybrid form of 
cooperation: the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme has been established by way of an international 
legally binding treaty.48 
Acknowledging that existence of an international treaty within the otherwise informal 
and flexible structure of a hybrid mechanism is unusual and to a certain extent illogical – after 
all, the hybrid is created precisely to avoid the hassle of negotiating a treaty – it is suggested that 
the inherent flexibility of the hybrids rejects the very premise of a rigid set of necessary features 
that have to be present within every relevant mechanism. Ultimately, the hybrids are ad hoc 
creations that are capable of addressing challenges their creating States require to have 
addressed. If, as in 1988 when the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme was created, States see the 
treaty as a proper method to ensure due consideration of their individual interests and a safeguard 
against digressions, and if the number of participating States is small enough to allow negotiating 
a treaty with relatively low costs, then adoption of a constituent treaty becomes just another 
peculiar feature of the mechanism in question. 
A wide recourse to acts of ‘soft law’ is also not a distinctive feature of hybrids. The 
majority of international organizations, as discussed above, are normally authorized to adopt 
exclusively legally non-binding documents as well,49 but that does not undermine their 
characterization as international intergovernmental organizations. While ‘soft law’ documents 
are a hallmark of the past two decades, when they have transformed into a way of legal 
‘regulation’ often resorted to of both technically complex and not-so-complex issues, they have 
always been a part of international law. For this reason, it is suggested that the acts of ‘soft law’ 
should not be considered as a distinctive characteristic of the hybrids – albeit non-binding 
documents are the method of coordination within such mechanisms – but as a default 
                                                        
47 Id. at 58-59. 
48 International COSPAS-SARSAT Programme Agreement, July 1, 1988. 1518 U.N.T.S. 209.  
49 In fact, international intergovernmental organizations that do have law-making authority are very few, see, A. 
Guzman, Doctor Frankenstein’s International Organizations, 24 Eur. J. Int’l L. 999 (2013). 
 488 
characteristic, which, at the same time, might be altered by an agreement between cooperating 
States.  
“Paradoxically, the avoidance of the intergovernmental model gave rise to new ways of 
institutionalizing interstate relations that exclude international personification but maintain 
intergovernmental working.”50 An absent international legal personality and an 
intergovernmental way of working are the two mandatory features of any effective hybrid 
mechanism.  
International personification by definition moves the entity to the category of 
international organizations. Although “the task of the jurists is not just that of ‘packing reality 
into the already existing juridical categories’, but of adjusting ‘such categories to the events of 
reality’,”51 international legal personality is still one characteristic that unequivocally signals 
attribution of a mechanism to the category of international intergovernmental organizations. 
States, especially those formerly belonging to the Soviet bloc, have not always been favoring 
attribution of a status of the subject of international law to international organizations; and now, 
when such an attribution is no longer questioned, only an entity possessing the legal status 
supported by the necessary institutional characteristics can be admitted to the list of subjects of 
international law. Just as an international organization with its capacity to participate in 
international relations cannot exist without legal personality, the legal personality cannot be 
attributed to any entity other than an international organization, simply because either such an 
attribution would not be recognized by States, or such an entity would be designated an 
international organization.  
International legal personality involves more than the capacity to enter into international 
relations, as it has been discussed at length in Chapter 1. The most notable consequence of the 
existing international legal personality is the formation of an autonomous will of an international 
organization, materializing a threat of creating Dr. Frankenstein’s monster. This threat is absent 
in the hybrids, making them an attractive way to cooperate. Hence, exclusion of international 
personification is an immutable characteristic of a hybrid.  
                                                        
50 M.-C. Runavot, “The Intergovernmental Organization and the Institutionalization of International Relations,” in 
R. Virzo and I. Ingravallo (eds.), Evolutions in the Law of International Organizations (2015), at 37. 
51 A. Di Stasi, “About Soft International Organizations: An Open Question,” in R. Virzo and I. Ingravallo (eds.), 
Evolutions in the Law of International Organizations (2015), at 58. 
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Intergovernmental working is the feature and the essence of the hybrids since they are 
created to facilitate such working. “Operativity and institutional effectiveness as evidence of 
their existence”52 is the third overarching characteristic that has to be present in a hybrid 
mechanism of cooperation. “Operativity” in this context means that the hybrids are created to 
work permanently in performing tasks that require continuous coordination and oversight, 
primarily in the areas of practical applications. “Institutional effectiveness” refers to the ability to 
perform tasks the mechanism is entrusted with, and hence serves as an indicator of its existence. 
If the mechanism performs the tasks adequately through its institutional structure, it is 
maintained to ensure an uninterrupted performance of the tasks or is entrusted with performance 
of additional tasks, thereby confirming its existence. Due to a non-existent legal personality and, 
in most cases, an absent international treaty, whose existence can be easily confirmed or 
otherwise, legally there is no evidence of the mechanism’s existence except for ongoing 
activities.  
In the context of space activities, it is suggested that four additional characteristics would 
enhance the quality of the hybrid mechanism and boost the chances of such a mechanism 
success.  
The first feature is that equipment used in the projects has to be owned individually by 
those States, groups of States or international organizations undertaking a particular project. The 
hybrids are not created to manage or even supervise space projects undertaken by States and 
international organizations, whether individually or in partnerships, but to provide an adequate 
institutional framework to coordinate these projects, avoid redundancies and facilitate 
management of resources in an effective and economical way. The second feature, therefore, is 
an independent financing of projects overseen by a mechanism. Each project is financed 
individually by the States participating in the project, and not from the uniform budget of the 
entity. These two features are interconnected: preservation of individual ownership prevents the 
need to allocate funds for management of the projects, read involved assets, on the international 
level. Common funds should be limited to contribution necessary to maintain the institutional 
structure.  
The last two features are also interconnected. On the one hand, a mechanism should have 
substantial legal flexibility, and on the other, focus on technical issues. The first element does not 
                                                        
52 Id. 
 490 
presuppose a legally non-binding nature of the underlying document; rather, it refers to the need 
to limit the underlying document to those elements that are structurally essential for the very 
existence of a mechanism. For example, it may include provisions on the objectives of the 
mechanism, subject matter of its activities, initial participants and rules for admission of new 
participants; it may outline structure of the plenary organ, executive organ, should one be 
created, an organ performing secretarial functions and any other organs that are deemed 
necessary; it may also include voting rules and an amendment procedure. The underlying 
document should, however, refrain from including any technical-scientific details of the projects 
overseen, standards of safety and security, standards of operations and the like.  
The last feature – the focus on technical issues – is only possible when the legal 
flexibility is present. Organizational and legal matters should be addressed in broad terms in the 
underlying document, leaving a mechanism with a stable foundation to perform the tasks it was 
created for, focusing on technical and scientific aspects. A flexible underlying document ensures 
that a mechanism has sufficient authority, creating an opportunity to address technical tasks, 
focusing on technical effectiveness and precision, without the need to formulate 
recommendations in a formal way. In essence, the hybrid mechanism needs a short underlying 
document supplemented by annexes analogous to those developed within the International Civil 
Aviation Organization. These might take various forms: the CEOS Working Groups that focus 
on particular overseen projects within the general framework of the Committee is one example; 
bilateral cooperative arrangements concluded within the COSPAS-SARSAT Programme are 
another. No matter the actual institutional structure chosen, the overarching approach that 
requires distinguishing regulation of legal and technical matters should be followed. 
There is a certain value in adding specifics to the foregoing recommendations, for 
example by suggesting functions a secretarial organ should perform, the approach to allowing 
new participants or the preferred voting procedure. Such recommendations are excluded from the 
present analysis for three reasons. First, they inevitably would reflect preferences of the author, 
no matter how well reasoned, since almost any legal argument, more so a policy argument – 
which this recommendation would resemble in significant part – can go many ways. Second, any 
mechanism belonging to the hybrid form of cooperation is the one possessing substantial 
flexibility and the one reflecting preferences and needs of founding States, not following a rigid 
theoretical model. Finally, the hybrids might be effectively used in various areas of space 
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activities; trying to predict what institutional procedures would work better for those yet 
unforeseen activities comes closer to astrology than to international space law.  
 
14.2.4 Framework-contract-treaty 
This form of cooperation includes two analyzed mechanisms of cooperation in space: the 
International Space Station 1998 Intergovernmental Agreement53 and bilateral treaties. 
Obviously, bilateral treaties and the Intergovernmental Agreement are concluded between 
different numbers of States, but functionally they are close. The analyzed bilateral treaties create 
a legal foundation for future cooperative space projects, details of which are specified in relevant 
implementing arrangements. The Intergovernmental Agreement similarly creates a legal 
foundation for the performance of a long-term cooperative project, whereas legal and technical 
particularities are left to be addressed by the Memoranda of Understanding and relevant 
agreements between implementing agencies and related entities.  
Quite obviously, the contents of the bilateral treaties and the Intergovernmental 
Agreement differ significantly. Nevertheless, these justifiably belong to the same form of 
cooperation. The form of cooperation is the general denomination for mechanisms of 
cooperation that pursue substantially similar cooperative goals and possess an inextricable 
institutional connection. In this case, both mechanisms have the goal of creating a legal 
foundation for cooperation that is supplemented by lower-level arrangements, and both 
mechanisms in achieving this goal resort to the framework structuring of the treaties.54 
The bilateral treaties may be used to achieve goals going beyond the explicit provisions 
of a particular treaty due to an intricate complexity of bilateral relations of States, especially in 
the sensitive area of space cooperation. These additional goals cannot be identified without 
                                                        
53 Agreement among the Government of Canada, Governments of Member States of the European Space Agency, 
the Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the Government of the United States of 
America concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, Washington, done 29 January 1998, 
entered into force 27 March 2001; T.I.A.S. No. 12927. 
54 Similar view was expressed by S. Aoki in her recent paper analyzing reports of States submitted to the COPUOS 
Legal Subcommittee in the course of work on the agenda item “Review of the International Mechanisms for 
Cooperation in the Peaceful Exploration and Use of Outer Space.” S. Aoki, Identifying Common Legal Issues in 
International Cooperation Mechanisms, 58th IISL Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Technical Session “Joint 
IAF/IISL Session on the Legal Framework for Cooperative Space Activities,” IAC-15.E7.7.-B3.8.1. Not yet 
published as of November 2015 (Following the analysis of bilateral cooperative practice of the United States and 
Canada, the author admits that “the contents of the various Framework Conventions may differ depending on the 
subject-matter of the project. For instance, the ISS/IGA cannot be the same with a low budget and short period space 
science collaborative program.”). 
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resorting to political speculations, what should not be done in this work. Therefore, for the 
purposes of drawing conclusions, the role of bilateral treaties as tools in political relations will be 
disregarded as not affecting the legal component of cooperation. Both multilateral and bilateral 
treaties are considered as capable of performing the same range of tasks, albeit among different 
numbers of parties. 
The framework-contract-treaty form of cooperation might include mechanisms that have 
the following characteristics. First, they are bilateral or multilateral legally binding treaties. 
Second, they provide a framework for cooperation, meaning that they cover the elements thereof 
that are deemed essential by the parties. Third, they are expected to be used for an extended 
period either for multiple cooperative projects, or in the course of an evolving project. Fourth, 
they explicitly provide for a need to conclude additional implementing arrangements to 
supplement and specify provisions of the treaty.  
The treaties designated to this category of cooperation have several advantages compared 
to the treaties that aim at specifying all rights and obligations of parties in implementation of a 
certain project. The first advantage is the ability to tailor cooperation to the exact needs of the 
project with relatively low negotiation costs: once the legal framework is in place, the designated 
national agencies are capable of drafting necessary additions without involving their ministries of 
foreign affairs and, by way of concluding agency-level implementing arrangements, avoiding the 
need for ratification.  
Second, utilization of the framework treaties generally reduces the costs for negotiation 
of the treaty itself. In the course of the analysis of the selected treaties of the United States and 
Russia it has been shown that each country concludes, especially in the recent years, 
substantively identical treaties with different countries. Having a ‘template’ treaty in place 
eliminates the need to draft every new treaty from scratch. Supplementing these ‘templates’ by 
project-specific implementing arrangements, in turn, eliminates the need to sacrifice an 
individualized approach to cooperation for a less costly treaty negotiation process. This 
advantage might not be as evident as applied to multilateral treaties. But imagine all the 
multitude of issues that were addressed in the bilateral Memoranda of Understanding within the 
International Space Station framework would have been included in the Intergovernmental 
Agreement. The chances are that as of 2016 the Intergovernmental Agreement would not have 
been signed and ratified by all fifteen participating States.  
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The third advantage of the treaties comprised by this form of cooperation stems from 
their characterization as ‘contract’ treaties, meaning that they limit their application to a certain 
defined set of circumstances, not establishing a legal regime applicable to a State-party at all 
times. In the terms of Triepel’s theory distinguishing between law-making treaties and treaties as 
contracts,55 this is the case where contract-treaties with their limited scope of application might 
for the first time be superior to law-making treaties: for in modern space law hardly any legally 
binding ‘law-making’ treaty would gain much support. The fourth advantage of having a proper 
legal framework for an evolving project, which might well metamorphose along the way, can be 
described as follows: “If contingent conditions are correctly foreseen, the chances are improved 
that a professional outlook will have crystallized to some degree well in advance of particular 
problems. Such anticipations will diminish the likelihood of shock, panic, and confusion in the 
presence of new developments.”56 
Finally, conclusion of a framework-contract-treaty does not require immediate 
commencement of cooperation. But it does create a favorable atmosphere to consider possible 
ways and means to cooperate in future projects. From this standpoint, this form of cooperation is 
an appropriate approach toward involvement of less developed nations in outer space activities. 
The majority of bilateral treaties are concluded among developed nations; the International Space 
Station is a project exclusively of developed nations. It should be acknowledged that 
involvement of less developed nations in outer space activities would be beneficial not only for 
these States, but also for the whole international community. Space technologies are capable of 
providing the essentials that are missing today in the less developed nations, like communication 
and educational opportunities, which are vital for these nations’ steady development and more 
active inclusion in all areas of international relations.  
A recent scholarly work supports the proposition that the main benefits of concluding 
framework agreements supplemented by project-specific implementing arrangements are the 
ability to save resources and to agree on terms of cooperation before starting a specific 
cooperative project.57 The paper further emphasizes a feature of this practice that is quite a 
valuable addition to States with little cooperative experience in outer space activities: the 
                                                        
55 See, V.D. Degan, Sources of International Law (1997), at 489. 
56 M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (1963), at 1035. 
57 See, S. Aoki, Identifying Common Legal Issues in International Cooperation Mechanisms, 58th IISL Colloquium 
on the Law of Outer Space, Technical Session “Joint IAF/IISL Session on the Legal Framework for Cooperative 
Space Activities,” IAC-15.E7.7.-B3.8.1, at 6. Not yet published as of November 2015. 
 494 
framework agreement addresses the common legal issues that are likely to surface while 
negotiating a specific space mission, allowing “the emerging spacefaring nations to embark on a 
certain space cooperative activity without subjecting themselves to try-and-error procedure.”58 
Mechanisms belonging to this form of cooperation can generally be used for a wide 
variety of cooperative projects. A multilateral framework-contract-treaty should be 
recommended for multinational long-term projects involving construction of complex space 
systems requiring continuous management. Construction of a space station and construction of 
an installation on a celestial body are now the two foreseen types of projects where such a 
mechanism of cooperation would prove most beneficial. The bilateral treaties would be 
applicable in similar projects involving only two States. The bilateral treaties, of course, are very 
versatile and may be used in virtually any area of bilateral space cooperation, requiring only 
conclusion of appropriate implementing arrangements. 
Overall, this form of cooperation is likely to be an appropriate choice for many practical 
cooperative space projects. An approach that allows negotiating a legal framework with 
comparatively low costs, launching a project and adjusting legal and technical standards on every 
stage of the project is an attractive scenario. Moreover, such an approach does not require trade-
offs between legal precision, due attention to technical matters and adaptability of the 
cooperative framework. In projects where expenses are extremely high, where compliance of 
every participant is essential for the very existence of a project – what is duly acknowledged in 
the 1998 Intergovernmental Agreement59 – and where the legal guarantees provided by way of a 
legally binding document, no matter their moderate effectiveness, are appreciated, an 
international treaty is a preferred choice. 
 
14.2.5 Regional space international organizations 
As of today only one mechanism of cooperation can be designated to this form of 
cooperation; however, expecting that more of appropriate mechanisms will emerge sooner or 
later, since the effectiveness of regional organizations has been repeatedly reconfirmed during 
                                                        
58 Id. 
59 E.g., Art. 23, 24, 28 of the 1998 Intergovernmental Agreement. 
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the COPUOS sessions,60 a plural noun is used in the name of the form of cooperation. The 
European Space Agency (ESA) is the only mechanism designated to this form; in fact, the 
Agency might be considered as the one to pave the way toward identification of this form of 
cooperation in international space cooperation.  
The Commonwealth of Independent States, despite the widespread perception in Russian 
literature, is not a regional organization, hence cannot be designated to this form of cooperation. 
Based on the results of the analysis in Chapter 12, it is suggested that the Commonwealth should 
not be designated to any form of cooperation. For one, it has not been created as a mechanism of 
cooperation in outer space, and it has never been used as one. More broadly, the Commonwealth 
is excluded from the classification because it has been created to deal with a somewhat unique 
situation of an amicable State dissolution but for many reasons failed to create an appropriate 
institutional and legal basis for achievement of its goals. Neither is it likely that conditions 
triggering creation of the Commonwealth would be repeated in a foreseeable future, nor is it 
advisable for any number of States, no matter the circumstances, to use the Commonwealth’s 
approach to cooperation. This was a one-time solution that cannot be classified in any 
meaningful way; more so, such a classification would lack any sense precisely because it was a 
one-time solution not bearing any importance for future cooperative endeavors, except maybe for 
a lesson of how not to structure cooperation.  
“[R]egional organizations have been established in a wide variety of geographical areas, 
albeit, evidently, with varying intensity, depth and political and legal characteristics. In this 
regard, it has been noted that, in today’s world, there is no longer room for ‘solitary adventures’ 
on the part of individual States: the creation of integrated regional areas seems to be the 
‘postmodern passport to globalization’.”61 European regional cooperation has been the archetype 
of regional cooperation for many decades now; and economic integration is not its only strong 
side.  
The European Space Agency is an example of an unprecedented cooperation in many 
ways, the most notable being the level of cooperation the Agency has been able to achieve in 
certain areas. Traditionally, a regional (non-integration) organization works in an environment 
                                                        
60 S. Aoki, Identifying Common Legal Issues in International Cooperation Mechanisms, 58th IISL Colloquium on 
the Law of Outer Space, Technical Session “Joint IAF/IISL Session on the Legal Framework for Cooperative Space 
Activities,” IAC-15.E7.7.-B3.8.1. Not yet published as of November 2015. 
61 P. Pennetta, “International Regional Organizations: Problems and Issues,” in R. Virzo and I. Ingravallo (eds.), 
Evolutions in the Law of International Organizations (2015), at 80-81. 
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where national sovereignty has an absolute importance and achievement of an organization’s 
aims depends strictly on the willingness of States to take on further legal obligations and, more 
importantly, to implement them. A quite different approach is observed in organizations of 
integration. “To put it briefly, we may say that this type of organizations is defined by a strong 
political and legal dynamism as well as by a tendency to restrict, under certain (strictly defined) 
conditions and with regard to specific competencies, the exercise of State sovereignty.”62 
While labeling ESA an integration organization would be an exaggeration, it exhibits 
features that go beyond those expected from a traditional regional cooperation. Particularly, with 
respect to mandatory programs, an explicit consent of a State-party is not required to oblige it to 
participate. Achievement of a comparable level of cooperation might not be feasible in any other 
region in the near future. Such a level of cooperation is not something that can be achieved by 
merely mandating it in a constituent document; it is a result of certain institutional and legal 
arrangements coming together and incentivizing States to yield greater authority to an 
international organization. Learning from the ESA experience, the question is: What features 
should the mechanisms possess to be designated to this form of cooperation? 
Undoubtedly, ESA and its success are premised in large part on the overall success of the 
European integration. The European Union provided ESA with an unprecedented level of 
economic connections. That, however, does not mean that the ESA success cannot be mirrored in 
a different region that lacks its own ‘European Union’.63 A limited regional economic 
cooperation is a necessary prerequisite for space cooperation: the stronger the economic ties 
between the States, the easier, all else constant, the establishment of space cooperation would 
proceed. But even a region with a moderate level of preexisting cooperative ties is capable of 
establishing an effective regional space organization, though the scale of cooperation and the 
breadth of immediate results should not be overestimated – they cannot come close to those of 
ESA. A mistake of the founders of the Commonwealth of Independent States should not be 
repeated: you cannot recreate overnight what took decades to create.  
The foundation of an international organization is its membership; for a regional 
organization a wise approach to membership is even more important because the membership 
                                                        
62 Id. at 91-92. 
63 See, supra para. 11.3.2 (ESA and the European Union are two independently working international organizations 
that cooperate based on the 2004 Framework Agreement between ESA and the European Commission. ESA does 
not depend on the European Union for its functioning or existence, though their activities become more 
interconnected.). 
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tends to be more compact and the level of cooperation is expected to be deeper. “Theories of 
federalism teach us that jurisdiction over a problem should be allocated to the lowest level of 
government capable of internalizing the relevant externalities. When applied to international 
problems, the lesson is that international agreements should include all states (and only those 
states) that are significantly affected by relevant externalities.”64 Recalling the discussion on the 
approaches to regionalism, where it has been concluded that a region is more than a geographic 
proximity and that different goals require different approaches to regionalism,65 the theories of 
federalism applied to international space law teach us to limit membership to those States that 
have a proven interest in space projects and have necessary space capabilities. 
“The precondition for the creation of a regional form of association, whatever its legal 
nature, is the existence of a political will, which tends to be stronger where the organization has a 
limited number of members.”66 In other words, any successful regional space organization would 
have a limited initial membership and would have stringent rules for admission of new members, 
requiring demonstration of not only an interest in space projects, not only that a candidate-State 
shares ‘values’ of an organization, but that it is financially, economically, legally and 
technologically ready to commit to attainment of the goals of the organization.  
The most complicated aspect in establishing a new organization, especially the one 
intended to promote close cooperation between a limited number of States, is to create 
cooperative incentives. In other words, the benefits of cooperation, namely the benefits from 
division of labor, specialization and economy, should outweigh risks of cooperation, especially 
the one posed by Dr. Frankenstein’s monster. In the ESA context, cooperative benefits have been 
multiplied by utilization of three features: the geographic return principle, the mandatory-
optional programs dichotomy and the principle of internationalization. The second feature has 
been hailed as the one appropriate for adaptation in environments other than ESA.67  
The mandatory-optional programs dichotomy is indeed a smart way to structure 
cooperation, supplying enough cooperative projects to justify existence of an organization 
through implementation of mandatory programs, and simultaneously creating a potential for 
                                                        
64 A. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (2008), at 170. 
65 See, supra para. 12.3.1. 
66 P. Pennetta, “International Regional Organizations: Problems and Issues,” in R. Virzo and I. Ingravallo (eds.), 
Evolutions in the Law of International Organizations (2015), at 105-06. 
67 See, F.G. von der Dunk, “European Space Law,” in F.G. von der Dunk (ed.), Handbook of Space Law (2014), at 
311. 
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development by way of implementation of optional programs. The dichotomy provides a benefit 
of specialization by way of entrusting projects to be performed by a dedicated organization 
instead of a possibly less-qualified national agency.  
In the context of outer space activities, which are notoriously expensive, specialization 
might not be enough to outweigh the risks of cooperation. Economy, primarily financial 
economy, is the factor that, on the one hand, persuades States that they are indeed capable of 
entering space activities, and on the other, that the organization is the right tool for their space 
programs. More so, States would sign up for mandatory programs only if they bring the benefit 
of specialization – that is the promise that these programs would be implemented more 
professionally within the organization, and the benefit of economy – that is the promise that a 
State would receive benefits from implementing the programs as a member of the organization 
comparable to that of implementing them individually, but with lower costs. The division of 
labor, probably, does not play a crucial role in space activities, because generally States are 
willing to invest their time in supervision of space projects due to a traditionally high 
reputational income from being a part of a ‘space club’. 
Therefore, a regional space organization has to provide the benefit of specialization and 
the financial economy. The first one is relatively easy to achieve. If a specialized organization is 
established, it is intended to provide specialized services for its members. Credibility is the main 
challenge here: the newly created organization should have significant support from its founding 
members to allow bringing together an adequate institutional structure supported by qualified 
personnel. The other challenge lies in the regulatory field: the founding States should be bold 
enough to entrust the organization with the authority sufficient to effectively facilitate 
cooperation. The authority to adopt legally binding decisions with respect to projects the 
organization supervises is one necessary power. A dispute resolution authority and the power to 
take disciplinary measures against a non-compliant State would also be advisable.  
The financial economy is a trickier matter that requires a combination of precise tailoring 
of legal rights and obligations, technical proficiency and financial genius. Idealistically, the 
organization is created for a long period and is expected to perform projects ranging from 
research missions to practical applications projects. Therefore, it is not feasible to try and 
anticipate every possible financial scenario and prepare a course of action for each one. Rather, 
an overarching approach should be chosen. For example, ESA rules stipulate that in no case 
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should contribution of any State exceed a quarter of the Agency’s budget.68 At the same time, 
ESA utilizes a one member-one vote principle regardless of a particular member’s financial 
contribution.  
While this system might be working well for ESA, it has been suggested that such a 
financing system is inherently unjust and causes tensions between States with different sizes of 
contributions, sometimes making wealthier States question whether they need this organization 
at all. An organization unquestionably needs its wealthier members, so it is the duty of the 
organization, or ultimately its founding States, to work out the financing system that is 
acceptable to all States. If a cap on a maximum allowed contribution makes the principle of one 
State-one vote acceptable, that is the way to go; if a weighted voting system is a more 
satisfactory solution, international practice has multiple examples to draw inspiration from.  
Ultimately, both benefits of specialization and economy would heavily depend on the 
region where the organization is functioning. Is it a big region? Is it premised primarily on 
geographical proximity or has another factor been chosen as the preeminent one? How many 
founding members does the organization have and how many more members are expected to join 
it in the next decade? How close are the members of the organization economically and 
technologically? Is there an obvious leading State with excellent space capabilities? Is the 
organization aiming at balancing research and practical applications projects or is one element 
preferred over the other? Answers to these and many more questions would predetermine how 
the benefits of specialization and economy are better achieved in the regional organization in 
question. Unfortunately, no abstract theory can give a precise recipe for success. 
On the abstract level it is only possible to advocate paying profound attention to 
maximizing the benefits of economy, making maximization of the benefits from specialization a 
centerpiece of the institutional structure, considering borrowing the most successful strategies, 
particularly the mandatory-optional programs dichotomy, from the existing regional space 
organizations, and tailoring even the very best borrowed strategies to the unique conditions of 
the region. None of these suggestions would work, however, if the foundation, namely the 
membership, of the organization were mixed from inappropriate elements, if it were too loose or 
too rigid, or if it were downright inappropriate for the type of construction it is expected to bear.  
                                                        
68 Article XIII(1)(a) of the Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency, Paris, done 30 May 
1975, entered into force 30 October 1980; 14 I.L.M. 864 (1975). 
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14.3 Future Prospects 
 
Transgovernmental networks will increasingly provide an important 
anchor for international organizations and nonstate actors alike. U.N. officials 
have already learned a lesson about the limits of supranational authority; 
mandated cuts in the international bureaucracy will further tip the balance of 
power toward national regulators. The next generation of international institutions 
is also likely to look more like the Basel Committee, or, more formally, the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, dedicated to providing 
a forum for transnational problem-solving and the harmonization of national law. 
The disaggregation of the state creates opportunities for domestic institutions, 
particularly courts, to make common cause with their supranational counterparts 
against their fellow branches of government. Nonstate actors will lobby and 
litigate wherever they think they will have the most effect. Many already realize 
that corporate self-regulation and states' promises to comply with vague 
international agreements are no substitute for national law.69 
That is one grim prospect for international lawyers. Although the cited opinion correctly 
notes the overall trend toward greater reliance for regulation, in its strict legal sense, on national 
law and usage of international law primarily for coordination, it might go a bit too far in 
forecasting the role of the private sector and private regulation. The ability of non-state actors to 
lobby and litigate, to influence legal processes in a meaningful way is limited to those several 
countries with developed political and legal systems; a majority of nations until today do not 
have a powerful private sector or the necessary legal tools for it to use to assert the power. But 
the trend is clear: commercialization and globalization are making the private sector a more 
influential international player, and a traditional international law with its State-centricity and 
widespread vague formulations becomes less relevant in certain areas, demanding new ways to 
address contemporary issues. These trends are clear in the space sector. 
 
14.3.1 Looking into the Future: Recommended Forms of Cooperation 
In the course of the preceding twelve chapters, a representative set of modern 
mechanisms of international legal cooperation in outer space has been reviewed, paying 
profound attention to the legal and institutional features that affect their operational 
                                                        
69 A.-M. Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 Foreign Affairs 183 (1997), at 195. 
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effectiveness. The analysis has shown that some mechanisms are comparatively less effective, 
while others are undeniable examples of successful cooperation. Keeping in mind the 
overarching goal of the book, the most important result is the proposal of a list of forms of 
cooperation that are expected to be the most effective for the respective types of future 
cooperative space projects.  
Table 2 provides a short summary of the findings of the previous parts of the chapter. 
Although, as before, the form of the table forces omission of important details, this format 
provides a convenient at-a-glance overview of the results of the research. It makes clear that the 
three forms of cooperation possessing enumerated features are the recommended tools in 
achievement of three different types of goals. The form of hybrids is by far the most 
controversial, or at least non-conventional one. 
“Space activities have caught the imagination of international lawyers, as they have 
caught that of the public generally, by their dramatic quality. Man’s love of adventure has never 
been intoxicated by quite so strong a wine as the sense man is no longer earthbound.”70 It seems 
that today the thrill of that strong wine is wearing out and States are facing a difficult task of 
balancing the need to continue cooperation with the cautious approach to any additional legal 
obligations. Hybridization has been the answer to this conundrum. 
Hybridization is often equated to the phenomenon of ‘soft law’. The distinction between 
these concepts should be made clear. Hybridization is a phenomenon that can be found in both 
regulatory and institutional spheres; it refers to inclusion of informal elements into the 
traditionally formal concepts. The hybrid, as it is understood in this book, is an 
intergovernmental entity that combines features of an international organization and an 
international conference. The term ‘soft law’ is used throughout this book to refer to 
international acts adopted by international organizations or concluded between States, or 
between States and international intergovernmental organizations that do not create legal rights 
and obligations enforceable on the international plane, but might have political and moral value. 
‘Soft law’ and the hybrids, therefore, are the products of hybridization, whereas the first one is 
the result of a regulatory hybridization and the latter is the product of an institutional 
hybridization.  
                                                        
70 C.W. Jenks, Space Law (1965), at 315. 
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Both the regulatory and institutional hybridization have become a part of international 
space cooperation, particularly in the recent years, following the swift development of 
technology. Particularly, commercialization of space activities is one of the factors necessitating 
new approaches, where an international organization’s ‘prototype’ has to be tailored to meet the 
challenges.  
International law and the private sector in the context of outer space activities relate to 
each other in many ways, including the direct influence of the legal regime on the economic 
feasibility of activities.71 This new ‘balance of powers’ demands that commercial consequences 
are taken into consideration in elaboration of the legal regime, leading to institutional and 
regulatory hybridization. From the regulatory perspective, it encourages a less formal approach 
to the adopted documents. Transformation of outer space activities into a commercially feasible, 
in some instances also highly profitable business dictates the need not only for regulatory 
stability, but also for proactive resolution of technical and legal matters posed by involvement of 
new actors and by the advancements of science and technology, triggering the institutional 
hybridization. A hybrid mechanism of cooperation due to its inherent flexibility is well equipped 
to structure its working methods in a most appropriate way. 
Additionally, “many contemporary issues are increasingly technocratic, in the sense that 
they entail the development and application of expert knowledge. Faith in the agency expertise 
has justified deference to agencies and a concomitant expansion of their powers, both at a 
national level, but also transnationally. Moreover, political deference to agency actions at the 
transnational level appears justified by a sense that they relate to issues that are narrowly 
technical rather than broadly political. As such, they are questions that are best managed by 
technocrats, rather than political elites or bureaucrats specializing in international relations.”72 
This is another reason behind intensifying hybridization in both regulatory and institutional 
spheres. 
The hybrids are the form of cooperation that is characterized by availability of necessary 
skills, continuous character of work and structural flexibility, but is not complicated by lengthy 
law-making procedures. They are well equipped to solve coordination problems. It is suggested 
                                                        
71 J. Klabbers, “Of Round Pegs and Square Holes: International Law and the Private Sector,” in P. Jurčys, P.L. Kjaer 
and R. Yatsunami (eds.), Regulatory Hybridization in the Transnational Sphere (2013), at 32-34. 
72 M. Fenwick, “Transnational Regulatory Networks,” in P. Jurčys, P.L. Kjaer and R. Yatsunami (eds.), Regulatory 
Hybridization in the Transnational Sphere (2013), at 175. 
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that the hybrids are well fit to conduct oversight and coordination of activities in the area of 
space applications on a continuous basis, focusing on technical matters. Establishment of the 
space traffic management system and the system for space debris mitigation are the two 
examples of such problems that can be effectively addressed using the hybrids. In both cases 
cooperation is presumably the preferred solution, while finding the cooperative equilibrium, read 
the solution that seems relevant for all parties, is the most challenging task. Once the equilibrium 
is found, the ensuing cooperation requires only minimal formalization and continuous technically 
oriented oversight; and that is what the hybrids are competent to do. 
While the hybrids are playing an increasingly important role in international cooperation, 
the limits of their application should be understood. The hybrids are most appropriate in the area 
of space applications. Regulation does not need hybridity to achieve its goals; ‘hard law’ and 
‘soft law’ are sufficient tools in establishing rights and obligations of the parties.  
Both trends – commercialization and an increasingly technocratic nature of contemporary 
issues – play their role in shaping modern international space cooperation. The hybrids are 
indeed one of the forms of cooperation that has a great potential in addressing space-related 
matters, but the key phrase here is ‘one of’, meaning that the hybrids are not the only possible 
solution. The foregoing analysis underlined the fact that different goals require different 
approaches. So no matter the growing importance of the hybrids, they are not capable of 
effectively dealing with every topic on today’s space agenda.  
The other two recommended forms of cooperation are suitable for completely different 
tasks than the hybrids. The framework-contract-treaties, whether multilateral or bilateral, are an 
excellent institutional basis for long-term complex projects. This form of cooperation manages to 
combine the benefits of flexibility – by way of providing only a necessary minimum of formal 
regulation and leaving particularities to be decided ‘on the go’ – with the undeniable advantages 
of a traditional formal international treaty negotiated on the highest level and regulated by the 
decades-old international law of treaties. The form of regional space organizations, despite being 
a group of one in the present analysis, has a great potential as the space technology continues to 
develop and more nations engage in space activities, spreading the opportunities for regional 
cooperation beyond the European region. Together these three forms of cooperation constitute a 
firm institutional basis for future space projects; more so, they are capable to face challenges, 
both regulatory and institutional, that future endeavors might bring.  
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Table 2, however, does not contain any recommendations as to a preferred form of 
cooperation appropriate for cooperation in negotiation and development of a ‘law-making 
treaty’, which is understood as a treaty establishing a legal regime in certain areas and is broader 
compared to the ‘framework-contract-treaty’ concluded between a limited number of parties. In 
other words, the table does not suggest the appropriate form of cooperation in case an 
international document, whether legally binding or not, similar in regulatory nature to the Outer 
Space Treaty, or more realistically to an elaborating convention, is ever to be negotiated and 
adopted.  
This omission is intentional. First of all, taking into consideration the noted trends of 
commercialization and an increasingly technocratic nature of contemporary issues, it is hardly 
plausible to advocate that an agreement coming close to a ‘law-making treaty’ would become 
necessary in the space area any time soon. The second consequence of the noted trends is that 
any agreement aiming to regulate outer space activities on a more or less universal level is going 
to focus on rather peculiar issues, in contrast to the Outer Space Treaty and the three elaborating 
conventions that established the general legal regime of outer space. In this sense, it is more 
realistic that the next universal or near-universal space agreement would have a subject matter 
resembling that of the United Nations legal principles, focusing on a certain area of space 
activities or practical applications. It would be a pure speculation to try to predict what that area 
might be. A subject matter of an agreement, just as a subject matter of practical cooperation, 
predetermines the most appropriate format of cooperation; hence, no suggestions should be made 
with respect to the most appropriate format of cooperation without knowing the subject matter of 
a future possible international space agreement.  
Third, negotiation of a ‘law-making’ agreement is a familiar undertaking that has been a 
part of international relations for centuries. No matter the novelties in the subject matter of the 
agreement, any agreement is an “act of coming into accord”73 that has been mastered by States.  
When states come together to make an agreement, they have nearly total 
control over the content and form of the deal. The result is that agreements range 
over almost every imaginable topic and virtually every conceivable form of 
strategic interaction and they vary widely in their design. Some are bilateral while 
others are multilateral; some take the form of treaties that are said to be “binding” 
under international law while others are much less formal; some provide for 
                                                        
73 H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law (1952), at 317. 
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mandatory dispute resolution while others do not even mention the subject; some 
include comprehensive monitoring schemes while others provide no oversight 
whatsoever; some demand extensive changes to existing practices while other do 
little more than reflect what states are already doing; some are highly abstract and 
focused on general principles while others establish detailed commitments.74 
Recommendations as to appropriate procedures, number of negotiating parties and a 
preferred forum for negotiations might be made only when a specific agreement, or at least a 
subject matter is known. In the abstract, drafting and negotiating an international agreement 
might be arranged in a multitude of ways, and there are not really one or two preferred formats 
since the ultimate measure of success is the conclusion of a widely adhered-to agreement.  
Finally, in the context of outer space agreements establishing a general regime of outer 
space activities, COPUOS has been the forum for their negotiation. Despite the current stalemate 
in the Committee’s activities, introduction of changes to the COPUOS methods of work as 
described in Chapter 3, might well reinstate its primary role in the outer space lawmaking 
process. But again, that would be an utterly familiar undertaking that does not require theoretical 
elaboration and rather depends on the political will of participating States.  
 
14.3.2 Looking into the Future: Learning from the Present 
The words of Manfred Lachs do not lose their relevance: “In this and in a wider [context] 
… it ought to be made clear that principles as enumerated do not constitute a closed chapter. We 
have to welcome what has been achieved and strive for further agreements. The law of outer 
space is in its formative stage only. We must proceed with prudence and care – take full benefit 
of agreements reached … make them a living reality and continue with our efforts for further 
agreements. … The draft once adopted by the General Assembly could and should become a 
document of basic importance for our future efforts to facilitate international co-operation, to 
regulate and offer protection of law to the great achievement of man’s genius in outer space for 
the benefit of our generation and those who will succeed us.”75 Space activities are evolving, and 
so should methods of cooperation. That, however, does not mean that new approaches to 
cooperation should supersede the ones already in place; rather, they should complement them. 
The general principles of space law cannot be substituted by any hybridized regulation, but they 
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75 M. Lachs, The Law of Outer Space: An Experience in Contemporary Law-Making (2010), at 128. 
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surely can be enhanced, be made up-to-date. The general principles and traditional methods of 
cooperation should be treated as a “living reality” that adapts but that does not lose its relevance 
with emergence of new challenges.  
Being supportive of the theory of regulatory hybridization and acknowledging the 
benefits it brings, it is suggested that traditional mechanisms of cooperation have not lost their 
importance. Today’s challenge lies not in a lack of political will to cooperate, but in finding the 
most appropriate approach to cooperation. In a globalized world only a handful of issues can be 
labeled as being exclusively within a national purview; hence, the need for cooperation is there. 
It is suggested that nowadays three forms of cooperation reviewed above are capable of fostering 
international space cooperation and addressing issues on today’s space agenda.  
At the same time, the mechanisms already in place should not be disregarded as being 
obsolete. The mechanisms designated to the United Nations system form of cooperation and to 
the technical international organizations form of cooperation continue to be important tools in 
modern space cooperation. Non-inclusion of these two forms in the list of forms of cooperation 
deemed the most appropriate for future space projects suggests only that they are not the best 
options for possible future projects, but is not intended to undermine their role in the ongoing 
cooperation. The mechanisms designated to the United Nations system form of cooperation are 
unique in many ways; and one consequence of their uniqueness is that they cannot be effectively 
replicated to perform any functions other than those they are already performing; hence they 
should not be considered as institutional models for future cooperation that would inevitably 
include tasks going beyond these mechanisms’ mandates. 
The two analyzed technical international organizations are undoubtedly prominent 
examples of successful cooperation. More so, they might serve as models for future space 
cooperation. They are excluded from the list of the recommended forms of cooperation due to 
the currently widespread preference for more flexible cooperation based on ‘soft law’ 
documents. Technical issues akin to those addressed by ITU and ICAO are the easily solved 
coordination games that do not require a legally binding agreement to force broad States’ 
compliance. The proposal to exclude the form of technical international organizations from the 
list of the recommended forms of cooperation, thereby, is dictated by the desire to propose such 
approaches to cooperation that are most likely to gain broad support and be implemented in 
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practice. If an issue can be adequately resolved using less formal and hence less contentious 
method, this is the recommended way.  
 As has been explained above, the three suggested forms of cooperation do not exhaust 
options for space cooperation. The two other forms of cooperation preserve their current roles, 
and, moreover, it is expected that the mechanisms designated to these two forms would not cease 
to adjust their practices to the ongoing developments in space activities. While they are not 
suggested as the promising candidates to address new, yet unanticipated future space projects, 
they are well fit to continue tackling the issues they are effectively addressing today. And a 
possible need for an international ‘law-making’ agreement is one of the tasks that can be 
undertaken using one of these ‘traditional’ mechanisms of cooperation.  
A prominent scholar opined in 1965: “To attempt to predict the course or rate of further 
development would be hazardous in the extreme, but we can at least attempt to distinguish some 
of the broad considerations of policy which will call for continuing attention. It will remain 
essential to hold a balance between too fast and too slow. This has been from the outset the 
central dilemma of space law – to establish firmly a common interest of mankind in space and 
the rule of law in space before de facto situations have crystallized too far to permit of any bold 
international initiative, while avoiding crystallizing the law prematurely before enough is known 
of the facts which it will apply. … A similar balance must be held between what is appropriate 
for regulation by law and what is best left to understandings among scientists.”76 These 
suggestions continue to be a valuable guidance in the twenty-first century.  
The hybrids have been characterized as a “blueprint for the international architecture of 
the twenty first century.”77 That might well prove to be true. Paying greater attention to the less 
formal approaches to cooperation, the traditional methods of cooperation should not be forgotten. 
After all, the role of lawyers is to ensure that the best legal solutions are readily available when 
the need for cooperation is there.
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“’It has become a platitude to say that international law is changing’, said Maurice 
Bourquin at The Hague Academy of International Law in 1931. Some seventy-five years later, it 
is still commonplace to address international law in terms of its evolution.”1 Evolution of 
international law is multi-dimensional, taking place in the regulatory and institutional realms, at 
the same time entailing a multitude of non-legal changes in the way international relations 
operate. International space law, being a part of international legal order, is also believed to be in 
the process of development and continuous change. Here, too, both the regulatory and 
institutional evolution is taking place. It is, however, argued that the regulatory evolution is 
somewhat less dramatic both in terms of the depth of the ongoing changes and in terms of its 
influence on future development of international space activities. 
Throughout the book it has been shown that the general principles of international space 
law that have been established almost fifty years ago have seen only a moderate change, mostly 
amounting to enhancement, refinement and specialization of the pronounced principles. The 
regulatory framework of international space law similarly has not seen a dramatic change in the 
type of documents used: unlike in many other areas of law, for example, ‘soft law’ documents 
have long been a part of the space law normative basis. The institutional evolution, however, has 
always been a part of outer space activities: technological advancements have been closely 
followed by the corresponding institutional changes. Nowadays, new technological 
advancements again prompt new institutional approaches to take the center stage.  
Currently the institutional dimension of outer space activities is relatively more important 
than the regulatory framework. That is so for two reasons. First, it is firmly believed that the 
United Nations space treaties have created the necessary legal foundation and that new questions 
often might be effectively addressed by means other than international legally binding 
documents.2 In other words, the United Nations treaties are sufficient to a great extent, 
diminishing the need for additional international regulatory instruments. Second, the principle of 
                                                        
1 A.-Ch. Martineau, The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law, 22 Leiden J. of Intl L. 1 
(2009), at 1. 
2 Cf., F. von der Dunk, “The Undeniably Necessary Cradle – Out of Principle and Ultimately Out of Sense,” in G. 
Lafferranderie and D. Crowther (eds.), Outlook on Space Law over the Next 30 Years (1997), at 401-14. 
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cooperation is one of the primary principles in international space activities. Although the 
principle is not understood as an unqualified obligation to cooperate, it has been in the 
background of all developments in outer space activities. In the context of international space 
law, cooperation is exceedingly important, at least because international cooperation increases 
cooperating State’s legitimacy,3 thereby elevating the legitimacy of the whole international space 
regime. While the United Nations treaties provide a sufficient regulatory basis for cooperation, 
States are facing the need to create an institutional framework for cooperation. Thereby, the 
institutional side of cooperation becomes elevated both as a tool used to comply with the 
principle of cooperation and as a method to develop the regulatory basis by way of applying 
general principles and norms to unique circumstances of cooperation. 
International cooperation has been a part of space activities since the first years of the 
space era, but only in the recent decades has cooperation transformed into an immutable 
characteristic of space activities. Globalization and commercialization are sure to instigate 
further intensification of cooperation, making joint activities more beneficial for both States and 
non-State actors. Furthermore, it has been suggested “that international cooperation would 
continue to be a necessary basis for dealing with new challenges, such as ensuring the long-term 
sustainability of space activities and promoting peace and security so as to enable the sustainable 
development of all countries.”4 Hence, cooperation is not only a way of making space activities 
more rewarding, but also the way to address global issues.  
Choosing the right institutional mechanism for cooperation, therefore, becomes a matter 
of greater importance. As has been noted above, often a choice of a proper mechanism of 
cooperation draws a line between successful cooperation and no cooperation at all. Premised on 
the understanding that different categories of cooperation require different principles, procedures 
and provisions,5 this book has the goal of identifying the most appropriate forms of cooperation 
for various future space projects. Similar work is being done within the COPUOS framework. 
                                                        
3 See, P.J. Blount, Space Traffic Management and the United States Data Sharing Environment, 58th IISL 
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Technical Session “Legal Issues of Space Traffic Management,” IAC-
15.E7.4.4. Not yet published as of November 2015.  
4 Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its fifty-fourth session, held in Vienna from 13 to 24 April 2015, 
A/AC.105/1090, para. 215. 
5 See, S. Aoki, Identifying Common Legal Issues in International Cooperation Mechanisms, 58th IISL Colloquium 
on the Law of Outer Space, Technical Session “Joint IAF/IISL Session on the Legal Framework for Cooperative 
Space Activities,” IAC-15.E7.7.-B3.8.1, at 7. Not yet published as of November 2015. 
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It should be recalled that the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee in working on the agenda 
item titled “Review of the International Mechanisms of Cooperation in the Peaceful Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space”.6 While the goals of this book and of the study undertaken by the 
COPUOS Legal Subcommittee are analogous, they are not identical. 
The COPUOS study aims at providing an overview of currently existing mechanisms of 
cooperation, identifying the necessary elements of a mechanism of cooperation depending on the 
goals it aims to achieve. A view has been expressed that such an overview “would be especially 
useful for emerging spacefaring nations for they are relatively inexperienced for making an 
international project agreement mutually acceptable and equally beneficial. A future guidance 
will also be effective for non-governmental space entities which plan to embark on a new project 
with sovereign States.”7  
The present book would hopefully prove beneficial for various readers, representing 
experienced spacefaring States, emerging spacefaring nations, nations exploring opportunities 
for prospective involvement in space activities, non-State actors, academia and anyone else 
interested in the subject. This book, however, aims at drawing conclusions a level too abstract to 
serve as a proper guidance for those subjects seeking a counsel on the matters of proper 
structuring of international agreements underlying cooperative projects. This research aims 
primarily at proposing a list of forms of cooperation – that might be implemented through quite 
different mechanisms of cooperation – and suggesting the respective fields of cooperative 
activities these forms would be best suited for based on a representative, but not by all means 
comprehensive, review of practice of cooperation and on somewhat simplified ramifications of 
application of the rational choice theory to the context of international space cooperation. 
Responses of States submitted in the course of work on the agenda item “Review of the 
International Mechanisms of Cooperation in the Peaceful Exploration and Use of Outer Space” 
outline respective States’ purposes for cooperation. Cooperation is seen as, among others, the 
means to overcome global problems, the best way to ensure that activities in outer space are 
carried on in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and the way to develop 
                                                        
6 Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its fifty-fourth session, held in Vienna from 8 to 19 April 2013, 
A/AC.105/1045, para. 168. 
7 S. Aoki, Identifying Common Legal Issues in International Cooperation Mechanisms, 58th IISL Colloquium on the 
Law of Outer Space, Technical Session “Joint IAF/IISL Session on the Legal Framework for Cooperative Space 
Activities,” IAC-15.E7.7.-B3.8.1. Not yet published as of November 2015. 
 511 
national space sector.8 Cooperation, therefore, is perceived as an instrument for the attainment of 
very different goals, ranging from compliance with State’s international obligations to 
achievement of financial benefits for national economies.  
The increasing variety of goals States strive to achieve through cooperation demand that 
cooperation be structured in the most appropriate way. At the same time, the increasing variety 
of goals of cooperation makes proposing the most appropriate ways of cooperation a more 
delicate matter. As the number of subjects involved in cooperation, the types of cooperating 
subjects, the goals of cooperation, the types of cooperative projects and the intensity of 
cooperation grow, the more disparate and variable the chosen mechanisms of cooperation 
become. Praising the important role of international cooperation in contemporary outer space 
activities, the recommendations about the proper approaches to cooperation should preserve a 
certain level of abstractedness. States are more competent to decide on the details of the chosen 
mechanism of cooperation depending on particular circumstances of cooperation; researchers are 
properly placed only to provide theoretical, and to a certain extent metaphysical guidance. 
During the 2015 session of the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee the “view was expressed 
that the mechanisms for international space cooperation and the enhancement of the rule of law 
in outer space had been shown, in practice, to be complementary in nature: international 
cooperation served as an important means for advancing the rule of law in outer space, while the 
rule of law provided an effective institutional guarantee of international cooperation.”9 It was 
further emphasized that finding workable mechanisms of cooperation was an essential element in 
ensuring that the principle of international cooperation was effectively implemented. Hopefully, 
this book contributed to the process of finding the most appropriate ways to cooperation. 
                                                        
8 Id. 
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 Category of 
Mechanism 
Features Goals Effectiveness 
OST and 3 Conventions Treaty Adopted in the beginning of 
the space era, have broad 
support. Not likely to be 
repeated again. 
Adoption of general 
space law principles; 
their elaboration in 3 
conventions 
Yes, in establishing overarching 
regime of outer space; 
particularities are dealt with 
separately on int’l and national 
level 
COPUOS Organization Need to introduce changes 
with respect to broad 
membership, State-
centricity, work through 2 
Subcommittees 
Nowadays, the role is 
primarily to propose 
visions on law 
Overall, a very successful organ. 
With necessary transformation, 
might be effective in dealing with 
space debris and providing 
overview of UN space treaties 
practice of implementation, 
identifying CIL. 
UNISPACE Conference Using IO’s secretariat is 
beneficial for organization 
Review changes in outer 
space activities  
Yes, because incentivized 
cooperation and promoted 
cooperation in several areas of 
practical applications. 
ITU Organization The system is not tailored 
to deal with increasing 
pressure on system of 
frequencies and orbital slots 
allocation, and addressing 
policy implications in the 
course of technical-oriented 
cooperation 
Allocation and allotment 
of radio frequencies and 
orbital slots, i.e. 
coordination of usage of 
limited resources with 
focus on technical 
aspects 
Yes, with respect to all modes of 
communication. Effectiveness 
presupposed by physical 
characteristics; hypothetically, a 
hybrid mechanism could also 
succeed.  
ICAO Organization Regulates exclusively civil 
aviation, where States 




aviation to ensure safety, 
equality of opportunity 
Yes in civil aviation; not likely to 
be in space traffic management. 
Better choice for space traffic 
would be a hybrid mechanism. 
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Recommended practices 
and standards formulated as 
Appendixes to the 
Convention. 
and sound and 
economical operation 
ISS Treaty ‘Framework-contract-
treaty’ (IGA) that creates a 
legal basis for a multi-level 
legal and technical 
cooperation 
Establishment of a legal 
basis for operation of a 
long-term multi-nation 
cooperative project 
Yes, by way of allowing 
separating legal issues from 
technical, administrative, 
logistical and other. 
CEOS Hybrid Secretarial organ is close to 
that of an IO; extensive 
structure to support 
coordination 
Coordination of Earth 
observation missions of 
participating Agencies 
Yes, in avoiding redundancies in 
observation programs. 
Code of Conduct Hybrid Perfunctory outline of 
mechanism of cooperation; 
secretarial organ is not 
autonomous so doesn’t 
resemble that of an IO 
‘Regulation’ through 




peaceful uses of outer 
space 
Yet to be seen, but likely won’t 
be effective. ‘Regulation’ is too 
grand of a goal for a hybrid 
mechanism. 
COSPAS-SARSAT Hybrid Preservation of national 
ownership over space 
equipment, operation of 
equipment by States, and 
the focus on technical 
coordination – similar to 
CEOS 
Creation of an int’l 
system of space-based 
search and rescue 
Yes, in uniting efforts of 41 States 
in non-commercial use of 
practical space applications 
ESA Organization Regional space organization 
premised on deep 
integration, using the 




cooperation among the 
European States in space 
research and technology 
and their space 
applications 
Yes, though unites not all 
European States. Selective 
‘sectoral’ approach to regionalism 




CIS Organization Not a regional organization, 
but an organization with 
limited membership, 
allowing only former Soviet 
republics. Space 
cooperation through 
committee that includes all 
members of organization 
Promotion of economic, 
military and all other 
types of cooperation. In 
space – coordination of 
usage of formerly united 
space complex 
No, neither in cooperation in 
general, nor in space. Space 
cooperation on bilateral level, no 
programs on CIS level. 
Bilateral Treaties Treaty Usage of framework 
treaties that are elaborated 
by project-specific 
implementing arrangements 
Creation of legal basis 
for further cooperation 
in separate projects 
Yes, in creating legal basis for 
intensifying space cooperation, 
allowing to commence specific 






Form of Cooperation Examples Necessary features Areas of Work 




 Code of Conduct for Outer 
Space Activities 
 Absent international legal 
personality 
 Intergovernmental working 
 Operativity and institutional 
effectiveness as evidence 
of existence 
 Independent financing of 
overseen projects 
 Individual ownership of 
used equipment 
 Legal flexibility 
 Focus on technical issues 
Oversight and coordination of 
activities in the area of space 
application on a continuous 
basis, focusing on technical 
matters 
Framework-contract-treaties  ISS Intergovernmental 
Agreement 
 Bilateral treaties 
 Bilateral or multilateral 
legally binding treaties 
 Provide a framework for 
cooperation, covering the 
elements that are deemed 
essential by the parties 
 Are expected to be used for 
an extended period either 
for multiple projects, or 
for an evolving project 




Bilateral or multilateral long-
term projects involving 
construction of complex space 
systems requiring continuous 
management 
Regional Space Organizations  European Space Agency  Membership limited to 
States with a proven 
interest in space projects 
Both research and space 
application projects, depending 
on the mandate of the 
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and space capacities 
 Maximization of the 
benefits of economy 
 Institutional structure with 
an emphasis on 
maximizing the benefits 
from specialization 
organization 
 
